Nazir 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

There

the beginning

that is, the middle clause,

is referring to a case in which he vowed from only one

that he did not undertake naziriteship upon himself except with regard to one of them:

Therefore:

according to the Rabbis, who say

who maintain

that even if he vowed with regard to only one of them

he is a nazirite—here too

he is a nazirite, and it is forbidden.

Whereas

according to Rabbi Shimon, who says:

the nazirite’s acceptance is not an acceptance

until he vows with regard to all of them,

he is

permitted;

and this is how the Gemara had understood the explanation of the middle clause until now.

But the

final clause

is not dealing with one who did not accept upon himself all the prohibitions of naziriteship, as we initially thought. Rather:

For

in fact, at the time he accepted naziriteship

he vowed with regard to all of them

the prohibitions of a nazirite, and even according to Rabbi Shimon there is here a complete acceptance of naziriteship; therefore Rabbi Shimon prohibits him. However, now he regrets his vow, because he cannot live without wine, or because he sees that if he does not engage in the burial of the dead there will be no livelihood for his household—

and he sought dissolution with regard to one of them,

meaning that he consulted the Sages about these prohibitions that he could not withstand, and requested that the Sages permit them for him. And what we learned: “I know that a nazirite is forbidden wine, but I thought that the Sages would permit it for me,” means that this is what he says to the Sages: “Permit these prohibitions for me, as a sage permits a vow,” on the basis of the opening and the regret: “I cannot live except with wine, or because I bury the dead” —

The explanation of the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is whether, when he seeks dissolution with regard to one of the prohibitions, everything is permitted, or whether nothing is permitted until he regrets the entire vow. This law depends on their dispute regarding the fundamental acceptance of naziriteship: whether acceptance of one of the prohibitions is sufficient. The Rabbis follow their own position, and Rabbi Shimon follows his own position, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

For

according to the Rabbis, who say: even

if

if he vowed with regard to only one of them, he is a nazirite,

then even

when he seeks dissolution with regard to only one of them

when he consults the Sages only about one of the prohibitions,

it is dissolved

he is entirely released from all his naziriteship.

And since the “end of naziriteship,” meaning the uprooting of naziriteship through consultation with a sage, is analogous to the “beginning of naziriteship,” meaning the acceptance of naziriteship, just as through accepting one of the prohibitions the entire status of a nazirite takes effect upon him, so too, if he consults the Sages about one of the prohibitions, everything is permitted.

And

according to Rabbi Shimon as well, the “end of naziriteship” is analogous to the “beginning of naziriteship.” And since

he says

that at the “beginning of naziriteship” one is not a nazirite

until he vows with regard to all of them—

therefore

when he likewise seeks dissolution with regard to that one

when he consults the Sages about his naziriteship, he is not released

until he seeks dissolution with regard to all of them

until he consults the Sages about all the prohibitions of a nazirite.

And

for this reason it teaches

in the final clause that he consulted the Sages about only one of the prohibitions of a nazirite:

and Rabbi Shimon prohibits him.

The Gemara’s following answer is explained on the basis of one of the approaches in Tosafot and the rishonim.

We learned in tractate Nedarim 20b:

The Sages permitted four vows:

a. Vows made to motivate: for example, the seller wanted four zuz for his merchandise, while the buyer agreed to pay only two zuz, and the seller said to him, “This loaf is forbidden to me as an offering if I give you this object for less than four dinars.” If the seller wishes to give it to him for three dinars, he may do so, since the seller made the vow only to motivate the buyer to raise the price he had offered.

b. Exaggerated vows: for example, one who said: “These fruits are forbidden to me if I did not see on this road a multitude as large as those who left Egypt.” His vow does not take effect, since he intended only to say that he saw a great number of people, and not specifically as many as those who left Egypt.

c. Vows made in error: for example, one who said: “These fruits are forbidden to me if I ate,” while he indeed thought that he had not eaten, and later remembered that he had eaten. His vow does not take effect, since he was mistaken at the time of the vow. The reason is explained by the Ran [Nedarim 25b]: “Whenever there is an error regarding the essence of the vow, his mouth and his heart are not in agreement.”

And in the Gemara, Nedarim 25b: Just as vows made in error are permitted, so oaths made in error are permitted. What are oaths made in error? For example, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi: one said, “I swear that this is what Rav said” [one swore that Rav said such and such], and the other said, “I swear that this is what Rav said” [he swore that Rav said something different from what the first had said]. For each one swore according to his own understanding [each one swore truthfully according to his own understanding, and it is an “oath made in error,” not a false oath, even though Rav certainly said only one of the two things].

And in the Gemara, Shevuot 26a, this incident involving Rav Kahana and Rav Asi is explained as follows: “When they came before Rav, he said that it was as one of them [when the amoraim who had sworn conflicting oaths about what Rav had said came before him, Rav affirmed that it was as one of them]. The other said to him [the second one said to Rav]: ‘Did I swear falsely [since the truth was not as I said]?’ He said to him [Rav said to that amora]: ‘Your heart compelled you’ [you thought that you were swearing truthfully; that is, your oath is therefore an oath made in error].”

It is clear from the Gemara’s words that vows made in error are considered “vows resulting from compulsion.”

d. Vows resulting from compulsion: for example, a person prohibited his fellow from deriving benefit from him if he would not come to eat at his home, and that fellow did not come to eat at his home because he or his son became ill, or because a river delayed him. He is not forbidden to derive benefit from the one who made the prohibition, because the latter intended to prohibit him only if he refrained from coming without any compulsion; but when prevented by compulsion, he did not intend to prohibit him.

Alternatively, if you wish

to explain the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon in the final clause in a manner that does not contradict their position in the middle clause:

The final clause is dealing with a case in which he vowed with regard to all of them. At the time of the vow he accepted upon himself all the prohibitions of a nazirite, and there is no basis for saying that he is not a nazirite because of the principle “until he vows with regard to all of them,” even according to Rabbi Shimon.

The Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon are disputing the release of this nazirite

with regard to “

vows resulting from compulsion”—

that is, “vows made in error” which do not take effect because his heart compelled him—

they are disputing

whether, by rabbinic decree, consultation with the Sages is nevertheless required, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

That is, the explanation of our Mishna is that initially he accepted absolute naziriteship upon himself. Only afterward did he realize that he could not endure abstaining from drinking wine or becoming impure through contact with the dead. As a result, he now comes before the Sages to ask them to permit him, because his heart had compelled him: he had thought that he would be able to withstand this, but now he realizes that he cannot.

And this is what we learned: “I thought that the Sages would permit it for me,” meaning that this is what he now says to the Sages: It is proper to permit it for him, since he did not know that he would be unable to withstand it. Indeed, the Rabbis permit it for him; but the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon dispute whether, by rabbinic decree, consultation is required even for “vows made in error.” According to Rabbi Shimon, consultation is required by rabbinic decree, and therefore he prohibits him, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon dispute

the dispute between Shmuel and Rav Asi,

whether, even though these are “vows resulting from compulsion,” he is nevertheless rabbinically forbidden until he consults the Sages about his naziriteship!

For we learned

in tractate Nedarim:

The Sages permitted four vows:

a.

Vows made to motivate;

b.

exaggerated vows;

c.

vows made in error;

d.

vows resulting from compulsion.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Asi

concerning that Mishna in Nedarim:

These four vows—

including vows made in error—

require consultation with the Sages.

However, Rav Yehuda added,

when I stated

this teaching in the name of Rav Asi

before Shmuel, he said to me

Shmuel:

But

the tanna teaches “

the Sages permitted,”

while you say: They require consultation with the Sages!?

The Rabbis

in the final clause of our Mishna

follow Shmuel, for “vows made in error” are entirely permitted, and therefore they permit him in the final clause.

And

if

Rabbi Shimon

held

like Rav Asi,

that “vows made in error” require consultation with the Sages, Rabbi Shimon therefore prohibits him in the final clause.

Mishna:

One who says: “It is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite,” is obligated to bring the offerings for a nazirite completing pure naziriteship, and he may offer them on behalf of whichever nazirite he wishes, Maimonides.

One who said:

“I am hereby a nazirite, and

also

it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite”—

and his fellow heard

his words

and said,

his fellow: “

And I, and it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite” [that is, I too shall be a nazirite like my fellow, and I likewise accept upon myself the obligation to provide the haircutting offerings of another nazirite]. Thus, both of them became obligated to observe naziriteship and to provide the haircutting offerings of another nazirite—

It follows that

if they were

both

wise, they provide the haircutting offerings for

each other,

each for the other: the first brings the offerings of the second, and the second brings those of the first. Thus, by accepting these obligations they have incurred no more than the obligation of one nazirite, which includes observing naziriteship and bringing the offerings.

But if not,

if they do not possess this foresight, they

provide the haircutting offerings for other nazirites,

in addition to the offerings for their own naziriteship. Thus, by accepting these obligations they have incurred more than an ordinary nazirite, since they must bring two sets of offerings.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma before them:

One who says: “I am hereby a nazirite, and it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite,” and

his fellow heard and said “

And I,”

without adding: “And it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite”—

what

is the law of the one who heard?

Does “And I”

refer to the entire statement

of the first,

meaning

that it relates to all of the first person’s statement, and the one who heard thereby became obligated both in naziriteship and in providing the haircutting offerings of another nazirite?

Or perhaps: “

And I”

refers to half of the statement

of the first,

meaning

that it relates to half of the first person’s statement, and the second person became obligated only in half of the first person’s statement?

The Gemara further raises the following uncertainty:

If you say that “And I”

refers to half of the statement—

does it

refer to the beginning

of the first person’s statement—“I am hereby a nazirite”—so that the one who heard is obligated only in naziriteship?

Or perhaps “And I”

refers to the end

of the statement—“And it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite”—so that he is obligated to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite but is not obligated in naziriteship?

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

“I am hereby a nazirite, and it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite,” and his fellow heard and said, “

And I, and it is incumbent upon me to provide the haircutting offerings of a nazirite”;

if they were wise, they provide the haircutting offerings for each other,

and thereby each fulfills both his naziriteship and his obligation to provide the haircutting offerings.

And

from the fact that

the tanna says that the second person said: “

And I, and it is incumbent upon me,”

it follows that had he said only “And I,” he would not have become obligated in all of this, but only in half of the first person’s statement. And

learn from this: “

And I”

refers to half of the statement

of the first,

meaning.

They said

the members of the yeshiva concerning this:

No;

indeed, it can be derived from our Mishna that “and I” alone

indicates the division of the statement—

However,

the second uncertainty still remains: does “and I” refer

to the beginning

of the first person’s statement,

or to the end?

The Gemara says:

And from this—

from the place where we resolved the first uncertainty, you can also resolve the second uncertainty!

Since

the tanna stated that the second person said, in addition to “and I”: “

and it is incumbent upon me to shave

a nazirite,” and not “and I am a nazirite,”

infer from it: “

and I”

refers to the beginning of the statement,

and acceptance of naziriteship is included in the expression “and I”; therefore, he adds what is not included in the expression “and I,” namely, “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava

to reject the entire basis of the proof from our Mishna, and even the first uncertainty—whether “and I” refers to the entire statement of the first person or only to half of it:

From where is this so?

How can you derive from our Mishna that “and I” refers only to half of the statement?!

Actually, I can say to you that

“

and I”

refers to the entire statement,

and even if he had not added: “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,” he would have been obligated in everything that the first person accepted upon himself—

And if it is because

he added the words: “

and it is incumbent upon me

to shave a nazirite,” which implies that had he not added this, he would not have been obligated to shave a nazirite—

that is not so, and this expression does not prevent the acceptance itself, which was already included in the word “and I.” And

what does he mean [

what is this that he says] “

and it is incumbent upon me

to shave a nazirite”?

It means: in this matter!

That is to say: What I had already accepted [with the expression “and I”—namely, to shave a nazirite] is merely a repetition, as people commonly repeat their words. Nevertheless, the same law applies if he did not say, “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite”: because he said “and I,” he is obligated both in naziriteship and in shaving another person.

For if you do not say this,

but say as you have said—that the tanna needed to add in the second person’s statement “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite” in order for him to be obligated to shave, because without this addition he would have been obligated only in accordance with one statement of the first person and not both—

then

what is taught in the latter clause

of our Mishna [in the following Mishna]: If one said:

“It is incumbent upon me to shave half a nazirite,” and his fellow heard him and said: “

And I, and it is incumbent upon me

to shave half a nazirite,”

this one shaves a whole nazirite, and that one shaves a whole nazirite—

Is there really a division into two matters there [

does the first person’s statement there contain two statements]?!

That is to say: Is there, after all, a division into two parts in the first person’s statement, such that you could say that if the second person had not added “and it is incumbent upon me to shave half a nazirite,” he would have been obligated in only one of the first person’s statements?!

