Nedarim 36b — the Talmud in English

It was asked of them:

one who separates teruma from produce

belonging to him

for

his produce

belonging to his fellow,

whether

he requires his fellow’s consent,

that his fellow know that he is separating teruma on his behalf,

or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say: since

what he separates for his fellow

is a benefit for him,

for his fellow—

he does not require consent,

for one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence, and he is therefore like his agent,

or perhaps,

the giving of teruma

is his mitzva,

that of the owner of the produce,

and it is preferable to him to perform it

himself, and not that another perform it on his behalf.

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

He separates his terumot and his tithes with his consent.

With what are we dealing?

If you say

that he separates

from

the produce of

the owner of the heap -

for that of the owner of the heap,

and with whose consent [לדעתו של מי] הפריש]did he separate?

did he make the separation—that is, with whose consent?

If you say

that he separated

with his own consent,

that of the one who imposed the prohibition,

who made him [מי עשאו]who made him

who made him

an agent

for this one?! For we expound from the verse: “So you shall also separate,” just as you always separate with your consent, so too your agent must separate with your consent!

Rather,

that he separated from the owner of the heap’s produce for that of the owner of the heap, and did this

with the consent of the owner of the heap—he benefits him, since he is performing his agency!

For whenever a person performs his fellow’s agency, he benefits him!

Rather,

it must be said that we are dealing with a case in which he separated teruma

from

produce

belonging to him—

for that of the owner of the heap.

And with whose consent?

If you say, with the consent of the owner of the heap, he benefits him,

for he performed his agency!

Rather, is it not—

that we are dealing with a case in which he separated

with his own consent, and from his own he separates for that of his fellow .

And if you say

that one who separates from his own for that of his fellow

requires consent, he benefits him

by this, that he performed his agency!

Rather, is it not—

he does not require consent!

And let us resolve from here that one may separate from his own for that of his fellow even without his knowledge.

And we reject this:

Actually,

we are dealing with a case in which he separated

from

his produce

of the owner of the heap—

for

that

of the owner of the heap.

And

as Rava said

below, concerning Rabbi Jeremiah’s question:

when he says: “Anyone who wishes to separate teruma—

let him come and separate,” here too

we are dealing

with one who says, etc.

For regarding teruma, it is enough that he revealed his consent that whoever wishes may separate, and the teruma takes effect. But with regard to a vow, this is not called performing his agency—and he benefits him through this .

Rabbi Jeremiah asked Rabbi Zeira: One who separates from his own for that of his fellow—the benefit of disposition,

that is, what an Israelite will give him a small amount so that he give the teruma to his daughter’s son who is a koen ,

whose is it,

who is entitled to this gift?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say: if not for that person’s produce,

were it not for the produce of the one who separates,

who would rectify that person’s heap [האם היה נתקן הכרי של בעל הפירות]would the owner of the produce’s heap have been rectified?!

would the owner’s pile have been rectified?

or perhaps, if not for that person’s heap,

that of the owner of the heap,

this person’s produce would not have become [לא היו פירותיו של התורם]the produce of the one who separates

the one making the separation’s produce would not have become

teruma!

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

The verse says: “All the produce of your seed—

and you shall give.”

It follows that Scripture made the giving dependent upon the owner of the seed, namely, the owner of the heap.

He raised an objection to him

from our Mishna:

The one who imposed the prohibition separates

the one who imposed the prohibition

his terumot and his tithes with his consent [וסוברת עתה הגמרא שמדובר שתורם המדיר מפירותיו שלו]and the Gemara now assumes that it is dealing with the one who imposed the prohibition separating from his own produce.

[and the Gemara currently understands that the one who imposed the vow separates from his own produce].

And if you say

that

the benefit of disposition belongs to the owner of the heap

it is,

he benefits him

the one who imposed the prohibition, through the fact that the one prohibited by the vow can now give the teruma to whomever he wishes and receive money for this benefit of disposition!

Rather, conclude from this: the benefit of disposition belongs to him [של התורם]that of the one who separates!

the one making the separation!

They said: No.

In our Mishna, we are dealing with one who separates

from the owner of the heap’s produce for that of the owner of the heap, with the consent of the owner of the heap, when he says: “Anyone who wishes to separate teruma—

let him come and separate.”

And in such a case, certainly the benefit of disposition belongs to the owner of the heap.

Come and hear, for Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One who consecrates

an animal for his fellow’s offering, and a blemish occurred in it, and he now wishes to redeem it, since it is no longer fit as an offering—the law is that the one who consecrated it is the one who

adds a fifth

when he redeems it [for the law is that only the owners add a fifth when they redeem their consecrated property, as it is written: “And if the one who consecrated it redeems it, etc.”'].

But if his fellow wishes to redeem it, he need not add a fifth.

And

And with regard to substitution, where the law is that if the owner substitutes the animal for another, the sanctity is also transferred to the second animal, only the

one who obtains atonement

is considered the owner for this purpose, and he is the one who

makes a substitution.

And one who separates from his own for that which is not his—

the benefit of disposition is his [של התורם]that of the one who separates .

the one making the separation .

We learned in our Mishna:

He teaches him Midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Scripture.

And we wonder:

Why may he not teach him Scripture—

because he benefits him

the one who imposed the prohibition, through this, that he does not take payment from him for the teaching!

If so, when he teaches him

Midrash too he benefits him

for the very same reason, and why is he permitted to teach him Midrash?!

Samuel said:

In truth, by law it is permitted to take payment only for Scripture, and not for Midrash, as the reason will be explained below. However, there are places where they were stringent upon themselves not to take payment even for Scripture, and in those places it is indeed permitted to teach him even Scripture. But our Mishna speaks

of a place where they take payment for

the teaching of

Scripture, and do not take payment for

the teaching of

Midrash.

And therefore he is permitted to teach him specifically Midrash and not Scripture.

And we wonder:

What is the basis for this determination?

Why did the tanna formulate his words specifically in such a case, where they take payment only for Scripture and not for Midrash?! Surely he should have stated a fundamental law, that he is permitted to teach him only something for which payment is not taken!