Nedarim 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

1.

Beit Shammai say: One may make any vow

except an oath,

because an oath is more stringent, as it is stated concerning it: “He will not absolve.”

And Beit Hillel say: Even by an oath.

b. They also disagree concerning another matter:

Beit Shammai say: He may not initiate the vow for him,

for if he is not required to make a vow in order to substantiate his statement, he may not offer on his own initiative to make a vow to verify his statement.

And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate it for him.

c. They also disagree concerning another matter:

Beit Shammai say:

even when the coercer tells him to make a particular vow in order to substantiate his statement, the one who makes the vow is permitted only

with regard to what

the coercer

makes him vow,

without altering or adding anything. But if he altered or added something, prohibiting upon himself something that he had not been asked to prohibit, he is not permitted with regard to that alteration or addition.

And Beit Hillel say:

he is permitted

even with regard to what he was not made to vow,

provided that he made the vow in this manner in order to lend greater credibility to his statement.

How

did Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree in their final dispute?

If

he told him—

the brigand—:

“Say:

‘My wife shall be forbidden to me’ if what you say is not true,”

and he said:

“My wife and my sons shall be forbidden to me.”

Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted,

because he was made to vow concerning her,

but his sons are forbidden,

because he was not made to vow concerning them; rather, he added them on his own initiative.

And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One may make vows, and so too with regard to tax collectors:

And we raise an objection:

But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is law?

Since the tax collector purchased the right to collect the tax from the king, it is prohibited to deprive him of it; so how could the Sages permit a person to make a vow in order to deceive the tax collector and deprive him of it?

Rav Ḥinnana said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: [This is referring to] a tax collector who has no fixed rate.

The Rosh explained this in two ways:

The first: The king himself did not establish any fixed rate, but allowed the tax collector to take as his whim dictated—to take more from one person and less from another. Such a law is not law, because even the king cannot establish a discriminatory law; rather, the law must be uniform for all the residents of the country.

The second: The king did give him a fixed rate, but the tax collector takes more than that rate. Consequently, the tax collector is considered as though he had arisen on his own initiative to collect the tax, since the king does not desire the tax to be collected in this manner, and everything he takes is robbery.

The school of Rabbi Yannai say:

[This is referring to] a tax collector who arises on his own initiative,

not acting at the king’s command, and is merely a brigand.

We learned in the Mishna: One may make vows, and so on,

that they belong to the king’s household, even though they do not belong to the king’s household:

And we explain:

How did he make the vow,

in what manner can he make a vow that will not take effect?

Rav Amram said that Rav said:

By saying: “

The produce of the world shall be forbidden to me if they do not belong to the king’s household,”

and since he does not intend to prohibit anything to himself, but says this only in order to deceive the brigand or tax collector, his vow does not take effect.

And we raise an objection: But

since he said, “

The produce

of the world shall be forbidden to me,”

all the produce in the world has become forbidden to him!?

That is, if he actually makes such a vow, then although he made it under coercion and in his heart did not intend to prohibit anything to himself, nevertheless, unspoken thoughts do not nullify what he expressed verbally, and he is not permitted to eat the produce of the world.

And we answer:

By saying, “

All the produce of the world shall be forbidden to me

today.”

And we raise an objection: The Mishna cannot be explained in this manner, for

if he said “

today,”

the tax collector will not accept it from him;

the tax collector will not be satisfied with such a vow, because the person can lie and become forbidden to the produce of the world for only one day!?

And we answer: It does not mean that he said “today” with his mouth, but rather

by saying in his heart

that he intends to prohibit only

today,

while expressing with his lips without qualification: “The entire produce of the world shall be forbidden to me.” Since these are vows made under coercion, he need fulfill his verbal statement only according to what he intended in his heart.

And the Gemara explains:

And although we hold that unspoken thoughts are not legally significant,

and here, since he spoke without qualification, his words imply “forever,” so his thought that he intended to prohibit only today should not have been effective—

with regard to coercion, it is different,

that is, although the phrase “it shall be forbidden to me” is understood simply as referring forever, because that is its more natural meaning, here, since he was under coercion, the coercion interprets his words as meaning not forever but today, since he did not explicitly say that he was prohibiting it forever. We learned in the Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: In all

vows, except for oaths; and Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to oaths:

Beit Shammai say: [He is permitted only] with regard to what he was made to vow, and Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to what he was not made to vow. How so? If he told him, “My wife shall be forbidden to me,” and he said, “My wife and my sons shall be forbidden to me,” Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted and his sons are forbidden, while Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted:

Rav Huna said: A tannai

in a beraita:

Beit Shammai say: He may not initiate it for him through an oath.

And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate it for him through an oath.

The Gemara wonders: Is it so that

according to Beit Shammai, it is only with regard to an oath that he may not initiate it for him, but with regard to a vow he may initiate it for him!?

But didn’t we learn

in our Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: He may not initiate it for him—

even—

with regard to a vow!?

And furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

Is it only that he may not initiate it for him through an oath,

meaning that Beit Shammai prohibited only initiating the matter through an oath,

but he may make a vow through an oath,

that is, if they required him to swear, he may indeed swear!?

But didn’t we learn

in our Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: One may make all vows except through an oath,

even when they required him to swear!?

And we answer: The Mishna and the beraita do not disagree; rather, one completes the other:

The tanna taught the Mishna

the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

with regard to a vow,

in order

to demonstrate the force of Beit Shammai,

that even with regard to a vow, they do not permit him to initiate the matter.

And

the tanna taught the beraita

the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

with regard to an oath,

in order

to demonstrate the force of Beit Hillel,

that even with regard to an oath, they permit him to initiate the matter.

Rav Ashi said

another resolution to reconcile the contradiction between our Mishna and the beraita:

The beraita is not dealing at all with evading a brigand or tax collector, and

this is what it teaches

in the beraita—that is, this is its meaning: “Beit Shammai say: He may not initiate it for him through an oath”; that is,

Beit Shammai say: There is no request for release

to a Sage

with regard to an oath,

for the Sage may not initiate an opening to release an oath, since oaths are not released. “

And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate it for him through an oath”; that is:

And Beit Hillel say: There is a request for release with regard to an oath,

and the Sage may initiate an opening even to release an oath.

Mishna:

One who said concerning his saplings:

“Behold, these saplings are an offering,”

that is, they are consecrated for their sacrificial value,

if they are not cut down

[if they are not cut down].

And likewise one who says concerning his cloak:

“This cloak”

shall be for the

sacrificial value if it is not burned

[if it is not burned]—

these items

have a redemption,

that is, they are consecrated, and consequently they have a redemption, like all property consecrated for its monetary value.

But one who says:

“Behold, these saplings are an offering until they are cut down,”

or says:

“This cloak is an offering until it is burned,”

that is:

a. Until the saplings are cut down [or the cloak is burned], they are consecrated; and even if I return and redeem them from the consecrated property immediately, they will become consecrated again.

b. Once they are cut down [or the cloak is burned], their consecrated status lapses.