Rather,

necessarily, in the latter clause,

what does he mean by “

and upon me”?

It means

in this matter,

and this is merely a repetition of the wording.

And if so,

here

in the first clause

as well, when he says “

and it is incumbent upon me,”

it means: in this matter,

and this is nothing more than a repetition of the wording.

Rava said

to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

How can you compare them [

how do you compare the first clause to the latter clause]?!

For

if you grant that the first clause

indeed

requires it—

that is to say, the addition of the words “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite” is necessary in order for him to be obligated in what he is obligated, as I maintain—and only

the latter clause

is

not in need of

the addition “and it is incumbent upon me to shave half a nazirite,” this is understandable, because one can say that

the latter clause teaches “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,” even though

“and I must shave a nazirite” is

this addition is not necessary,

because of

because of

the addition written in

the first clause, which

indeed

is necessary.

there.

But if you say

as you have said, that

the first clause does not require

this addition, since “and I” refers to the entire statement, and that

the latter clause also does not require

this addition—

can one really say that

the first clause teaches something unnecessary, and teaches

also

the latter clause something unnecessary?!

Why would the tanna teach a matter that is unnecessary?!

It is necessarily the case that had he not said, “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,” the expression would have indicated only reference to half of the statement; therefore, he needed to add “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,” and the uncertainty is resolved.

A. One who betroths a woman is prohibited by Torah law from marrying her mother, who is his mother-in-law, as well as her mother’s mother and her father’s mother, her sister, her daughter, her son’s daughter, and her daughter’s daughter; and even if his wife dies, he remains prohibited from all of these women except her sister, while if he divorces her, he is prohibited even from her sister.

B. We hold: “Follow the majority.” Therefore, one who betrothed a woman but does not know who her female relatives are, and comes to betroth another woman, need not be concerned that this woman whom he is now betrothing might be one of his first wife’s relatives and therefore prohibited to him. For most women in the world are permitted to him, and we attribute this woman as well to the majority and deem her permitted to him.

C. Similarly, you say [in Ketubot 15a]: If a city’s majority consists of men who are fit and whose relations with women do not disqualify those women from marrying into the kehunah, while a minority of the men in the city consists of men whose relations with a woman disqualify her from marrying into the kehunah, and one woman had relations with one of the men of the city, but it is not known with whom she had relations, the woman is fit to marry into the kehunah, as we attribute that she had relations with a fit man from the majority.

D. There is, however, a distinction in this matter [as explained there]: If she had relations with him in the marketplace, outside his fixed location—that is, his home—we indeed attribute that she had relations with a fit man. But if we know that she went to the home of one of the men of the city and had relations with him in his fixed location, that is, his home, but we do not know whose home she entered, whether the home of a fit man or of an unfit man, we do not attribute that she had relations with a fit man. She remains in doubt, as perhaps she had relations with an unfit man. For the Sages received the principle: “Any fixed item is considered as half and half,” meaning as though there were not here a majority of fit men and a minority of unfit men, but half were fit and half were unfit. Since it is uncertain with whom she had relations, this is a case of a Torah uncertainty, which is treated stringently. And this is what the Sages said everywhere: “Whatever

separates

from the majority

separates,”

for one follows the majority only when the item has separated.

E. Despite what was stated in section D, one who does not know his wife’s female relatives and comes to marry a woman finds her permitted to him, because we attribute her to the majority. This is so whether he encountered her in the marketplace, outside her fixed location, and there became uncertain whether she is his wife’s relative, or whether he encountered her in her home, in her fixed location.

You might say: What is the difference between this man, who is of uncertain fitness, and this woman, whose permissibility is uncertain? After all, both are in their fixed locations?!

That is not so; there is a distinction between them [in accordance with Tosafot]. In the first case, “the prohibition [that is, the unfitness] is identifiable in itself, and the permitted status [that is, the fitness] is identifiable in itself”; rather, we are uncertain to whose home she went. In any such case, since the matter is in its fixed location, it is deemed fixed and “considered as half and half.” This is not so with one who marries a woman whose fitness is uncertain to him: even when he marries her in her fixed location, “the prohibition is not identifiable in itself,” for the uncertainty concerns this woman herself, whether she is permitted or prohibited. Therefore, this is not included in the category of “fixed,” and one follows the majority.

Rabbi Yitzhak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who says to his agent: