Nedarim 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

And is this not a tiyuvta of Rav Yehuda!?

And we answer:

When it teaches

“For if she benefits, she is subject to bal yachel devaro,”.

That is, this is the intention of the Mishna: Since if she benefits before Pesaḥ, she will retroactively be subject to bal yachel devaro if she goes to her father’s house, she may not benefit even before Pesaḥ.

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rav Yehuda from the following, as

we learned

in that same Mishna:

One who says to his wife before Pesaḥ:

“You shall be forbidden to benefit from me my property]

[for your own benefit]

until the festival

that follows Pesaḥ,

if you go to your father’s house before Pesaḥ

that is approaching.

If she

went before Pesaḥ

and violated his condition, she is

forbidden to benefit from him until the festival, but she is permitted to go after Pesaḥ.

And we infer: If she

went

before Pesaḥ, she is

forbidden

to benefit from him until the festival.

But if she

did not go

before Pesaḥ, she is

not

forbidden to benefit from him even until Pesaḥ, although if she were to go before Pesaḥ, it would turn out that she had already been forbidden to benefit from him from the time of the vow.

It is thus proven that we do not fear that she might violate her condition, and this is a difficulty against Rav Yehuda!?

Said

he answered,

Rava:

The same law applies even if she did not go

before Pesaḥ, in which case she is

forbidden

to benefit in any event until Pesaḥ, lest she go and thereby become forbidden.

However, if she

went

before Pesaḥ and the vow took effect, she is

forbidden

to benefit even until the festival,

and she is liable to lashes

if she violated the prohibition.

But if she

did not go

before Pesaḥ, she is

merely forbidden

to benefit until Pesaḥ by rabbinic decree, lest she go before Pesaḥ.

The following objection is raised

against Rav Yehuda: “

This loaf is forbidden to me today

in eating,

if I go to a particular place tomorrow”:

If he ate

today,

he is subject to “

do not go” tomorrow; if he went, he is subject to “bal yachel devaro.”

tomorrow; if he went, he has violated the prohibition “He shall not profane his word.”

It initially enters our minds that the beraita’s statement “If he ate, he is subject to ‘do not go’” means that he may eat today, and need not be concerned that he will be subject to “do not go” tomorrow.

And the reason is that if you would say that the tanna intended only to say that if he ate, he is subject to “do not go,” but that he is always forbidden to eat, lest he go tomorrow, there would be a difficulty: Since the tanna specified all the forms of prohibition, if you would say that this too is forbidden, the tanna should also have specified this prohibition.

If so, this is a difficulty against Rav Yehuda, who forbids eating lest he go tomorrow!?

And we reject this:

Does it teach “

he may eat,”

which would imply that this is permitted initially? Rather,

it teaches “he ate,”

teaching that when he ate, he is subject to ‘do not go.’

That is, the tanna indeed alluded to this prohibition as well, by using “he ate,” a formulation referring to an action performed after the fact, thereby teaching us that initially he may not eat.

The Gemara continues to raise a difficulty from the latter clause: “

If he went

tomorrow,

he is subject to bal yachel devaro.”

But it does

not

teach “

he may go.” That is, if you would say that he is forbidden to eat today lest he go tomorrow, then presumably the person in fact did not violate the prohibition. The tanna should therefore have said: “He may go tomorrow—for he did not eat today—and he is not subject to bal yachel devaro.” Yet from the tanna’s wording it appears that he presumably ate today, and he is therefore subject to bal yachel devaro because he ate yesterday—

and

if so, this is

a difficulty against Rav Yehuda,

who maintains that presumably he did not eat, since he is forbidden to eat!?

Rav Yehuda could say to you: “

The same law applies, and it should have taught

in the latter clause: “

he may go and is not subject to bal yachel devaro,” since presumably he did not eat yesterday.

and has not violated ‘He shall not profane his word,’” since presumably he did not eat yesterday.

