Nedarim 15b — the Talmud in English

And a tiyu(v)ta against Rav Yehuda!?

And we answer:

When it teaches

“For if she benefits, behold, this is a violation of ‘He shall not profane his word’”.

That is to say, this is the intent of the Mishna: Since if she benefits before Passover, she will retroactively be in violation of bal yachel devaro if she goes to her father’s house, therefore she should not benefit even before Passover.

The Gemara raises another difficulty against Rav Yehuda from that which

we learned

in that Mishna:

One who says to his wife before Passover:

“You shall be benefiting from me”

[for your own benefit]

“until the festival”

that is after Passover,

“if you go to your father’s house before Passover”

that is near.

If

she went before Passover

and violated his condition, she is

forbidden to benefit from him until the festival, and permitted to go after Passover.

And we infer: If

she went

before Passover,

she is forbidden

to benefit until the festival.

But if

she did not go

before Passover,

she is not

forbidden to benefit from him even until Passover, although if she goes before Passover, it follows that she was already forbidden to benefit from the time of the vow.

It is thus proven that we do not fear lest she violate her condition, and this is difficult for Rav Yehuda!?

Said

he explained

Rava:

The same law applies even if she did not go

before Passover, for she is

forbidden

to benefit at least until Passover, lest she go and become forbidden.

But if she

went

before Passover and the vow took effect, she is

forbidden

to benefit even until the festival,

and she receives lashes

if she violated it.

But if she

did not go

before Passover, she is

merely forbidden

to benefit until Passover by rabbinic law, lest she go before Passover.

He raises an objection

against Rav Yehuda:

“This loaf is upon me today”

with regard to eating,

“if I go to such-and-such a place tomorrow”:

If he ate

today,

behold, this is in

“He shall not go”

tomorrow; if he went, behold, this is in violation of “He shall not profane his word.”

It might have entered our mind that the intent of the beraita, “If he ate, behold, this is in violation of ‘He shall not go,’” is to say that he may eat today, and need not be concerned that he will be in violation of “He shall not go” tomorrow.

And because, if you should say that the tan(n)ai intended to say only that if he ate, he is in violation of “He shall not go,” but in fact he is always forbidden to eat lest he go tomorrow, this would be difficult: Since the tan(n)ai specified all the forms of prohibition, if you should say that this too is forbidden, the tan(n)ai should also have specified this prohibition.

And if so, this is difficult for Rav Yehuda, who forbids eating lest he go tomorrow!?

And we reject this:

Does it teach

“he may eat,”

which implies ab initio? But

“he ate”

it teaches, for when he ate, behold, this is in violation of “He shall not go.”

That is to say: Indeed, the tan(n)ai also hinted to us at this prohibition by saying “he ate,” in the language of a post facto occurrence, to inform us that initially he should not eat.

The Gemara adds to raise a difficulty from the latter clause:

“If he went”

tomorrow,

behold, this is in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word.’

But

“he goes”

it does not

teach. That is to say: If you should say that he is forbidden to eat today lest he go tomorrow, then presumably the person indeed did not violate the prohibition, and the tan(n)ai should have said: “He goes tomorrow—for he did not eat today—and he is not in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word.’” Yet according to the wording of the tan(n)ai, it implies that presumably he ate today, and behold, he is in violation of “He shall not profane his word” because he ate yesterday—

and

if so,

this is difficult for Rav Yehuda,

who holds: Presumably he did not eat, since he is forbidden to eat!?

Rav Yehuda could say to you:

The same law applies, it should teach

in the latter clause:

“He goes

and is not in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word,’” for presumably he did not eat yesterday.

But

since it teaches in the first clause:

“If he ate

behold, this is in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word,’”

for it did not teach him “he eats,”

since in my view he is forbidden to eat ab initio, therefore

it taught

also in the

latter clause “he went.”

That is to say: Since in the first clause it says, “If he ate, behold, this is in violation of ‘He shall not go,’” had the tan(n)ai taught in the latter clause, “He goes and is not in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word,’” we would have interpreted the beraita as follows: At times, if he “ate [on the first day], behold, this is in violation of ‘He shall not go’” tomorrow.

And at times, even if he ate on the first day, nevertheless it is “he goes [tomorrow] and is not in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word.’” How so?

If he “ate”—on the first day intentionally, that is, he knew that by violating his vow, through which he prohibited himself from eating, he would consequently be forbidden to go tomorrow—“behold, this is in violation of ‘He shall not go’” tomorrow.

But if he ate on the first day unintentionally, that is, he did not remember at the time of eating that, as a result of his eating, he would be forbidden to go tomorrow, behold, it is “he goes and is not in violation of ‘He shall not profane his word.’”

And since the tan(n)ai is not dealing here with these laws, therefore the tan(n)ai taught in the latter clause the wording “he went,” so that we should not err in interpreting the beraita. We learned in the Mishna:

One who says to a woman, “A korban: I am abstaining from relations with you”—behold, this is in violation of “He shall not profane his word”:

And we raise a difficulty:

But he is bound to her

[the husband to his wife] with regard to marital relations

by Torah law, as it is written: “Her food, her clothing, and her marital relations he shall not diminish,”

and if so, how can he prohibit marital relations for her? But this is like one who prohibits another person’s produce to that other person!?

And we answer:

When he says

“The benefit of your marital relations is upon me,”

and he does not desire marital relations,

that is to say: Our Mishna is not dealing with one who prohibited marital relations for the woman, but rather with one who prohibited for himself the benefit of her marital relations; and regarding prohibiting it for himself, he has the authority to do so.

For Rav Kahana said

this distinction concerning a woman who prohibits her husband with regard to marital relations, and the same law applies concerning a husband:

One who says to her husband:

“My marital relations are upon you,”

we compel her and she has relations with him,

since

she is bound to him

[the woman is bound to her husband with regard to marital relations], and this is like one who prohibited her husband’s produce to her husband, in which case the vow does not take effect.

But one who says to her husband,

“The benefit of your marital relations is upon me,” -

he is forbidden

to have relations with her,

for one does not feed a person something that is forbidden to him,

and since she is prohibited from benefiting from his marital relations, he is forbidden to have relations with her, so as not to cause her to stumble through something forbidden to her.

Mishna:

One who says:

“An oath: I shall not sleep,”

or says: “An oath

that I shall not speak,”

or

“that I shall not walk” -

in all these cases, behold, he is

forbidden.

One who says:

“A korban: I shall not eat yours,”

his words are interpreted in two ways:

The first: “I swear by the life of a korban [with which it is not possible to swear] that I shall not eat yours.”

The second: “A korban [the prohibition of a vow] shall be what I shall not eat of yours”; he prohibited only what he will not eat.

Or he said:

“This is a korban that I shall eat of yours,”

which implies: An oath by the life of a korban [with which one does not swear] that I shall not eat of yours.

Or he said:

“For a korban

[with a patah beneath the lamed]

I shall not eat yours,”

which implies: “What I shall not eat of yours shall not be a korban,” and he did not explicitly prohibit what he will eat —

Therefore, in all these cases, behold, he is

permitted

to eat from another person’s produce, for his words imply neither a valid oath nor a prohibition like a korban upon what he will eat from another person.