Nedarim 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Introduction There are four areas in which a person can prohibit something to himself through speech: by a vow, by an oath, by a herem, and by nazirite vows. This is apart from cases in which a person confers sanctity upon an object, such as hekdesh or the separation of teruma, in which his speech causes sanctity to take effect upon the object; once the sanctity takes effect, he is obligated to treat the object in accordance with what the Torah requires. A vow is divided into two principal types: The first is a vow through which a person prohibits a particular object to himself or to another. The second is a vow through which a person obligates himself to perform a mitzva. However, a person cannot obligate himself through a vow to perform an act that is not a mitzva, since the essence of a vow is imposing a prohibition upon an object, not undertaking an obligation to perform an act. This is apart from a vow concerning a mitzva, which is learned from other verses, through which a person can obligate himself to perform a mitzva—for example, one who obligates himself to give charity, to bring an offering, or to study upon rising early in the morning. Mishna:

Our Mishna explains two innovations concerning the formulations by which a person prohibits something to himself.

The first is a formulation expressed as a “substitute,” in which he does not state the vow or oath in its usual wording, but instead uses another expression [which is either a linguistic distortion or a special formulation that the Sages instituted for those who take vows].

The second is a formulation expressed as a “handle,” in which he states only part of the wording of the vow or oath.

A. Substitutes for vows:

All substitutes for vows -

their status is

like vows.

One who takes a vow but does not use the explicit formulation of a vow-prohibition, instead employing an expression that is a “substitute,” has effected a vow, as will be explained:

One who says in his vow, “This object is forbidden to me like an offering,” has expressed an explicit vow.

But if he says, “This object is forbidden to me like a konam,” or if he says, “Konam to me is this object,” he has expressed himself by means of a substitute, since konam is a substitute for an offering.

And

all substitutes for

herem -

their status is

like herem.

For example, if a person says, “This object is harakh,” it is a substitute for herem, and the herem takes effect.

And

all substitutes for

oaths -

like oaths.

For example, if a person says, “Shevuta that I will perform such-and-such an act,” this is a substitute for an oath, and his oath takes effect.

And

all substitutes for

nazirite vows -

like nazirite vows.

For example, if one says, “I am a nazik,” which is a substitute for a nazirite, the status of a nazirite takes effect upon him.

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagree in the Gemara as to whether the substitutes are expressions used by foreign peoples, and are corruptions of the Holy Tongue, or whether they are expressions that the Sages instituted for one who takes a vow. Since people were accustomed to say, “For God, an offering,” the Sages were concerned that they might retract after uttering the Name of God and fail to consecrate the animal as an offering, thereby uttering the Name of Heaven in vain. Therefore, the Sages instituted that those taking vows should say konam instead of “offering,” so that they would not be accustomed to join the Name of God to this expression'.

B. Handles of vows

One who utters a partial statement of a vow whose meaning indicates a prohibition [and such a statement is called a “handle” of a vow, analogous to the handle of a utensil: whoever grasps the handle of a utensil is considered as though he were grasping the utensil itself] has effected his vow, since “the handles of vows” are like the vows themselves. For example:

One who says to his fellow “

I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you,”

without stating a complete declaration, “I hereby prohibit myself from eating your food,” or “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you like an offering,” but only the partial statement, “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you,” whose meaning is, “I am forbidden to eat your food.” However, this is not a complete statement of a vow. Or one who says to his fellow

“I am separated from you by vow,”

without stating a complete declaration of prohibition, “It is forbidden to me to eat your food".

Or one who says to his fellow

“I am distanced from you by vow.”

In all three of these statements, if he adds:

“that I eat from you” [

that is, for example, if he said, “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you, that I eat from you,”],

or if he adds

“that I taste from you”—

he is forbidden

to eat or taste from him because of the vow, as though he had explicitly said that it is forbidden for him to eat from him. But if he merely said, “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you,” this is not even a “handle” of a vow, and he is not forbidden to derive benefit from him.

One who says to his fellow

“I am excommunicated from you” -

Rabbi Akiva was hesitant [

he was uncertain about the matter and inclined

to rule stringently],

to prohibit it like a vow, because such a statement is also a form of a handle: one who is excommunicated is forbidden to eat or even to be together with his fellow who is not excommunicated.