Nazir 51a — the Talmud in English

The Sages taught: What is a corpse that has the status of dust of decay?

A corpse

that decayed without anything else being mixed into it at the time of its decay, namely: a.

that was buried

naked

and no decay from the corpse’s garment was mixed into it at the time of its decay; b. and

in a marble coffin

which does not decay,

or

the corpse was

on a stone floor

which does not wear away.

This is a corpse that has the status of decay!

But if

it was buried in its garment

which decays together with it and becomes mixed with its decay, or if it was buried

in a wooden coffin

which decays,

or on a brick floor

which wears away,

this is a corpse that does not have the status of decay,

since at the time it decayed, the decay or worn-away material of another substance was mixed with it.

Ulla said: There is no status of decay except for that which comes from the flesh

and from the sinews and from the bones,

meaning that the decay must come from all of them.

Rava raised an objection to Ulla

from the following beraita:

Decay that comes from the flesh

alone is

pure.

This implies:

if it comes from the bone

alone, it is

impure, even though there is no flesh

[there is no flesh there]!?

And we answer:

Say this instead

[this is how the beraita should be taught]:

Decay that comes from the flesh

is

pure until there is bone in the flesh.

And we challenge this: Even if the beraita is explained in this way, it is still difficult. Ultimately,

there are no sinews,

meaning that the beraita did not state that decay exists only when it comes from the sinews as well

!? And we answer:

There cannot be flesh and bones without sinews,

and since flesh and bone are present, sinews must necessarily be present as well.

Rav Shmuel bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

Two corpses that were buried together become mutually invalidating substances

for one another

[one nullifies the decay of the other], because the decay of one corpse that becomes mixed with the other at the time of decay is like another substance mixed with it, which is not considered decay.

Rabbi Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya raised an objection

from the following beraita:

Decay that comes from two corpses

is

impure,

and we initially understood that they decayed together. This is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who said that decay of this kind does not impart impurity

!?

He

answered

Rava:

Here, with what case are we dealing? It is a case such as

where he buried this one separately and that one separately,

so that the decay of one was not mixed with that of the other at the time of decay. Rather, the impurity comes from half a handful-measure from this corpse and half a handful-measure from that corpse—

And

even if

both decayed and stood

together

as one full handful-measure

of

decay.

Rabba bar bar Hana said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

If he cut the hair

of a corpse

and

afterward

buried it with him, the hair becomes for him

the

mutually invalidating substance, because hair that was cut is like another substance mixed with the corpse’s decay, and there is no status of decay here.

We learned there

in tractate Oholot:

Everything that is in a corpse

is

impure

and imparts impurity even when it has separated from the corpse. The skin, too, imparts impurity when it has separated from the corpse,

except for the teeth, the hair, and the nail

which do not impart impurity when they have separated from the corpse.

And while they are attached

to the corpse,

all of them are impure—

meaning that they serve as an extension for impurity: one who touches them or shelters over them is as though he touched or sheltered over the corpse, and is therefore impure.

Hezekiah raised a question

and was uncertain:

Hezekiah asked:

Hair that is about to be shaved

before the person died, for example, because his hair had grown long, or

a nail that is about to be cut,

and he died before he shaved his hair or cut his nail:

what

is their status with regard to impurity?

Do we say: Anything that is destined to be cut is considered as though it were

already

cut

—it is already

considered

as such—and therefore it does not serve as an extension for impurity?

Or perhaps: At present, they are attached

[they are still attached], and until they are cut they serve as an extension for impurity?

And we challenge this:

Can we resolve

Hezekiah’s question

from Rabba bar bar Hana,

who said: “If he cut his hair and buried it with him, it becomes a mutually invalidating substance”? The Gemara apparently understands that Rabba bar bar Hana stated his ruling even concerning hair that was destined to be cut while the person was alive, and nevertheless

the reason is because he cut it

that the hair becomes a mutually invalidating substance;

but if he did not cut it,

and the hair is still attached,

it does not

become a mutually invalidating substance. We have therefore learned that as long as the hair was not cut, it is considered part of the corpse’s body and does not become a mutually invalidating substance; the same law should apply in that it is considered an extension for impurity.

And we reject this:

This is what

Rabba bar bar Hana

meant: If

he cut

the hair,

it is a mutually invalidating substance

for the corpse; but if he still

did not cut it, let it remain a question—meaning, Rabba bar bar Hana himself was uncertain in the case where he did not cut it, and therefore he stated his ruling only in the case where he did cut it. Consequently, when he did not cut it, the uncertainty still remains.

meaning: Rabba bar bar Ḥana himself was uncertain about the case in which he did not cut it, and therefore he stated the case of one who cut it. If so, when he did not cut it, the uncertainty remains unresolved.

Rabbi Jeremiah raised a question

and was uncertain:

Rabbi Jeremiah asked:

Decay that comes from the heel—

of the corpse—where there is a thickness of flesh that was already “dead flesh” during the person’s lifetime:

what

is the law concerning whether it imparts impurity by the status of decay?

The Gemara explains the two sides of the question:

Should we say:

When we received the tradition concerning

[the matter concerning which the halakha was transmitted],

decay that comes from the entire corpse,

meaning that decay exists only from a limb that died together with the entire body,

but

decay

that comes from the heel,

which died before the rest of the body,

does not

impart impurity through the status of decay?

Or perhaps: There is no difference,

and even “dead flesh” has the law of decay, just as flesh that died together with the death of the corpse?

Come and hear

that even decay that comes from the heel imparts impurity, from

the beraita taught by Rabbi Natan bar Rabbi Oshaya,

which states:

Decay that comes from two corpses

is

impure,

and Rava explained earlier in the Gemara: this is a case where they decayed and together amounted to one full handful-measure of decay.

And if it would enter your mind

that decay

that comes from the heel does not

impart impurity, then here too it should not impart impurity, since

perhaps in this case it came by way of the heel,

and perhaps in that case it came by way of the heel—

Meaning: Since only one full handful-measure of decay remained from the two bodies, there is reason to suspect that it contains some of the heel of one corpse or some of the heel of the other. Why, then, does it impart impurity

!? And we reject this: Indeed,

if the entire corpse decayed and the decay came by way of the heel,

meaning that the entire corpse decayed, including the heel,

it is indeed so

that there is no uncertainty whether it imparts impurity even though it contains some of the heel, because there is no deficiency in the fact that what is intrinsically “dead flesh” is present, as the Gemara demonstrated.

Rather, here

we are dealing with Rabbi Jeremiah’s question in a case

such as one in which

not

one limb decayed,

but

one limb decayed and the decay came

by way of the heel.

That is, the flesh of the corpse in the heel decayed together with only the limb adjacent to it. In this case Rabbi Jeremiah was uncertain:

what

is its law concerning decay?

The reason for his uncertainty is that one might say: Since it is dead flesh, it and the limb adjacent to it decayed; or one might say that in a corpse that decayed for this reason, the status of decay was not transmitted.

And we conclude:

The question remains without a resolution!

Rabbi Jeremiah raised another question

and was uncertain:

Rabbi Jeremiah asked:

A fetus in a woman’s womb:

does

—

the fetus for the mother and the mother for the fetus—

mutually invalidating substances,

nullifying the status of decay of one through the other, as with two corpses that were buried together, each of which becomes a mutually invalidating substance for the other,

or not?

Rabbi Jeremiah explains the two sides of the question:

Should we say:

Since the master said:

“A fetus is a thigh of its mother,”

and is considered like one of her limbs,

therefore, even with regard to decay,

it is

part of her body

[it is considered part of the mother’s body] and

does not become a mutually invalidating substance,

and they impart impurity through the status of decay?

Or perhaps: Since eventually it was destined

to

emerge

from its mother, it is as though it had already

separated from her

[separated from her] and they became mutually invalidating substances for one another.

And if you should conclude: The fetus,

since

it was destined to emerge,

is as though it had already

separated from her—