Nedarim 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Shimi bar Abba raised an objection

from that which was taught in a beraita:

If the one who imposed the vow was

the

kohen, he may sprinkle upon him

[Can he sprinkle for the benefit of the one who is prohibited from deriving benefit]

the blood of his sin-offering and the blood of his guilt-offering!

And this proves that the kohanim are agents of Heaven! For if they are our agents, how can he sprinkle the blood for him? He is carrying out his agency!?

And we answer: There, it is referring to

the blood of the sin-offering of a leper and the blood of the guilt-offering of a leper, as it is written

concerning them:

“This shall be the law of the leper.”

And from this verse containing the term “law,” it is derived that one offers

both

the offering of a

grown person and that of

a

minor,

even though a minor has no awareness. It is evident that this offering does not require the owner’s awareness. Therefore, these offerings may be brought for one prohibited from deriving benefit, since, as his awareness is not required, the kohen is not carrying out his agency.

We learned in the Mishna: The kohanim who rendered offerings piggul in the Temple,

that is, who entertained an invalid intention concerning an offering—either to offer it outside the time designated for it or outside the place designated for its offering—if the kohanim were

intentional

in rendering it piggul, knowing that the offering would thereby be disqualified, they are

liable

to pay its value to the owners, since the owners must now bring another offering in its place .

This

is the case if they were

unintentional

—they are

exempt from payment,

but

nevertheless

their piggul is piggul,

and the offering is prohibited.

Now,

if it is reasonable

that the kohanim

are agents of Heaven, this explains why their piggul is piggul,

because the Torah made the kohanim its agents for offering the sacrifices in every circumstance, even when they rendered them piggul and did not offer them properly.

But if you say

that they

are our agents,

granted, when they intentionally rendered the offering piggul, they did not carry out the agency of the owner of the offering at all; rather, they acted on their own initiative. And we hold that a person can prohibit something that does not belong to him through an action, and therefore their piggul is piggul.

But when they rendered it piggul unintentionally,

why is their piggul piggul?

After all, the entire act of offering is performed as the agent of the owner of the offering, whereas with regard to the act involving the intention of piggul, the kohen is not the owner’s agent. If so,

let the owner say to him

the kohen:

“I appointed you as my agent

[I made you my agent] only

for

the purpose of

repairing

[correcting],

and not for corrupting

[and not for causing damage]! With regard to an act performed with an intention of piggul, you are not my agent, and your intention to render the offering piggul cannot damage and disqualify my offering.”

And we reject this:

They said: The matter of piggul is different

[the matter of piggul is exceptional],

as the verse says

in that context:

“It shall not be reckoned for him”—

in any event.

That is, this verse teaches that even in such a case, it is piggul.

As for the essential matter, Rav Yohanan said: Everyone requires awareness, except one lacking atonement. For a person brings an offering on behalf of his minor sons and daughters.

And we learn from this ruling of Rabbi Yohanan that one may derive what is possible from what is impossible. For the Torah speaks of minor sons, who cannot bring their offering themselves, and therefore their father brings their offering. Rabbi Yohanan, however, learns from here that all those lacking atonement do not require the awareness of the owner, even adults, who could bring the offering with their own awareness.

And we raise a difficulty:

If that is so,

that according to Rabbi Yohanan one derives what is possible from what is impossible,

a person should bring a sin-offering for violating the prohibition against forbidden fat

[A sin-offering is referred to generically as a “sin-offering for forbidden fat,” as this is the common sin-offering]

on behalf of another person,

without his knowledge, even though it could be brought with his knowledge,

since

we find that the Torah revealed, in a case where a sinner cannot bring a sin-offering for his transgression with his own awareness, that another person may bring it on his behalf, for the Torah said:

A person brings

an offering

on behalf of his mentally incapacitated wife,

who cannot bring her offering with her own awareness,

in accordance with

the words of

Rabbi

Yehuda,

and we should derive for every case that a person may bring a sin-offering on behalf of another, since one derives what is possible from what is impossible!?

Apparently, Rabbi Elazar said

that the law is not so:

If one designated a sin-offering for violating the prohibition against forbidden fat on behalf of another person—

he has done nothing!

And the reason is that one does not derive what is possible from what is impossible. It is specifically in the case of a mentally incapacitated wife that he may bring an offering, because she herself cannot bring one. But with regard to another person, that person can bring the offering himself!

And we say: Actually, in general one does derive what is possible from what is impossible. Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan learned that an offering may be brought on behalf of one lacking atonement without his awareness, despite the fact that it could be brought with his awareness, from the fact that one may bring an offering on behalf of his minor sons and daughters, who cannot bring an offering with their own awareness.

But when Rabbi Yehuda said that a person brings an offering on behalf of his wife, he must have been speaking of the sin-offering of a woman who has given birth, and not of a sin-offering for forbidden fat.

For

what are the circumstances of a mentally incapacitated wife,

such that he could bring a sin-offering for forbidden fat on her behalf?

If she ate

the forbidden fat

while she was mentally incapacitated,

then

she is not subject to an offering

at all, since one who is mentally incapacitated is not responsible for his actions!

And if she ate it while she was competent and then became mentally incapacitated

afterward,

Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan:

If

a person ate

forbidden fat

and designated an offering

for his transgression,

and

afterward

became mentally incapacitated, and

then

recovered

[became competent again], that offering is

disqualified,

because

since it was rejected

from being brought while he was mentally incapacitated,

it remains rejected

forever. Consequently, the case must necessarily concern the offering of a woman who has given birth, and the Torah did not reveal that a person may bring, without the owner’s awareness, a sin-offering brought for an accidental transgression.

And we ask:

If that is so,

according to your approach, that one derives what is possible from what is impossible, then

a person should bring

an offering,

a Paschal offering on behalf of another person,

even though the other person can bring it with his own awareness,

since a person brings

a Paschal offering

on behalf of his minor sons and daughters,

who cannot bring it with their own awareness!

Apparently, Rabbi Elazar said: If one designated a Paschal offering on behalf of another person—

he has done nothing,

because the other person must join him in his Paschal offering with his own awareness!

Rabbi Zeira said:

Actually, in such a case one does derive what is possible from what is impossible.

Nevertheless, one cannot infer from the fact that a person brings a Paschal offering on behalf of his minor sons and daughters that he can also bring one on behalf of another person, because the law of

“a lamb for each household” -

[required by Torah law] . By Torah law, minors do not need to be registered for the lamb together with the members of the group; rather, they may eat from it even though they were not registered for it.

Although a Paschal offering may be eaten only by those registered for it, this applies specifically to those fit to be registered. But with regard to minors, who are not fit for this, since they have no awareness, it is of no concern.

And if so, the reason a person brings a Paschal offering on behalf of his minor sons and daughters is that they do not need to be registered for the offering at all, and this is not comparable to bringing a Paschal offering on behalf of another person.

And from where

do we know that the law of “a lamb for each household” is not מן התורה?

From that which we learned in the Mishna: One who says to his sons: “I am

going up to Jerusalem, and “I am

slaughtering

there

the Paschal offering for whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem,”

once the first

of the sons has brought

his head and most of his body

into Jerusalem,

that son acquires

his portion

and grants his brothers a share with him

in the Paschal offering.

And if you say

that the law of

“a lamb for each household”

how is this law possible?

After all, when the son enters Jerusalem, the Paschal offering has already been slaughtered. If so,

with regard to its flesh

[the flesh of the slaughtered lamb]

is

the father

granting it to them

the sons and registering them for the Paschal offering? But it is written concerning the Paschal offering, “from the living lamb,” and it is derived: “while the lamb is alive”—one must be registered for the lamb while it is still alive!

Rather, it is necessarily the case that the law of “a lamb for each household” is not מן התורה, and in fact the sons do not need to be registered for the lamb.

And we inquire: If so, since that son was not actually registered with him by going first,

then why did they need

their father to say to them

this—that he would slaughter the Paschal offering for whichever of them went up first?

And we explain:

He said this in order to motivate them to perform the mitzva.

A beraita was taught likewise: There was an incident

in which the father said this to his children,

and the daughters preceded the sons,

entering Jerusalem first,

and the daughters were found to be diligent—

while the sons were lowly.

And from the fact that we learned, “the daughters were found to be diligent,” rather than “the daughters were found to acquire the offering,” it is implied that his intention was only to motivate them.

We learned in our Mishna:

And he contributes his terumot, and so on.