Nedarim 27a — the Talmud in English

He vowed concerning the basket, ![](pamud.bmp "

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and there were in it

in addition to the ordinary figs also

Benot Shuah,

which are choice figs.

And he said: Had I known that Benot Shuah were in it, I would not have vowed! —

The basket is forbidden,

but

Benot Shuah are permitted.

Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow whose part was permitted, all of it was permitted!

Is it not,

that this is speaking of a case where he also retracts his wording,

for he said: Had I known that Benot Shuah were in it, I would have said

specifying and saying:

Black figs and white figs are forbidden,

but

Benot Shuah are permitted.

And it is Rabbi Akiva's [opinion], and the Rabbis disagree!

And this is difficult for Rava, who said: If he changes his vow and his wording, everyone agrees that it is a vow whose part was permitted; and everyone agrees that a vow whose part was permitted, all of it was permitted!

And the Gemara rejects this:

No!

Here it is speaking

of one who says: Had I known that Benot Shuah were in it, I would have

said: The entire basket is forbidden, and Benot Shuah are permitted.

That is, he maintains his wording and changes only his vow.

And the Gemara explains:

Who is the tanna for that which the Sages taught in a beraita: If he vowed concerning five people at once —

if it was permitted for one of them, it was permitted for all of them.

If he vowed concerning all of them

except one of them —

he is permitted, and they are forbidden? —

According to Rabba —

the first clause is Rabbi Akiva's [opinion], and the latter clause is the opinion of everyone.

According to Rava —

the latter clause is the Rabbis' [opinion], and the first clause is the opinion of everyone.

Mishna:

Vows made under duress,

how so?

His fellow placed him under a vow prohibiting him from his property

in order

that he eat with him,

for he placed him under a vow on the condition that he would not come to eat with him.

And

an instance of duress occurred to the one prohibited by the vow, preventing him from coming, such as

he became ill

[the one prohibited by the vow became ill],

or his son became ill

of the one prohibited by the vow, and he was somewhat under duress because he had to look after him,

or a river prevented him

from coming to eat with the one who imposed the vow.

These are vows made under duress

and he is not forbidden to derive benefit from the one who imposed the vow, for it did not occur to the one who imposed the vow to place him under a vow except if no duress at all prevented him; but whenever he was under duress, even somewhat, such as when his son became ill, he did not intend to place him under a vow.

Gemara:

An incident involving

a certain man who deposited his documents of entitlement in the court

[he deposited his document of entitlement in the court],

who said

[and said]:

If I do not come by thirty days, let these documents of entitlement be annulled

[if I do not come from now until thirty days, let all these rights of mine be annulled] —

That is, that document was a promissory note, or a document of the court confirming that that man had brought such-and-such proofs, and the borrower said that he admitted that the promissory note was forged and that all the proofs he had brought were untrue, except that he made his admission conditional on whether he would not come from now until thirty days. In the end

he was prevented by circumstances

and did not come

[he was under duress and did not come] by the time he had set.

Rav Huna said:

Although he was under duress, since he did not come as he had said —

his documents of entitlement are annulled

[his rights were annulled].

Rabba said to him

to Rav Huna: But

he is under duress, and the Merciful One exempts one under duress!?

As it is written “

[And if the man finds the betrothed girl in the field, and the man seizes her and lies with her, then the man who lay with her shall die alone].

But to the girl you shall do nothing

there is no capital sin in the girl, etc. For in the field he found her; the betrothed girl cried out, and there was no one to save her].”

And here too, since he did not come because of duress, his documents of entitlement should not be annulled.

And if you would say,

and even if you should say that

death is different

[death is different], for the Torah came to exempt the betrothed girl from stoning; and the “claim of duress” is effective only to exempt from punishment, but concerning other matters, such as the fulfillment of a condition, there is no “claim of duress” at all —

Then, from another perspective, his documents of entitlement should not be annulled, because it did not occur to him to annul his documents of entitlement unless he did not come voluntarily; but if he did not come because of duress, he certainly did not intend that his documents of entitlement be annulled, for

and we learned

this reasoning in our Mishna concerning a vow:

Vows made under duress: His fellow placed him under a vow that he eat with him, and he became ill, or his son became ill, or a river prevented him—these are vows made under duress,

and the reason is that it did not occur to the one who imposed the vow to place him under a vow in a situation where he would not eat with him because of duress; and if so, the same should be said in the case before us.

And

we raise an objection

against Rabba: How is this different from that which we learned:

One who gives a bill of divorce to his wife and says: “

This is your bill of divorce

from now, if I do not come from now until twelve months,” and

he dies within twelve months

and consequently did not come, and the condition was fulfilled —

This is a bill of divorce.

And

according to Rabba, let this be difficult:

Why!?

But he was prevented by circumstances

[for he was prevented by circumstances through death]!?

They said

the members of the academy in order to answer for Rabba's position: