Nazir 51b — the Talmud in English

There still remains a doubt:

seminal fluid in the intestines of a woman

who died,

what is the law that it should become gilgulin for the woman, to nullify from her the law of rakav?

the ruling regarding whether it becomes an accessory to the woman and thereby prevents the law of dust from applying to her?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

Do we say: since the fetus has not yet been formed [it has not yet been formed from the seed], therefore

[the fetus has not yet developed from the semen], then

it is considered like her body [it is considered like the woman's body].

[it is considered part of the woman’s body].

That is: should we say that although the fetus is not considered like her body, because it is destined to emerge from her, nevertheless the seed—from which a fetus has not yet been formed—is not destined to emerge from her; rather, it will become a fetus, and the fetus, which is a “new entity,” is what will emerge from her, and if so the seed is considered like her body?

Or perhaps, or perhaps we should say: on the contrary, the seed is inferior to the fetus,

or perhaps we should say: On the contrary, semen is inferior to a fetus,

since

since the seminal fluid

comes from elsewhere [it comes to her from outside], unlike the fetus, which is formed from the seed that is in her body.

[it comes from outside her], whereas a fetus is formed from semen that is within her body.

Rav Pappa raised a doubt:

Her excrement [the excrement in a woman’s intestines from the food that she ate]

[the excrement in a woman’s intestines from the food she ate]

what is the law as to whether it should become gilgulin?

the ruling regarding whether it becomes an accessory?

And Rav Pappa explains the sides of the doubt:

Should we say:

since the woman cannot exist without eating [the woman cannot exist without food],

[a woman cannot survive without food],

it is her life [it is the woman’s life] and it is like a part of her body.

[it is the woman’s life] and is considered part of her body.

Or perhaps this also—excrement, like seminal fluid—

excrement, like semen—

comes from elsewhere [it comes to her from outside], and becomes gilgulin for her.

[it comes to her from outside] and becomes an accessory for her.

Rav Aḥai, son of Rav Ika, raised a doubt:

He was uncertain:

Rav Aḥai, son of Rav Ika: his skin, while it is attached to him,

of a dead person, while it is still attached to him,

what is the law as to whether it should become gilgulin for him?

the ruling regarding whether it becomes an accessory for him?

Rav Huna, son of Rav Menaḥem, raised a doubt:

Рав Хуна бар Менох:

His spittle and nasal discharge—

saliva and moisture that ordinarily emerge through the mouth —

what is the law as to whether they should become gilgulin for the corpse?

the ruling regarding whether they become accessories for a corpse?

Rav Shmuel bar Aḥa said

he wondered

to Rav Pappa: But

behold,

if it enters your mind that all these that were mentioned [all these mentioned in the preceding doubts]—hair,

excrement, skin, his spittle and nasal discharge—

are gilgulin for the corpse,

for the corpse?! If so,

where can you find rakav that transmits impurity, how can you find a corpse that does not have these, so that it should transmit impurity on account of rakav?!

how could you find a corpse lacking all these things, so that it would convey impurity because of dust?

Rav Pappa said to Rav Shmuel bar Aḥa: Even if you should say that all these become gilgulin for a corpse, you can still find rakav in a corpse

that he gave the corpse to drink [he gave the corpse to drink]

[he gave the corpse to drink]

palm water

which thoroughly cleans all the excrement and his spittle and nasal discharge,

and anointed it with a depilatory agent [he anointed the corpse with a substance] that removes the hair,

[he applied a substance to the corpse] that removes the hair,

and boiled it [boiled it thoroughly]

[boiled it thoroughly]

in the waters of Tiberias that are hot,

in order to remove its skin.

Abaye said: We have received [we have a tradition and transmission]:

[we have a received tradition]:

A corpse that one ground has no rakav; that is, the law of rakav was stated only concerning the dust of a corpse that results from decay, but dust that results from grinding has the law of rakav.

meaning: The law of dust applies only to the fine particles of a corpse that result from decomposition, but fine particles that result from grinding do not have the law of dust.

They raised a question before them: If one ground it

first, while it was a corpse,

and it then decayed—

what is the law as to whether it has the law of rakav?

the ruling? Does it have the status of dust?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the doubt: Should we say:

Is the reason anything other than that there are flesh, sinews, and bones—that is, what is rakav? Flesh, sinews, and bones that decayed—

—that is, what is dust? Flesh, sinews, and bones that decomposed;

and these are present, for this rakav too contains all of these, and if so it is rakav.

all these components in this dust, and therefore it has the status of dust.

Or perhaps: We require it to be as it was created,

the limb must have been whole, according to its creation, before it decayed,

and it is not present, for he ground it first.

since it was first ground.

And we conclude:

The matter shall stand unresolved!

Ulla bar Ḥanina taught:

A corpse that is deficient:

A.

it has no rakav.

B.

and not tefusa; that is, one who finds a corpse on the road in its usual manner, if he moves it, takes the corpse together with its tefusa, meaning that he takes all the loose soil, and an additional three fingerbreadths of virgin soil; but if the corpse was deficient, it does not have the law of tefusa.

C.

and not a burial cluster; that is, if one found three corpses, if there are between one and the other from four cubits up to eight cubits, this is a burial cluster, and he examines from it onward in order to render the place pure, because there is concern that perhaps there is a cemetery there. But if he found even two whole corpses and one deficient, this is not a burial cluster.

that is, if one finds three corpses, and the distance between each one and the next is from four cubits to eight cubits, this establishes a graveyard, and he examines the area from that point onward in order to purify the place, because there is concern that a cemetery may be located there. But if he finds even two complete corpses and one incomplete corpse, this does not establish a graveyard.

They raised an objection from the Mishna in Eduyot, in which the tannaim disagreed concerning the law of a limb [flesh, sinews, and bones] from a living person that transmits impurity, whether, when an olive-bulk of flesh separated from the limb, it also transmits impurity, like flesh that separates from a limb of a corpse; and there is one who says that this law is learned from a limb of a corpse. And we learned there in the Mishna:

the Mishna in Eduyot, in which the tannaim disputed the law of a limb [flesh, sinews, and bones] from a living person that conveys impurity—whether, when an olive-bulk of flesh separates from the limb, it also conveys impurity, like flesh that separates from a limb of a corpse. And there is one who says that this law is derived from the law of a limb of a corpse. And we learned there in the Mishna:

This cannot be said concerning a corpse,

for it has several stringencies:

that it has a majority [bones that constitute the majority of the structure or the majority of the number of a corpse, which transmit impurity in a tent],

[bones constituting either the majority of the corpse’s structure or the majority of the number of its bones, which convey impurity in a tent],

and a quarter [a quarter-kav of bones that come from the bones constituting the majority of the structure or the majority of the number of a corpse; they transmit impurity in a tent],

[a quarter-kav of bones that come from the majority of the corpse’s structure or the majority of the number of its bones, which convey impurity in a tent],

or a full spoonful of rakav.

Would you say this concerning a living person, who has neither a majority, nor a quarter, nor a full spoonful of rakav? Rather, only a limb from a living person transmits impurity; we have thus learned that a limb from a living person does not transmit impurity through rakav.

—rather, only a limb from a living person conveys impurity? We learn from this that a limb from a living person does not convey impurity through dust.

И

And what are the circumstances of a limb from a living person that does not transmit impurity through rakav? Necessarily,

of a limb from a living person that does not convey impurity through dust? It must be

that one limb alone decayed, and concerning this we learned that in the case of a corpse it transmits impurity, while in the case of a living person it does not transmit impurity. And if so, we have learned:

alone. And concerning this we learned that in the case of a corpse it conveys impurity, but in the case of a living person it does not convey impurity. If so, we learn:

That similarly, concerning a corpse [a corpse analogous to the living person],

[a corpse analogous to the living person],

even

в

with one limb—

which was cut off from the corpse and decayed—

there is

a law of

rakav. Behold, even a deficient corpse has the law of rakav?! And we reject this:

Does it teach the beraita:

in the beraita,

that this corpse analogous to a limb from a living person has rakav?!

that is analogous to a limb from a living person has the law of dust?

This is what it teaches us,

the beraita:

any [any]

name

corpse has rakav, whereas

whereas

no living person has rakav. That is: the beraita does not intend to distinguish between a limb from a living person and a limb from a corpse, but to distinguish between a corpse and a living person: a corpse sometimes has rakav, if it is not deficient, whereas a living person never has rakav.

That is, the beraita does not distinguish between a limb from a living person and a limb from a corpse. Rather, it distinguishes between a corpse and a living person: a corpse sometimes has the law of dust, if it is not incomplete, whereas a living person never has the law of dust.

Rava raised a doubt:

If one limb decayed

one limb of a person’s body

when he [the person]

was still

alive, and the person then

the person

died, what is the law as to whether that limb transmits impurity on account of rakav?!

the ruling? Does that limb convey impurity because of dust?

And Rava explains the sides of the doubt:

Should we say:

when the law of rakav was received [the halakha of rakav was not received] it was only in a case such as

[the halakha concerning dust was received] only in a case such as

that it decayed when it was dead [that it decayed at the time of its death], but this limb, which decayed while he was alive, is not subject to the law of rakav.

[it decomposed after his death]. But this limb, which decomposed while he was alive, is not subject to the law of dust.

Or perhaps, now at any rate, it has died [in the end, now it is dead], and a corpse has rakav, and we are not concerned that it decayed while he was alive?

[ultimately, he is now dead], and a corpse has the law of dust; it does not matter that the limb decomposed while he was alive?

Come and hear from the Mishna in Eduyot mentioned above:

from the Mishna in Eduyot mentioned above:

This cannot be said concerning a corpse, which has a majority, a quarter, and a full spoonful of rakav; would you say it concerning a living person

who has neither a majority, nor a quarter, nor a full spoonful of rakav?

Behold, it is implied:

the reason—

that a limb from a living being that decomposed has no rekav—only

because

it is

living

is this;

but behold,

if

the person died

after that limb had decomposed,

it has rekav.

And we reject this:

Who teaches

in the beraita:

but behold,

if

it died

afterward it has rekav?!

For it can be said that

this is what it teaches us

the beraita:

that any dead thing has rekav, and no living thing has rekav,

and in the manner explained above.

A. We learned in the Mishna in Makkot 13a: “Rabbi Shimon said to the Sages, who held that there are no lashes for eating a prohibited thing except for an olive-bulk: ‘Do you not agree with me concerning one who eats an ant, any amount [whether while it is alive or after its death], that he is liable’ [because it is a creeping thing that swarms upon the earth]?” “They said to him: ‘Because it is a creature in its complete form.’”

B. Just as a creature is forbidden for eating even when it does not contain an olive-bulk, so too a creeping thing that is in its complete form renders impure, even though it does not contain the measure for the impurity of creeping things, which is a lentil-bulk.

Rava raised a question: “

An ant

that does not contain an olive-bulk,

that is missing

in a manner in which it can live—for example, its legs were cut off—

what

is the law: is one liable on account of it, and does it render impure even though it does not contain the measure of a lentil-bulk?

And the Gemara explains the sides of the uncertainty:

Is it that “

the measure

is learned for it”—that is, is this the received halakha, that a complete creature stands in place of the measure of an olive-bulk or a lentil-bulk—

, meaning: Was the halakha received that a complete creature takes the place of the olive-sized or lentil-sized measure,

and

if so,

is it lacking? That is: just as when something is lacking from the measure of an olive-bulk one does not transgress, or when something is lacking from the measure of a lentil-bulk it does not render impure, so too a creature must be complete?

In other words, just as if an olive-sized measure is lacking one is not liable, or if part of the lentil-sized measure is lacking it does not render one impure, so too a complete creature must itself be whole?

Or “

a creature

is learned for it”—that it is forbidden and renders impure, and does not stand in place of the measure of an olive-bulk or a lentil-bulk—

—that it is forbidden and renders one impure, and that it does not take the place of an olive-sized or lentil-sized measure—

and

if so,

it is present, for it can live.

, since it can live.