Nedarim 36a — the Talmud in English

Rav Shimi bar Abba raised an objection from

that which was taught:

if the

one who made the vow

is a kohen, he shall sprinkle upon him [could he sprinkle for the needs of the mudar]

the

blood of his sin-offering and the blood of his guilt-offering!

And it is proven that the priests are agents of Heaven! For if they are our agents, how can he sprinkle blood for him? He is carrying out his agency!?

And we answer: there it is referring to

the blood of the sin-offering of a leper and the blood of the guilt-offering of a leper, for it is written

concerning them:

“This shall be the law of the leper.” And from this verse of “the law” they derive that they offer

And from this verse, through the word “law,” the Sages derive that they sacrifice

both

the offering of a

an adult and

that of a

minor, even though a minor has no understanding. We see that this offering does not require the owner’s intent. Therefore he may offer these offerings for the mudar, since, as his intent is not required, he is not carrying out his agency.

even though a minor has no legal understanding. We see that this offering does not require the awareness of its owner. Therefore, these offerings may be sacrificed for one prohibited from receiving benefit, because since his awareness is not required, the priest is not carrying out his agency.

We learned: The priests who caused pigul in the Temple, that is, who entertained an invalidating intention concerning the offering—either to offer it beyond the time fixed for it or beyond the place of its offering—if the priests were

that is, they had an invalid intention concerning the offering: either to sacrifice it after the time prescribed for it, or outside the place prescribed for its sacrifice—if the priests were

intentional in causing pigul, knowing that the offering would thereby become invalid,

intending to render it piggul, knowing that the offering would thereby become invalid, they are

they are liable to pay their value to the owners, since they now have to bring another offering in its place .

to pay its value to the owners, since the owners must now bring another offering in its place .

But if they were

if they were

unintentional—

they are exempt from paying,

from payment,

except that

nevertheless

their pigul is pigul, and the offering is forbidden.

and the offering is prohibited.

And now,

if you say that the priests

to say that the priests

were agents of Heaven, this explains why their pigul is pigul, because the Torah made the priests its agents for offering the offerings in every respect, even when they caused pigul and did not offer them properly.

because the Torah made the priests its agents for the sacrifice of offerings in every circumstance, even when they rendered them piggul and did not sacrifice them properly.

But if you say that they

that the priests

were our agents, granted, when they caused pigul intentionally, they did not carry out the agency of the owner of the offering at all, but acted according to their own intention; and we hold that a person can prohibit something that is not his through an act, and therefore their pigul is pigul.

then, granted, when they intentionally rendered the offering piggul, they did not carry out the agency of the owner of the offering at all; rather, they acted on their own initiative. And we maintain that a person can prohibit something that does not belong to him through an action, and therefore their piggul is piggul.

But when they caused pigul unintentionally,

why is their pigul pigul? For the entire act of offering is performed as the agency of the owner of the offering, whereas with regard to the service involving the intention of pigul the priest is not the agent of the owner of the offering. If so,

After all, the entire sacrificial procedure is carried out as the agency of the owner of the offering, whereas with regard to the service involving an intention of piggul, the priest is not the owner’s agent. If so,

let the owner of the offering say to the priest:

the owner of the offering to the priest:

I made you an agent [I made you an agent] only

[I made you my agent] only

for

the purpose of

repairing [to repair],

[correcting the offering],

and not for distorting [and not for spoiling]! With regard to service involving a pigul intention, you are not my agent, and your intention to cause pigul cannot spoil and invalidate my offering.

[and not for ruining it]! With regard to service involving an intention of piggul, you are not my agent, and your intention to render the offering piggul cannot ruin or invalidate my offering.

And we reject this:

They said: The matter of pigul is different [the matter of pigul is different],

[the matter of piggul is different],

for the verse says

in that context:

“It shall not be reckoned for him”—

in any event. That is, they derive from this verse that even in such a case, it is pigul.

That is, this verse includes even such a case: the offering is nevertheless piggul.

Concerning the matter itself, Rav Yohanan said: Everyone requires intent, except for one lacking atonement. For a person brings an offering for his minor sons and daughters.

And we learn from this law of Rabbi Yohanan that one derives the possible from the impossible. For the Torah speaks of minor sons, who cannot bring their offering themselves, and therefore their father brings their offering; whereas Rabbi Yohanan learns from here that all those lacking atonement do not require the owner’s intent, even adults, who can bring the offering with their own intent.

And we ask:

but from now, according to Rabbi Yohanan, one derives the possible from the impossible,

according to Rav Yohanan, who derives a rule concerning one who is able to act from one who is unable to act,

a person should bring a sin-offering for forbidden fat [a regular sin-offering is called a “sin-offering for forbidden fat,” since this is the common sin-offering]

[a standard sin-offering is called “a sin-offering for eating forbidden fat,” as this is the common case]

for his fellow, without his intent, even though he can bring it with his own intent,

without his awareness, even though it could be brought with his awareness.

since we find that the Torah revealed, in a case in which a sinner cannot bring a sin-offering for his sin with his own intent, that another person may bring it for him, for the Torah said:

we find that the Torah revealed that when a sinner cannot bring an offering for his sin with his own awareness, someone else may bring it for him, as the Torah said:

a person brings an

offering

for his foolish wife, who cannot bring her offering with her own intent,

who cannot bring her offering with her own awareness,

as

the words of

Rabbi

Judah, and we should derive for every case that a person may bring a sin-offering for his fellow, because one derives the possible from the impossible!

and we should learn from this for every case that a person may bring a sin-offering on behalf of another, since one may derive a rule concerning one who is able to act from one who is unable to act!

But Rabbi Elazar said that the law is not so:

that the law is not so:

if one set aside a sin-offering for forbidden fat for his fellow—

he did nothing!

And this is because one does not derive the possible from the impossible. Specifically, with regard to his foolish wife he brings an offering because she herself cannot bring it. But with regard to his fellow, his fellow can bring it himself!

And we say: Actually, in general one derives the possible from the impossible, and therefore Rabbi Yohanan learned that an offering may be brought for one lacking atonement without his intent, although it can be brought with his intent, from the fact that one may bring an offering for his minor sons and daughters, who cannot bring an offering with their own intent.

But with regard to what Rabbi Judah said, that a person brings an offering for his wife, he necessarily spoke of the sin-offering of a woman after childbirth, and not of a sin-offering for forbidden fat.

For

his foolish wife—what are the circumstances?

How is it possible that he brings for her a sin-offering for forbidden fat?

If she ate

the forbidden fat

while she was foolish,

then

she is not subject to an offering at all, since a foolish person is not responsible for his actions!

at all, since a mentally incapacitated person is not responsible for his actions!

And if she ate it while she was competent, and then became foolish,

afterward,

Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said: if

If

a person ate

a person

forbidden fat and set aside an offering

for his sin,

and

afterward

he became foolish, and

again

he recovered [became competent]—then that offering is

[became competent again], that offering is

invalid, because

because

since it was rejected

the offering from being brought while he was foolish,

it remains rejected forever. Necessarily, the reference is to the offering of a woman after childbirth, and the Torah did not reveal that a person brings for his fellow, without his intent, a sin-offering that comes for an inadvertent sin.

forever. It is therefore necessarily referring to the sin-offering of a woman who has given birth; the Torah did not reveal that a person may bring for another without his awareness a sin-offering brought for an unwitting sin.

And we challenge:

but from now, according to your method, that one derives the possible from the impossible, if so,

according to your approach, that one derives a rule concerning one who is able to act from one who is unable to act, then

a person should bring an

offering

of Passover for his fellow, even though his fellow can bring it with his own intent,

even though the other person can bring it with his own awareness,

since a person brings a Passover offering

for

his minor sons and daughters, who cannot bring it with their own intent!

who cannot bring it with their own awareness!

But Rabbi Elazar said: If one set aside a Passover offering for his fellow—

he did nothing, because he must enroll with him for his Passover offering with his own intent!

because the other person must register with him for his Paschal offering of his own accord!

Rabbi Zeira said: Actually, in such a case one derives the possible from the impossible.

Actually, in a case like this one does derive a rule concerning one who is able to act from one who is unable to act.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to learn from the fact that he brings a Passover offering for his minor sons and daughters that he can also bring one for his fellow, because the law of

“a lamb for each household” \-

is not from the Torah

it . For according to Torah law, minors do not need to be enrolled on the lamb together with the members of the group; rather, they eat from it even though they were not enrolled upon it.

For although a Passover offering may be eaten only by those enrolled upon it, this applies specifically to those fit to be enrolled. But with regard to minors who are not of this category, since they have no understanding, we have no concern.

And if so, the reason a person brings a Passover offering for his minor sons and daughters is that they do not need to be enrolled on the Passover offering at all, and this is not similar to offering a Passover offering for his fellow.

And from where?

From where do we know that the law of “a lamb for each household” is not from the Torah?

From what we learned: One who says to his sons: I am

going up to Jerusalem, and I am

slaughtering

there

the Passover offering for whoever among you goes up first to Jerusalem,

once the first one has brought

the sons’

head and the greater part of his body

into Jerusalem—

that son acquired

that son

his share, and acquires his brothers’ shares together with him

in the Passover offering.

And if you say that the law of

that the law of

“a lamb for each household” is

from the Torah,

it is so, how is this law possible?

For when the son entered Jerusalem, the Passover offering had already been slaughtered, and if so,

he is standing over its flesh [over the flesh of the slaughtered lamb]

[of the slaughtered lamb]

stands

the father—

and acquires it for them

for the sons and enrolls them on the Passover offering?! But it is written concerning the Passover offering, “from the being of the lamb,” and they derive: “from the life of the lamb,” that one must be enrolled on the lamb while it is still alive!

Rather, it necessarily follows that the law of “a lamb for each household” is not from the Torah, and in truth the sons do not need to be enrolled on the lamb.

And we consider this: if so, since in truth that son was not enrolled with him by going ahead,

then why did they need

their father to say to them

this, that he would slaughter the Passover offering for whoever went up first?

And we explain:

He said this in order to encourage them in the mitzvot.

It was likewise taught: An incident occurred

in which the father said this to his children,

and the daughters preceded the sons,

and entered Jerusalem first,

and the daughters were found to be diligent—

and the sons lowly.

And from the fact that we learned “the daughters were found to be diligent,” and did not learn “the daughters were found to acquire,” it follows that he intended only to encourage them.

We learned in our Mishna:

And he separates his tithes, etc.