Nedarim 15a — the Talmud in English

And the reason is:

for a person is not careful

with a condition,

only with the prohibition [only with a condition a person is not careful], that is: a person is not careful not to violate the condition upon which the vow of yesterday depends, and even though if he violates it, it is found that he retroactively violated the vow; therefore the Sages were concerned lest he violate the condition, and he is found to have violated it retroactively.

That is, a person is not careful to avoid violating the condition on which the vow he made yesterday depends. Even though, if he violates it, he is found to have retroactively violated the vow, the Sages were concerned that he might violate the condition and thereby be found to have retroactively violated the vow.

But with a prohibition he is careful, in the body of the prohibition that he prohibited to himself through the vow, he is careful; and since sleeping tomorrow is the body of the prohibition, there is therefore no concern lest he sleep tomorrow.

With regard to the substance of the prohibition that he imposed upon himself through the vow, he is careful. Since sleeping tomorrow is the substance of the prohibition, there is no concern that he might sleep tomorrow.

We learned

in our Mishna:

“A konam that I sleep, that I walk, that I speak,”

he is subject to “Do not profane his word.”

What are the circumstances,

in what manner does our Mishna deal, and what does it come to inform us?

If you say

that the one making the vow vowed

as it teaches [as it is written in the Mishna], saying: A konam

in the Mishna, saying: “A vow:

“that I sleep,”

that is, what I sleep shall be prohibited to me, and the Mishna comes to inform us that even though he did not prohibit any object upon himself, but rather sleep, which has no substance, nevertheless the vow takes effect?

It is impossible to say this.

For

is it a vow at all

when it has no substance!?

And it was taught

in the beraita brought above, 13b:

There is greater stringency with oaths

than with vows,

for oaths take effect with regard to something that has substance and with regard to something that has no substance, which is not so with vows,

for they take effect only with regard to something that has substance, meaning that the prohibition relates to an object or to a limb of the person.

And sleep

is

something that has no substance,

and a vow cannot take effect upon it!?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that our Mishna is to be interpreted as dealing with a case

where he said: “My eyes are a konam”

—which are the object prohibited to him—

“with regard to sleep”

forever, and the Mishna comes to inform us that although ultimately he will be forced to violate his vow, for a person cannot refrain from sleeping forever, even for three days, nevertheless he is not permitted to sleep until he is overcome by sleep.

It is likewise impossible to say this, for:

And if he did not assign a measure [if indeed he did not limit his vow] and prohibited sleep upon himself forever,

if he indeed did not limit his vow and prohibited sleep to himself forever—

do we leave him until he violates the prohibition of “Do not profane” [and do we leave him until he violates the prohibition of “Do not profane”], that is: is such a vow, which he cannot fulfill and through which he will necessarily violate “Do not profane,” indeed effective from the outset at all!?

Would such a vow, which he cannot fulfill and through which he will necessarily violate the prohibition against profaning his word, take effect at all from the outset!?

But Rabbi Yohanan said:

“An oath that I will not sleep for three days,”

which is something a person cannot withstand, the oath does not take effect at all, and

they flog him

immediately because of “a vain oath”

and he sleeps at once,

for the oath did not take effect at all.

And if you should conclude that our Mishna deals with a case where he prohibited sleep upon himself forever, and comes to inform us that until he is overcome he is prohibited from sleeping, this is not so, for the vow does not take effect at all, and he may sleep immediately.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that our Mishna deals with a case where

he said: “My eyes are a konam with regard to sleep tomorrow, if I sleep today,” and our Mishna comes to inform us that he is prohibited from sleeping today lest he sleep tomorrow; and this is what we learned: “He is subject to ‘Do not profane his word,’”

that is, he is prohibited from sleeping today, lest tomorrow he come to “Do not profane his word.”

This too is impossible to say, for

you have said: everyone is careful with a prohibition,

and he is not prohibited from sleeping today out of concern lest he sleep tomorrow, which is the primary prohibition.

Rather, it is obvious

that our Mishna deals, for example, with a case where

he said:

“My eyes are a konam with regard to sleep today, if I sleep tomorrow,”

and in this manner the Mishna says: “He is subject to ‘Do not profane his word.’”

And now this is difficult:

It is impossible to interpret the Mishna’s intention as meaning that he is under the prohibition of “Do not profane” to sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow, for this is not the prohibition of “Do not profane”; even according to the one who prohibits, it is only a concern of the Sages, and not the prohibition of “Do not profane.”

And necessarily, “Do not profane his word” stated in the Mishna refers to sleeping tomorrow.

And

if so, in what manner does our Mishna deal?

