Nazir 29b — the Talmud in English

Not so if you said this concerning a male:

that his offering is eaten,

for there is one prohibition

in it if in truth he did not transgress, namely, non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard.

Will you say this concerning a female, that

her offering is not eaten, because if in truth she did not give birth to a viable male, there are in her offering

two prohibitions,

namely, the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass, since the sin-offering is killed by pinching, and non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, as he explains and proceeds.

And here the Gemara raises its question against Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina, for according to the Gemara’s explanation above, he necessarily holds: “There is no slaughtering for a bird by Torah law”:

But

what are the two prohibitions [what are the two prohibitions that there are in a bird sin-offering brought on account of uncertainty] and

not the prohibition against an animal carcass and the prohibition against non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard

are they not the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass and non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard!?

And if so, it is proven that there is slaughtering for a bird by Torah law, and therefore a bird sin-offering brought on account of uncertainty contains a prohibition on account of an unslaughtered carcass if she did not give birth to a viable male; it follows that according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina—who is the tanna of the beraita—“there is slaughtering for a bird by Torah law” and “non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard is a Torah prohibition”!

Rav Aḥa son of Rav Ika challenges it [Rav Aḥa was astonished at the questioner]:

[Рав Аха выразил удивление по поводу этого возражения]:

And perhaps one is liable for it because it appears like two prohibitions, by rabbinic law [and perhaps one who eats it is liable because it appears like two prohibitions by rabbinic law], that is: it is possible to explain Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina’s intention in the beraita as being that there are not two complete prohibitions in eating a bird sin-offering brought on account of uncertainty; rather, the Sages prohibited eating it because it appears as though there are two prohibitions in it by rabbinic law.

[а возможно, тот, кто ест ее, несет наказание, поскольку она выглядит как содержащая два запрета, установленных мудрецами]. Иными словами, намерение рабби Йоханана, сына рабби Ханины, в барайте можно объяснить так: при употреблении в пищу сомнительной жертвы птицы нет двух полноценных запретов; однако мудрецы запретили есть ее, поскольку она выглядит так, будто в ней есть два запрета, установленных мудрецами.

Let us say—

the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina concerning the reason for the law that a father makes his son a nazirite—

is a dispute among tannaim

who disagreed in that same dispute, for it was taught:

Until when does

the father

make his son a nazirite?

Until he produces two hairs; these are the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he reaches the age of vows,

that is, from the age of twelve years and one day.

Is it not so [is this not the case] that

Is it not the case

it is a dispute among tannaim,

that these tannaim disagreed in the dispute of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

For Rabbi—

who says, “Until he produces two hairs”—

holds: It is a halakha concerning naziriteship

that the father makes his minor son a nazirite,

and

therefore

even though he has reached the age of vows, he continues to make him a nazirite [the father makes him a nazirite and continues]

the father imposes it on him and continues to do so]

until he produces two hairs [until he produces two hairs].

until he grows two hairs].

And Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda—

the one who

says: Until he reaches the age of vows—

holds:

the father makes his son a nazirite

in order to train him in mitzvot, and since he has left his authority, he is no longer obligated [since the son has left his authority, the father is no longer obligated], that is: since he does not require his father’s authority, for he can make a vow himself, the father is therefore not obligated to make him a nazirite on account of training.

once the son has left his authority, the father is no longer obligated], that is: since he no longer requires his father’s authority, as he can make a vow himself, the father is no longer obligated to impose naziriteship on him for the sake of education.

They said,

the members of the academy:

No,

this is not what they disagreed about; rather,

everyone agrees that it is a halakha concerning naziriteship—

and here it is concerning

the dispute concerns

the one wondrously near to manhood that

that

they disagree:

Rabbi holds: “

the one wondrously near to manhood,”

who is able to make vows and to make nazirite vows,

is rabbinic

;

and the Torah law—

a halakha given to Moses at Sinai—

displaces the rabbinic law,

it displaces the rabbinic law of “the one wondrously near to manhood,” and therefore the father can make him a nazirite until he becomes an adult.

And Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda holds: “

the one wondrously near to manhood” is

by Torah law,

and therefore it is impossible that there should be a halakha that the father makes him a nazirite after he has become “the one wondrously near to manhood.”

And if you wish, say that

the dispute of the tannaim should be explained:

Everyone—

both Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda—hold that the reason for the law is

in order to train him in mitzvot, and “

the one wondrously near to manhood”

is rabbinic,

for if “the one wondrously near to manhood” were by Torah law, then everyone would say that the father is not commanded to train his son in something in which the son himself is obligated.

And their dispute is:

Rabbi—

who says: Until he produces two hairs—

holds: Rabbinic training comes and displaces the rabbinic one wondrously near to manhood, that is: since he can make a vow himself only by rabbinic law, there is therefore a law of training imposed upon the father, to make him a nazirite.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda—

And Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda—

who says: Until he reaches the age of vows—

holds: Rabbinic training does not come and displace the rabbinic one wondrously near to manhood, that is: since, in the end, he is himself obligated in it by rabbinic law, there is therefore no law of training imposed upon the father.

Иными словами: поскольку сын, в конечном счете, уже обязан исполнять это по постановлению мудрецов, отец больше не обязан воспитывать его в этом.

Let us say

these tannaim are like those tannaim, that is: the tannaim who disagreed in the following beraita disagreed in the same dispute in which Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda disagreed, whether the father can make his son a nazirite after the son has reached the age of vows

; as it was taught in a beraita:

; for it was taught:

An incident involving Rabbi Ḥanina, whose father made him a nazirite, and brought him

his father

before Rabban Gamliel

on the same day that he made him a nazirite—

And Rabban Gamliel would examine him to know whether he had already produced

already

two hairs

for then his father’s naziriteship does not take effect upon him,

if he had not produced them.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Rabban Gamliel did not examine him to know whether he had already produced two hairs, but rather

to know whether he had reached the age of vows, that is: to examine him whether he knows for whom he vowed

for then his father’s naziriteship does not take effect upon him

if not.

The reason of Rabbi Yosei is that he holds according to the view of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda that the father does not make his son a nazirite once he has reached the age of vows, and he disagrees with the first tanna, who holds according to Rabbi that the law depends upon two hairs.

He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥanina to Rabban Gamliel:

Rabbi, do not trouble yourself [do not exert yourself]

to exert yourself]

to examine me,

for in either event I am a nazirite—

For

if I am a minor

I shall be on account of my father, that is: on account of his making me a nazirite,

and

if I am an adult, I shall be on my own account, that is: I accept naziriteship upon myself, and in either event I am a nazirite.

that is: I accept naziriteship upon myself, and in either event I am a nazirite.

Rabban Gamliel was impressed by Rabbi Ḥanina’s words:

Rabban Gamliel stood and kissed him

Rabbi Ḥanina

on his head,

and

Rabban Gamliel said:

Rabban Gamliel

I am certain concerning this one that he will issue halakhic rulings in Israel.

They said: Not many days passed before

Rabbi Ḥanina

issued a halakhic ruling in Israel.

It is thus explained that the tannaim disagreed whether the father can make his son a nazirite after he has reached the age of vows, just as Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning this matter.

It entered our minds to explain what Rabbi Ḥanina said—“If I am a minor, I shall be on account of my father, and if I am an adult, I shall be on my own account”—as follows: “If I am a minor with regard to making a vow myself, for I have not reached the age of vows, and if I am an adult with regard to making a vow myself, meaning that I have reached the age of vows, I shall be on my own account”; and therefore we ask:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda

who says: Until he reaches the age of vows, this is what

Rabbi Ḥanina

said:

If I am a minor—if I have not reached the age of vows—

I shall be on account of my father, and if I am an adult

—that I have already reached the age of vows—

I shall be on my own account.

But according to Rabbi, who says: Until he produces two hairs,

the father can make him a nazirite; if so, how did Rabbi Ḥanina say:

and if I am an adult—

that I have already reached the age of vows—

I shall be on my own account

and not on account of my father!?