Nedarim 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

All appellations of vows are equivalent to vows,

and חרמים are equivalent to חרמים, oaths are equivalent to oaths, and nazirite vows are equivalent to nazirite vows.

And we raised a question about this:

What is different

—why is it different that

with regard to a nazirite vow,

at the beginning of tractate Nazir, where we also learned: “All appellations of nazirite vows are equivalent to nazirite vows,”

the tanna did not teach all of them.

There, in addition to the appellations of nazirite vows, the tanna did not also teach that appellations of vows are equivalent to vows, appellations of חרמים are equivalent to חרמים, and appellations of oaths are equivalent to oaths.

And what is different

here,

with regard to vows, that he taught them all?

And we answer:

Because vows and oaths are written adjacent to one another,

as they are written together in the passage concerning the tribal heads: “When a person makes a vow or swears an oath”; therefore

he taught

here

two,

the tanna taught both of them together: both that appellations of vows are equivalent to vows and that appellations of oaths are equivalent to oaths.

And since he taught two,

and since the tanna had already taught two matters in which an appellation is equivalent to the actual expression,

he taught,

the tanna had already taught

all of them,

all four matters in which an appellation is equivalent to the actual expression. But a nazirite vow is an independent type of vow; therefore, in tractate Nazir the tanna did not teach them all.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty: Since you said that the tanna taught the appellations of oaths together with the appellations of vows because they are written together in the verse, then one should object:

And let him teach “

appellation

s of

oaths

are equivalent to oaths”

after

“all appellations of

vows

are equivalent to vows,” immediately afterward; and why did the tanna interrupt between them and teach the appellations of חרמים after the appellations of vows!?

And we answer:

Since

the tanna taught vows,

in which the object is rendered forbidden to him,

since the essence of a vow is the imposition of the vow’s prohibition upon the object, and by virtue of the object-prohibition a person is forbidden to violate his vow,

he also taught חרמים, in which the object is rendered forbidden to him,

because one who declares an object to be cherem imposes upon it an object-prohibition of cherem, and by virtue of the object-prohibition of “cherem” that takes effect upon the object, a person is forbidden to violate the prohibition of cherem.

That is, the tanna placed these two object-prohibitions next to one another—

To exclude,

to exclude from this category

an oath,

for it is not the object that is prohibited through an oath; rather, it is the person who

prohibits himself from the object.

Ritva, at the beginning of the second chapter, explains that all Torah prohibitions are prohibitions applying to the person, because even in the case of forbidden foods, it is not the object that is forbidden to be eaten; rather, the person is forbidden to eat it. In light of this, Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains that vows are also, in this respect, “prohibitions applying to the person,” since it is the person who is forbidden to violate his vow. The entire distinction that the Gemara makes here between vows, which are a prohibition applying to the object, and oaths, which are a prohibition applying to the person, concerns the reason that causes the prohibition against violating the vow. In other prohibitions, including forbidden foods, the reason for the prohibition is that the Torah wants the person not to perform the act or eat the forbidden food, so that the person himself will not be harmed by eating it; it is not concerned that the object or food itself be harmed. In the case of a vow, however, the reason for the prohibition is that the Torah wants the legal status of the vow’s prohibition resting upon the object not to be violated, since an object subject to a vow has a legal status of prohibition like an offering or consecrated property. This is like consecrated property itself, which is also a prohibition applying to the object, since the reason the Torah forbids a person to benefit from consecrated property is that it wants the consecrated object not to be profaned or harmed. In this way Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains the statement of the Nimukei Yosef below, in the second chapter, which answers the early authorities’ question: Why does a vow take effect with regard to a mitzva, such as when one vows not to benefit from dwelling in a sukka, so that he cannot fulfill the mitzva of dwelling in a sukka because of his vow? Should not the positive commandment of dwelling in a sukka override the prohibition of the vow? The Nimukei Yosef answers that the prohibition of a vow applies to the object, and therefore it is not overridden by the mitzva of sukka, which is an obligation upon the person. At first glance, this answer is difficult: Why should the positive commandment of dwelling in a sukka not override the prohibition, so that there would no longer be any prohibition applying to the object? But if we say that the prohibition applying to the object in the case of a vow means that one may not violate the legal status of prohibition resting upon the object, analogous to consecrated property, whose sanctity the Torah forbids one to profane, then even if the mitzva were to override the prohibition, the legal status of prohibition would still remain upon the object. This is analogous to consecrated property: even if the positive commandment were to override the prohibition concerning consecrated property, the object would remain in its state of sanctity, and fulfillment of the positive commandment would harm its sanctity. In such a case, where the legal status of prohibition or sanctity would be harmed even if the mitzva were to override the prohibition, a positive commandment does not override a prohibition! The wording of the Rosh here supports this definition, since he explained why the prohibition of a vow applies to the object: “The prohibition of a vow is that he associates it with an object subject to a vow and it becomes prohibited like it.”

That is, when a person swears not to eat an object, he does not prohibit the object to himself; rather, he prohibits himself from eating the object. This prohibition is considered a “prohibition upon the person,” in contrast to the prohibition of a vow, which is considered an “object-prohibition.”

To indicate this fundamental difference between a vow and an oath, the tanna taught the law of חרמים immediately adjacent to the law of vows, to show that both are object-prohibitions, whereas he taught the law of oaths, which is a prohibition upon the person, afterward. The Gemara now explains the tanna’s arrangement in the Mishna:

And we raised a question about this:

The tanna began

with

appellations,

as he said, “

All appellations of vows

are equivalent to vows,” but the tanna did not explain what the appellations are;

and

instead he

explains

the matter of

incomplete formulations: “

One who says to his fellow, ‘I am prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from you’”!?

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty: Did the tanna forget to mention the rule that “all

incomplete formulations

of vows are equivalent to vows,”

and

instead immediately proceeded to explain what the language of incomplete formulations is, without first stating the rule that incomplete formulations are equivalent to vows!?

The Gemara first answers the second question:

Incomplete formulations—

he is dealing with them,

indeed the tanna is dealing with them and states the rule that incomplete formulations of vows are equivalent to vows.

The Mishna is deficient,

in our Mishna,

and this is what the tanna teaches

in it:

A.

All appellations of vows—

are equivalent to vows.

B.

And incomplete formulations of vows—

are equivalent to vows.

But the first question still remains:

And let him explain,

let the tanna explain what

the appellations are at the outset,

first, before explaining the law of incomplete formulations. Since the tanna began his words with the law of appellations, he ought to explain them before explaining the law of incomplete formulations!

And we answer:

That

matter

from which he concluded,

the tanna concluded with the matter of incomplete formulations [after correcting the wording of the Mishna, so that it reads: “All appellations of vows are equivalent to vows, and incomplete formulations of vows are equivalent to vows”]—

that

matter

the tanna explains

the tanna

at the outset!

For it is the tanna’s practice to explain first the matter he mentioned at the end of his words, before explaining the beginning of his words.

For

example, this is

what we learned

in tractate Shabbat [20b]:

With what may one kindle

the Shabbat lights,

and with what may one not kindle them?

The tanna proceeds to explain the end of his words first:

One may not kindle,

and so on.

and so on.

Similarly, we learned there [47b]:

With what may one insulate

on Shabbat,

and with what may one not insulate?

When the tanna comes to explain his words, he begins by explaining the end of his words:

One may not insulate,

and so on.

and so on.

And likewise we learned there [57a]:

With what may a woman go out, and with what may she not go out?—

A woman may not go out.

The Gemara challenges this:

And

is this indeed the tanna’s practice—that

whenever he began

his words with one matter and concluded them with an additional matter,

he does not explain

the tanna

at the outset

the opening of his words, but instead precedes it with an explanation of the end of his words?

But we learned

in tractate Bava Batra [108a]:

There are heirs who inherit and bequeath,

and there are

heirs who inherit but do not bequeath.

The tanna explains the opening of his words first:

And who are those who inherit and bequeath!?

And likewise we learned in tractate Yevamot [84a]:

There are

women who are

permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yevamim.

And there are women who are

permitted to their yevamim but forbidden to their husbands.

The tanna begins by explaining the opening of his words:

And who are those permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their yevamim?

And similarly we learned in tractate Menahot 59a]:

There are

meal-offerings that are

required to contain oil and frankincense,

and there are those that are required to contain

oil but not frankincense.

The tanna explains the opening of his words:

And which are those required to contain oil and frankincense!?

And likewise we learned there [60a]:

There are

meal-offerings

that require presentation

at the corner of the altar,

but do not require waving,

and there are meal-offerings that require

waving but not presentation.

And which are those that require presentation!?

And likewise we learned in tractate Bekhorot [46a]:

There is a firstborn

with regard to inheritance but not a firstborn with regard to the kohen,

for example, when he is his father’s firstborn but not his mother’s firstborn. With regard to inheritance it is stated, “for he is the first fruit of his vigor,” whereas with regard to the redemption of the firstborn son it is stated, “the opener of the womb,” meaning that he opened [emerged through] his mother’s womb for the first time at birth.

And there is

a firstborn with regard to the kohen but not a firstborn with regard to inheritance,

when he is his mother’s firstborn but not his father’s.

And which is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but not a firstborn with regard to the kohen?

And we answer:

These

Mishnayot in which the tanna explains the opening clause first do so

because the latter clause is more extensive for him,

as it contains more details than the opening clause [or as it contains many matters]. Therefore, in these cases,

the tanna explains

first

that

matter

with which he began

in

the opening clause.

And we refute this:

But

in the Mishna “

With what may an animal go out and with what may it not go out,”

which is not extensive,

as there are not many matters in the latter clause,

and

nevertheless the tanna first explains his words in the opening clause, as

it teaches: A camel goes out!

Therefore, the Gemara answers in a different manner: