Nazir 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

It is a rabbinic enactment

in order to train him in the mitzvot.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

If so—

if the father renders his son a nazirite on the basis of training him, then

even a woman as well

should render her son a nazirite!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, holds:

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina:

A man

is obligated to train

his

son in the mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to train her son

in the mitzvot.

The Gemara raises six objections to the view of Reish Lakish, citing the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and resolves them all:

a.

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that it is a halakha

concerning a nazirite; for this reason [that is, therefore]

his

son, but not

indeed, the father renders his son a nazirite, but

not

his daughter, because this is how the halakha was transmitted.

But according to Reish Lakish,

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said that he renders him a nazirite because of training; if so,

even

his

daughter

should the father render a nazirite in order to train her in the mitzvot!? And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, holds that a person

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina: a person

is obligated

to

train

his son in naziriteship, but

he is not obligated to train his daughter

in naziriteship.

b. We again raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite, for this reason [therefore]

therefore

in the case of naziriteship, yes,

indeed, the father renders his son a nazirite, but

in the case of vows, no,

because this is how the halakha was transmitted.

But according to Reish Lakish,

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said that this should be difficult:

even vows as well

the father should be able to impose a vow upon his son, such as a vow undertaken for the fulfillment of mitzvot!?

And we answer:

The Mishna states a matter by way of “it is not necessary to say”!

In our Mishna:

It is not necessary to say that with regard to vows, which do not involve

the son’s

disgrace,

he can render his son subject to a vow;

rather, even with regard to naziriteship, which does involve disgrace,

even so, he is obligated to train him.

c. We again raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite, this is why it teaches

in our Mishna:

If he protested or his relatives protested [the naziriteship is annulled],

because this is the halakha concerning a nazirite.

But according to Reish Lakish, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said

that the reason is in order to train him in the mitzvot; this should be difficult:

Do they have the authority

of

relatives who say

to the father:

“Do not teach him mitzvot” [can the relatives really have the power to say to the father: Do not train your son in the mitzvot]!?

[Can the relatives really have the power to say to the father: “Do not train your son in the commandments”]!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, holds:

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

Any

training that is not significant [training that is not important]

[training that is not significant]

is not acceptable to him;

that is, since shaving his hair is a disgrace and is not agreeable to his son, the Sages did not enact the law of training in such a case.

d. We again raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: It is a halakha concerning a nazirite; for this reason he shaves

the son

and performs the removal of the hair around the head as part of the mitzva of shaving upon the completion of his naziriteship, even though the Torah states: “You shall not round the corners of your heads.”

of the head as part of the commandment of shaving when the days of his naziriteship are complete, even though the Torah says, “You shall not remove the side-growth of your head.”

But according to Reish Lakish, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,

who says that the reason for the law is

in order to train him in the mitzvot,

this should be difficult:

He is performing the removal of the hair around the head

and transgressing “You shall not round the corners of your heads,” even though he is obligated in this prohibition only by rabbinic law!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, holds:

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

The removal of all the hair of the head

is prohibited only

by rabbinic law,

and training

is

by rabbinic law; and rabbinic training comes and overrides the rabbinic prohibition against removing the hair around the head.

e. We again raise an objection to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that it is a halakha concerning a nazirite, for this reason [therefore]

therefore he

he shaves

the minor and

brings an offering [

he brings the offerings of pure naziriteship].

But according to Reish Lakish, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,

who says that the reason is in order to train him in the mitzvot, this should be difficult:

He is bringing unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard [

he is bringing unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard]!? And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, holds:

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

Unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard are not

a prohibition

by Torah law

but only by rabbinic law, and rabbinic training comes and overrides the rabbinic prohibition against unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard.

And we challenge Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite; therefore, when he becomes impure, he brings the bird offering

[that is why, when he becomes impure, he brings a sin offering from a bird], since this is what the Mishna implies: all the laws of a nazirite apply to him, including those of a “defilement offering”—

and a priest eats the bird after melika

[and the priest eats the bird, which was not slaughtered with a knife from the neck, but was killed by pinching with the fingernail at the nape].

But according to Reish Lakish, who cites Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina

that the reason is in order to train him in the mitzvot, this is difficult:

but he is eating

the priest

a nevela

, since melika renders only a bird sin offering fit for consumption, whereas this is unconsecrated and is therefore a nevela!?

And we answer:

He holds

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, that there is no Torah requirement of sheḥita for a bird

and it requires only the severing of its סימנים, so that the blood exits through them; therefore, melika suffices by Torah law,

and the prohibition against unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law.

We challenge:

And

if

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina holds

this way

that there is no Torah requirement of sheḥita for a bird and that the prohibition against unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law!?

The beraita can be understood in accordance with the Noda BiYehuda, Yoreh De’ah, second edition, section 133 .

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: From where is it derived that a bird sin offering is brought in a case of uncertainty

and is not eaten,

that is, from where is it derived that it is brought in a case of uncertainty, and from where is it derived that it is not eaten?

The verse states: “

And the one with a discharge, for a male and for a female” -

It juxtaposes

a matter for which one is liable to bring an offering and which applies only to a

female

—namely, a woman who has given birth—

to

a matter for which one is liable to bring an offering and which applies only to a

male,

namely, one who has intercourse with a male:

Just as a male

indeed

brings

an

offering,

a sin offering,

for a definite case

[when he certainly had intercourse with a male inadvertently], since he is among those liable for karet, and all those liable for karet bring a sin offering for an inadvertent transgression,

so too, a female,

a woman who has given birth, indeed

brings

an offering

for a definite case

[when she certainly gave birth to a viable male].

And just as a male brings an offering for a case of uncertainty,

when he is uncertain whether he sinned, he brings an asham talui,

so too, a female,

a woman who has given birth,

brings an offering for a case of uncertainty

when she is uncertain whether she gave birth to a viable offspring.

And just as a male of the animal species

—that is, livestock—

brings for a definite case,

indeed he

brings for a case of uncertainty, so too, a female of the species

—that is, a bird—

which brings for a definite case

indeed

it brings for a case of uncertainty.

You might say:

Just as a male brings an offering

of an asham talui for a case of uncertainty

and it is eaten,

the guilt offering,

so too, a female brings an offering and it is eaten?

You say

[say on your own]: