Nedarim 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

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For if he had known that he would die, he would have concluded the matter immediately and given the get [if he had known that he would die, he would not have made any condition at all, but would have given a get immediately],

that is: the entire reason he gave her a get was that he did not want her to require yibbum, and if so, it is certainly the case that with regard to such an unavoidable circumstance, he does not wish to invalidate the get.

The Gemara further challenges Rabba:

What is different from the case of that man

who gave a get to his wife and

said to them: “

If I do not come from now until thirty days, let this be a get” [“If I do not come by the end of thirty days, this shall be a get”]—

And indeed, he was on the road returning, but at the end of his journey he had to cross a river, and

the ferry had departed [the ferry was on the other side of the river, and he could not cross].

He said to them

from the other side of the river: “

See that I have come; see that I have come” [“See that I have come; see that I have come”]—

and Shmuel said:

although he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from coming,

it is not considered arrival [this is not considered as though he had come], and the get is consequently a valid get.

But according to Rabba, this is difficult:

Why?!

But he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control!

And we answer:

Perhaps a foreseeable unavoidable circumstance [an obvious and foreseeable unavoidable circumstance]

is different,

because one should have stipulated in advance with regard to such an unavoidable circumstance;

and the ferry

is, after all,

a revealed unavoidable circumstance,

since it is common for one to be unable to cross because of the ferry.

Here the Gemara returns to the basic ruling of Rav Huna, who invalidated the rights of the one who deposited them, since that person had said, “If I do not come from now until thirty days, let these rights of mine be nullified,” and he did not come—

And

the Gemara asks

Rav Huna: Since this is an asmakhta, and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition,

that is: this man deposited his rights only because he was confident that he would come within the allotted time, and in any such case, even if he was not prevented by circumstances beyond his control, the acquisition is not effective—!?

And we answer:

Here it is different, since the rights were deposited,

for once the rights had left his possession and he had deposited them in the hands of the court, there is no asmakhta.

The Gemara objects:

And

is that to say that

where the item is deposited, it is not an asmakhta?!

But we learned:

In the case of one who repaid part of his debt,

the borrower was concerned that the lender might return and demand the entire debt recorded in the document,

and he deposited his document

with a third party, and the borrower added and

said

to the third party:

If I do not give him

the payment of the remainder of my debt

from now until thirty days,

then the money I gave was given as a gift and not as repayment, and

give him

the lender

his document,

so that he may collect the entire debt with it, since nothing has in fact been repaid.

If

the

time

arrived

that the borrower had stipulated,

and he did not give

the lender the payment of the remainder of his debt:

Rabbi Yosei says: He shall give

the third party the document to the lender, and the lender shall collect the entire debt with it, since that is what the borrower agreed; and although this is an “asmakhta,” since the borrower was confident that he would repay him within thirty days—

And Rabbi Yehuda says: He shall not give it,

since this is an “asmakhta,” and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition.

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says: An asmakhta effects acquisition.

We have therefore learned from Rav Naḥman’s words that an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, even though he deposited the debt document in the hands of the third party!?

And we answer:

Here it is different, for he said

the one who deposited the rights:

“Let my rights be nullified” [“Let my rights be nullified”]!

That is: since this is an admission that his proofs are false, the matter is not subject to the principle that an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, as that principle applies specifically to a new transfer of ownership, undertaking, or waiver.

a. Although we hold that “an asmakhta does not effect acquisition,” nevertheless, if he immediately transfers to the other party the thing that he promised him, the other party acquires it, even though it is an asmakhta. And even if he does not transfer it to him immediately, but says to him, “From now, if I do not come within thirty days,” or something similar, the other party acquires it, even though it is an asmakhta.

b. A kinyan sudar that is to take effect later is not effective, since the act of acquisition has already come to an end at the time when the acquisition takes effect; nevertheless, if he added in his wording and said, “From now,” there is no deficiency of “the act of acquisition has come to an end.”

c. Here the Gemara comes to establish the halakhic ruling concerning the nullification of the rights, with regard to the two issues discussed by the Gemara: whether fulfillment of the condition under circumstances beyond one’s control nullifies the rights, an issue disputed by Rav Huna and Rabba, and whether this involves an asmakhta. The Gemara adds further details concerning this nullification of rights, as well as the laws of asmakhta in general, and these matters are also relevant to our discussion.

And the halakha is

with regard to this case of one who deposits his rights:

An asmakhta effects acquisition,

that is: although this is an asmakhta, and generally “an asmakhta does not effect acquisition,” here his rights are nullified; if he does not come by the time he stipulated, his rights are nullified.

The Gemara qualifies this with two qualifications:

The first concerns the manner in which the condition is fulfilled: his rights are not to be nullified if he fails to come unless

he was not prevented by circumstances beyond his control;

but if he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control, even by a minor unavoidable circumstance—for example, his son became ill and for that reason he did not arrive—his rights are not nullified, in accordance with Rabba’s view.

The second concerns the essential legal force of his words:

and this is provided that they acquired it from him in an important court [such as the court of Rabbi Ami and Rav Asi].

This includes three elements:

a. His admission that his proofs are false is not effective without an act of acquisition, as with other admissions of a litigant; rather, it requires a kinyan sudar, since he did not make an absolute admission, but made his admission conditional.

b. Since this admission is unlike other admissions, but is conditional and requires an act of acquisition, the matter reverts to being like other asmakhtot, which do not effect acquisition.

However, the problem of asmakhta has already been resolved on its own, since a kinyan sudar necessarily takes place in a manner in which he says, “From now, if I do not come.” Otherwise, “the act of acquisition has come to an end”; and once he says “from now,” there is no longer a deficiency on account of asmakhta.

c. The Gemara introduces a principle concerning the laws of asmakhta: even a complete asmakhta, if the act of acquisition concerning it was performed in an important court, is not subject to the principle that “an asmakhta does not effect acquisition,” because a person does not act frivolously in an important court.

In our case, this novel principle is effective: even if it had not been necessary to say “from now” in order to prevent the act of acquisition from coming to an end, there would be no deficiency of asmakhta if he performed the act of acquisition in an important court.

Mishna:

In the previous Mishna, one type of vows made under duress was explained: a person was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from violating his vow. In our Mishna, another type of “vows made under duress” is explained: a person was compelled to make a vow, for otherwise he would suffer a loss.

Another category of “vows made under duress” that the Sages permitted:

One may vow,

a person may make a vow

to murderers and to confiscators [Jewish bandits who wish to seize his produce],

and to tax collectors [Jews appointed to collect taxes, who demand from him a tax on his produce that they are not legally entitled to collect],

and he wishes to free himself from them: “

That it is teruma,”

that is: he may make a vow and say, “This and that are konam to me if this produce is not teruma, as I am telling you,”

and

even though in truth it

is not teruma,

he does so because he knows that they do not concern themselves with teruma,

and he wishes to free himself from them through this false claim, which he reinforces by means of the vow.

If he does so, the vow does not take effect, and he is permitted with regard to the thing he vowed, since he was compelled to make the vow; for otherwise they would take his produce unlawfully. Alternatively, he may say to them regarding property in his possession: “This and that are konam to me if they are not

of the king’s household,”

at which point they will leave him alone,

even though they are not of the king’s household.

However, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree concerning this law in three respects: