Nedarim 35a (לה.) — the Talmud in English

He raised an objection

Rav Hiyya bar Avin to Rava from that which is taught in a beraita:

He said to him

one person to another:

Lend me your cow

this one lying before us, which is acquired by you!

And his fellow wished to excuse himself, saying that he could not lend it to him, and said to him:

Konam

upon you

the cow

this one,

which I own for you [if I have acquired another cow besides this one]!

Or he said to him:

My property

is forbidden

to you, if I have

any cow other than this one!

And likewise if he said to him:

Lend me your ax!

And

he said to him: Konam—the ax that I have, which I own!

That is, he forbids himself from deriving benefit from this ax if he has acquired an additional ax. He does so in order to prove to his fellow that he is not lending him the ax merely because he needs his only ax for his own use.

Or he said to him:

My property is forbidden to you if I have any ax other than this one!

And

in the end

it was found that he has

another cow, or that he has another ax,

then the law is as follows:

During the lifetime

of the owner of the cow and ax,

it is forbidden

to his fellow to use them.

But if

he died

their owner,

or he gave it to him as a gift—

it is permitted.

And it is thereby demonstrated that when the one who imposed the vow gives the item as a gift to the one prohibited by the vow, the matter becomes permitted, since it is no longer considered to belong to the one who imposed the vow!

And this is difficult for Rava, who forbids a gift of konam, since by transferring it from one domain to another, one violates the prohibition of konam, just as with consecrated property, which may not be transferred from one domain to another even when one does not derive benefit from it.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

There is no proof from here concerning our matter, because it can be said that here the case is

that it was given to him by another.

That is, the one who imposed the vow gave it to another person, and that person gave it to the one prohibited by the vow. In such a case it is certainly permitted, since the one prohibited by the vow did not derive benefit from the one who imposed the vow, but from another person.

Rav Ashi said:

The wording of the beraita

is also precise

in accordance with the statement of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika.

As it teaches

the wording

“that he gave it to him” [the first nun is vocalized with a hiriq. This was the received reading, although there is no distinction in the writing],

the first nun is pronounced with a hirik vowel. This was the received reading, although there is no difference in the written form],

and it does not teach, “that he gave it to him” [with a sheva beneath the nun]. This indicates that it was given to him by another person .

with a sheva vowel beneath the nun]. This indicates that it was given to him by someone else.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

Is there

a

law of

me'ila with regard to konamot ,

or not?

That is, does the konam make the item for him like a sacrifice, so that if he derives benefit from it, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for me'ila, as one who derives benefit from consecrated property , or not?

He said to him: You have learned it

in our Mishna:

Where they take

[for returning the lost object]

a fee—

the benefit shall go to consecrated property.

And from the fact that the tanna stated that the benefit shall go to consecrated property, rather than saying, as he generally does in such cases involving forbidden benefit, “He shall take the benefit to the Dead Sea” it follows

to say—

that it is like consecrated property.

That is, konam is similar to consecrated property.

Just as consecrated property—

there is me'ila with regard to it, so too with regard to konamot—

there is me'ila with regard to them .

And we say that this question, whether me'ila applies to konamot or not,

is

a dispute

among tannaim

.

For so we learned in a beraita: If a person said,

“This loaf is konam,

so that the loaf should be forbidden to everyone like

consecrated property,” and he ate it

afterward,

whether

he ate it

himself, or whether

he ate it

his fellow—

he has committed me'ila,

because me'ila applies to konamot, and he forbade the loaf through konam to everyone.

And

therefore,

since this loaf is subject to the law of me'ila,

it has

also the law of

redemption. If he redeemed the konam with money, that money is likewise caught by the prohibition. [See the introductory notes to the sugya].

If he redeemed the object prohibited by the vow with money, that money also becomes subject to the prohibition. [See the introductory notes to the discussion.]

But if he said:

“This loaf is consecrated property to me,” and

afterward

he ate it,

then, if

he

himself

ate it,

since he had forbidden it to himself through konam.

But if

his fellow

ate it, he has not committed me'ila,

since he did not forbid it to him at all.

And since the loaf is not forbidden to everyone, the “sanctity of the konam” is not sufficiently strong, and

therefore it does not have

the law of redemption

for the “sanctity of the konam” .

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: In either case,

whether it is a general konam, which he forbade to everyone, or a private konam, which he forbade only to himself,

he has not committed me'ila, because there is no

law of

me'ila with regard to konamot

at all.

And it is thereby demonstrated that the tannaim disputed this matter, whether me'ila applies to konamot or not .

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi:

According to Rabbi Meir, who holds that there is a law of me'ila with regard to sacrifices, if one said to his fellow,

“My loaf is forbidden to you,” and he gave it to him

to his fellow

as a gift,

so that through this a me'ila violation was committed, just as with consecrated property: One who took a stone or beam of consecrated property for his own use committed me'ila by acquiring it, even though he had not yet used it. Here too, since it left the domain of the one who forbade it and entered the domain of the recipient, me'ila was committed.

Who committed me'ila

through this gift?

Should the giver commit me'ila?!

It is impossible to say so, for

it was not forbidden to him,

so why should it be considered me'ila for him?

Should the recipient commit me'ila?

But

he can

say:

say: I wanted something permitted—

that is what I wanted,

I wanted to receive something permitted, but

something forbidden—

I did not want!

Had I known that the loaf was forbidden, I would not have accepted it. If so, this is an acquisition made in error, which is not considered an acquisition!

He said to him

Rav Ashi: Indeed, for the reasons you stated, neither of them commits me'ila at this point.

But

the recipient commits me'ila—

when he takes it out

[that is, when he uses the loaf].

Because

anyone who takes consecrated funds out into non-sacred use,

even if

when

he took them out he was

under the impression

that the money was

non-sacred—

he

commits me'ila,

therefore

this one too,

the one prohibited by the vow, when he uses the loaf, although he did not intend to use something forbidden,

commits me'ila.