Nedarim 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

that he places

and brings

the flesh of a firstborn animal, and places flesh of such

and brings this permitted flesh from its other side, and places it

above it

beside it.

And he said

about the permitted flesh: “

This—

like this”!

And

the dispute

is a tannaitic dispute:

whether he associates it with the initial status, with the flesh of the firstborn before the sprinkling of the blood, when it was forbidden to everyone to eat because of the sanctity of the offering, and it is therefore forbidden; or whether he associates it with the present status, with the flesh of the firstborn after the sprinkling of the blood, when it is permitted for the priests to eat, and it is therefore permitted!

And we reject this:

No,

this is not the issue over which Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Yosei disagree.

Rather,

everyone agrees

that he associates it, even if he stated his words without specification, with the flesh of a firstborn animal

before the sprinkling of the blood.

And what is the reason of the one who permits it?

But a firstborn animal is an offering!?

Since

the verse says

in the passage concerning vows [Numbers 30]: “A man

when he takes

a vow to the Lord”—the Torah teaches through the repetition of the phrase “when he takes a vow” that a vow does not take effect through association

until he takes a vow

and associates it

with something that is subject to a vow.

To exclude

and remove

a firstborn animal—

for it is something prohibited!

For a firstborn animal is sacred from the womb, automatically, and is not something placed under a vow by a person.

And

if

the one who prohibits

thought as follows:

Since

the verse says: “When he takes a vow

to vow

to the Lord”—

the verse teaches with the word “to the Lord”

to include

one who associates it with

something prohibited.

The Gemara explains:

And the one who permits [

since he associates it with something prohibited and not with something subject to a vow]—what does he do with the word

“to the Lord,”

what use does he make of it?

He requires it—

he needs the superfluous word “to the Lord”

to refer to one who associates it with

the flesh of

a sin-offering or a guilt-offering.

We raise a difficulty:

What have you seen that leads you to include

one who associates it with the flesh of

a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, and to exclude one who associates it with a

firstborn animal,

which is?

And we answer:

I include a sin-offering and a guilt-offering—

because one associates it with something subject to a vow.

And I exclude a firstborn animal—

because it is sanctified from its mother’s womb.

And the one who prohibits

thought:

a firstborn animal, too—

one associates it with something subject to a vow,

for in addition to its sanctity from the womb, which comes about automatically, it also possesses sanctity brought about through a person’s consecration!

As it was taught in a beraita: In the name of Rabbi they said: From where is it derived concerning

one who

has born

to him

a firstborn animal within his household, that it is a mitzva

for its owner

to consecrate it

himself, and to say, “This is consecrated with the sanctity of the firstborn,” even though it is already sacred automatically by Torah law?

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 15]: “

"The

The male—

you shall consecrate.”

And if so, a firstborn animal, too, is something subject to a vow, since its owner consecrated it.

And the one who permits

thought: Even

when its owner does not consecrate it

as a firstborn animal—

is it not consecrated

automatically, at the time of its birth?

Therefore, the mitzva to consecrate it does not make it “something subject to a vow,” since the person’s consecration does not add any sanctity to it; rather, there is merely a mitzva for its owner to state verbally that the firstborn animal should be sacred with the sanctity of the firstborn.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says,

“Like a lamb, like pens,”

it is forbidden.

The tanna taught

in a beraita:

“Lamb,” “for a lamb,” “like a lamb.”

“Pens,” “for pens,” “like pens.”

“Wood,” “for wood,” “like wood.”

“Fires,” “for fires,” “like fires.”

“Altar,” “for the Altar,” “like the Altar.”

“Sanctuary,” “for the Sanctuary,” “like the Sanctuary.”

“Jerusalem,” “for Jerusalem,” “like Jerusalem.”

In

all of them,

if he added and said:

“that I may eat to you”—

it is forbidden.

But if he added and said:

“I will not eat to you”—

it is permitted.

We raise a difficulty:

Whom do we hear maintain that there is no difference

between one who says

“lamb”

and one who says

“for a lamb”

or

“like a lamb,”

so that the vow takes effect in all of them even if he does not add the kaf of comparison?—

It is Rabbi Meir!

For according to Rabbi Yehuda, if he does not add the kaf of comparison, he has said nothing.

If so,

say the latter clause: “And in all of them,”

if he added and said:

“I will not eat to you”—

it is permitted.

And this is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir, for—

And we learned: “

As an offering, I will not eat to you”—

Rabbi Meir prohibits.

And

concerning this

Rabbi Abba said: It is treated as though he had said, “

It shall be an offering—

therefore I will not eat to you”!

Yet our Mishna permits it to be eaten.

And we answer:

This is not difficult:

This—

our Mishna is speaking of a case

in which he said: “

No,

lamb, I will not eat to you.” In that case it is permitted according to Rabbi Meir, since he does not hold that “from a negative statement you infer a positive one.”

But

Whereas

the case in which

Rabbi Meir says that it is forbidden is one in which he said: “

For a lamb” [with a sheva beneath the lamed], I will not eat to you.

a.

Mishna:

1.

One who says: “An olah-offering, a meal-offering, a sin-offering, a thanksgiving-offering, or peace-offerings”—

“that I may eat to you!”

It is forbidden,

even though he did not add the kaf of comparison.

Rabbi Yehuda permits

until he adds the kaf of comparison.

There is a novelty in Rabbi Yehuda’s statement: We do not say in these cases that “their names indicate their prohibition,” and they are not comparable to one who says “piggul” or “notar” without the kaf of comparison. In those cases even Rabbi Yehuda prohibits, since their names demonstrate that his intention is to impose a prohibition.

2. One who says:

“The offering, like an offering, an offering”—

“that I may eat to you.”

It is forbidden

even without the kaf of comparison.

3. One who says

“As an offering, I will not eat to you”—

Rabbi Meir prohibits.

Gemara:

It teaches

in the middle clause of the Mishna:

“An offering, the offering, like an offering, that I may eat to you”—

it is forbidden.

The anonymous tanna taught “

an offering”—

in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who does not distinguish between “

lamb”

and

between “like

a lamb.”

And we challenge this:

If it is Rabbi Meir,

it is difficult:

that which it teaches

in the additional example:

“The offering, that I may eat to you”—

it is forbidden.

But it was taught in a beraita: The Sages agree [

Rabbi Meir]

with Rabbi Yehuda concerning one who says: “This is an offering, and this is an olah-offering, and this is a meal-offering, and this is a sin-offering, that I may eat to you”—

that it is permitted,

because

he made this vow only regarding the life of an offering!