Nazir 58b — the Talmud in English

that a positive commandment does not come and override a prohibition and a positive commandment -

why!?

Let us derive it from a

metzora

who overrides

a positive commandment, even a prohibition and a positive commandment; and just as they are overridden for him!?

Rather,

you are necessarily compelled to concede that

from a

kohen

we do not derive,

because

what is there about a

kohen, since

the destruction of his beard is a

prohibition [an issur] that

is not applicable equally to all,

for women are not prohibited in the destruction of a beard.

And if so, a

Nazirite

metzora

from a

kohen metzora

also does not

derive, since

the destruction of his beard is

a prohibition that is not applicable equally to all, whereas the shaving of the Nazirite’s hair is a prohibition applicable equally to all.

The Gemara returns and raises an objection in the opposite direction:

And

it can still be asked

according to the one who explains “

his head”

as referring to a Nazirite,

why do I need “

his beard”?

For if the verse came to teach concerning the beard of a metzora kohen, that it is prohibited by a prohibition and a positive commandment and is overridden on account of a positive commandment [as the beraita cited above maintains], it should be derived from the fact that the shaving of a metzora overrides the prohibition and positive commandment of a Nazirite!?

And we answer: even according to this tanna,

it is needed for that which was taught: “

His beard,”

what does the verse teach by stating it? Since it was said, “

They shall not shave the corner of their beard,”

one might have thought that a metzora kohen is also subject to this; the verse therefore states, “

his beard.”

Rather, the verse does not come to innovate the overriding, which we already knew from “his head,” but to teach us that the shaving of a metzora is with a razor; for otherwise the Torah would not have permitted him to destroy his beard, since the prohibition of destroying the beard applies only with a razor, and he could fulfill both of them.

And the Gemara explains:

from where do we know that it is specifically with a razor

that the Torah prohibited the destruction of the beard?

For it was taught:

It was said concerning kohanim, “

They shall not shave the corner of their beard.”

One might have thought that even if he shaved it with scissors

and did not destroy the beard from its root -

he should be liable; the verse therefore states

concerning Israelites: “

You shall not destroy the corner of your beard,” and this is not destruction whenever he has not shaved the beard from its root.

the corner of your beard.” This is not considered destruction whenever he has not shaved the beard at its roots.

One might have thought that if he plucked

his beard

with a tweezer and a rahitni [types of knives or files used by craftsmen]

which destroy the beard,

he should be liable.

Therefore

the verse states

concerning kohanim: “

They shall not shave the corner of their beard,”

and this implies in the manner of shaving.

How so?

What is shaving that involves destruction

that is to say, what is destruction that is the manner of shaving?

You must say: this is a razor.

And by the gezerah shavah “corner, corner,” we learn to apply what is stated concerning kohanim also concerning Israelites, and what is stated concerning Israelites also concerning kohanim.

The Gemara’s forthcoming question is explained according to the method of Rabbi Meir in Tosafot, and as he explained his method in the Keren Orah.

And

we object to

the one who derives this “

his head”

for a prohibition alone,

of the rounding of the head:

why need it be written “

his head,”

and why need it be written

also “

his beard”!?

And Tosafot added an explanation: The Gemara’s reasoning that the law of a leprous kohen can be derived from that of a leprous nazir—even though the Torah certainly did not intend the case of a leprous nazir to teach that every positive commandment overrides every prohibition and positive commandment—is that the Gemara understands the reason the prohibitions of a nazir are overridden: they are less severe because they can be annulled by a sage. The Gemara holds that prohibitions and positive commandments that do not apply equally to everyone are comparable to prohibitions and positive commandments that can be annulled by a sage, and that each can therefore be derived from the other. The difficulties that can be raised against this explanation in the Gemara, and their resolutions: A. Apparently, the main difficulty concerning the tanna’s wording is not understandable. Without the extra word “his beard,” we would know nothing, since we would not know that a leper shaves specifically with a razor. Thus the tanna needed “his beard”; and from “his beard” alone we would already know that a leprous kohen shaves, since the Torah did not distinguish between one leper and another. If so, why did he need to mention “his head” in addition to “his beard” and derive the law of a kohen from that of a nazir, when everything could be derived from “his beard”!? It must be said that, nevertheless, the wording implies that “his beard” is needed for the essential law that a positive commandment overrides prohibitions and positive commandments that do not apply equally to everyone. This is not the true explanation, since it is sufficient to derive from it that a leper shaves with a razor, while the rule that the prohibition is overridden can already be derived from “his head.” B. Keren Ora asked: Why did the Gemara raise this difficulty only against the tanna who derived from “his head” merely a prohibition, and not against the tanna who derived from “his head” the law of a nazir? On the contrary, according to the latter opinion the difficulty is even more obvious: Let us derive from “his beard” that a leper shaves with a razor, and then derive the law of a kohen from the nazir learned from “his head.” See there. One can answer with difficulty as follows: Apparently, according to the Gemara’s wording, the difficulty is raised only against the beraita that derives merely a prohibition from “his head.” But what difficulty is there? Perhaps the tanna of the beraita concerning “his beard” is the same tanna as that of the second beraita, and for him there would be no difficulty. Rather, the difficulty certainly applies to the second beraita as well, and even more obviously, as Keren Ora states; in either case the beraita is difficult. The reason the Gemara does not raise the question explicitly against that beraita is the principle of “not only”: Not only is there a difficulty according to that beraita, but there is a difficulty according to this beraita as well. Since both beraitot are difficult, the beraita concerning “his beard” is difficult in either event. C. This requires explanation: It was explained earlier in the discussion that the tanna who derives from “his head” the prohibition of rounding the head for every leper has no other source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. He derives it from “his head” by saying: If the verse is not needed for a prohibition that does not apply equally to everyone—namely, rounding the head, which does not apply to women—apply it to a prohibition that applies equally to everyone. If so, what is the Gemara’s difficulty concerning the tanna of “his beard”? Why did he not derive the law of a leprous nazir from “his head,” thereby also learning the law of a leprous kohen? Had he done so, we would again have no source that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition everywhere, since “his head” would not be teaching only about rounding the head. It would also teach that a leprous nazir shaves his head while violating both a prohibition and a positive commandment, and that a leprous kohen shaves off his beard while violating both a prohibition and a positive commandment. We could then no longer say, “If the verse is not needed,” and we would not know that a prohibition applying equally to everyone is overridden. To retain a source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, the tanna had to derive the law of a leprous kohen from “his beard.” Once we know from “his beard” that prohibitions and positive commandments that do not apply equally to everyone are overridden, we also know that prohibitions and positive commandments that can be annulled by a sage—namely, those of a leprous nazir—are overridden, according to the Gemara’s present reasoning that they are comparable. All the more so, we know that an Israelite leper rounds his head, violating a prohibition that does not apply equally to everyone. If so, “his head” is superfluous and can teach that a prohibition applying equally to everyone is overridden throughout the Torah!? One can answer as follows: Apparently, a stronger difficulty could be raised against the Gemara according to its own approach. Since we can learn from “his head” that the law also applies to a leprous nazir, because the verse does not distinguish between one leper and another, how do we know that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition throughout the Torah? “His head” is not superfluous, so that we could say, “If the verse is not needed,” since it is also needed to teach the law of a leprous nazir, because the Torah stated the law without qualification. The later authorities raised a similar difficulty concerning the continuation of the discussion, as explained below in a note, and mentioned that the rule for the entire Torah can nevertheless be derived together with the teaching from the passage concerning ritual fringes; see there. This resolves this difficulty. Once this difficulty is resolved, the earlier difficulty no longer applies, since it was based on the assumption that “his head” is needed to teach the rule for the entire Torah; according to the later authorities, there is no need for this. D. It is difficult to understand why Tosafot explained that the two cases are “comparable.” Why did they need to say this? Before this difficulty, the Gemara simply asked: “According to the one who interprets ‘his head’ as referring to a nazir, why do I need ‘his beard’?” This shows that the Gemara straightforwardly assumed that the law of a kohen could be derived from that of a nazir. On the basis of that same straightforward assumption, the Gemara now asks why the law of a kohen should not be derived from that of a nazir. Why, then, did Tosafot need to add their explanation here!? It must be said that this is indeed the case: Tosafot here also explain the preceding difficulty of the Gemara. Yet this too requires explanation, since the Gemara explicitly shows that the cases are not comparable. Earlier, the Gemara asked the reverse question: Since “his beard” is stated concerning a leprous kohen, why do I need “his head” for a leprous nazir? The Gemara answered that the law of a leprous nazir cannot be derived from that of a leprous kohen. It is therefore clear that they are not comparable. One must respond with difficulty that Tosafot did not mean literally that they are comparable, but rather that a prohibition and positive commandment that do not apply equally to everyone are less severe than a prohibition and positive commandment that can be annulled by a sage. If the Torah reveals the law in the case of a nazir, we can know the law concerning a kohen by an a-fortiori inference; but if we know the law concerning a kohen, we still do not know the law concerning a nazir.

That is to say: since the Torah said “his head,” that the metzora shaves and rounds his head, we must say: since the Torah did not distinguish between one metzora and another, the Nazirite is also included, so that he shaves his head; and since the metzora Nazirite violates a prohibition and a positive commandment, a metzora kohen also destroys his beard and violates a prohibition and a positive commandment. Thus the tanna of the beraita of “his beard” would no longer have needed to learn from “his beard” that a metzora kohen violates a prohibition and a positive commandment, for he could learn it from “his head”!?

And we answer: indeed, “

his head”

implies overriding a prohibition alone, namely the rounding of the head in every metzora,

and

automatically

implies

also

overriding a prohibition and a positive commandment of a Nazirite, for the Torah did not distinguish between one metzora and another and permitted him to shave his head.

Therefore it is equivalent, and both will come:

that is to say, indeed we learned from “his head” concerning a metzora that he rounds his head, and also concerning a metzora Nazirite that he shaves his head.

And concerning your difficulty: if so, let us derive a kohen from a Nazirite, and why do I need “his beard”? I can say to you:

a kohen cannot be derived from a Nazirite, since it is subject to annulment;

you can say the same concerning the prohibition and positive commandment of the destruction of the beard, which are not subject to annulment, and we cannot derive from the prohibition and positive commandment of a Nazirite, which are overridden. The Gemara adds to explain: and

a Nazirite also cannot be derived from a kohen, since it is a prohibition not applicable equally to all,

and you know that a Nazirite shaves his head when he is a metzora only from what the Torah said, “his head,” without distinguishing between one metzora and another. The Gemara adds to explain:

and generally, [in every place where a prohibition and a positive commandment stand against a positive commandment]

[where a prohibition and a positive mitzva stand against a positive mitzva],

we do not derive from them [we cannot derive from a Nazirite and a kohen]

that the positive commandment overrides them,

because there is room to refute it as we said [because one can refute it as we said], namely: one cannot derive from a Nazirite, since it is subject to annulment, and one cannot derive from a metzora kohen, since it is a prohibition and positive commandment not applicable equally to all.

a. The following passage is explained according to the version of the Gemara before us. b. It is stated in the Torah, in the portion of Ki Teitzei [Deuteronomy 22]: “A man’s implement shall not be upon a woman, and a man shall not wear a woman’s garment, for whoever does these things is an abomination of the Lord your God.”

Rav said:

permits

a person

removing

all

hair

of his body

even

with a razor,

that is: it is permitted for a man to shave all the hair of his body, even the hair of the armpit and the pubic hair, and he is not concerned because of “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment”.

Meitivi: One who removes

the hair of

the armpit and

the hair of

the pubic area—he is liable for lashes,

and the reason is because it is stated: “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment,” and this is unlike Rav!?

And we answer:

this—

that they said in the beraita that he is liable for lashes—

with an actual razor

precisely.

This—

that Rav permitted—

with scissors

and not with a razor, and even when they remove the hair from its root as a razor does.

The Gemara objects to this:

But Rav too “

with a razor”

said,

so it follows that Rav permitted it even with a razor!?

And we answer: Rav, when he said “razor,” did not intend an actual razor, but

something resembling a razor,

that is, they remove the hair from its root; but Rav did not permit shaving with an actual razor.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who removes

the hair of

the armpit and

the hair of

the pubic area,

he is

liable for lashes

even with scissors, and this is unlike Rav.

It might have entered our minds that he is liable for lashes by Torah law because he transgressed what is written, “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment,” and we raise an objection:

Meitivi: The removal of hair

in the armpit and the pubic area

is not

prohibited

by Torah law, but by the words of the Sages,

whereas Rabbi Yohanan said that he is liable for lashes by Torah law!?

And we answer:

What is the meaning of “

liable for lashes”

also, as he said

Rabbi Yohanan?—

By rabbinic law,

for they prohibited it even in this manner; but the primary verse was not stated concerning this matter, but concerning another matter, as will be explained later in the Gemara.