Nazir 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

Granted, according to my view, as I say:

that I interpret the reason for the Mishna’s ruling concerning one who immersed that day

as being

that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter,

it is not difficult for me why we apply a lenient assumption, since permitted matter combines with prohibited matter by Torah law—

because one can interpret the beraita as dealing with

a case where the non-sacred produce is plentiful [that is, there is a great quantity of non-sacred produce in the container compared with the se’a of teruma that fell into it and became mixed with the non-sacred produce], and therefore we apply a lenient assumption and say: “I say

that it is the other matter.”

But according to you, as you say

that the reason for the Mishna’s ruling concerning one who immersed that day is

because there is an olive-bulk within the time required to eat a

half-loaf,

and “an olive-bulk within the time required to eat a half-loaf is a Torah-law measure,” if so:

when the non-sacred produce is plentiful, what difference does it make

[what does it matter that there is a great quantity of non-sacred produce in the containers compared with the teruma that fell into them, when they contain a mixture of teruma in the amount of an olive-bulk within the time required to eat a half-loaf]!?

He said to him

Rav Dimi said to Abaye:

Set aside teruma nowadays,

for it is only

rabbinic,

and since it is merely a rabbinic prohibition that became mixed with a majority of permitted matter, we say: “I say.”

Furthermore,

Abaye said to Rav Dimi

to challenge Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that nazirite prohibitions are unlike all other prohibitions of the Torah, and that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter in their case because it is stated: “Soaked”:

From where does this

“soaked”

come

to teach that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter

?

How do we know that the extra word “soaked” comes to teach with regard to a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine that “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter”—

Perhaps it comes to impart, that is, to teach the law of

“

taste is equivalent to substance”

it comes

[perhaps the verse comes to teach that “taste is equivalent to substance”]!?

Before the Gemara completed bringing all of Abaye’s statements, it expressed astonishment at him:

But as for Abaye,

that is, what is Abaye’s own view in this entire matter, since he appears to contradict his own statements? For—

Initially, it was difficult for him;

at first Abaye found difficulty with

what Rav Dimi had said,

that throughout the Torah permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter,

and he raised against him

Abaye raised against Rav Dimi

all these refutations

[he challenged him with all the questions mentioned above]—

and if so, Abaye himself holds that “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter” throughout the Torah.

And then

he returned

[he went back] and

said to him:

Abaye said: Perhaps even in the case of a nazirite permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter, while the extra word “soaked” comes

to impart “taste is equivalent to substance”!?

If so, it follows that he holds that throughout the Torah permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter!

And we answer:

After he had answered him

[after Rav Dimi had answered Abaye regarding all his proofs by which he sought to demonstrate that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter throughout the Torah]—

he again

said to him:

Abaye

perhaps

even a nazirite is no different from all other cases in the Torah, and in his case prohibited matter does not combine with permitted matter. And “soaked”

comes to impart

“taste is equivalent to substance”

it comes.

Here the Gemara returns to complete Abaye’s challenge: Perhaps “soaked” comes to teach that taste is equivalent to substance. It explains that this means:

As it was taught:

It is written with regard to a nazirite: “And he shall not drink any grape soak.”

Therefore the Torah said

“soaked”,

in order

to impart taste is equivalent to substance,

and to teach:

if he soaked

the nazirite

grapes in water, and the water contains the taste of wine,

then he is

liable.

The early authorities fundamentally disagreed about the explanation of this matter:

Rashi [Pesaḥim 44b] explained: To make the taste of the prohibited matter

equivalent to its substance and tangible presence,

so that if the nazirite drank an olive-bulk of the water, he is liable, because the entire substance has become prohibited [the entire mixture has become a prohibited entity]. This is because anything that receives flavor through a prohibition becomes entirely a prohibited entity.

However, Ramban’s view [in Milḥamot there] is that water that received the flavor of a prohibition does not become a prohibited entity. Rather, under the law that taste is equivalent to substance, we say that the taste mixed into the water is itself prohibited, as though it were the actual substance and tangible presence of the prohibition.

Although there is no tangible substance of prohibition here that can be measured as an olive-bulk, it is sufficient to eat an olive-bulk of permitted matter into which the taste of the prohibition was mixed. The law that taste is equivalent to substance introduces the principle that eating an olive-bulk of permitted matter containing the taste of a prohibition is itself prohibited, just as it is prohibited to eat an olive-bulk of the prohibited substance. However, this does not mean that the permitted matter itself becomes prohibited.

And from here—

from the case of a nazirite—

you can derive a ruling for all prohibitions of the Torah,

such as forbidden mixtures of a vineyard and orla: If one soaked grapes of forbidden mixtures of a vineyard or orla in water and the water contains the taste of wine, the water is prohibited for drinking, since we can derive this by a kal va-chomer from the case of a nazirite:

And if a nazirite,

who is lenient in three respects:

a.

His prohibition is not an eternal prohibition,

for ordinary naziriteship lasts thirty days.

b.

His prohibition is not a prohibition against deriving benefit,

for grapes and wine are permitted to a nazirite for purposes of benefit.

c.

There is a remedy for his prohibition,

through a question submitted and the annulment by a Sage—

and nevertheless

the verse established in his case

the principle of

“taste is equivalent to substance,”

as we learned from “soaked”—

forbidden mixtures of a vineyard—

whose prohibition is more stringent than the prohibition of a nazirite in these three respects—

that their prohibition is eternal, that their prohibition is one against deriving benefit, and that there is no remedy for their prohibition—is it not all the more logical that the verse should establish in their case

the principle of

“taste is equivalent to substance”?

The same law applies: one can derive from the case of a nazirite

to the case of

orla in two respects,

that is, because orla has two stringencies relative to a nazirite: a. Its prohibition is an eternal prohibition, for those grapes that grew during the first three years are prohibited forever.

b. Its prohibition is one against deriving benefit.

If so, from where do we know that “soaked” comes to teach that “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter”? Perhaps it comes to teach that “taste is equivalent to substance”!?

He said—

he answered—

to him, one of the Sages

[one of the scholars] answered Abaye:

He—

Rabbi Yoḥanan, who interpreted “soaked” as teaching that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter—

spoke in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter, based on “soaked.”

The beraita, however, which expounds “soaked” as teaching “to impart taste is equivalent to substance,” follows the view of the Sages, who disagreed with Rabbi Akiva.

And the Gemara explains:

Which Rabbi Akiva?

Where do we find that Rabbi Akiva holds that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter?

If you say it is Rabbi Akiva here

[of our Mishna],

as we learned: Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and it contains enough to combine to form an olive-bulk, he is liable;

and we might have assumed that “to combine” means to combine an olive-bulk of bread and wine, in which case the reason for the liability is that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter—

that cannot be said. For—

From where

do we know that Rabbi Akiva’s intention is to say that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter?

Perhaps it is only when there is an olive-bulk of wine by itself

[Rabbi Akiva holds the nazirite liable only when there is an olive-bulk of wine in the bread]. But the permitted bread cannot combine with the wine to complete the measure. And when Rabbi Akiva said “to combine,” he meant that the wine, since it is absorbed, must be gathered together in order to constitute an olive-bulk.

And if you would say,

perhaps you might say: If there is an olive-bulk of wine,

what is the point of stating this

[what innovation is there in Rabbi Akiva’s ruling]!?

I can tell you that there is indeed an innovation here: He is liable even for an olive-bulk of wine alone,

excluding

[to exclude]

the first tanna, who says:

he is not liable

until he drinks a quarter-log of wine!

Rather,

from the words of

Rabbi Akiva in the beraita

we can learn that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter in the case of a nazirite, because it is stated: “soaked.”

As it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-bulk of bread and wine,

he is

liable.

This proves that Rabbi Akiva holds that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.

He said

and objected

to him, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, to Rav Ashi:

According to Rabbi Akiva, who interprets this “

and every

servant”

for

the law of “

the permitted combines with the forbidden,”

and not for the law of “taste is like substance,” if so, the law of “

to give taste the status of substance”—

from where does he derive it

from where does he learn that “taste is like substance” applies to a nazirite and throughout the Torah

a. This requires explanation: According to what Tosafot wrote above—that if a nazirite soaked his bread in wine and the bread contains an olive-bulk of wine, he is liable only because “taste is like substance” [cited in note 9 above]], ; if so, even if the verse speaks of a case in which there was no olive-bulk except through the combination with the bread, nevertheless, if “taste is like substance” does not apply, there is no “permitted combines with the forbidden,” since there is no prohibition here at all! And Tosafot asked: From where do we actually know that Rabbi Akiva holds that “taste is like substance”? And they answered: If Rabbi Akiva did not hold that there was another source for “taste is like substance,” Rabbi Akiva would not have interpreted the verse as referring to “the permitted combines with the forbidden,” but rather as referring to “taste is like substance.” It necessarily follows that the law of “taste is like substance” is obvious to him from another source, and the Gemara asks from where this is obvious to him. According to their explanation, the earlier difficulty is resolved ; nevertheless, their wording in their question and answer requires explanation ; and see what was brought in “ Arzei HaLevanon” section 123. b. Rashi’s language in the sugya in Pesaḥim 44b is: “ And Rabbi Akiva: since he derives this ‘servant’ as teaching that the permitted combines with the forbidden ; taste is like substance: where there is no actual substance, but only taste—for example, where grapes were soaked in water—from where does he derive it?” The explanation of his words is that if there is “substance,” meaning actual forbidden matter, such as where he soaked his bread in wine, Rashi holds that according to Rabbi Akiva there is no significance in “taste is like substance,” since the substance itself is forbidden even without the law of “taste is like substance,” and the bread too combines with it even if it had not absorbed any taste from the wine, since “the permitted combines with the forbidden.” We learn from these words of Rashi that actual forbidden matter absorbed into bread does not require the law of “taste is like substance” in order to render it forbidden. This is unlike the words of Tosafot cited above in note 9, who hold that even a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, when the wine contains an olive-bulk, cannot be made liable except because “taste is like substance” Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya:

He derives it;

Rabbi Akiva derives the law that taste is like substance

from meat and milk

that were cooked together, which the Torah prohibited for both consumption and benefit.

For

it is not merely taste

and it is forbidden; here—

with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah—

it is likewise no different.

Therefore, we do not derive a stringency stated with regard to it for application to the other prohibitions. Just as the other innovations found in the prohibition of meat and milk do not apply to the other prohibitions, so too, this law of “taste is like substance” cannot be learned from meat and milk for the other prohibitions. And the Gemara explains:

But the Rabbis

who needed to learn the principle that "taste is like substance" from "soaked thing," rather than learning it from meat and milk, give this reason:

it cannot be derived from meat and milk

it cannot be learned from them, because

the

meat and milk

constitute an exceptional case

; the entire prohibition is exceptional, since nothing similar to it exists among the other prohibitions.

Therefore, we do not apply a stringency stated with regard to it to the other prohibitions. Just as the other exceptional features of the prohibition of meat and milk do not apply to the other prohibitions, so too, do not learn this law of "taste is like substance" from meat and milk for the other prohibitions. And the Gemara explains:

What is the innovation

of “meat and milk”?

If you say

because

this—

the meat—

by itself

alone,

and this

the milk—

by itself

alone—

is permitted [

they are each permitted on their own],

and

only when they are

together

in combination

is it forbidden

to eat them.

And the innovation is that two permitted substances become forbidden when they are mixed with each other?

That cannot be said. For—

The prohibition of

mixed species

of grain in a vineyard of vines

also

contains that same innovation —

For

this

the grain

by itself is permitted, and this

the vine in the vineyard

by itself is permitted, and

only

together [

when they become intermingled through their growth]

is it forbidden

to eat them.

Rather,

this is the innovation of meat and milk:

If one soaks it all day in milk [

if he soaked the meat in milk all day]

it is permitted,

even though, because the meat was pickled in milk all day, it is considered as though it had been cooked, the meat is not rendered forbidden under the prohibition of meat and milk.

But

if

he cooks it through cooking

when he cooks the meat in milk, then it is

forbidden.

And we object:

And Rabbi Akiva likewise—

how can we say that he derives “taste is like substance” from meat and milk, when

meat and milk are also an innovation!?