Nedarim 28a — the Talmud in English

a.

Beit Shammai say: With all vows ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

except for an oath,

because it is stringent, as it is said concerning it: “He will not hold him guiltless.”

And Beit Hillel say: Also with an oath.

b. And they further disagreed:

Beit Shammai say: He should not open it for him with a vow,

for if they do not demand that he vow in order to confirm his words, he should not offer on his own to make a vow to establish the truth of his words.

And Beit Hillel say: He may also open it for him.

c. And they further disagreed:

Beit Shammai say:

even when the coercer tells him to vow such and such in order to establish the truth of his words, the one who vows is permitted only

in that which

the coercer

makes him vow,

and he did not alter or add; but if he altered or added, to prohibit upon himself that which he was not asked to prohibit, he is not permitted regarding that alteration or addition.

And Beit Hillel say:

he is permitted

also regarding that which he does not make him vow,

provided that he vowed so in order to establish his words more effectively.

How

did Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree in their final disagreement?

If

he said to him

the bandit:

Say: “

Konam, my wife shall be forbidden to me”

if it is not as you said,

and he said: Konam, my wife and my sons shall be forbidden to me.

Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted

because he made her subject to the vow,

and his sons are forbidden

because he did not make them subject to the vow; rather, he himself added them.

And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One may vow, and so forth, and for tax collectors:

And we raise an objection:

But Shmuel said: The law of the kingdom is law,

and since the tax collector purchased the tax from the king, it is forbidden to rob it from him; and how do the Sages permit a robber to vow in order to rob it from him!?

Rav Hinena said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: With a tax collector who has no fixed rate.

And the Rosh explained two interpretations:

The first: The king himself did not establish any fixed rate, but gave the tax collector permission to take according to his whim—more from one and less from another—and such a law is not law, because even the king cannot establish a discriminatory law, but only a law equal for all the inhabitants of the country.

The second: The king indeed gave him a fixed rate, but the tax collector takes more than the fixed rate. Since this is so, the tax collector is considered as though he stood on his own to take tax, for the king does not desire the taking of tax in this manner, and everything in his hand is robbery.

The school of Rabbi Yannai said:

With a tax collector who stands on his own,

not by the command of the king, and he is nothing but a bandit.

We learned in the Mishna: One may vow, and so forth,

that they belong to the king’s household, even though they do not belong to the king’s household:

And we explain:

How did he vow,

in what manner can he vow and his vow not take effect?

Rav Amram said that Rav said:

By saying: “

The produce of the world shall be forbidden to me if they are not of the king’s household,”

and since he does not intend to prohibit anything to himself, but only to deceive the bandit or the tax collector, his vow does not take effect.

And we raise an objection: But

since he said “

shall be forbidden

the produce of the world to me,”

are all the produce of the world forbidden to him!?

That is: If he actually vows so, then although he vowed so under coercion and in his heart did not intend to prohibit anything to himself, nevertheless, matters in the heart do not nullify what he uttered with his mouth, and he is not permitted to partake of the produce of the world.

And we answer:

By saying “

All the produce of the world shall be forbidden to me

today.”

And we raise an objection: But it is impossible to explain the Mishna in this way, for

if he said “

today,”

the tax collector will not accept it from him,

for the tax collector will not be satisfied with such a vow, because he can lie and become forbidden to the produce of the world for one day!?

And we answer: Not that he said “today” with his mouth, but

by saying in his heart

that he does not intend to prohibit except

today,

while uttering with his lips without specification: “The entire produce of the world shall be forbidden to me.” And since these are vows of coercion, he need not fulfill the statement of his mouth except according to what he thought in his heart.

And the Gemara explains:

Even though we hold: Matters in the heart are not matters,

and here, since he spoke without specification, it implies “forever,” and his thought that he intended to prohibit only today should not have been effective—

With regard to coercion it is different,

that is: Although, in its plain sense, the expression “shall be forbidden to me” is explained as forever, for this is the stronger implication, here, since he was coerced, the coercion interprets his words as meaning not forever but today, since he did not explicitly say that he was prohibiting it forever. We learned in the Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: With everything

one may vow, except with an oath; and Beit Hillel say: Also with an oath:

Beit Shammai say: In that which he makes him vow, and Beit Hillel say: Also in that which he does not make him vow. How so? If he said to him, “Konam, my wife shall be forbidden to me,” and he said, “Konam, my wife and my sons shall be forbidden to me,” Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted and his sons are forbidden, and Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted:

Rav Huna said: A tanna

in a beraita:

Beit Shammai say: He should not open it for him with an oath.

And Beit Hillel say: He may also open it for him with an oath.

The Gemara wonders: Is it so that

according to Beit Shammai, it is with an oath that he should not open it for him, but with a vow he may open it for him!?

But we learned

in our Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: He should not open it for him—

even—

with a vow!?

And furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

It is opening that he should not open for him with an oath, [

implying that Beit Shammai prohibited only opening with an oath],

but making him vow a vow with an oath,

that is: If they demanded that he swear, indeed he should swear!?

But we learned

in our Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: With everything one may vow, except with an oath,

even when they demanded that he swear!?

And we answer: The Mishna and the beraita did not disagree; rather, one completes the other:

The tanna of the Mishna

stated the disagreement of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

with a vow,

in order

to make known the force of Beit Shammai,

that even with a vow they do not permit him to open it.

And

the tanna of the beraita

stated the disagreement of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

with an oath,

in order

to make known the force of Beit Hillel,

that even with an oath they permit him to open it.

Rav Ashi said

another resolution for reconciling the contradiction between our Mishna and the beraita:

The beraita is not dealing at all with evading a bandit or a tax collector, and

this is what it teaches

in the beraita, that is, this is the intention of the beraita: “Beit Shammai say, ‘He should not open it for him with an oath,’” that is:

Beit Shammai say: There is no annulment inquiry

before a Sage

with an oath,

so that the Sage should not open an opening for him to permit his oath, because oaths are not permitted. “

And Beit Hillel say: ‘He may also open it for him with an oath,’” that is:

And Beit Hillel say: There is an annulment inquiry with an oath,

and the Sage may open an opening for him even to permit an oath.

Mishna:

Whoever said concerning his saplings:

Behold, these saplings are a korban

that is, consecrated for sacrificial value,

if they are not cut down [

if they are not cut down].

And likewise one who says concerning his cloak:

This cloak

shall be for the value of a

korban if it is not burned [

if it is not burned]—

these

have redemption,

that is, they are consecrated, and consequently they have redemption, like the other “kedushat damim.”

But one who says:

Behold, these saplings are a korban until they are cut down,

or who said:

This cloak is a korban until it is burned,

that is:

a. Until they are cut down [the saplings, or the cloak is burned], they will be consecrated, and even if I return and redeem them from the consecration immediately, they will again become consecrated.

b. When they are cut down [the saplings, or the cloak is burned], their consecration will lapse.