If he did not sleep today

at all [if he did not sleep today],

when he sleeps tomorrow, what

“Do not profane his word”

is there

for there is no prohibition of “Do not profane” whatsoever in sleeping tomorrow?

Rather, is it not a case of one who slept [for example, one who sleeps]

today, in which case there is indeed a prohibition of “Do not profane” with regard to sleeping tomorrow?

But you cannot say that our Mishna comes to inform us that if he slept today, he is under the prohibition of “Do not profane” tomorrow, for that is obvious.

Thus, it is evident that there is [a case of] sleeping,

that is: necessarily our Mishna comes to inform us that he is permitted to sleep today, and this is the interpretation of the Mishna: he is permitted to sleep today and to place himself in a possible prohibition of “Do not profane” if he sleeps on the following day.

And this is a refutation of Rav Yehuda,

who prohibits sleeping today lest he sleep tomorrow and come to the retroactive prohibition of “Do not profane.”

And we answer:

When it teaches

our Mishna, “He is subject to ‘Do not profane his word,’”

if he sleeps,

that is: this is the intention of the Mishna and its novelty:

Since if he sleeps today he will be subject to “Do not profane his word” tomorrow, he should not sleep today, lest he come to “Do not profane” tomorrow.

Ravina said:

Actually, as it teaches,

he did not say, “My eyes are a konam with regard to sleep,” but rather said, “A konam that I sleep,” and the tannay comes to inform us that it is prohibited to him even though it is something that has no substance,

and

as for your difficulty: this contains no prohibition, since it has no substance—

What

“Do not profane”

is there? From rabbinic ordinance,

for by rabbinic ordinance the vow takes effect, even though it has no substance.

The Gemara asks:

And is there

“Do not profane”

from rabbinic ordinance,

that is: have we found that a Mishna should say, “He is subject to ‘Do not profane his word,’” which is the wording of the verse, and nevertheless the Mishna’s intention is only to a rabbinic prohibition because of “Do not profane”!?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed we find the wording “Do not profane his word” where the intention is not to a Torah prohibition, but rather to a rabbinic prohibition because of “Do not profane.”

And it was taught

in agreement:

Things that are permitted, but others adopted the practice of prohibiting them,

you are not permitted to permit them before them, as it is stated:

“Do not profane his word.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav Yehuda from that which

we learned

in a Mishna below, 57a:

One who says to his wife before Passover:

“That you benefit from me

[my property]

until Passover, if you go to your father’s house until the festival

that follows it.”

If she

went before Passover

and violated his condition, for he stipulated that she not go from the time of his vow until the festival, she is

prohibited from benefiting from him until Passover.

The Gemara infers: only if she

went before Passover

and violated his condition is she indeed prohibited from benefiting from him until Passover; but if she has still

not gone—rather, if she goes she will be prohibited retroactively—

and it is only the case that if she goes she will become retroactively forbidden—

not

is she prohibited from benefiting from him.

It is thus proved that she is permitted to violate the prohibition, and she does not fear that she may violate the condition in the future; and this is difficult for Rav Yehuda!?

Rabbi Abba said

to resolve Rav Yehuda’s method: Actually, she is immediately prohibited from benefiting, even if she has not gone, because perhaps she will go. And what we learned, “If she went” before Passover, she is prohibited from benefiting from him until Passover, this is what it says:

“If she went before Passover, she is prohibited

from benefiting from him

and

also

she is flogged,

the woman who violated “Do not profane his word.”

But if she

did not go, she is prohibited in general

rabbinically, but she is not flogged.

And we still ask against Rav Yehuda:

Come and hear the latter clause

of this Mishna:

“After Passover

she is

subject to ‘Do not profane his word,’

that is: she is prohibited from going to her father’s house until the festival, since by doing so she will retroactively violate the prohibition of “Do not profane” concerning the benefit she enjoyed before Passover.

And if she did not benefit before Passover [if she did not benefit before Passover],

—

is there ‘Do not profane’

after Passover? What prohibition does she have against going to her father’s house as much as she wishes!?

Rather, it is obvious

that the latter clause deals with a case

where she benefited

from him before Passover, and therefore she is prohibited from going to her father’s house until the festival.

Thus, it is evident that she benefits [she is permitted to benefit before Passover], that is: if she is not permitted to benefit before Passover, how did the tannay state plainly that she is prohibited from going to her father’s house until after Passover? On the contrary, presumably she refrained from benefiting, and she is then permitted to go.

before Passover. That is, if she were not permitted to benefit from him before Passover, how could the tanna state simply that she is forbidden to go to her father’s house until after the festival? On the contrary, presumably she refrained from benefiting from him, in which case she would again be permitted to go.