Nedarim 27b — the Talmud in English

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for if he had known that he would die, he would have completed [the matter] and given the bill of divorce immediately [if he had known that he would die, he would not have made any condition at all, but would have given a bill of divorce immediately],

that is to say: all that he gave her a bill of divorce was only because he did not want her to require yibbum, and if so, certainly with regard to such coercion he does not wish to annul the bill of divorce.

We further raise an objection to Rabba:

What is different from that case where

he gave a bill of divorce to his wife, and

said to them: “

If I do not come from now until thirty days, let it be a bill of divorce” [“If I do not come by thirty days, this shall be a bill of divorce”]—

Он действительно находился в пути, чтобы вернуться, но в конце дороги ему нужно было переправиться через реку,

And indeed, he was on the road returning, but at the end of his journey he had to cross a river,

and the ferry was cut off [the ferry was on the other side of the river, and he could not cross].

[переправа находилась на противоположной стороне реки, и он не мог перебраться].

He said to them from the other side of the river: “

from the other side of the river: “

See that I have come, see that I have come” [“See that I have come, see that I have come”]—

[«Смотрите, я пришел; смотрите, я пришел»] —

and Shmuel said:

Although he was prevented by coercion from coming,

it is not called coming [this is not considered as though he came], and behold, the bill of divorce is a valid bill of divorce.

[это не считается так, будто он пришел], и поэтому разводной документ остается действительным.

And for Rabba this is difficult:

Why!?

But he was certainly coerced!?

And we answer:

And perhaps manifest coercion [open and foreseeable coercion]

[явное и предсказуемое вынужденное обстоятельство]

is different,

for with regard to such coercion he should have stipulated in advance,

and the ferry

indeed

makes his coercion manifest,

for it is common that he should be prevented from crossing because of the ferry.

Here the Gemara returns to the principal ruling of Rav Huna, who annulled the rights of the one who deposited them, since the one who deposited them said, “If I do not come from now until thirty days, let these rights of mine be annulled,” and he did not come—

And

the Gemara asks

Rav Huna: Since this is an asmachta, and an asmachta does not acquire, that is to say: this person deposited his rights only because he was confident in his mind that he would come within the time, and in every such case, even if he was not coerced, he does not acquire!?

that is: this man deposited his rights only because he was confident that he would come within the allotted time, and in any such case, even if he was not prevented by circumstances beyond his control, the acquisition is not effective—!?

And we answer:

Here it is different, for their rights have been deposited,

since the rights left his possession and he deposited them in the hand of the court, there is no asmachta.

The Gemara is astonished:

And

is that to say

where they are deposited, it is not an asmachta!?

But we learned:

One who paid part of his debt

and the borrower was concerned that the lender would return and demand from him his entire debt written in the document,

and he entrusted his document

to a third person, and the borrower added

and said

to the third person:

If I do not give him

the payment of the remainder of my debt

from now until thirty days,

then the money that I gave is as a gift and not as payment, and

give him

the lender

his document,

so that he may collect the entire debt with it, for nothing has been paid.

If

the time

that

the borrower

set had arrived,

and he did not give

the lender the payment of the remainder of his debt:

Rabbi Yose says: He shall give

the third party shall give the document to the lender, and he shall collect his entire debt with it, for this is what the borrower agreed to; and although it is an “asmachta,” since the borrower was confident that he would repay him within thirty days,

and Rabbi Yehuda says: He shall not give

the third party shall not give it, since it is an “asmachta,” and an asmachta does not acquire.

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yose, who said: An asmachta acquires.

We have thus learned from Rav Naḥman’s words that an asmachta does not acquire, even though he deposited the debt document in the hand of the third party!?

And we answer:

Here it is different, for he said

the one who deposited them:

Let my rights be annulled [“Let my rights be annulled”]!

То есть: поскольку это признание того, что его доказательства ложны, здесь нельзя рассматривать дело с точки зрения правила, что условная договоренность не приобретает юридической силы. Это правило относится именно к новому приобретению, обязательству или отказу от права.

That is to say: since it is an admission that his proofs are false, this is not to be judged as an asmachta that does not acquire, for that applies specifically to a new acquisition, or an obligation, or a relinquishment.

A. Although we hold that “an asmachta does not acquire,” nevertheless, if he immediately transfers to him the thing that he promised him, he acquires it, even though it is an asmachta; and even if he does not transfer it to him immediately, but says to him, “From now, if I do not come by thirty days,” and the like, he acquires it, even though it is an asmachta.

B. An acquisition through a cloth after a time is not effective, since by the time the acquisition takes effect, “the acquisition has ended”; nevertheless, if he added in his wording and said, “From now,” then there is no deficiency of “the acquisition has ended.”

C. Here the Gemara comes to establish the halakhic ruling concerning this matter of the annulment of the rights, with regard to the two issues that the Gemara discussed: namely, whether fulfillment of the condition under coercion annuls his rights, concerning which Rav Huna and Rabba disagreed, and whether there is in this the matter of asmachta; and the Gemara adds further details concerning this matter of the annulment of the rights, as well as the laws of asmachta everywhere, and this is also relevant to our matter.

And the halakha

concerning this law of one who deposits his rights:

An asmachta acquires,

that is to say: although it is an asmachta, and generally “an asmachta does not acquire,” here his rights are annulled, and if he did not come by the time that he set, his rights are annulled.

And the Gemara qualifies this with two qualifications:

The first, concerning the fulfillment of the condition: his rights are annulled only if he does not come

and he was not coerced,

but if he was coerced, even by minor coercion, such as that his son became ill and for that reason he did not arrive, his rights are not annulled, in accordance with Rabba’s opinion.

The second, concerning the essential taking effect of his words:

and this is when they acquired from him in an important court

such as the court of Rabbi Ami and Rav Asi.

This includes three parts:

A. His admission that his proofs are false does not take effect without an acquisition, like other admissions of a litigant; rather, it requires an “acquisition through a cloth,” since he did not admit absolutely, but made his admission dependent upon a condition.

B. Since this admission is unlike other admissions, but is conditional and requires an acquisition, the law returns to being like other asmachtot that do not acquire.

Except that the problem of asmachta has already been resolved by itself, since an acquisition through a cloth must necessarily be performed in a manner in which he says, “From now, if I do not come”; for otherwise, “the acquisition has ended,” and since he said “from now,” there is once again no deficiency on account of asmachta.

C. The Gemara innovates a general rule in the laws of asmachta: even a complete asmachta, if the acquisition concerning it was performed in an important court, is not subject to “an asmachta does not acquire,” for no person plays games in an important court.

And in our matter this innovation is effective: even if it were not necessary to say “from now” so that the acquisition should not end, there would be no deficiency of asmachta if he performed the acquisition in an important court.

Mishna:

In the preceding Mishna, one type of “vows under coercion” was explained: that he was coerced into violating his vow; and in our Mishna another type of “vows under coercion” is explained: that he was coerced into making a vow, for otherwise he would suffer a loss.

Another case among the “vows under coercion” that the Sages permitted:

One may vow,

a person may vow

to murderers and to confiscators [Jewish bandits who wish to plunder his produce],

and he wishes to free himself from them: “

and to tax collectors [Jewish officials appointed over the tax who demand from him a tax on his produce that they are not legally entitled to], and he wishes to free himself from them: “

That it is teruma,”

that is: he may make a vow and say, “This and that are konam to me if this produce is not teruma, as I am telling you,”

That it is teruma,”

that is to say: he may vow and say, “Konam, this and that are forbidden to me if this produce is not teruma, as I am telling you,” and

even though

in truth it

is not teruma,

and he does this because he knows that they do not concern themselves with teruma, and he wishes to free himself from them by means of this false claim, which he validates through the vow.

And if he did so, the vow does not take effect, and he is permitted with regard to what he vowed, since they compelled him to vow; for otherwise they would take his produce unlawfully.

Or he may say to them concerning property in his possession: “Konam, this and that are forbidden to me if they are not

the property of the king,”

and then they will leave him alone,

even though they are not the property of the king.

However, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed concerning this law in three matters: