Nazir 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

Not if you say that, in the case of a male,

his offering may be eaten,

as it contains only one prohibition

when in fact he did not father a viable child, namely, the prohibition against non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard.

Would you say, in the case of a female, that

her offering may not be eaten, because if in fact she did not give birth to a viable male child, her offering contains

two prohibitions

, namely, the prohibition against an animal carcass, since the bird sin-offering is killed by pinching rather than slaughter, and the prohibition against non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, as the Gemara explains below.

Here the Gemara raises its objection against Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina, for according to the Gemara’s explanation above, he must necessarily hold that “there is no Torah requirement of slaughter for a bird”:

But

what are the two prohibitions [what are the two prohibitions that apply to a bird sin-offering brought in a case of uncertainty]? Is it

not the prohibition against an animal carcass and the prohibition against non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard

!?

If so, it is proven that there is a Torah requirement of slaughter for a bird, and therefore a bird sin-offering brought in a case of uncertainty involves the prohibition against an animal carcass if she did not give birth to a viable male child. Thus, according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina—the tanna of the beraita—“there is a Torah requirement of slaughter for a bird” and “non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard are prohibited by Torah law”!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, challenged this [Rav Aḥa expressed his astonishment at the one who raised the objection]:

Perhaps one is liable for it because it appears to involve two prohibitions by rabbinic law [perhaps one who eats it is liable because it appears to involve two prohibitions by rabbinic law], that is: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina’s intention in the beraita may be explained as follows: eating a bird sin-offering brought in a case of uncertainty does not involve two fully-fledged prohibitions; rather, the Sages prohibited eating it because it appears as though it involves two rabbinic prohibitions.

Shall we say—

the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina concerning the reason for the law that a father imposes naziriteship on his son—

is the subject of a dispute between tannaim

who disagreed in that same dispute, as it was taught in a beraita:

Until when may

the father impose naziriteship

on his son?

Until he grows two hairs; this is the statement of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he reaches the age of vows

, namely, from the age of twelve years and one day.

Is it not the case

that it is a dispute between tannaim,

that these tannaim disagreed in the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina:

Rabbi—

who says, until he grows two hairs—

holds: There is a halakha concerning naziriteship

that a father may impose naziriteship on his minor son,

and

therefore

even though he has reached the age of vows, the father continues to impose it on him [

the father imposes it on him and continues to do so]

until he grows two hairs [

until he grows two hairs].

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda—

who

says: Until he reaches the age of vows—

holds:

the father imposes naziriteship on his son

in order to educate him in the mitzvot, and once he leaves his authority, he is no longer obligated [

once the son has left his authority, the father is no longer obligated], that is: since he no longer requires his father’s authority, as he can make a vow himself, the father is no longer obligated to impose naziriteship on him for the sake of education.

The members of the academy said

:

No,

that is not the matter in which they disagreed. Rather,

everyone agrees that there is a halakha concerning naziriteship—

and here

the dispute concerns

“mufla samukh le-ish”,

that

is what they disagree about:

Rabbi holds: “

‘Mufla samukh le-ish’,”

who is able to make vows and nazirite vows,

is rabbinic

law,

and the Torah law—

the halakha given to Moses at Sinai— -

overrides the rabbinic law,

overriding the rabbinic law of “mufla samukh le-ish.” Therefore, the father may impose naziriteship on him until he becomes an adult.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda holds: “

‘Mufla samukh le-ish’”

is by Torah law,

and therefore it is impossible that there should be a halakha that the father may impose naziriteship on him after he has become “mufla samukh le-ish.”

And if you wish, say that the dispute between the tannaim should be explained as follows:

Everyone—

both Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda—

holds that the reason for the law is

in order to educate him in the mitzvot, and “

‘mufla samukh le-ish’”

is rabbinic,

because if mufla samukh le-ish were by Torah law, everyone would agree that the father is not commanded to educate his son in a matter in which the son himself is obligated.

Their dispute is as follows:

Rabbi—

who says, until he grows two hairs—

holds: The rabbinic obligation of education overrides the rabbinic law of mufla samukh le-ish, that is: since he can make a vow himself only by rabbinic law, the father remains subject to the obligation of educating him by imposing naziriteship on him.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda—

who says: Until he reaches the age of vows—

holds: The rabbinic obligation of education does not override the rabbinic law of mufla samukh le-ish, that is: since, in the final analysis, he is himself obligated in the matter by rabbinic law, there is no obligation of education upon the father.

Shall we say

that these tannaim are like those tannaim,

that is: the tannaim who disagree in the following beraita disagree in the same dispute as Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, concerning whether the father may impose naziriteship on his son after the son has reached the age of vows

; as it was taught in a beraita:

There was an incident involving Rabbi Ḥanina, whose father imposed naziriteship on him and brought him

his son

before Rabban Gamliel

on the same day that his father imposed naziriteship on him—

And Rabban Gamliel examined him to determine whether he had already grown

two

hairs

for if so, his father’s imposition of naziriteship would not take effect,

if he had not grown them.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Rabban Gamliel did not examine him to determine whether he had already grown two hairs, but rather

to determine whether he had reached the age of vows,

that is, to examine whether he knew for whose sake he had made the vow, for if so, his father’s imposition of naziriteship would not take effect,

if not.

Rabbi Yosei’s reason is that he holds in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, that a father may not impose naziriteship on his son once he has reached the age of vows, and he disagrees with the first tanna, who holds in accordance with Rabbi, that the law depends on the growth of two hairs.

He said to him

Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rabban Gamliel:

My teacher, do not trouble yourself [

to exert yourself]

to examine me,

for in either event I am a nazirite—

because

if I am a minor

I will be a nazirite on my father’s account,

that is: on account of my father’s imposition of naziriteship,

and if I am an adult, I will be a nazirite on my own account,

that is: I accept naziriteship upon myself, and in either event I am a nazirite.

Rabban Gamliel was impressed by Rabbi Ḥanina’s words:

Rabban Gamliel stood and kissed him

Rabbi Ḥanina

on his head,

and

Rabban Gamliel said:

Rabban Gamliel

I am certain that this one will issue halakhic rulings in Israel.

They said: It was not many days before he issued

Rabbi Ḥanina

a halakhic ruling in Israel.

It is thus explained that the tannaim disagree over whether a father may impose naziriteship on his son after he has reached the age of vows, just as Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda disagreed about this matter.

The initial assumption was to explain what Rabbi Ḥanina said—“If I am a minor, I will be on my father’s account, and if I am an adult, I will be on my own account”—as follows: “If I am too young to make a vow myself, meaning that I have not reached the age of vows, and if I am an adult with regard to making a vow myself, meaning that I have reached the age of vows, I will be on my own account.” Therefore, we ask:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda

who says: Until he reaches the age of vows, this is what Rabbi Ḥanina meant when he said

Rabbi Ḥanina:

If I am a minor—

one who has not reached the age of vows—

I will be on my father’s account, and if I am an adult -

who has already reached the age of vows—

I will be on my own account.

But according to Rabbi, who says: Until he grows two hairs,

the father may impose naziriteship on him; if so, how could Rabbi Ḥanina have said:

And if I am an adult—

who has already reached the age of vows—

I will be on my own account,

and not on my father’s account!?