Nazir 28b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains the reason for the dispute between the first tannai and Rabbi Akiva in our Mishna, whether he can annul [her vow] after slaughtering and before the sprinkling:

The tannai of our Mishna holds:

he can annul it as long as she is forbidden wine, and therefore:

Only from when one of the bloods has been sprinkled upon it can he no longer annul it, for

once blood has been sprinkled upon it, she is immediately permitted wine

since one of the bloods has been sprinkled upon it, she is immediately permitted wine,

and she no longer has disgrace

and then her affliction has ceased; and therefore the law depends on the sprinkling of the blood and not on the slaughter.

And Rabbi Akiva holds:

Even

only

once the animal has been slaughtered

has been slaughtered, the

animal

again

he cannot annul [the vow], because of the loss of sacred offerings,

for if he annuls it before the blood has been sprinkled, he will no longer be able to sprinkle the blood, as the Gemara explains the reason and proceeds, and the offerings will go to the place of burning, since without the sprinkling of the blood the meat is not permitted for eating.

Rabbi Zeira had thought that the reason he cannot sprinkle the blood after the annulment is that after the annulment he cannot sprinkle the blood for the purpose of the shelamim of a nazir, because they are no longer the shelamim of a nazir but rather shelamim of a freewill offering, and it is forbidden to sprinkle the blood for the purpose of something for which they had not been designated before slaughter; and therefore:

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection to him: And why—

that is to say: What difference does it make that the offerings had not been designated as shelamim of a freewill offering before slaughter? Is it because of this forbidden to sprinkle the blood!?

To sprinkle their blood

of the slaughtered animal

not for their sake

not for the purpose of the shelamim of a nazir,

and thereby permit the meat for eating,

and the sacred offerings will not be lost!?

Is it not taught

that we learned in a beraita that it is permitted for him to sprinkle the blood:

The lambs of the festival of Shavuot

that come with the two loaves,

which he slaughtered

not for their sake

that is, for the sake of shelamim of a freewill offering, and consequently they do not fulfill the obligation of “the lambs of the festival of Shavuot,” according to the law of offerings slaughtered not for their sake, which do not count for their owners as their obligation.

Or if he slaughtered them before their time

on the eve of the festival of Shavuot,

or after their time

on the night after the festival of Shavuot, and the designation “lambs of the festival of Shavuot” was removed from them,

the blood shall be sprinkled and the meat shall be eaten.

And when he slaughtered them on a Festival not for their sake, he must sprinkle the blood on the Festival [so that it should not become disqualified through remaining overnight], and he does not concern himself with the prohibition of “rectifying,”

but if it was Shabbat, he shall not sprinkle

because he is like one who rectifies the meat, and it is forbidden by rabbinic law,

but if he sprinkled

on Shabbat,

it is accepted for burning the sacrificial fats toward evening.

It is thus proven that it is permitted to sprinkle the blood for the sake of shelamim of a freewill offering, for necessarily he sprinkles them for the sake of a freewill offering, because for this they are designated, even though the lambs had not been designated for this before slaughter.

They said

the members of the academy to answer:

If he slaughtered an elevation-offering or shelamim, so too

indeed, if before her annulment only the elevation-offering or the shelamim had been slaughtered, he could indeed annul [the vow], for there is no loss of sacred offerings here, since he can sprinkle the blood.

But here, what are we dealing with

in our Mishna?

For example, he slaughtered the sin-offering first

he slaughtered the sin-offering first, for in the case of a sin-offering there is no remedy by sprinkling its blood not for its sake, since a sin-offering is disqualified not for its sake, for the sake of shelamim of a freewill offering, because a sin-offering does not come as a freewill offering.

And if you say: If so, since he slaughtered the sin-offering first, how did the first tannai say that he cannot annul [the vow] because the woman has already become permitted wine, when we have heard only that the nazir becomes permitted wine after a single act only after the sprinkling of the blood of the shelamim, because it is stated: “And the nazir shall shave at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” and it is explained in the Gemara below, 45a, that this refers to shelamim—

This is not so, and

as we learned

in the Mishna below, 45a: “

If he shaved on one of the three

on one of the three offerings—

he has fulfilled [his obligation].”

We learned in the Mishna:

In what case are these words said? With regard to purification shaving; but with regard to impurity shaving, he may annul [the vow]. And Rabbi Meir says: Even with regard to purification shaving he may annul [the vow], because he can say: I do not want a wife who shaves.

The Gemara explains the reason of the first tannai, who does not hold that because of the shaving he can annul [the vow]:

And the first tannai could say to you:

Even though she shaves, what concern is this to the husband? For

it is possible

for her

with a wig,

and she will not be repulsive to him.

And Rabbi Meir holds: With a wig—

since

it has

filth

and it is not part of her body, she is repulsive to her husband, and

he is not pleased

with this.

Mishna:

A man imposes nezirut on his son

who is a minor

as a nazir,

for if the father said concerning his son, “My son shall be a nazir,” he is a nazir even if the son does not know that his father imposed nezirut upon him.

But a woman does not impose nezirut on her son.

And all this applies when the son or his relatives did not object, but if

the son shaved

the son

or his relatives shaved him

for there is no greater objection than this, and likewise

the son objected

the son

or his relatives objected,

the nezirut is annulled.

If he had an animal designated

for the offerings of purification nezirut, and afterward the nezirut was annulled through objection, the law of the offerings he designated is like the law of the offerings of a woman who is a nazir whose husband annulled [her vow] after she had designated her offerings:

The

animal that was designated for a

sin-offering shall die,

according to the law of “a sin-offering whose owners have died,” which goes to death by a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai.

And

if

the

animal that was designated as an

olah, it shall be brought as an olah, and the peace offerings shall be brought as peace offerings -

and they shall be eaten

the peace offerings

for one day

only, in accordance with the stringency of the peace offerings of a nazirite, and not like other peace offerings, which are eaten for two days and one night.

And they do not require bread

like the other peace offerings of a nazirite, since it is stated concerning the waving of the bread: “on the palms of the nazirite,” whereas there is no nazirite here.

If he had money

that he had designated and consecrated for his nazirite offerings, but the money was

unassigned

because he did not specify which money would be used for the sin offering, which for the olah, and which for the peace offerings, but merely said: “This money shall be for my nazirite offerings,”

it shall all fall

all of it

to voluntary offerings

for the purchase of offerings for the altar.

But if he had

assigned money

because he specified which money would be for the sin offering, which for the olah, and which for the peace offerings:

the money for the sin offering shall go to the Dead Sea

to be destroyed, since if the animal had been before us, it would have been put to death -

one may not derive benefit

from it by rabbinic decree,

and one is not liable for misuse of consecrated property

because it is not designated to be sacrificed and is not “sacred property of the Lord.”

The money for the olah shall be used

for

an olah, and one is liable for misuse of consecrated property with regard to it.

The money for the peace offerings shall be used

for

peace offerings, and

those peace offerings

shall be eaten for one day

only,

and they do not require bread

as is the law concerning an animal designated as a peace offering.

Gemara: The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna, the foundational compilation of the Oral Law: A man may impose naziriteship on his son, but a woman may not impose naziriteship on her son:

A man may, indeed,

indeed impose naziriteship on his son,

but a woman may not

impose naziriteship on her son, as we learned in the Mishna.

What is the reason

that is, what is the fundamental reason that a father may impose naziriteship on his son, and from this it will be understood why a mother may not impose naziriteship on her son?

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is a halakha

transmitted to Moses at Sinai

regarding naziriteship

that a father may impose naziriteship on his son. This is how the halakha was transmitted: A father may impose naziriteship on his son, but a mother may not impose naziriteship on her son.

And Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina: