Nazir 58b (נח:) — the Talmud in English

that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva –

why!?

Let us derive it from a

leprous

priest

who overrides a positive mitzva, and even a prohibition and a positive mitzva; and just as they are overridden in his case,

so

you too are necessarily forced to concede that

from a

leprous priest, in whose case the prohibition and the positive mitzva are overridden,

we do not derive this,

because

what is there about the priest? His

beard-shaving is

a prohibition

[a prohibition] that

is not applicable to everyone, since women are not prohibited from destroying the beard.

for women are not prohibited in the destruction of a beard.

If so,

a nazirite

leper

from a priest

leper

also cannot

derive it, since

his beard-shaving is

a prohibition that is not applicable to everyone, whereas the nazirite’s hair-shaving is a prohibition applicable to everyone.

The Gemara then raises the opposite objection:

And

the question still remains

for the one who interprets “

his head”

as referring to a nazirite,

why do I need “

his beard”? For if the verse came to teach that a leprous priest is prohibited by both a prohibition and a positive mitzva from shaving his beard, and that this prohibition is overridden by a positive mitzva [as in the beraita cited above], this could be derived from the fact that the leper’s shaving overrides the nazirite’s prohibition and positive mitzva!?

beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—brought above, this could be learned from the fact that the shaving of a leper overrides the prohibition and positive commandment of a nazir!?

And we answer: Even according to this tanna,

it is needed for the teaching stated in the following beraita: “

His beard”

Why does the verse state this? Because it is stated “

They shall not shave the corners of their beard.”

I might have thought that a leprous priest is included as well; the verse therefore states “

his beard.” Rather, the verse does not come to introduce the overriding of the prohibitions, which we already know from “his head,” but to teach us that the leper’s shaving is with a razor. Otherwise, the Torah would not have permitted him to destroy his beard, since the prohibition against destroying the beard applies only when done with a razor, and he could fulfill both requirements.

Rather, the verse does not come to innovate the overriding, which we already knew from “his head,” but to teach us that the shaving of a metzora is with a razor; for otherwise the Torah would not have permitted him to destroy his beard, since the prohibition of destroying the beard applies only with a razor, and he could fulfill both of them.

And the Gemara explains:

From where do we know that the Torah prohibited the destruction of the beard specifically with a razor

?

As it is taught:

It is stated concerning priests: “

They shall not shave the corners of their beard.”

I might have thought that even if one shaved with scissors

– and did not destroy the beard at its roots –

he should be liable; the verse therefore states concerning Israelites: “

And you shall not

destroy

the corner of your beard.” This is not considered destruction whenever he has not shaved the beard at its roots.

I might have thought that if he plucked

the hair of

his beard with a tweezers and a plane

[types of knives or sharpening instruments used by craftsmen], which destroy the beard,

he should be liable.

Therefore,

the verse states concerning priests: “

They shall not

shave the corners of their beard,”

which indicates that the prohibition applies in the manner of shaving.

How is this so?

What shaving involves destruction,

that is, what destruction is performed in the manner of shaving?

You must say that this is a razor.

And through the gzera shava “corner, corner,” we learn to apply what is stated concerning priests also to Israelites, and what is stated concerning Israelites also to priests.

The following question of the Gemara is explained according to the approach of the Rambam in Tosafot, as his approach was explained in Keren Ora.

And

we challenge

the one who derives this “

his head”

as referring merely to the prohibition

of rounding the head:

Why was it necessary to write “

his head,”

and why was it necessary to write also

also “

“his beard”!?

And Tosafot added an explanation: The Gemara’s reasoning that the law of a leprous kohen can be derived from that of a leprous nazir—even though the Torah certainly did not intend the case of a leprous nazir to teach that every positive commandment overrides every prohibition and positive commandment—is that the Gemara understands the reason the prohibitions of a nazir are overridden: they are less severe because they can be annulled by a sage. The Gemara holds that prohibitions and positive commandments that do not apply equally to everyone are comparable to prohibitions and positive commandments that can be annulled by a sage, and that each can therefore be derived from the other. The difficulties that can be raised against this explanation in the Gemara, and their resolutions: A. Apparently, the main difficulty concerning the tanna’s wording is not understandable. Without the extra word “his beard,” we would know nothing, since we would not know that a leper shaves specifically with a razor. Thus the tanna needed “his beard”; and from “his beard” alone we would already know that a leprous kohen shaves, since the Torah did not distinguish between one leper and another. If so, why did he need to mention “his head” in addition to “his beard” and derive the law of a kohen from that of a nazir, when everything could be derived from “his beard”!? It must be said that, nevertheless, the wording implies that “his beard” is needed for the essential law that a positive commandment overrides prohibitions and positive commandments that do not apply equally to everyone. This is not the true explanation, since it is sufficient to derive from it that a leper shaves with a razor, while the rule that the prohibition is overridden can already be derived from “his head.” B. Keren Ora asked: Why did the Gemara raise this difficulty only against the tanna who derived from “his head” merely a prohibition, and not against the tanna who derived from “his head” the law of a nazir? On the contrary, according to the latter opinion the difficulty is even more obvious: Let us derive from “his beard” that a leper shaves with a razor, and then derive the law of a kohen from the nazir learned from “his head.” See there. One can answer with difficulty as follows: Apparently, according to the Gemara’s wording, the difficulty is raised only against the beraita that derives merely a prohibition from “his head.” But what difficulty is there? Perhaps the tanna of the beraita concerning “his beard” is the same tanna as that of the second beraita, and for him there would be no difficulty. Rather, the difficulty certainly applies to the second beraita as well, and even more obviously, as Keren Ora states; in either case the beraita is difficult. The reason the Gemara does not raise the question explicitly against that beraita is the principle of “not only”: Not only is there a difficulty according to that beraita, but there is a difficulty according to this beraita as well. Since both beraitot are difficult, the beraita concerning “his beard” is difficult in either event. C. This requires explanation: It was explained earlier in the discussion that the tanna who derives from “his head” the prohibition of rounding the head for every leper has no other source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. He derives it from “his head” by saying: If the verse is not needed for a prohibition that does not apply equally to everyone—namely, rounding the head, which does not apply to women—apply it to a prohibition that applies equally to everyone. If so, what is the Gemara’s difficulty concerning the tanna of “his beard”? Why did he not derive the law of a leprous nazir from “his head,” thereby also learning the law of a leprous kohen? Had he done so, we would again have no source that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition everywhere, since “his head” would not be teaching only about rounding the head. It would also teach that a leprous nazir shaves his head while violating both a prohibition and a positive commandment, and that a leprous kohen shaves off his beard while violating both a prohibition and a positive commandment. We could then no longer say, “If the verse is not needed,” and we would not know that a prohibition applying equally to everyone is overridden. To retain a source for the principle that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, the tanna had to derive the law of a leprous kohen from “his beard.” Once we know from “his beard” that prohibitions and positive commandments that do not apply equally to everyone are overridden, we also know that prohibitions and positive commandments that can be annulled by a sage—namely, those of a leprous nazir—are overridden, according to the Gemara’s present reasoning that they are comparable. All the more so, we know that an Israelite leper rounds his head, violating a prohibition that does not apply equally to everyone. If so, “his head” is superfluous and can teach that a prohibition applying equally to everyone is overridden throughout the Torah!? One can answer as follows: Apparently, a stronger difficulty could be raised against the Gemara according to its own approach. Since we can learn from “his head” that the law also applies to a leprous nazir, because the verse does not distinguish between one leper and another, how do we know that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition throughout the Torah? “His head” is not superfluous, so that we could say, “If the verse is not needed,” since it is also needed to teach the law of a leprous nazir, because the Torah stated the law without qualification. The later authorities raised a similar difficulty concerning the continuation of the discussion, as explained below in a note, and mentioned that the rule for the entire Torah can nevertheless be derived together with the teaching from the passage concerning ritual fringes; see there. This resolves this difficulty. Once this difficulty is resolved, the earlier difficulty no longer applies, since it was based on the assumption that “his head” is needed to teach the rule for the entire Torah; according to the later authorities, there is no need for this. D. It is difficult to understand why Tosafot explained that the two cases are “comparable.” Why did they need to say this? Before this difficulty, the Gemara simply asked: “According to the one who interprets ‘his head’ as referring to a nazir, why do I need ‘his beard’?” This shows that the Gemara straightforwardly assumed that the law of a kohen could be derived from that of a nazir. On the basis of that same straightforward assumption, the Gemara now asks why the law of a kohen should not be derived from that of a nazir. Why, then, did Tosafot need to add their explanation here!? It must be said that this is indeed the case: Tosafot here also explain the preceding difficulty of the Gemara. Yet this too requires explanation, since the Gemara explicitly shows that the cases are not comparable. Earlier, the Gemara asked the reverse question: Since “his beard” is stated concerning a leprous kohen, why do I need “his head” for a leprous nazir? The Gemara answered that the law of a leprous nazir cannot be derived from that of a leprous kohen. It is therefore clear that they are not comparable. One must respond with difficulty that Tosafot did not mean literally that they are comparable, but rather that a prohibition and positive commandment that do not apply equally to everyone are less severe than a prohibition and positive commandment that can be annulled by a sage. If the Torah reveals the law in the case of a nazir, we can know the law concerning a kohen by an a-fortiori inference; but if we know the law concerning a kohen, we still do not know the law concerning a nazir.

That is: Since the Torah stated “his head,” teaching that a leper shaves and rounds his head, we should say that, since the Torah did not distinguish between one leper and another, a nazirite is included as well and shaves his head. And since a leprous nazirite violates both a prohibition and a positive mitzva, a leprous priest likewise destroys his beard and violates both a prohibition and a positive mitzva. Consequently, the tanna of the beraita concerning “his beard” would not have needed to derive from “his beard” that a leprous priest violates a prohibition and a positive mitzva, since he could derive it from “his head”!?

And we answer: Indeed, “

his head”

means to override merely a prohibition, namely, the rounding of the head in every leper,

and

automatically it

also means

that it serves

to override the prohibition and positive mitzva of a nazirite, since the Torah did not distinguish between one leper and another and permitted him to shave his head.

Therefore, it is equivalent, and both interpretations apply,

that is: From “his head” we have learned that a leper rounds his head, and also that a leprous nazirite shaves his head.

And if you ask: If so, let us derive the law of a priest from that of a nazirite, and why do I need “his beard”? I can answer you:

The law of a priest cannot be derived from that of a nazirite, since the nazirite status can be annulled by a sage;

but can you say this concerning the prohibition and positive mitzva of destroying the beard, which cannot be annulled? We cannot derive their being overridden from the prohibition and positive mitzva of a nazirite, which are overridden. The Gemara adds an explanation:

Nor can the law of a nazirite be derived from that of a priest, since the priest’s prohibition is not applicable to everyone;

and you know that a nazirite shaves his head when he is a leper only because the Torah stated “his head” without distinguishing between one leper and another. The Gemara further explains:

And elsewhere,

[where a prohibition and a positive mitzva stand against a positive mitzva],

we do not derive from them

[we do not derive from the cases of the nazirite and the priest] that the positive mitzva overrides them,

because one can refute the derivation as we said

[for one can raise the following refutation]: The case of a nazirite cannot serve as a source, since its prohibitions can be annulled; and the case of a leprous priest cannot serve as a source, since his prohibition and positive mitzva are not applicable to everyone. a. The following passage is explained according to the version of the Gemara before us. b. It is stated in the Torah, in the portion of Ki Teitzei [Deuteronomy 22]: “A man’s attire shall not be upon a woman, and a man shall not wear a woman’s garment, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your God.”

Rav said:

may shave

a man

the

entire

hair

of his body

even

with a razor, that is: A man is permitted to shave all the hair on his body, even the hair of the armpit and the pubic hair, and he need not be concerned because of the prohibition: “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment”.

meyiṭivi: One who removes

the hair

of the armpit and

hair

of the pubic area is liable to receive lashes

, and the reason is that it is stated: “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment”

, and this is not in accordance with Rav!? And we answer:

this—

that which the baraita says makes him liable to lashes—

with an actual razor

.

This—

that Rav permitted—

with scissors

and not with a razor, even when the scissors remove the hair at its roots, like a razor.

The Gemara objects to this:

But Rav also said

“with a razor”

did he not say so

, meaning that Rav permitted it even with a razor!?

And we answer: When Rav said “razor,” he did not mean an actual razor, but

something resembling a razor

, meaning that they remove the hair at its roots; but Rav did not permit shaving with an actual razor.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who removes

the hair

of the armpit and

hair

of the pubic area,

he is

liable to receive lashes

, even with scissors, and this is not in accordance with Rav.

The initial understanding is that he receives lashes by Torah law, because he violated the verse “A man shall not wear a woman’s garment,” and we raise an objection:

The removal of hair

in the armpit and the pubic area

is not

prohibited

by Torah law, but by rabbinic enactment,

whereas Rabbi Yohanan said that he receives lashes by Torah law!?

And we answer:

What does Rabbi Yohanan also mean when he

says “liable to lashes”

? He means

by rabbinic enactment

, for they prohibited it even in this manner. But the primary intent of the verse is not this matter, but another matter, as the Gemara will explain below.