Nedarim 2a — the Talmud in English

Introduction Through four matters can a person prohibit something to himself by the utterance of his mouth: through a vow, through an oath, through a ban, and through nazirite status. This is aside from the cases in which a person imposes an application of sanctity upon a thing, such as consecration or the separation of teruma, in which his utterance applies the sanctity to the object, and from the moment that the sanctity takes effect, he is obligated to conduct himself with the thing according to what the Torah obligates. The vow is divided into two principal types: The first: a vow in which a person prohibits a particular object to himself or to his fellow. And the second: a vow in which a person obligates himself to perform a mitzva. However, a person cannot obligate himself through a vow to perform an action that is not a mitzva, since the essence of a vow is the imposition of a prohibition upon an object, and not a commitment to perform an action. Aside from a vow concerning a mitzva, which is learned from other verses, through which a person can obligate himself to perform a mitzva, such as one who obligates himself to give charity or to bring an offering, or who obligates himself to study upon rising in the morning. Mishna:

Our Mishna explains two innovations concerning the expressions through which a person prohibits something to himself.

The first: an expression stated in the manner of a “designation,” in which he does not state the vow or oath in the ordinary expression, but rather uses another expression [which is a linguistic corruption, or which is a special expression that the Sages instituted for those who vow].

And the second: an expression stated in the manner of a “handle,” in which he says only a partial utterance of the vow or oath.

A. Designations of vows:

All designations of vows —

their law is

like vows.

One who vows and does not state an explicit expression of a vow-prohibition, but rather uses an expression that is a “designation,” his vow takes effect, as will be explained:

One who says in his vow, “This thing is forbidden to me like an offering,” this is an explicit vow.

But if he says, “This thing is forbidden to me as a konam,” or if he says, “Konam to me is this thing,” he is expressing himself through a designation, since konam is a designation for an offering.

And

all designations of

bans —

their law is

like bans.

For example, a person who says, “This thing is a ḥarekh,” this is a designation for a ban, and the ban takes effect.

And

all designations of

oaths —

like oaths.

For example, a person who says, “Shavuta that I will do such-and-such a thing,” this is a designation for an oath, and his oath takes effect.

And

all designations of

nazirite status —

like nazirite status.

For example, one who says, “Behold, I am a nazik,” which is a designation for a nazirite, the law of a nazirite takes effect upon him.

And Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disputed in the Gemara whether the designations are expressions of gentiles, and are a corruption of the Holy Tongue, or whether they are expressions that the Sages instituted for a person making a vow, since they were accustomed to say, “For the Most High, an offering,” and the Sages were concerned lest they retract after saying the Name of the Most High and not consecrate the animal as an offering, with the result that they utter the Name of Heaven in vain. Therefore the Sages instituted that those making vows should say “konam” instead of “offering,” and then they would not be accustomed to attach the Name of the Most High to this expression'.

B. Handles of vows

One who says a partial utterance of a vow that has a prohibition implied in it [and such an utterance is called a “handle” of a vow, similar to the handle of a vessel, for anyone who grasps the handle of the vessel is considered as one who grasps the vessel itself], his vow takes effect, since the “handles of vows” are like the vows themselves. For example:

One who says to his fellow

“I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you,”

who does not say a complete utterance, “I am prohibiting myself from eating your food,” or “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you like an offering,” but only a partial utterance, “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you,” which implies, “I am forbidden to eat your food.” But this is not a complete utterance of a vow. Or one who says to his fellow

“I am separated from you,”

who did not say a complete utterance of prohibition, “It is forbidden to me to eat your food”.

Or one who says to his fellow

“I am distanced from you.”

In all three of these utterances, if he added and said:

“that I eat yours” [

that is, for example, he said, “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you, that I eat yours,” ],

or he added and said

“that I taste yours” —

it is forbidden

for him to eat or taste from him because of a vow, as though he explicitly said to him that it is forbidden for him to eat from him. But if he said merely, “I am forbidden by vow to derive benefit from you,” this is not even a “handle” of a vow, and it is not forbidden for him to derive benefit from him.

One who says to his fellow

“I am excommunicated from you” —

Rabbi Akiva was hesitant [

he was uncertain about the matter, and inclined ]

in this matter toward stringency,

to prohibit it like a vow, because such an utterance too is a form of a handle, for one who is excommunicated is forbidden to eat or even to be together with his fellow who is not excommunicated.