Nedarim 14b — the Talmud in English

In the beraita below, which deals with one who made a vow concerning the Torah, our Sages disagreed whether it is speaking of a vow or of an oath.

Their disagreement is fundamental: whether it is possible to associate a person’s vow with a vow, with an issar, or with the offerings mentioned in the Torah, or perhaps association is possible only with things that have been made [sacred], and not with things written in the Torah.

The early authorities [the Ritva and the Ran] who hold that it is not possible to associate a vow with what is written in the Torah establish the beraita as referring to an oath, by which a person validates his words by swearing by the Torah.

The explanation of the beraita below was written according to the Ran and the Rosh, who establish it as referring to one who swore and not to one who associated [his statement] with a vow.

And three matters were stated in the beraita: in the first clause, in the middle clause, and in the final clause.

It was taught in a beraita:

A. The first clause:

One who vows by

“the Torah,”

when a Torah scroll was before him, and he said, “By this Torah, that I will do, or that I will not do, a certain matter” —

he has said nothing,

since he swore by the parchment.

B. The middle clause: But if he vowed

by what is written in it —

his words stand,

since he swore by the Name of the Lord that is in the Torah.

C. The final clause:

And if he said,

“By it and by what is written in it” —

his words stand,

and this is an oath.

And the Gemara analyzes the wording of the beraita:

It teaches

in the middle clause:

“By what is written in it” —

his words stand.

If so, why did the tanna add by saying in the final clause:

“By it and by what is written in it”?

Is it so that

it is necessary to say

that if he said this, his words stand?

Rav Naḥman said: This is not difficult.

This is the meaning of the beraita:

The first clause and the middle clause of the beraita speak of one who was holding a Torah scroll in his hand.

Therefore, in the first clause, where he swore by it, his words do not stand, since he swore by the parchment.

And in the middle clause, where he swore by what is written in it, his words stand, because, while holding it in his hand, he swore by the Name of the Lord written in it.

But in the final clause, it is speaking of a case where he is not holding the Torah scroll, but it is lying before him. Then, if he says only “by what is written in it,” his intention is the parchment on which the Torah scroll is written.

Therefore, only if he says “by it and by what is written in it” does the meaning of his words become that he swore by the Name of the Lord written in it.

And this is how Rav Naḥman distinguished:

This—the final clause, where he says “by it and by what is written in it”—is speaking of a case

such as

where the Torah is placed on the ground,

as was explained.

Whereas

this—that the beraita stated in the first clause “one who vows by the Torah,” and in the middle clause “one who vows by what is written in it”—is speaking of a case

such as

where he takes it

the Torah

in his hand.

And Rav Naḥman explains his distinction:

If he vows when the Torah scroll is

placed on the ground —

his mind is on the parchment,

his intention is to swear by the parchment, and there is no substance to his oath. Therefore, only if he said the wording “by it and by what is written in it” does he intend to swear by the Name of the Lord written in the Torah.

But if, at the time he vows, he

takes it

the Torah

in his hand,

and said that he swears by the Torah —

his mind is on the Names in it.

And if you wish, say:

we shall establish the beraita in one manner, and not in two different manners as we established it in the previous answer; rather, in all three cases it is speaking of a case

where it is placed,

where the Torah is placed

on the ground.

And this it teaches us

the tanna in the middle clause:

even though it is placed,

where the Torah is placed

on the ground,

and there was room to say that he swore by the parchment in it, nevertheless,

since he said “by what is written in it” —

it is effective,

since his intention is to swear by the Name of the Lord in the Torah.

And the final clause is superfluous, because when he says “by it and by what is written in it,” it is obvious that his intention is not to swear only by the parchment, but also by the sacred Names in the Torah.

And the superfluity of the final clause comes to reveal that the beraita is speaking in this manner: that he is not holding the Torah scroll in his hand, but it is lying before him; nevertheless, the middle clause teaches that if he says that he swears “by what is written in it,” his intention is not the parchment, but the sacred Names in the Torah.

And

the words of the beraita—in the formulation of

“this, and it is not necessary to say this,”

it teaches.

For after the final clause reveals concerning the middle clause that it is speaking in a case where the Torah scroll is not in his hand, but is lying before him, there is no novelty at all in the words of the final clause itself.

And if you wish, say:

it is possible to establish the beraita in another manner:

The first clause and the middle clause speak of a case where the Torah scroll is lying before him. Therefore, when he says “by the Torah,” he intends to swear by the parchment, and when he says “by what is written in it,” he swears by the sacred Names in it.

Whereas the final clause speaks of a case where he is holding the Torah scroll in his hand, as Rav Naḥman established it in the first answer. However, the final clause should not be read as saying that he swears “by it and by what is written in it,” for this is obvious and is included in the words of the middle clause.

Rather, the final clause should be read [as stated, we have now established it as speaking of a case where he is holding the Torah in his hand], that he swore “by it” alone!

[The reading below follows the reading of the Ran!] And

the final clause—this it teaches us: since he takes it

the Torah

in his hand,

then

even though he said only

“by it” —

it is like one who says

“by what is written in it,”

it is considered.

For by holding the Torah scroll in his hand, he intends to swear by what is stated in it, and not by the parchment.

Mishna:

One who says:

“A konam that I sleep,”

or he said: “A konam

that I speak,

or

that I walk,”

and the Gemara will explain what his wording was.

And likewise,

one who says to his wife: “A konam that I engage in intercourse with you” —

this is —

each and every one of these —

subject to “

he shall not profane his word.”

Gemara:

It was stated:

One who said:

“A konam on my eyes with regard to sleep today, if I sleep tomorrow.”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: He should not sleep today

by rabbinic law,

lest he sleep tomorrow

and it be found that his condition was fulfilled, and that retroactively he was prohibited from sleeping today.

And Rav Naḥman said: He may sleep today

if he wishes,

and we are not concerned lest he sleep tomorrow

and it be found that he retroactively transgressed bal yachel through his sleeping today.

And Rav Yehuda concedes: When he says:

“A konam on my eyes with regard to sleep tomorrow, if I sleep today.”

He should sleep today,

and we are not concerned lest he sleep tomorrow.