Nazir 37b (לז:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva

derives

the law of “flavor is equivalent to substance”

from “

the purging of gentile vessels.”

That is, from the law concerning a pot in which a gentile cooked forbidden food: when a Jew subsequently cooks in it, the pot purges [expels]

the flavor of the prohibition absorbed into its walls into the Jew’s stew.

For

it

was stated by the Merciful One

after the war with Midian, when the Israelites brought the spoils they had taken from Midian [Numbers 31]: “

Every object [

vessel]

that comes into the fire [

in order to cook in it]—you shall pass through fire.”

The verse teaches that just as a vessel is used, so is it purged.

That is to say,

here the verse stated

that “

the purging of gentile vessels,” that is, the flavor expelled from the vessel into the stew, is forbidden.

But

the purging of gentile vessels

absorbed in the vessel and expelled from it into the stew—

is it not

indeed

merely flavor

since there was no actual substance of the prohibition in the vessels,

and

nevertheless

it is forbidden

to eat the food; rather, the vessel must be purged so that it will expel the flavor absorbed in it?

And the same law applies

here,

with regard to all prohibitions that impart flavor into permitted food:

it is likewise no different,

as the flavor of a prohibition is forbidden like the substance itself.

And we object:

But according to the Rabbis as well,

who derive from “mishrat” that flavor is equivalent to substance—why do they need “mishrat”? Is it not

derived from “

the purging of gentile vessels”?

This can be learned from the purging of gentile vessels!

Rav Ashi said

to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya:

There,

the prohibition of the purging of gentile vessels

is an exceptional law,

and it cannot be used to derive the law for other prohibitions, just as a law cannot be derived from the prohibition of meat and milk, which is also exceptional.

For throughout the entire Torah, “

an imparted flavor that detracts,”

a defective flavor absorbed into permitted food that does not improve it but rather impairs it,

is permitted.

But

if

with regard to “

the purging of gentile vessels,”

the imparted flavor is defective,

it is nevertheless forbidden.

For the flavor absorbed in the vessels [that were brought from Midian] is an “imparted flavor that detracts,” since, once the absorption remained in the wall of a vessel overnight, its flavor became defective and spoiled, and it no longer improves the food cooked in the pot.

If so, a difficulty arises for Rabbi Akiva: how can he derive the law that flavor is equivalent to substance from the purging of gentile vessels?

And according to Rabbi Akiva as well,

the following difficulty can be raised: How can the law that flavor is equivalent to substance be derived from the purging of gentile vessels,

given that

the prohibition of this flavor

is an exceptional law,

and no other prohibitions can be derived from it?

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya

answered:

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya

said: The purging of gentile vessels is not an exceptional law, and therefore Rabbi Akiva derives from it the law that flavor is equivalent to substance.

For

the Torah did not prohibit

the purging of gentile vessels among the vessels of Midian

except in the case of a pot “

used that day”

[a pot in which food had been cooked that same day],

which is not “

an imparted flavor that detracts”

but

rather imparts an advantageous flavor.

And

the Gemara now explains the reasoning of

the Rabbis—why they do not derive the law from the purging of gentile vessels, since one might say that the Torah prohibited only a pot used that day, and thus the purging of gentile vessels would not be exceptional:

why they do not learn from the purging of gentile vessels, for one might say that indeed the Torah forbade only a pot of that day, and consequently there is no novelty at all in the purging of gentile vessels:

Even

a pot used that day inevitably causes some deterioration!

Even the absorption in a pot used that day has its flavor slightly impaired. Therefore, the purging of gentile vessels is an exceptional law, since the absorption is forbidden even though it imparts a defective flavor, and consequently the law that flavor is equivalent to substance cannot be derived from it.

Furthermore,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, raised

a difficulty

to Rav Ashi

concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds in accordance with Rabbi Akiva and said that “the permitted joins the forbidden” applies only to a nazirite and not throughout the Torah:

For

from the Rabbis,

who maintain that “mishrat” comes to teach that flavor is equivalent to substance,

we can infer

[we can derive]

the interpretation of

Rabbi Akiva,

who maintains that “mishrat” comes to teach that “the permitted joins the forbidden,” contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding.

who holds that “ministered” comes to teach that “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter,” unlike Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding.

For,

did they not say

—did

the Rabbis

not say that

this “

mishrat”

comes to impart the law that flavor is equivalent to substance

?

And

the Sages further said: “

From here you can derive the law for all prohibitions in the Torah,”

for in them as well flavor is equivalent to substance. If so,

according to Rabbi Akiva as well, who interprets this “

mishrat”

as “

the permitted joins the forbidden,”

let us say

[we should likewise say according to his view]: “

From here you can derive the law for all prohibitions in the Torah,”

so that the permitted joins the forbidden in them as well?

Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, say that “with regard to all prohibitions in the Torah, the permitted does not join the forbidden”?

Rav Ashi said

to Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya:

It is impossible to say that according to Rabbi Akiva “the permitted joins the forbidden” throughout the Torah,

because of the nazirite and the sin-offering,

for the Torah explicitly taught with regard to them that “the permitted joins the forbidden”;

they are two verses that come as one

[teaching one matter].

And

we have an established principle:

Whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach

this law for another context.

The Gemara explains Rav Ashi’s statement:

The nazirite—

the Torah explicitly taught with regard to him that “the permitted joins the forbidden”; this is

that which we stated

[as explained]: the Torah stated “mishrat” in order to teach that “the permitted joins the forbidden.”

The sin-offering—

the Torah explicitly taught with regard to it that “the permitted joins the forbidden.”

What is it

[where do we find this]?—As

it was taught:

Regarding the flesh of a peace-offering into which the fat of a sin-offering was absorbed, the Torah said [Leviticus 6]: “

Whatever touches”

[such as the flesh of a peace-offering]

its flesh

—the flesh of the sin-offering—

shall become holy”

[the flesh that touches it assumes the law of the flesh of the sin-offering, as the beraita proceeds to explain].

One might have thought that “whatever touches” should be understood literally,

and

even if it did not absorb

anything, the flesh touching the flesh of the sin-offering becomes holy and assumes the status of a sin-offering—

Therefore,

the verse states: “

its flesh.”

This indicates that something from the sin-offering entered the flesh of the other animal. We therefore learn that the flesh does not become prohibited and assume the stringency of the sin-offering

until it is absorbed into its flesh.

And the meaning of what the Torah says, “

shall become holy,”

is

to become

the flesh that absorbed some of the flesh of the sin-offering

like it,

like the flesh of the sin-offering—

The practical consequence is:

if it is disqualified

the sin-offering—for example, if it was pigul or notar—

it becomes disqualified

the flesh that absorbed some of the flesh of the sin-offering.

And if it is valid,

the sin-offering,

the food that absorbed from it shall be eaten

by the one who absorbed from it

according to its more stringent component,

according to the stringency of the sin-offering absorbed into it: it may be eaten only in the Temple courtyard and not throughout Jerusalem, and only by male priests, and for one day and one night. For the food that absorbed it contains two types, one more stringent and one less stringent, and it follows entirely the more stringent one.

From here we learn that with regard to a sin-offering “the permitted joins the forbidden.” For the Torah must necessarily be teaching that even if half a kezayit of the fat of a sin-offering was absorbed into half a kezayit of a peace-offering, and one ate both without observing the stringency applicable to the sin-offering, he transgresses, because “the permitted joins the forbidden.”

For if you explain that a full kezayit of the fat of a sin-offering was absorbed into the flesh of a peace-offering, it is obvious that he is liable, since we already know that flavor is equivalent to substance from the purging of gentile vessels. What, then, would the Torah be teaching us?

And the Rabbis

will say to you: Both “mishrat,” stated with regard to the nazirite, and “whatever touches its flesh shall become holy” do not come to teach that “the permitted joins the forbidden”; rather, they come to impart the law that flavor is equivalent to substance. For the verse concerning the sin-offering is not discussing half a kezayit of the fat of a sin-offering absorbed into half a kezayit of a peace-offering; it is discussing a full kezayit of a sin-offering absorbed into a peace-offering, and thus there is no need for the novel law that “the permitted joins the forbidden”; the peace-offering must be eaten according to the stringency of the sin-offering because flavor is equivalent to substance.

Perhaps you might say: a. Why did the Torah need to teach us with regard to the sin-offering that flavor is equivalent to substance? According to the Rabbis, we have already learned that flavor is equivalent to substance throughout the Torah from “mishrat,” stated with regard to the nazirite.

b. How did we derive from the nazirite that flavor is equivalent to substance throughout the Torah? The nazirite and the sin-offering are two verses that come as one—teaching that flavor is equivalent to substance—

and two verses that come as one do not teach this law for the entire Torah.

I can say to you:

They are necessary.

The Torah needed to teach us both with regard to the nazirite and with regard to the sin-offering that flavor is equivalent to substance, and it is impossible to derive one from the other, as the Gemara proceeds to explain. Therefore, they are not considered “two verses that come as one and do not teach,” for that principle applies only when the verses come to teach a law throughout the Torah: in that case, the Torah would not have needed to write the law in two places, since we could have derived one from the other. But these two verses, since one cannot be derived from the other, do teach the entire Torah that flavor is equivalent to substance.

The Gemara explains:

For had the Merciful One written with regard to the sin-offering

alone that flavor is equivalent to substance,

I would have said that the nazirite cannot be derived from it

[that it is impossible to derive from the sin-offering that flavor is equivalent to substance in the case of a nazirite], and

because a nazirite is derived from sacrificial offerings

[the sin-offering is a sacrificial offering]

we do not derive

from it, because sacrificial offerings are subject to greater stringency.

And had the Merciful One written with regard to the nazirite

alone that flavor is equivalent to substance,

I would have said:

We do not derive from the nazirite

[we cannot derive the law of the sin-offering from that of the nazirite],

because its prohibition is more stringent,

the prohibition of the nazirite,

for even grape seeds,

which are not normally eaten,

are forbidden to him,

whereas throughout the Torah one is not liable for this, since one is not liable for eating in an abnormal manner —

Therefore, the sin-offering cannot be derived

from

it,

from the nazirite.

And Rabbi Akiva —

that is, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that Rabbi Akiva’s statement that “the permitted joins the forbidden” applies only to a nazirite, and that this law is not derived for the entire Torah—

will say to you:

The sin-offering and the nazirite, which teach that “the permitted joins the forbidden,” are two verses that come as one and do not teach this law elsewhere.

And as for what you said—that the sin-offering and the nazirite are both necessary, since the nazirite cannot be derived from the sin-offering because it is a sacrificial offering, and the sin-offering cannot be derived from the nazirite because it is more stringent with regard to grape seeds, and thus these are not two verses that come as one—this is not so, because:

Why are they necessary,

the two verses?

Granted, had the Merciful One written “the permitted joins the forbidden” only with regard to the

that permitted food combines with forbidden food only in the case of a

sin-offering,

then

the nazirite could not have been derived from it,

as you said,

for we do not derive ordinary food from sacrificial offerings.

Rather, had the Torah written "

“the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance” only

with regard to naziriteship, and let us derive the sin offering from it—for all prohibitions in the Torah are derived from naziriteship.

That is: One should derive from naziriteship for the entire Torah, and all the more so for a sin offering; there is no basis for saying that naziriteship is more stringent because the Torah prohibited a nazirite from eating the grape’s ḥartzan —

Since the Torah had to introduce the principle in the sin offering that “the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance,” these are therefore two verses that come as one, and one may not derive from them for the entire Torah.

The Gemara now returns and explains:

Since Rabbi Yoḥanan rejected the rationale that the sin offering cannot be derived from naziriteship, then even according to the Rabbis, who interpret the verses as teaching the principle of “taste is like substance,” these are two verses that come as one, from which one may not derive; how, then, did the Sages say: “From here you derive for all prohibitions in the Torah”

And

therefore the Gemara retracts its previous explanation and explains the position of

the Rabbis

in a different manner, that

they will say to you:

The verse stated with regard to the

sin offering—

for “

the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance”—

is what it comes to teach, as we explained with regard to Rabbi Akiva.

And

the reason we do not say this with regard to the entire Torah is that

we do not derive the laws of non-sacred food from consecrated offerings.

And the word “

mishrat” stated with regard to naziriteship comes alone

to teach

that taste is like substance,

and therefore:

From this—

from naziriteship—

you derive for all prohibitions in the Torah,

since we have only one verse, and it teaches a rule for the entire Torah.

The Gemara then summarizes the position of Rabbi Akiva as Rabbi Yoḥanan interpreted it according to his view:

And

according to

Rabbi Akiva, both—

the verse concerning the sin offering and the verse concerning naziriteship—

for “

the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance.”

And the reason that, in any event, we do not derive from naziriteship for the entire Torah is that

the reason that in any event we do not learn from the nazirite for the entire Torah is that

they are—

naziriteship and the sin offering—

two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a rule for other cases.

Said

Rav Ashi

asked Rav Kahana:

But with regard to that which was taught in a beraita:

It is written in the passage concerning naziriteship: “All the days of his naziriteship,

from all that

shall be made from the grapevine,

from grape seeds to grape skins he shall not eat.” And from the word “all,”

the verse taught

that

the prohibitions of naziriteship,

which he ate together,

join one another

to complete the measure of the prohibition.

According to Rabbi Akiva—

who holds that “the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance” with regard to the prohibitions of naziriteship—this is difficult:

Now, it may be said

[if we learned] “

the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance”—

A prohibited substance

joins

a prohibited substance—

is it necessary to say so?

Is it necessary to state that it joins it to complete the measure, and why did the Torah need to teach us that the prohibitions of naziriteship join one another!?

He said to him

Rav Kahana to Rav Ashi:

There is no difficulty: When

a permitted substance joins a prohibited substance,

it joins it only when he ate them

simultaneously,

but

a prohibited substance joining a prohibited substance—which the Torah increased by teaching that they join one another—means

that

even

when he ate them

one after another,

within the time required to eat a peras, just as if he were eating from a single prohibition within the time required to eat a peras, he would be liable. The Gemara raises another objection: