Nazir 58a (נח.) — the Talmud in English

One might even say

that

a leper as well

should not shave around his head, but only the rest of his hair. Therefore,

the verse states:

“his head”

which is superfluous, in order to teach that a leper shaves around his head, because a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition.

And another beraita taught:

“his head”

what does it come to teach?

Since it is stated with regard to a nazirite:

“A razor shall not pass over his head,”

one might have thought that even a nazirite

during the period of his naziriteship, when he is

a leper as well,

would not fulfill the mitzva of the leper’s shaving, in order not to violate this prohibition, since it is accompanied by the positive mitzva, “He shall be holy; he shall let the hair of his head grow,” and a positive mitzva does not override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva—

Therefore,

the verse states:

“his head,”

which is superfluous, in order to teach that even a leprous nazirite shaves his head with a razor.

Is it not the case that this is a dispute between tannaim? That is, is it not necessary to conclude that the foundation of the dispute between the beraitot—whether “his head” teaches that both a prohibition and a positive mitzva are overridden, or that only a prohibition is overridden—is the law of “shaving the entire head”?!

For according to the one who says that “his head” includes the shaving of a

nazirite

who is prohibited by both a prohibition and a positive mitzva, it is because

he holds:

“shaving the entire head is not considered shaving around.”

Since he can shave around his head in this manner, the Torah certainly did not permit a leper to shave in the prohibited manner, namely, by first shaving around the side-locks. It necessarily follows that

when the verse came concerning “his head”—concerning a leprous nazirite—it came

to override the prohibition and positive mitzva

of the nazirite’s shaving, and not merely the prohibition.

But the other one—who holds that “his head” includes shaving around the head, which is prohibited only by a prohibition—

holds:

“shaving the entire head is considered shaving around,”

and regardless of how he shaves, he violates a prohibition.

And therefore we must say that

when the verse came it came only

to override the prohibition alone [that is, only the prohibition], and to teach us that “shaving the entire head is considered shaving around”;

but to override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva, we do not learn from “his head.”

and regardless of the manner in which he shaves, he violates a prohibition.

And

therefore we must say that

when the verse came

only

to override the prohibition alone [

the prohibition alone], and to teach us that “shaving the entire head is considered shaving around the head”; but that both a prohibition and a positive commandment are overridden cannot be derived from “his head.”

Rava said

in refutation:

No.

Everyone—including the one who holds that “his head” came to permit shaving around—holds that

“shaving the entire head is not considered shaving around,”

and the verse did not come to permit him to shave his head by shaving around the entire head, thereby teaching that shaving the entire head is considered shaving around.

And when the verse came—according to his view—it came

for a case in which he shaved around

first his side-locks

and ultimately shaved

the rest of the hair on his head; that is, to permit him, if he wishes, to shave in a manner other than shaving around the entire head: namely, to shave around his side-locks first and then shave his head.

The verse came to introduce the following ruling:

Since, if he shaved it all at once he would not be liable,

if he first shaved around it and ultimately shaved it, he is likewise not liable. That is, the Torah’s innovation is that although setting aside the prohibition is not needed in order to fulfill the positive mitzva, since he can shave by “shaving the entire head,” which is permitted, nevertheless it is permitted for him to shave even in this manner, which is prohibited.

The verse came to introduce the following principle:

Since, if he had shaved it all at one time, he would not be liable,

if he first shaved around the head and finally shaved

he is likewise not liable.

That is: The Torah’s innovation is that although overriding the prohibition is not needed in order to fulfill the positive commandment—since he could shave by “shaving the entire head,” which is permitted—nevertheless, he is permitted to shave in this other manner as well, even though it is ordinarily prohibited.

This is the point of dispute with the tanna who holds that “his head” teaches that both the positive mitzva and prohibition are overridden in the shaving of a leprous nazirite. In his view, the Torah certainly did not permit shaving around when he could fulfill the mitzva of shaving in a permitted manner. It necessarily follows that the verse came concerning the shaving of a nazirite, to override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva.

And we challenge this:

Can the verse really have written this? That is, can one say that the verse came to override the prohibition against shaving around when he can fulfill the positive mitzva of shaving in a permitted manner?!

But didn’t Reish Lakish say: Wherever you find a positive mitzva and a prohibition, if you can fulfill both, it is preferable; and if not, let the positive mitzva come and override the prohibition?

If so, since he can fulfill both—by shaving first and then shaving around, which constitutes shaving the entire head and is not considered shaving around—the positive mitzva of the leper’s shaving does not override the prohibition!

If so, since he can fulfill both—by shaving first and then shaving around the head, which is shaving the entire head and is not considered shaving around the head—the positive commandment of the leper’s shaving does not override the prohibition!?

Rather, the Gemara rejects in another manner the interpretation we sought to give, that the tannaim disagree concerning the law of “shaving the entire head”:

Everyone holds that

“shaving the entire head is considered shaving around,”

as a matter of logic alone, and no verse was needed to teach us this. For does the fact that he shaved additional hair mean that he would not be liable for shaving the side-locks?

Their dispute is as follows: The one who holds that “his head” teaches that only a prohibition is overridden holds that here the Torah taught us that “a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition”;

whereas the one who holds that “his head” teaches that both a prohibition and a positive mitzva are overridden holds that “a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition” is learned from another source, as the Gemara proceeds to explain. Consequently, the verse must have come to teach that, in the case of a leprous nazirite, both a prohibition and a positive mitzva are overridden.

The Gemara explains:

And the one who applies the verse to override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva

—the tanna who interprets “his head” as teaching that a positive mitzva overrides both a prohibition and a positive mitzva—

a prohibition alone,

which is overridden by a positive mitzva,

from where does he derive it?

He derives it from the verse concerning

“fringes,” —

the verse concerning

“twisted threads.” —

As the verse states:

“You shall not wear shaatnez, wool and linen together. You shall make for yourself twisted threads on the four corners of the garment with which you cover yourself.”

wool and linen together. “You shall make twisted threads for yourself on the four corners of the garment with which you cover yourself.”

And it was taught:

The passage concerning tzitzit was juxtaposed to the passage concerning shaatnez in order to teach:

“You shall not wear shaatnez; these—twisted threads—you shall make for yourself from them,”

because the positive mitzva of tzitzit overrides the prohibition, “You shall not wear shaatnez.”

The Gemara further explains: And

the one who derives it—that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition—

from

“his head,”

why does he not derive it from “fringes”?

why does he not derive it from “twisted threads”? [

Why does he not derive it from there]?

He can say to you: The juxtaposition of the passage concerning tzitzit to the prohibition of shaatnez

came for the purpose of Rava’s ruling

; it came to teach Rava’s ruling.

it came to teach Rava’s ruling]!

For Rava raised a contradiction

between verses:

It is written in the passage concerning tzitzit:

“And they shall place upon the fringe of the corner”

—a thread of sky-blue wool—

which implies that he should place it from

the same material as the corner;

that is, from whatever material the corner is made, he should make its tzitzit from that same material. If he made the corner from silk, linen, or serikin, he should likewise make the tzitzit from that same material.

But

on the other hand

it is written:

“You shall not wear shaatnez”

“wool and linen together. You shall make twisted threads for yourself,” and from the juxtaposition of the passages one should learn that he must use tzitzit of wool or linen specifically, even if the corner is made of another material—

You shall make twisted threads for yourself.” From the juxtaposition of the passages, one should derive that the ritual fringes must specifically be made of wool or linen, even if the corner was made of another material.

How then

are these two verses to be fulfilled? Tzitzit of

wool and linen

are

effective

in exempting the garment from its obligation

both when they are of the same material

—when the corner is made of that material—

and when they are not of the same material.

Whereas

other materials are effective

only when they are of the same material;

they

are

effective because they are “the same material as the corner.” But

because they are “the same material as the corner,” but

when they are not of the same material

—when the corner is not made of that material—

they are not effective.

The Gemara further explains the views of the tannaim of the two beraitot, and asks:

And as for this tanna who derives

“his head”

for a prohibition alone

—for a prohibition alone, meaning that the verse concerns the shaving around the head of every leper—his statement is subject to the following difficulty: How can we derive from here that everywhere a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition? The prohibition against shaving around is not “equally applicable to all,” since women are not prohibited by it, and from where do we know that even a prohibition that is equally applicable to all—which is more severe—is overridden by a positive mitzva?!

Necessarily, his reason is that with regard to a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, even both a prohibition and a positive mitzva are overridden by a positive mitzva, as the Gemara proceeds to explain, and all the more so a prohibition alone. Therefore, if “his head” is not needed for a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, since that is obvious, apply it to a prohibition that is equally applicable to all, which is also overridden by a positive mitzva.

The Gemara explains the source for this:

That a positive mitzva comes

and overrides both a prohibition and a positive mitzva

that are not equally applicable to all, such as those that do not apply to women—

from where do we know this?

And we explain: He

derives it—that a prohibition and a positive mitzva that are not equally applicable to all are overridden by a positive mitzva—

from

“his beard,”

as it was taught:

as a teaching states:

“His beard”

what does it come to teach?

Was it not already stated, “He shall shave all his hair”?

Since it is stated concerning the priests:

“They shall not shave the corners of their beards,”

one might have thought that even

when the priest is

a leper

—

so;

that he should not shave his beard, because he is prohibited by both a prohibition and a positive mitzva from destroying his beard. Therefore,

the verse states concerning a leper

“his beard,”

in order to include a leprous priest, who shaves his beard.

We have therefore learned that a prohibition and positive mitzva that are not equally applicable to all—like the prohibition against destroying the beard, which does not apply to women—are overridden by a positive mitzva.

Since the Gemara has cited the beraita that derives from “his beard” that the prohibition and positive mitzva against destroying the beard are overridden, it raises the following difficulty according to the tanna of the second beraita:

And as for the one who derives

“his head”

for the positive mitzva and prohibition

of a nazirite, which are overridden by the positive mitzva,

let him derive it from

“his beard,”

and say: Just as the prohibition and positive mitzva against destroying the beard are overridden, so too the prohibition and positive mitzva of the prohibition against shaving for a nazirite are overridden. Why, then, do I need “his head”?

And we answer:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your argument that you wish to equate the prohibition and positive mitzva of a nazirite with the prohibition and positive mitzva of a priest, and to learn that just as the former are overridden, so too are the latter—this too should be difficult for you:

For

we have established as a general principle

—[the text ends here]