Nedarim 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

But what of the teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering

from the forty loaves—only

after the sprinkling of the blood is it

made, for at that point all the prohibitions pertaining to the offering lapse, and it becomes permitted for consumption by the kohanim. Therefore, the teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering is customarily separated only after the sprinkling of the blood.

Once the blood has been sprinkled, the loaves are no longer forbidden as a “matter designated by a vow,” like an offering; rather, they are forbidden to Israelites only as a “forbidden matter,” like teruma from produce, which is considered a forbidden matter and not a matter designated by a vow, since it is permitted for consumption by kohanim and forbidden to Israelites.

If so, it necessarily follows that one who associates an object with the teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering is prohibited only because he associates it with the original state—that is, with the thanksgiving loaves before the sprinkling of the blood. At that time they are forbidden as an offering before the sprinkling of its blood, because they are the loaves of a thanksgiving offering and have the status of an offering, whose prohibition is in the category of a matter designated by a vow. Therefore, it is possible to associate an object with them!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, rejects this proof:

Say

that the statement should be emended, and that instead of “the teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering” it should read:

like the teruma of the chamber.

That is, the coins that were “contributed” into three collection boxes from all the money located in the “chamber” [in the Temple courtyard, beside the Temple].

In the chamber, all the half-shekel coins received each year from the Jewish people were gathered. With the money in the boxes, which was “contributed” from all the coins in the chamber, the communal offerings were purchased.

It follows that one who associates an object with the “teruma of the chamber” is indeed associating it with its present state, with money that at present possesses the sanctity of an offering, which is a matter designated by a vow; therefore it is

forbidden.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

But

one who associates an object with the

teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering—what is his status?

What, in your opinion, is the ruling when he associates it with its present state?—

It is permitted.

For now the loaves do not possess the sanctity of an offering.

If so, it is difficult:

let the Mishna teach

that one who associates an object

with the teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering

after the sprinkling of the blood, it is permitted.

There would be a greater novelty in this statement than in the ruling that one who associates an object with teruma or with ḥalla is permitted—for although originally these loaves possessed the sanctity of an offering, which is a “matter designated by a vow,” nevertheless the object that he now associates with the teruma of the loaves is not prohibited. Since he associates it with their present state, and the loaves from which the teruma was separated no longer possess the sanctity of an offering, they have only the status governing consumption: they are permitted for consumption by kohanim but not by Israelites.

And all the more so,

one who associates an object with

his teruma

separated from produce is permitted, since teruma from produce is never a matter designated by a vow. Even originally, when the produce was tevel, it was not considered a matter designated by a vow, but rather a forbidden matter!

And we answer: The loaves of the teruma of a thanksgiving offering are also included in what the Mishna below states: “like the ḥalla of Aaron and like his teruma.”

And

this teaches us

that the Mishna included them within the category of teruma:

the teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering

is included within

his teruma!

And if you wish, say: The teruma of the loaves of a thanksgiving offering, too— -

It is possible that

it is made before the sprinkling of the blood

is performed.

And

for example, he separated them

the loaves of teruma from the thanksgiving loaves already

at

the time of

kneading,

when the blood of the thanksgiving sacrifice had not yet been sprinkled. It follows that the thanksgiving loaves possessed the sanctity of an offering, which is a matter designated by a vow.

The Gemara demonstrates that it is possible to separate the teruma of the thanksgiving loaves at such an early stage—

And is this not what Rav Tovi bar Kisna said in the name of Shmuel: If one baked the loaves of a thanksgiving offering as four loaves

from the four types of thanksgiving loaves—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

The Gemara now discusses Shmuel’s statement and demonstrates that it must be understood as referring to one who separated the thanksgiving loaves at the time of kneading:

We raised a question concerning Shmuel’s statement:

But it is written, “

forty

loaves.” How, then, could Shmuel say that the thanksgiving loaves may be baked as four loaves? His statement must be explained as follows: the requirement to bake forty separate loaves applies only initially,

for

the fulfillment of the

mitzva.

But after the fact, one fulfills his obligation even if they are baked as four loaves.

Nevertheless, Shmuel’s statement is still difficult:

How can it be possible to bake four loaves from the four types and thereby fulfill one’s obligation after the fact?

But it is necessary to take the teruma!

One must take four loaves from the thanksgiving loaves for the teruma of the thanksgiving loaves [for one must separate one loaf from every ten loaves]. How, then, can one take teruma consisting of four loaves from four loaves?!

And should you say that he takes,

perhaps, as an answer, that he can take

one loaf

from among the four loaves and separate it as teruma

for all of them.

This cannot be said, because it would mean that the loaf he separates as teruma represents only one type of loaf from among the four types of the thanksgiving offering—

But did we not learn:

It is written concerning the teruma of the thanksgiving loaves [Leviticus 7], “

one from each offering”—

the verse teaches

that he may not take from one offering

one loaf and separate it

for its fellow!

Rather, he must take from each and every one of the four types of thanksgiving loaves a loaf of that particular type—

And should you say that he takes,

perhaps, as an answer to Shmuel’s statement, that he cuts

a piece from each and every one

of the four loaves, and separates the four pieces from the four types as teruma for the four loaves.

This, too, cannot be said, for—

But did we not learn: “

one”—

he must take one whole loaf as teruma—

he may not take a piece!

Rather,

it necessarily follows that Shmuel’s statement refers to a case where

he separated

the loaves of teruma of the thanksgiving offering

at

the time of

kneading,

while he was still kneading the dough.

He takes one

piece of dough

from

the dough of the ḥalla of

leavened loaves, and one

piece of dough

from

the dough of the

loaves, and one

piece of dough

from

the dough of the

wafers, and one

piece of dough

from

the dough of the

scalded loaves.

That is, he takes a piece of dough from each of the four types of loaves. In that case, the piece of dough is not considered a “piece” cut from a loaf, and he separates the four pieces of dough from the four types of dough as the teruma of the thanksgiving loaves.

He then bakes the four portions of dough as four thanksgiving loaves of the four types.

Likewise, he bakes separately the four pieces of dough in his possession as four loaves of the teruma of the thanksgiving loaves.

It follows that he has four loaves baked as teruma, and they do not suffer from the deficiency of being a “piece.”

Since we have established that Shmuel’s statement refers to one who separated the loaves of teruma of the thanksgiving offering while they were still dough, at the time of kneading, we have found that the teruma of the thanksgiving loaves can be separated before the sprinkling of the blood of the thanksgiving sacrifice.

The Gemara now considers whether the dispute between Rava and Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, as to whether one associates an object with the original state or with its present state, is a dispute between tannaim:

Shall we say that this is a dispute between tannaim?—

As it is taught in a beraita: One who says:

It is incumbent upon me like a firstborn animal—

Rabbi Yaakov prohibits, and Rabbi Yehuda permits.

We raised a question concerning this:

What are the circumstances?

In what case do they disagree?

If you say

that the beraita is referring to one who associates meat or a loaf of bread and explicitly says that he is associating it with the meat of a firstborn animal

before the sprinkling of the blood—

what is the reason of the one who permits?

After all, a firstborn animal is an offering, and it follows that he is associating the object with an offering!

And if

he is explicitly associating it with the meat of a firstborn animal

after the sprinkling of the blood,

when it is permitted for consumption—

what is the reason of the one who prohibits?

Rather, is it not

that the beraita is referring to a case such as: