Nazir 37a — the Talmud in English

Granted, according to me, who say that

I explain the reason of the Mishna concerning one who immersed that day

because

“the permitted combines with the prohibited,”

it will not be difficult for me why we incline leniently, for indeed the permitted combines with the prohibited by Torah law—

because the beraita can be explained as dealing with

a case in which the non-sacred produce is abundant [that is, the non-sacred produce in the chest is greater than the se’a of teruma that fell and became mixed with the non-sacred produce], and therefore we incline leniently and say, “I say that

there is [non-sacred produce] here,”

But according to you, who said

that the reason of the Mishna concerning one who immersed that day is

because there is an olive-sized portion within the time required to eat a

half-loaf,

and “an olive-sized portion within the time required to eat a half-loaf is by Torah law,” if so:

when the non-sacred produce is abundant, what difference does it make [what difference does it make that the non-sacred produce in the chests is greater than the teruma that fell into them, for there is in them a mixture of teruma in the measure of an olive-sized portion within the time required to eat a half-loaf]!?

He said to him

Rab Dimi to Abaye:

Set aside teruma in the present time,

for it is only

rabbinic,

and since it is only a rabbinic prohibition that became mixed with a majority of permitted matter, we say, “I say that.”

And furthermore

Abaye said

to Rav Dimi, to challenge Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the prohibitions of a nazirite are not like all the prohibitions of the Torah, and that the permitted combines with the prohibited in them because it is said, “soaked”:

From where

that this

“soaked”—

for

“the permitted combines with the prohibited”—

is what it came for?

From where do we know to explain that the superfluous word “soaked” came to teach concerning a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine that “the permitted combines with the prohibited”—

perhaps it came to provide

to teach the law of

“taste as substance”

is what it came for [perhaps the verse came to teach that “taste as substance”]!?

Before the Gemara finished bringing all of Abaye’s words, the Gemara wondered about him:

And as for Abaye,

that is, Abaye himself: what is his view in this entire matter, since he appears to contradict his own words? For—

Initially, it was difficult for him,

at the beginning Abaye had difficulty with

what Rav Dimi said,

that throughout the entire Torah “the permitted combines with the prohibited,”

and he raised against him

all these refutations [and raised against him all the questions mentioned above]—

and if so, Abaye himself holds that “the permitted combines with the prohibited” throughout the entire Torah.

And again

he then [he returned and]

said to him

Abaye: Perhaps even with a nazirite the permitted does not combine with the prohibited, whereas the superfluous word “soaked” came

to provide taste as substance!?

And if so, it implies that he holds that throughout the entire Torah the permitted does not combine with the prohibited!

And we answer:

After he answered him [after Rav Dimi answered Abaye concerning all his proofs by which he wished to prove that “the permitted combines with the prohibited” throughout the entire Torah]—

he returned and

said to him

Abaye:

Perhaps

even a nazirite is not different from all the Torah, and the prohibited does not combine with the permitted in it. And “soaked”—

to provide “

taste as substance”

is what it came for.

Here the Gemara returns to complete Abaye’s words, in which he challenged: Perhaps “soaked” came to teach “to provide taste as substance.” And it explains that this means:

As it was taught:

It is written concerning a nazirite: “And every soaked substance of grapes he shall not drink.”

that taste is like substance

For this reason the Torah said

“soaked,”

in order

to provide taste as substance,

and to teach: if he soaked the nazirite

grapes in water, and they have the taste of wine,

then he is

liable.

The early authorities fundamentally disagreed in explaining this matter:

Rashi [Pesaḥim 44b] explained: to make the taste of the prohibited

like its substance and material reality,

and if the nazirite drank an olive-sized portion of the water, he is liable, because it all became prohibited [it became entirely a forbidden entity]; that is, because anything that received taste through a prohibition becomes entirely a forbidden entity.

then he is

liable.

The early authorities fundamentally disagreed about the meaning of this matter:

But Ramban’s view [in the Milḥamot there] is that the water that received the taste of the prohibition does not become a forbidden entity. Rather, by the law of “taste as substance” we say that that taste mixed into the water is itself prohibited, as though it were the substance and material reality of the prohibition.

Even though there is here no actual substance of a prohibition that can be measured as an olive-sized portion, it is sufficient to eat an olive-sized portion of permitted matter into which the taste of the prohibition became mixed. It was newly established by the law of “taste as substance” that eating an olive-sized portion of permitted matter containing the taste of a prohibition is itself prohibited, just as it is prohibited to eat an olive-sized portion of a prohibition. But the intention is not that the permitted itself becomes prohibited.

And from here— from a nazirite— you derive a rule for all the prohibitions of the Torah, such as mixed species of the vineyard and orla: if he soaked grapes of mixed species of the vineyard or orla in water and they imparted the taste of wine to it, the water is prohibited to drink, for we must derive them by a kal va-chomer from a nazirite: And if a nazirite, who is lenient in three matters: 1. Its prohibition is not an eternal prohibition, for ordinary nazirite status is thirty days.

However, Ramban’s view [in his Milḥamot there] is that water that acquired the taste of a prohibition does not become a piece of prohibited matter. Rather, by the law that taste is like substance, we say that the taste mixed into the water is itself forbidden, as though it were the substance and tangible presence of the forbidden matter.

Although there is no tangible forbidden substance here that can be measured as an olive-bulk, it is sufficient to eat an olive-bulk of permitted food into which the taste of a prohibition has been mixed. The law that taste is like substance teaches that eating an olive-bulk of permitted food containing the taste of a prohibition is itself forbidden, just as it is forbidden to eat an olive-bulk of a forbidden substance. But this does not mean that the permitted matter itself becomes forbidden.

And from this—

from the case of a nazirite—

2.

Its prohibition is not a prohibition of benefit,

for grapes and wine are permitted to a nazirite for benefit.

3.

There is a way to permit its prohibition

of a nazirite, through a question and the annulment by a sage—

and nevertheless

the verse made in it “

taste as substance,”

as we learned from “soaked”—

mixed species of the vineyard

whose prohibition is more stringent than the prohibition of a nazirite in these three matters—

that their prohibition is an eternal prohibition, their prohibition is a prohibition of benefit, and there is no way to permit their prohibition—is it not the law that the verse should make “taste as substance” apply to them?

And the same law

is that we can derive from a nazirite

for orla in two respects,

that is, because of two stringencies that orla has over a nazirite: A. Its prohibition is an eternal prohibition, for those grapes that grew during the first three years are prohibited forever.

B. Its prohibition is a prohibition of benefit.

Mixed species in a vineyard—

whose prohibition is more stringent than the prohibition of a nazirite in these three respects—

their prohibition is everlasting, their prohibition includes a prohibition against deriving benefit, and there is no way to permit their prohibition—is it not logical that the verse should establish in their case

the law that

taste is like substance?

The same applies

to deriving from the case of a nazirite

And if so, from where do we know to say that “soaked” came to teach that “taste as substance,” perhaps it came to teach that “the permitted combines with the prohibited”!?

He said

he answered

to him, that one of the sages [one of the sages] to Abaye: He— Rabbi Yoḥanan, who explained “soaked” as teaching that “the permitted combines with the prohibited”— is speaking according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that “the permitted combines with the prohibited” from “soaked.” Whereas the beraita that expounds “soaked” as teaching “to provide taste as substance” follows the Sages, who disagreed with Rabbi Akiva. And the Gemara explains: Which Rabbi Akiva? Where do we find that Rabbi Akiva holds that “the permitted combines with the prohibited”? If you say, Rabbi Akiva of here [of our Mishna], as we learned: Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and there is enough in it to combine to make an olive-sized portion, he is liable;

and it might enter our mind that “to combine” means to combine an olive-sized portion from the bread and the wine, and if so, the reason for the liability is that “the permitted combines with the prohibited”—

this cannot be said. For—

And from where

that Rabbi Akiva’s intention is to say that “the permitted combines with the prohibited”?

Perhaps, and only when there is an olive-sized portion of wine by itself [Rabbi Akiva made the nazirite liable only when there is an olive-sized portion of wine in the bread]. But the permitted bread cannot combine with the wine to complete the measure—and what Rabbi Akiva said, “to combine,” means that it requires combination in order to gather it together into one measure of an olive-sized portion of wine, since it is absorbed.

Rabbi Yohanan, who explained “mixtures” as teaching that permitted matter combines with forbidden matter—

And if you will say, perhaps you will say: If there is an olive-sized portion of wine,

what is the point of saying it [what novelty is there in Rabbi Akiva’s ruling]!?

I can say to you: Indeed, there is a novelty in the matter, that he is liable even for an olive-sized portion of wine alone, and

to exclude [and to exclude]

the first tanna, who said:

he is not liable

until he drinks a quarter-log of wine!

[of our Mishna],

as we learned: Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and there is enough of it to combine to make an olive-bulk, he is liable;

and we might have thought that “to combine” means to combine an olive-bulk of bread and wine, so that the reason for the liability is that permitted matter combines with forbidden matter—

this cannot be said, since—

From where

do we know that Rabbi Akiva’s intention is that permitted matter combines with forbidden matter?

Rather,

from the words of

Rabbi Akiva of the beraita we can learn that “the permitted combines with the prohibited” for a nazirite because it is said, “soaked.”

For it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-sized portion of bread and wine

is

liable.

And from here it is proven that Rabbi Akiva holds that “the permitted combines with the prohibited.”

to exclude

[and distinguish it from]

the first Tanna, who said:

he is not liable

until he drinks a quarter-log of wine!

Rather,

from the words of

Rabbi Akiva in the beraita

we must learn that permitted matter combines with forbidden matter in the case of a nazirite, because it is stated: “mixtures.”

As it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-bulk of bread and wine

is

liable.

This proves that Rabbi Akiva holds that permitted matter combines with forbidden matter.

He said

he objected

to Rav Ashi by Rav Aḥa son of Rav Avya:

According to Rabbi Akiva, who interprets this “

and every

soaked thing”

for

the law of “

permitted matter combines with forbidden matter,”

and not for the law of “taste is like substance,” if so, the law of “

to impart taste as substance”—

from where does he derive it

[from where does he learn that “taste is like substance” in the case of a nazirite and throughout the entire Torah]!?

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa son of Rav Avya:

He derives

Rabbi Akiva derives the law of taste is like substance

from meat and milk

that were cooked together, which the Torah prohibited for eating and benefit.

For

it is not merely taste

and is forbidden; here—

throughout all the prohibitions of the Torah—

it is likewise no different.

Therefore, we do not derive a stringency stated with regard to it for application to the other prohibitions. Just as the other innovations found in the prohibition of meat and milk do not apply to the other prohibitions, so too, this law of “taste is like substance” cannot be learned from meat and milk for the other prohibitions. And the Gemara explains:

And the Rabbis

who needed to learn “taste is like substance” from “soaked thing” and did not learn it from meat and milk—their reason is:

we do not derive from meat and milk [we cannot learn this],

since

meat and milk

meat and milk

are a novelty

the entire prohibition is a novel matter, for nothing like it is found among the other prohibitions.

Therefore, we do not learn a stringency stated concerning it for the other prohibitions. Just as the other novel aspects found in the prohibition of meat and milk do not apply to the other prohibitions, so too this law of “taste is like substance” should not be learned from meat and milk for the other prohibitions. And the Gemara explains:

What is its novelty

of “meat and milk”?

If you say

because

this

the meat

by itself

alone

and this

the milk

by itself

alone

is permitted [

each of them is permitted individually],

and only when they are

only when they are

together

with one another

is it forbidden

to eat them.

And the novelty is that two permitted things, when they became mixed with one another, become forbidden?

It is impossible to say so. For—

The prohibition of

mixed species

of grain in a vineyard of vines

also

contains that same novelty —

For

this

the grain

by itself is permitted, and this

the vine in the vineyard

by itself is permitted, and only

when

together [

when they became mixed through their growth]

is it forbidden

to eat them.

Rather

this is the novelty of meat and milk:

If they soak it all day in milk [

if they soaked the meat all day in milk]

it is permitted,

even though, because the meat remained soaked all day in milk, it is like cooked meat, the meat is not prohibited under the law of meat and milk.

But

And

if he cooks it in the manner of cooking [

when he cooked the meat in milk], then it is

forbidden.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Akiva too

how can we say that he learns “taste is like substance” from meat and milk? For

meat and milk are also a novelty!?