Nazir 29a — the Talmud in English

It is a rabbinic enactment

in order to train him in the mitzvot.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina:

If so—

that the father makes his son a nazirite on account of training, then

even a woman as well

should make her son a nazirite

. ; but the opinion of the Keren Ora is that, according to everyone, he makes him a nazirite from the womb, and he deduced this from the Jerusalem Talmud here, [and he wrote that this is also implied by Rashi at the end of Tractate Makkot and by the Tosafot above, 4b, s.v. “Shimshon”]. And there he wrote the reason for the matter: This training is not comparable to the other training in a mitzva, in which one must train the minor to perform some mitzva; for that, he must have reached a certain level of understanding, each one according to his law. But the training here is to separate him from excesses and dedicate him to Heaven with caution and separation; for this, his understanding is not needed, but the father is charged with guarding him from all impurity. See there further. B. The Rosh wrote: “In order to train him in mitzvot, for naziriteship is a safeguard for separation,” and the reason that the Rosh needed this and did not explain it according to its simple meaning—that he trains him in the mitzvot of naziriteship—is, one may say, because he maintains that this training is from the womb; see section A ; and one may also say that it is because we do not find, in the law of training, that the father brings his son into an obligation, as with naziriteship, through which he makes him a nazirite; furthermore, by the law of training he cannot make him a nazirite. Therefore, he explained that it is a special enactment concerning a nazirite, since it is a safeguard for separation, that he should train him in this manner ; and they also answered that the obligation of training applies only to the father and not to the court ; and see there another reason for distinguishing between a positive commandment and a prohibition. D. In Kehilot Yaakov, Berakhot, section 24, he proved that the Tosafot hold that, besides the law of training incumbent upon the father, there is also a law of training incumbent upon the minor himself. What they said here—that the obligation of training applies only to the father—is because, according to the law of training incumbent upon the minor, he is not obligated to vow to become a nazirite, since even an adult is not obligated in this; furthermore, the minor cannot vow at all to become a nazirite, since he has not reached the age of vows. This law is necessarily only according to the law of training incumbent upon the father, to accustom him to fulfilling the mitzvot ; and he added in explanation that one should not ask why the court is not commanded to separate him, because of the law concerning the minor himself. This is understandable, of course: although he is obligated, nevertheless there is no obligation to separate him when he does not fulfill a rabbinic enactment, for the mitzva of rebuke does not apply to a minor, since he does not possess complete understanding , and see there further. E. The later authorities raised an objection to the Tosafot’s question [see Arzei ha-Levanon]: Surely, until now, had we not heard of the law of training, that they objected only from our sugya!? According to what was explained in Kehilot Yaakov, according to the Tosafot, that besides the law of training explained in our sugya there is also a law of training incumbent upon the minor himself—and from this one cannot ask why the court does not separate him, as brought in section D—it is well: indeed, one may say that from here they learned the law of training others, whereas in all the other places it may be referring to the law concerning the minor himself. F. It would appear that one should wonder about the Tosafot in their first answer: Since the training is for the positive commandment “He shall be holy,” then the obligation of training applies only to shaving, concerning which it says, “He shall be holy; he shall let the hair of his head grow wild” [and perhaps what is said concerning impurity, “He is holy to the Lord,” is also a positive commandment]. But drinking wine is not associated with a positive commandment, so how does his father train him in this!? One must say that in order to train him in the positive commandment of shaving, the father is necessarily required to make him a nazirite and to make him a complete nazirite, for there is no partial naziriteship. The designation “naziriteship” also applies to the prohibition of wine, since the minor himself will be obligated in it according to the law of training incumbent upon himself [as Kehilot Yaakov, cited in section D, wrote]. This requires study. And we answer:

He holds—

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina—that

a man

is obligated to train

his

son in mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to train her son

in mitzvot.

And the Gemara raises six objections to the position of Resh Lakish in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina, and answers all of them:

A.

It is understandable according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is a halakha

concerning a nazirite; for this reason

—therefore—

his son, but not

his

daughter. Indeed, the father makes his son a nazirite, but the father does not make his daughter a nazirite, because this is how the halakha was stated.

because this is how the halakha was stated.

But according to Resh Lakish,

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina says that he makes him a nazirite on account of training; if so,

even his

his

daughter

should the father make a nazirite in order to train her in mitzvot!? And we answer:

He holds—Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina—that a person is

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina: a person

obligated

to train his

son in naziriteship, but he is

in naziriteship, whereas

not obligated to train his daughter

in naziriteship.

B. We further raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina:

It is understandable according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite; for this reason

—therefore—

in naziriteship, but not

indeed, the father makes his son a nazirite, but

in vows, not,

because this is how the halakha was stated.

But according to Resh Lakish,

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina, it should be difficult:

even vows as well—the father should be able to make his son vow, such as a vow for the fulfillment of mitzvot!?

should the father be able to impose a vow of naziriteship on his son, such as a vow undertaken to fulfill commandments!?

And we answer:

It states “It is not necessary”

in our Mishna!

It is not necessary to say that concerning vows, which do not have

for the son

disfigurement,

that he can make his son vow;

rather, even concerning naziriteship, which does have disfigurement,

even so, he is obligated to train him.

C. We further raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina:

It is understandable according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite; this is why it teaches

in our Mishna:

if he protested or his relatives protested

[the naziriteship is annulled], because this is the halakha that was stated concerning a nazirite.

But according to Resh Lakish, Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina

says that the reason is in order to train him in mitzvot; it should be difficult:

Is it within their power,

that the

relatives should say to him

the father:

“You shall not teach him mitzvot” [Can the relatives have the power to say to the father: “Do not train your son in mitzvot”]!?

[Can the relatives really have the power to say to the father: “Do not train your son in the commandments”]!?

And we answer:

He holds—

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina—that

all

training that is not significant

[training that is not significant]

is not pleasing to him, meaning: Since shaving his hair is a disgrace and is not pleasing to his son, the Sages did not enact the law of training in this manner

.

D. We further raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina:

It is understandable according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says: It is a halakha concerning a nazirite; for this reason he shaves

the son

and performs the surrounding

of the head, through the mitzva of shaving when the days of his nazirite term are complete, even though the Torah said: “You shall not round the corners of your head.”

But according to Resh Lakish, Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina

says that the reason for the law is

in order to train him in mitzvot;

it should be difficult:

but he is performing the surrounding

and violating “You shall not round the corners of your head,” even though he is obligated in it only by rabbinic law!?

And we answer:

He holds—

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina—that

the surrounding of the entire head

is forbidden only

by rabbinic law.

And training

is

by rabbinic law, and rabbinic training comes and overrides rabbinic surrounding.

E. We further raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina:

It is understandable according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite; for this reason

—therefore—he

shaves

the minor and

brings an offering

[he brings offerings of pure naziriteship]

. But according to Resh Lakish, Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina,

who says that the reason is in order to train him in mitzvot, it should be difficult:

but he is bringing unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard

[for behold, he brings unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard]!? And we answer:

He holds—

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina—that

unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard are not

a prohibition

by Torah law

but by rabbinic law; and rabbinic training comes and overrides rabbinic unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard.

And. We raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite; therefore, when he becomes impure, he brings a bird-offering

[therefore, when he becomes impure, he brings a sin-offering from a bird], for so it is implied by the Mishna, that all the laws of a nazirite apply to him, even with regard to a “purity-offering”—

and a priest eats the bird-pinched by melika

[and the priest eats the bird, which was not slaughtered with a knife from the neck, but was pinched with a fingernail from the nape].

But according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina, as stated by Resh Lakish

that the reason is in order to train him in the mitzvot, this is difficult:

he is eating

the priest

a carcass,

for melika renders fit for eating only the bird sin-offering, whereas this is unconsecrated and is a carcass!?

And we answer:

he holds

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda, that there is no slaughtering for a bird according to Torah law

and only piercing of the organs is required in order to bring out the blood through the organs, and therefore melika suffices according to Torah law,

and unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard is not a Torah prohibition.

We raise an objection:

And

when

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina holds

thus,

that there is no slaughtering for a bird according to Torah law and unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard is not a Torah prohibition, is this so!?

The beraita is explained according to the Noda BiYehuda, Yoreh De'ah, second edition, section 133.

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina said: From where is it established that a bird sin-offering that comes for uncertainty

is not eaten,

that is, from where is it established that it comes for uncertainty and from where is it established that it is not eaten?

The verse teaches: “

And the man with his discharge for a male and for a female” -

He compares

a matter for which one is liable to bring an offering and which applies only to a

female

namely, a woman who gave birth—

to

a matter for which one is liable to bring an offering and which applies only to a

male,

namely, one who has intercourse with a male:

Just as a male

indeed

brings

he

an offering,

a sin-offering,

for certainty

[when he certainly had intercourse with a male unintentionally], for he is among those liable to excision, and all those liable to excision bring a sin-offering for an unintentional act,

so, too, a female

a woman who gave birth indeed

brings

she an offering

for certainty

[when she certainly gave birth to a viable male child].

And just as a male brings for uncertainty,

when it is uncertain to him whether he sinned, he brings a provisional guilt-offering,

so, too, a female,

a woman who gave birth,

brings for uncertainty

when it is uncertain to her whether she gave birth to a viable child.

And just as a male of a species—

that is, an animal—

which he brings for certainty,

indeed he

brings for uncertainty, so, too, a female of a species—

namely, a bird—

which she brings for certainty,

indeed

she brings for uncertainty.

You might say:

If so, just as a male brings an offering

a provisional guilt-offering for uncertainty

and it is eaten,

the guilt-offering,

so, too, a female brings an offering and it is eaten?

You have said

[say it yourself]: