Nedarim 36b (לו:) — the Talmud in English

It was raised as a question before them:

one who separates teruma from produce

of his own

for

his produce

belonging to another,

does he

require his awareness

that is, must the other person know that he is separating teruma on his behalf,

or not?

And the sides of the question are:

Do we say that, since

what he separates for the other

is a benefit for him

the other person,

he does not require his awareness,

since one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence, and the one who does so is considered his agent,

or perhaps,

the giving of teruma

is his mitzva,

that of the owner of the produce,

and he prefers to perform it

himself, rather than have another perform it on his behalf.

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

He separates his terumot and tithes with his awareness.

What are we dealing with here?

If you say

that he separates

from

the produce of

the owner of the heap -

for that of the owner of the heap,

and with whose awareness [

whose awareness did he separate?]

If you say

that he separated

with his own awareness,

that of the one who imposed the vow,

who made him [

who made him]

an agent

for this person?! After all, they expound from the verse: “So shall you also raise,” meaning: Just as you always separate with your own awareness, so too your agent must separate with your awareness!

Rather,

he separated from the produce of the owner of the heap for that of the owner of the heap, and did so

with the awareness of the owner of the heap; he has thereby benefited him, since he performs his agency!

For whenever a person performs another’s agency, he benefits him!

Rather,

we must say that he separated teruma

from

produce

of his own

for that of the owner of the heap.

And with whose awareness?

If you say, with the awareness of the owner of the heap, he has thereby benefited him,

since he performed his agency!

Rather, is it not the case that he separated

with his own awareness,

and from his own produce he separates for that of another .

And if you say

that one who separates from his own produce for that of another

requires his awareness, he has thereby benefited him

by performing his agency!

Rather, is it not

that awareness is not required!

And let us resolve from here that one may separate from his own produce for that of another even without his awareness.

We reject this:

Actually,

we are dealing with a case where he separated

from

the produce

of the owner of the heap

for

that

of the owner of the heap.

And

as Rava said

below, with regard to Rabbi Yirmeya’s question:

When he says, “Let anyone who wishes separate teruma

come and separate,” so too here

we are dealing with a case where he

says, etc.

With regard to teruma, it is sufficient that he revealed his consent that anyone who wishes may separate it, and the teruma takes effect. With regard to a vow, however, this is not considered performing his agency, and therefore he has not benefited him in this respect.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: One who separates from his own produce for that of another, the right of disposition,

that is, the small amount that an Israelite may give him so that he will give the teruma to his daughter’s son who is a priest,

whose is it,

who is entitled to this payment?

And the sides of the question are:

Do we say: If not for the produce of that person,

were it not for the produce of the one who separated the teruma,

who would have had the heap of that person rectified [

would the owner’s heap have been rectified]?!

Or perhaps: If not for the heap of that person,

that of the owner of the heap,

the produce of this one would not have become [

the produce of the one who separated it would not have become]

teruma!

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

The verse says: “All the produce of your seed

and you shall give.”

This indicates that Scripture made the giving dependent on the owner of the seed, namely, the owner of the heap.

He raised an objection to him

from our Mishna:

The one who imposed the vow separates

his

terumot and tithes with his awareness [

The Gemara now assumes that the one who imposed the vow separates from his own produce].

And if you say

that

the right of disposition belongs to the owner of the heap,

then

he has thereby benefited him,

since the person prohibited by the vow can now give the teruma to whomever he wishes and receive payment for this right of disposition!

Rather, conclude from it that the right of disposition belongs to him [

the one who separated it]!

They said: No.

Our Mishna is dealing with a case where he separates

from the produce of the owner of the heap for that of the owner of the heap, and with the awareness of the owner of the heap, saying: “Let anyone who wishes separate teruma

come and separate.”

In such a case, certainly the right of disposition belongs to the owner of the heap.

Come and hear, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One who consecrates

an animal for another’s offering, and it develops a blemish and he now wishes to redeem it, since it is no longer fit as an offering, the law is that the one who consecrated it is the one who

adds a fifth

when redeeming it [for the law is that only the owners add a fifth when redeeming their consecrated property, as it is written: “And if the one who consecrated it redeems it, etc.”].

But if another person wishes to redeem it, he need not add a fifth.

And

with regard to substitution, where the law is that if the owner substitutes the animal with another, the sanctity is transferred to the second animal as well, only the

one who effects atonement

is considered the owner for this purpose, and he is the one who

performs substitution.

And one who separates from his own produce for that which is not his—

the right of disposition is his [

that of the one who separated it] .

We learned in our Mishna:

He teaches him Midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Scripture.

And we ask:

What is the reason that he may not teach him Scripture

because he thereby benefits him,

the one who imposed the vow, by not taking payment from him for the instruction!

If so, when he teaches him

Midrash as well he benefits him

for that very reason; why is he permitted to teach him Midrash?!

Shmuel said:

In fact, as a matter of law, one may take payment only for teaching Scripture, but not for teaching Midrash, as the reason will be explained below. However, there are places where people adopted the stringency of not taking payment even for Scripture, and in those places he may indeed teach him even Scripture. But our Mishna is speaking

of a place where they take payment for

teaching

Scripture, and they do not take payment for

teaching

Midrash.

Therefore, he may teach him specifically Midrash, but not Scripture.

And we ask:

What is the basis for this distinction?

Why did the tanna establish his statement specifically in a case where payment is taken only for Scripture and not for Midrash?! He should have stated the fundamental rule: He may teach him only something for which payment is not taken!