Rather,

since the first clause teaches: “

If he ate, he is subject to bal yachel devaro,”

and it did not teach him ‘he may eat,’

it does not teach him ‘he may eat,’

since in my view he is forbidden to eat initially, therefore

it taught

also in the

latter clause, ‘if he went.’

That is, since the first clause says, “If he ate, he is subject to ‘do not go’” tomorrow, had the tanna taught in the latter clause, “He may go and is not subject to bal yachel devaro,” we would have interpreted the beraita as follows: At times, if he “ate [on the first day], he is subject to ‘do not go’” tomorrow.

And at times, even if he ate on the first day, he is nevertheless “permitted to go [tomorrow] and is not subject to bal yachel devaro.” In what circumstances?

If he “ate”—on the first day deliberately, meaning that he knew that by violating his vow, through which he had forbidden himself to eat, he would thereby become forbidden to go tomorrow—“he is subject to ‘do not go’” tomorrow.

But if he ate on the first day inadvertently, meaning that at the time of eating he did not remember that as a result of his eating he would be forbidden to go tomorrow, he is “permitted to go and is not subject to bal yachel devaro.”

Since the tanna is not dealing here with these laws, he therefore taught in the latter clause the wording “he went,” so that we would not err in interpreting the beraita. We learned in the Mishna:

One who says to a woman, “A konam: I will not have relations with you,” is subject to “he shall not profane his word”:

And we raise a difficulty:

But he is obligated toward her

[the husband is obligated toward his wife] with regard to marital relations

by Torah law, as it is written: “He shall not diminish her sustenance, her clothing, or her marital rights,” and if so, how can he forbid relations to her? This is like one who forbids another person’s produce to that person himself!?

and if so, how can he prohibit marital relations for her? But this is like one who prohibits another person’s produce to that other person!?

And we answer:

He is speaking of one who says: “

The benefit of your marital relations is forbidden to me”;

and he does not desire the marital relations,

that is, our Mishna is not dealing with one who forbade relations to the woman, but rather with one who forbade himself the benefit of her marital relations, and one is permitted to forbid something to oneself.

For Rav Kahana said

this distinction concerning a woman who forbids her husband to have relations with her, and the same applies to a husband:

A woman who says to her husband: “

My marital relations are forbidden to you”—

we compel her and he has relations with her,

since

she is obligated to him, the woman is obligated to her husband with regard to marital relations], and this is like one who forbids her husband’s produce to her husband, in which case the vow does not take effect.

[the wife is obligated to her husband regarding marital relations], and this is like one who forbids his spouse’s produce to that spouse, in which case the vow does not take effect.

But if a woman says to her husband: “

The benefit of your marital relations is forbidden to me”—

he is forbidden

to have relations with her,

as one may not give a person something that is forbidden to him,

and since she is forbidden to benefit from his marital relations, he is forbidden to have relations with her, so as not to cause her to violate something forbidden to her.

Mishna:

One who says: “

An oath: I will not sleep,”

or says: “An oath

that I will not speak,” or

“

that I will not walk”—

in all these cases, he is

forbidden.

One who says: “

An offering: I will not eat from you,”

his words can be interpreted in two ways:

The first: “I swear by the life of an offering [an entity by which one cannot swear], that I will not eat from you.”

The second: “Let what I do not eat from yours be an offering [a vow-prohibition],” meaning that he forbade only what he will not eat.

Or if he says: “

This is an offering that I will eat from you,”

the meaning is: “I swear by the life of an offering [an entity by which one cannot swear] that I will not eat from yours.”

Or if he says: “

As an offering”

[with a pataḥ beneath the lamed]

“I will not eat from you,”

the meaning is: “Let what I do not eat from yours not be an offering,” and he did not explicitly forbid what he will eat —

Therefore, in all these cases he is

permitted

to eat from another person’s property, since his words do not signify either a valid oath or a prohibition like an offering concerning what he will eat from another person.