Nedarim 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

And we resolve:

This is not difficult:

Here,

where Rabbi Meir concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that it is permitted, the case is one in which

he said

this in two words: “

This is a korban,”

and for the reason that the Gemara will explain shortly.

But here,

where the matter is considered an act of invoking a korban, the case is one in which

he said

this as a single word, “

the korban,”

whose meaning is “like a korban.”

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that one who says “This is a korban” has not made a vow?

Since when he says “This is a korban”—“By the

life of the korban,”

he is saying—

and this is not an act of associating something with an object made forbidden by a vow.

The Gemara now proceeds to explain what

is taught

at the end of our Mishna: “

As a korban, I shall not eat of yours”—

Rabbi Meir prohibits.

The Gemara assumed that the meaning of his words is: “May that which I do not eat of yours be a korban,” and it follows from these words that “what I eat of yours shall be a korban.”

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Meir does not hold

the principle that “

from a negative statement you can infer a positive one”?!

And we resolve:

Rabbi Abba said: This statement is made

as though he were

saying: “

As a korban shall it be”—

therefore I shall not eat of yours.”

Mishna:

This Mishna presents a new principle in the laws of vows: a person can prohibit his own limbs from being used, just as he can prohibit himself from using his possessions.

For example, he can prohibit his mouth from being used for speech.

Likewise, he can prohibit himself from using his limbs for another person’s benefit; for example, he can prohibit his mouth from speaking with his fellow.

One who says to his fellow: “

Konam, my mouth is forbidden from speaking with you,”

or one who says, “Konam,

my hands are forbidden from acting for you,”

or one who says, “Konam,

my feet are forbidden from walking with you”—

it is forbidden

for him to speak with him, act for him, or walk with him.

The Gemara will ultimately explain that although a person cannot impose a vow prohibiting an action or activity itself, but can prohibit only an object to himself, nevertheless his vow takes effect, so that he may not speak with him, act for him, or walk with him.

This is because our Mishna is speaking of one who prohibited his mouth to himself from using it to speak with his fellow, or who prohibited his hands to himself from using them for his fellow, or who prohibited his feet to himself from using them to walk with him.

Gemara:

At first, the Gemara assumed that the intent of our Mishna was to say that a person can prohibit himself by a vow from speaking with his fellow, acting for him, or walking with him.

And we raise a contradiction

to this from what we learned in the Tosefta [Nedarim, chapter 1, and likewise in Tractate Shevuot 25a]:

There

is a stringency with regard to oaths over vows, and

there

is a stringency with regard to vows over oaths.

And the beraita explains there:

The stringency with regard to vows

over oaths is—

that vows take effect

even

with regard to a mitzva,

to nullify its fulfillment,

just as

they take effect

with regard to

a matter that is

permitted.

For example, if a person prohibits himself by a konam from sitting in a sukka, he is forbidden to sit in the sukka, even though by doing so he nullifies the mitzva of sitting in a sukka.

This is not so with regard to oaths,

which do not take effect to nullify a mitzva. For if one swears not to sit in a sukka, his oath does not take effect.

And the stringency with regard to oaths

over vows is—

that oaths take effect

both

with regard to a tangible matter, and

with regard to a matter

that is intangible.

This is not so with regard to vows!

A vow can take effect only with regard to a tangible matter. Therefore, one who says, “Konam, I shall not speak with you,” has not made an effective vow, because there is no tangible object upon which it can take effect. But if he says to him, “Konam, my mouth is forbidden from speaking with you,” the vow takes effect with regard to his mouth, which is a tangible object.

And since vows do not take effect with regard to an intangible matter, this is apparently a contradiction to our Mishna, which says that a person can prohibit himself from speaking, acting, or walking!

Rav Yehuda said:

Our Mishna is speaking

of one who says: “

May my mouth be forbidden—

to my speech”; “

May my

hands be forbidden—

to their actions”; “

May my

feet be forbidden—

to their walking,”

for by doing so he imposes an object-prohibition upon the limbs of his body, so that he is forbidden to use them.

His bodily limbs are tangible objects, and with regard to the matters that he prohibited to himself, they become for him objects subject to prohibition.

This is also precise, as it is taught

in our Mishna: “Konam,

my mouth is speaking with you,”

which prohibits his mouth, a tangible object,

and it does not teach “Konam,

my speech is forbidden from being

with you,”

which is an intangible matter.

We shall return to you, Kol Kinuyei

Mishna:

This Mishna explains the fundamental principle: a vow can be assimilated only to a “matter subject to a vow,” and not to a “matter prohibited.”

The source of this law was explained in the previous chapter [on the previous page], from the repetition of the expression “when a person takes a vow.”

Several definitions of a “matter subject to a vow” were stated by the early commentators.

Some define it as an object whose sanctity comes through a person’s speech and does not arise on its own.

Others define it as something that can be brought as a vow or a freewill offering, without one being obligated to do so. Or even if one is obligated to do it, it is nevertheless brought because of his vow or freewill offering.

But if one assimilates his vow to a matter that is inherently prohibited—one that the Torah prohibited and that did not come about as a result of a person’s speech—the vow does not take effect.

Our Mishna is divided into two parts.

In its first part, it explains the law concerning one who assimilates his vow to a prohibited matter: the vow does not take effect at all, and he does not require annulment, not even by rabbinic decree.

In its second part, the Mishna explains a rabbinic enactment that applies only in certain cases, such as one who vows to derive no benefit from his wife. In such a case, the Sages required one who assimilated his vow to a prohibited matter to seek annulment of his vow by rabbinic decree. Until he seeks annulment, she is prohibited to him by rabbinic decree, as though the vow had taken effect.

The first part:

And these

are the “vows” that are

permitted,

for the speech in the wording of a vow does not prohibit the one who takes the vow at all, since the vow was assimilated to a prohibited matter and not to a matter subject to a vow—

One who says to his fellow:

“What I eat shall be non-sacred to you.”

The Gemara will explain for what purpose the Mishna teaches this law.

Or one who says to his fellow:

“Like the flesh of a pig”

that I eat shall be to you.

Or

“Like idolatry”

that I eat shall be to you.

Or

“Like the hides”

of animals that were offered as a ritual offering to idolatry, which are

perforated.

That is, the hides were perforated opposite the heart of the animal, because idolaters were accustomed to pierce the animal’s hide opposite its heart while it was alive, remove the animal’s heart from there while it was still alive, and offer it to idolatry.

These hides are prohibited from benefit because they are the hides of animals that were offered as a ritual offering to idolatry.

Or

“Like unslaughtered carcasses and animals with fatal defects,”

or

“like creeping things and crawling creatures.”

Or

“Like Aaron’s dough offering and his teruma” —

In the words of our early authorities there are several differing explanations as to why teruma and dough-offering are considered a thing that is forbidden and not a thing made forbidden by a vow, despite the fact that the designation of teruma and dough-offering takes effect upon them through a person’s speech, and through this they become forbidden to non-koanim to eat. According to Maimonides and the Nimukei Yosef, the reason for the matter is that teruma and dough-offering do not come through a vow or a voluntary offering, unlike a sacrifice, which is a thing that comes through a vow or a voluntary offering. Whereas the Raavad, in his objections, and likewise the Rashba, explain that the prohibition against non-koanim eating teruma and dough-offering does not result from calling a designation upon them, similarly to a sacrifice, but only because they are the property of a koen. And proof of the matter is that they are permitted to be eaten even by a koen’s purchased slave, despite the fact that they are not koanim. And according to this, it is also impossible to assimilate a vow to the breast and thigh given to the koanim from peace-offerings, because the breast and thigh, too, may be eaten by a koen’s purchased slave, and they are a thing forbidden for non-koanim to eat because they are the property of a koen, and not because they are a thing made forbidden by a vow [and the sanctity of the sacrifice that had been in them, which is a thing made forbidden by a vow, departed from them at the time of the sprinkling of the blood of the sacrifice]. But the Tosafot above, 12a, and the Rosh there, wrote that teruma or dough-offering forbid the produce or the dough as untithed produce even before he called upon them the designation of teruma or dough-offering, because the presence of the teruma in the produce, or of the dough-offering in the dough, is what makes everything untithed until they separate and identify the teruma or the dough-offering. It follows that separating teruma from the produce or taking dough-offering from the dough does not forbid the teruma or the dough-offering by calling a designation upon them; on the contrary, calling the designation only permits the untithed produce by identifying the forbidden teruma or the forbidden dough-offering from within it. If so, calling the designation of teruma or dough-offering is not considered a “thing made forbidden by a vow,” but rather a thing that identifies the prohibition from within the mixture in which it had been. Therefore, one who assimilates his vow to Aaron’s dough-offering and his teruma is considered one who assimilates his vow to a thing that is forbidden. And so wrote the Meiri and the Ritva, and even the Rashba cited that there is one who explained in this manner. And according to this, one who assimilates his vow to the breast and thigh is considered one who assimilates his vow to a thing made forbidden by a vow. And the Ran explained on page 12a that since teruma and dough-offering are permitted to be eaten by koanim and forbidden to be eaten only by Israelites, this is proof that the prohibition of non-koanim is a law of the Torah and does not result from his speech. For the one who separates them, when he sanctifies the teruma and the dough-offering, did not distinguish in his speech between koanim and Israelites. And according to his words, the vow of one who assimilates his vow to the breast and thigh likewise does not take effect, because he sanctified the sacrifice and made it forbidden to everyone to eat, and it is only a law of the Torah that the sprinkling of the blood permits the prohibition of the sacrifice, and permits the breast and thigh to be eaten by koanim but not by Israelites, and the meat also by Israelites. Therefore, the prohibition against non-koanim eating the breast and thigh is not considered a thing made forbidden by a vow, because from the perspective of his vow there is no difference between koanim and Israelites.

In all these cases—

it is permitted,

since he assimilated his vow to a prohibited matter and not to a matter subject to a vow.

The second part:

One who says to his wife, “

Behold, you are”

prohibited]

to me as

my

mother

is prohibited to me”—his vow does not take effect by Torah law, since he assimilated it to a prohibited matter.

Nevertheless, the Sages enacted that he should conduct himself as though the vow had taken effect, and should seek annulment of it.

The reason the Sages were more stringent in enacting this with regard to this vow than with regard to other vows assimilated to a prohibited matter is that a person commonly vows to prohibit his wife to himself when he is angry with her. If we permit him to disregard the vow when he assimilates it to a prohibited matter, he may also come to permit himself to disregard it when he assimilates it to a matter subject to a vow.

Although the vow takes effect by rabbinic decree alone and not by Torah law, they were nevertheless stringent with regard to it: when he comes to seek annulment of his vow, they do not open an avenue for him by invoking the honor of his mother, asking him, “Had you known that the assimilation to your mother was not in her honor, would you not have vowed?” This is just as they are stringent not to use an avenue based on the honor of one’s father and mother for a Torah vow.

Rather, they shall

open an avenue for him from another matter,

that is, they find another reason on which to base it, such that had he known of it, he would not have vowed—in order to annul his vow.

And as long as he has not sought annulment of his vow, she is prohibited to him, so that

he will not treat this matter lightly.

Gemara:

The Gemara infers from the wording of our Mishna, which opened by saying, “And these are permitted—what I eat shall be non-sacred to you,” a statement that contains no novelty whatsoever. Necessarily, the intent of our Mishna is to teach:

The reason

that they are permitted is that

he said, “

What I eat shall be non-sacred to you.”

But

if

he said, “

For non-sacred use shall be what I eat to you,”

with a patah beneath the lamed—

it implies, “

It shall not be non-sacred—

rather, a sacrificial offering,”

and these items are prohibited.

We inquire concerning this:

Whose opinion is expressed in our Mishna?