Nedarim 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

and we are not concerned lest he sleep tomorrow. And the reason is:

because a person is not careful

with a

condition [only with a condition is a person not careful]; that is, a person is not careful to avoid violating the condition upon which the vow he made yesterday depends. And although, if he violates it, it is found that retroactively he has violated the vow, nevertheless the Sages were concerned that he might violate the condition, and it would consequently be found that he had violated the vow retroactively.

That is, a person is not careful to avoid violating the condition on which the vow he made yesterday depends. Even though, if he violates it, he is found to have retroactively violated the vow, the Sages were concerned that he might violate the condition and thereby be found to have retroactively violated the vow.

But with regard to a prohibition, he is careful:

With regard to the substance of the prohibition that he imposed upon himself through the vow, he is careful. And since sleeping tomorrow is the substance of the prohibition, there is no concern that he might sleep tomorrow.

We learned

in our Mishna:

“A konam that I sleep, that I walk, that I speak”

he is therefore subject to “he shall not profane his word.”

What are the circumstances

of the case addressed by our Mishna, and what is it coming to teach us?

If you say

that the one making the vow vowed

as it is stated [as it is written in the Mishna], saying: “A konam that

in the Mishna, saying: “A vow:

I sleep,”

meaning: My sleeping shall be forbidden to me, and the Mishna comes to teach us that although he did not prohibit any object upon himself, but rather prohibited sleeping, which has no substance, nevertheless the vow takes effect—

It is impossible to say this.

For

does a vow take effect at all

when it concerns something that has no substance?

But it was taught

in the beraita cited above, on 13b:

There is greater stringency with regard to oaths

than with regard to vows,

as oaths take effect with regard to something that has substance and with regard to something that has no substance, whereas this is not so with regard to vows,

which take effect only with regard to something that has substance, meaning that the prohibition must relate to an object or to one of a person’s limbs.

And sleeping

is

something that has no substance,

and a vow cannot take effect with regard to it!

Rather,

perhaps you should explain our Mishna as dealing with a case

where he said: “My eyes are a konam”

—they being the object prohibited to him—

“with regard to sleep”

forever. And the Mishna comes to teach us that although ultimately he will be forced to violate his vow, since a person cannot refrain from sleeping forever, or even for three days, nevertheless he may not sleep until he is overcome by sleep.

That too cannot be said, since:

And if he did not specify a measure [if indeed he did not limit his vow], but prohibited sleeping upon himself forever,

if he indeed did not limit his vow and prohibited sleep to himself forever—

do we leave him until he violates the prohibition of “he shall not profane” [do we leave him until he violates the prohibition of “he shall not profane”]? That is: Would such a vow, which he cannot fulfill and through which he will necessarily violate “he shall not profane,” take effect at all from the outset!?

Would such a vow, which he cannot fulfill and through which he will necessarily violate the prohibition against profaning his word, take effect at all from the outset!?

But didn’t Rabbi Yohanan say:

If one swears that he will not sleep for three days,

since this is something that a person cannot endure, the oath does not take effect at all, and

they lash him

immediately on account of a “vain oath,”

and he sleeps immediately,

since the oath did not take effect at all.

And if so, if you can say that our Mishna is dealing with a case in which he prohibited sleeping forever, and it comes to teach us that he is prohibited from sleeping until he is overcome by sleep, this is not so, since the vow does not take effect at all, and he may sleep immediately.

Rather,

perhaps you should say that our Mishna is dealing with a case

where he said: “My eyes are a konam with regard to sleeping tomorrow if I sleep today,” and our Mishna comes to teach us that he is prohibited from sleeping today, lest he sleep tomorrow. And this is what we learned: “He is subject to ‘he shall not profane his word,’”

meaning that he is prohibited from sleeping today, lest tomorrow he come to violate “he shall not profane his word.”

That too cannot be said, as

you have said: In every matter involving a prohibition, he is careful,

and he is not prohibited from sleeping today out of concern that he might sleep tomorrow, which is the actual substance of his prohibition.

Rather, it is obvious

that our Mishna is dealing, for example, with a case

where he said: “

My eyes are a konam with regard to sleeping today if I sleep tomorrow,”

and in such a case the Mishna says: “He is subject to ‘he shall not profane his word.’”

And now the difficulty arises:

It is impossible to explain the Mishna’s intention as being that he is subject to the prohibition of “he shall not profane” with regard to sleeping today lest he sleep tomorrow, since this is not a prohibition of “he shall not profane.” Even according to the one who prohibits it, this is only a rabbinic concern, and not the prohibition of “he shall not profane.”

Necessarily, then, the phrase “he shall not profane his word” stated in the Mishna refers to sleeping tomorrow.

And

in what case, then, does our Mishna deal?

If he did not sleep today

at all [if he did not sleep today],

if he sleeps tomorrow, what “

violation of ‘he shall not profane his word’

is there?”

There is no prohibition whatsoever against sleeping tomorrow.

Rather, is it not referring to one who slept [for example, one who slept] today? In that case, there is indeed a prohibition of “he shall not profane” with regard to sleeping tomorrow.

—for example, if he sleeps today, in which case there is indeed a prohibition against profaning his word through sleeping tomorrow?

But you cannot say that our Mishna comes to teach us that if he slept today, he is subject to the prohibition of “he shall not profane” tomorrow, since that is obvious.

Apparently, the possibility of sleeping exists,

meaning: Necessarily, our Mishna comes to teach us that he is permitted to sleep today, and this is the explanation of the Mishna: He is permitted to sleep today and thereby place himself in a situation of possible violation of “he shall not profane” if he sleeps tomorrow.

This is a refutation of Rav Yehuda,

who prohibits sleeping today lest he sleep tomorrow and thereby retroactively come to violate the prohibition of “he shall not profane.”

And we answer:

When it teaches

in our Mishna, “He is subject to ‘he shall not profane his word,’”

if he slept,

this is the intention and novelty of the Mishna:

Since, if he sleeps today, he will be subject to “he shall not profane his word” tomorrow, he should not sleep today, lest he come to violate “he shall not profane” tomorrow.

Ravina said:

Actually, it is as it is stated: He did not say, “My eyes are a konam with regard to sleeping,” but rather said, “A konam that I sleep,” and the tanna comes to teach us that he is prohibited even though this concerns something that has no substance.

He did not say, “My eyes are forbidden with regard to sleep,” but rather said, “Sleeping is forbidden to me,” and the tanna comes to teach that it is forbidden to him even though it is something that has no tangible substance.

And

as for the difficulty raised against you—that there is no prohibition here since it concerns something that has no substance—

What “

‘he shall not profane’

by rabbinic law?” Since by rabbinic law the vow takes effect, despite the fact that it concerns something that has no substance.

The vow takes effect by rabbinic authority, even though it concerns something that has no tangible substance.

The Gemara is astonished:

Is there “

‘he shall not profane’

by rabbinic law?” That is: Do we find that the Mishna would state, “He is subject to ‘he shall not profane his word,’” which is the language of the verse, while nevertheless intending only a rabbinic prohibition on account of “he shall not profane”?

That is, can we find a Mishna that says, “He is subject to ‘He shall not profane his word,’” which is the language of the Torah, while meaning only a rabbinic prohibition based on “He shall not profane his word”?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed we find the expression “he shall not profane his word” where the intention is not a Torah prohibition, but a rabbinic prohibition on account of “he shall not profane.”

And it was taught

in support:

“With regard to permitted matters that others have adopted the practice of prohibiting,

you are not permitted to permit them in their presence, as it is stated: “

He shall not profane his word.”

The Gemara raises an objection against Rav Yehuda from the following:

We learned

in a Mishna below, on 57a:

One who says to his wife before Passover: “

The benefit you receive from me [my property]

[meaning, my benefit is forbidden to you]

is forbidden to you until Passover if you go to your father’s house until the Festival

that follows it.”

If

she went before Passover

and violated his condition—for he stipulated that she not go from the time of his vow until the Festival—she is

forbidden to benefit from him until Passover.

The Gemara infers: Only if

she went before Passover

and violated his condition is she indeed forbidden to benefit from him until Passover; but if she

has not gone—rather, if she goes, she will become retroactively prohibited—

and it is only the case that if she goes she will become retroactively forbidden—

she is not

forbidden to benefit from him.

It is therefore proven that she is permitted to violate the prohibition, and she is not concerned that she might violate the condition in the future, which is difficult for Rav Yehuda!?

Rabbi Abba said

to reconcile the view of Rav Yehuda: Actually, she is immediately forbidden to benefit, even if she has not gone, because perhaps she will go. And what we learned, “If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to benefit from him until Passover,” means as follows:

If she went before Passover, she is forbidden

to benefit from him,

and

she also

she is also liable to lashes,

the woman who violated “he shall not profane his word.”

But if

she has not gone, she is merely prohibited,

by rabbinic law, but she is not liable to lashes.

The Gemara still raises an objection against Rav Yehuda:

Consider the latter clause

of this Mishna:

“After Passover”

she is

subject to ‘he shall not profane his word,’

meaning: She is forbidden to go to her father’s house until the Festival, since by doing so she would retroactively violate the prohibition of “he shall not profane” with regard to the benefit she received before Passover.

And if she did not benefit before Passover [if she did not benefit before Passover],

—

is there a violation of “he shall not profane”

after Passover? What prohibition could there be against her going to her father’s house as much as she wishes!?

Rather, it is obvious

that the latter clause is dealing with a case

where she benefited

from him before Passover, and therefore she is forbidden to go to her father’s house until the Festival.

Apparently, she does benefit [she is permitted to benefit before Passover]. That is, if she were not permitted to benefit before Passover, how could the tanna state plainly that she is forbidden to go to her father’s house until after Passover? On the contrary, presumably she refrained from benefiting, and she should then be permitted to go.

before Passover. That is, if she were not permitted to benefit from him before Passover, how could the tanna state simply that she is forbidden to go to her father’s house until after the festival? On the contrary, presumably she refrained from benefiting from him, in which case she would again be permitted to go.