Nazir 11b — the Talmud in English

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the first clause [that is, the middle clause]

that is, the middle clause,

for example, he vowed from one of them [that he did not accept naziriteship upon himself except from one of them]:

that he did not undertake naziriteship upon himself except with regard to one of them:

And therefore:

according to the Rabbis who say [who hold]

who maintain

that even if he vowed only from one of them

he is a nazirite — here too

he is a nazirite, and it is forbidden.

But

according to Rabbi Shimon, who says:

the nazirite’s acceptance is not an acceptance

until he vows from all of them,

he is

permitted; as the Gemara has understood until now the explanation of the middle clause.

and this is how the Gemara had understood the explanation of the middle clause until now.

But the

final clause

does not deal with one who did not accept upon himself all the prohibitions of naziriteship, as we initially thought, but rather:

that

in truth, at the time of accepting his naziriteship,

he vowed from all of them,

the prohibitions of a nazirite, and even according to Rabbi Shimon there is here a complete acceptance of naziriteship; therefore Rabbi Shimon forbids him. Rather, today he regrets his vow because he cannot live without wine, or because he sees that if he does not engage in the dead, there will be no livelihood for his household —

and he became subject to inquiry concerning one of them, and he was questioned by the Sages concerning these prohibitions, which he cannot withstand, and requests that the Sages release him; and what we learned: “I know that a nazirite is forbidden wine, but I thought that the Sages would permit me,” means that this is what he says to the Sages: Permit me these prohibitions, according to the law of a sage who releases a vow, and because of the opening and the regret, “that I cannot live except with wine, or because I bury the dead” —

meaning that he consulted the Sages about these prohibitions that he could not withstand, and requested that the Sages permit them for him. And what we learned: “I know that a nazirite is forbidden wine, but I thought that the Sages would permit it for me,” means that this is what he says to the Sages: “Permit these prohibitions for me, as a sage permits a vow,” on the basis of the opening and the regret: “I cannot live except with wine, or because I bury the dead” —

And the explanation of the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon is whether, by being questioned concerning one of the prohibitions, everything is released, or whether nothing is released until he regrets all of it. And this law depends upon the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon concerning the essence of accepting naziriteship: whether acceptance of one of the prohibitions is sufficient. The Sages follow their position, and Rabbi Shimon follows his position, as it proceeds to explain.

For

according to the Rabbis who say: even

if

he vowed only from one of them, he is a nazirite,

then even

when he becomes subject to inquiry concerning only one of them [when he is questioned only concerning one of the prohibitions],

when he consults the Sages only about one of the prohibitions,

it is released [he is released]

from all his naziriteship completely.

And since the “end of a nazirite” — that is, uprooting the naziriteship through inquiry — is like the “beginning of a nazirite” — that is, accepting the naziriteship — just as through accepting one prohibition the entire law of a nazirite takes effect upon him, so too, if he is questioned concerning one prohibition, everything is released.

And

according to Rabbi Shimon also, the “end of a nazirite” is like the “beginning of a nazirite”; and since

он

he says

in the “beginning of a nazirite” that he is not a nazirite

until he vows from all of them —

therefore

when he likewise becomes subject to inquiry concerning that one [when he is questioned concerning his naziriteship],

he is not released

until he becomes subject to inquiry concerning all of them [until he is questioned concerning all the prohibitions of a nazirite].

until he consults the Sages about all the prohibitions of a nazirite.

And

for this reason it teaches

in the final clause that he was questioned only concerning one of the prohibitions of a nazirite:

and Rabbi Shimon forbids.

The following answer of the Gemara is explained according to one of the approaches in Tosafot and the early authorities.

We learned in tractate Nedarim 20b:

Four vows the Sages released:

A. Vows of urging: for example, the seller wanted four zuz for his merchandise, while the buyer agreed to only two zuz, and the seller said to him, “This loaf is a konam to me if I give you this object for less than four dinars.” If the seller wishes to give it to him for three dinars, he may, for the seller vowed only to urge the buyer to raise the price that he had offered.

B. Vows of exaggeration: for example, one who said: “These fruits are a konam to me if I did not see on this road a multitude like those who came out of Egypt.” His vow does not take effect, since he intended only to say that he saw many people, and not specifically people like those who came out of Egypt.

C. Vows of error: for example, one who said: “These fruits are a konam to me if I ate,” and in fact thought that he had not eaten, and afterward remembered that he had eaten. His vow does not take effect, since he was in error at the time of the vow. The reason is explained by the Ran [Nedarim 25b]: “Whenever there is an error in the essence of the vow, his mouth and his heart are not equal.”

And in the Gemara, Nedarim 25b: Just as vows of error are permitted, so oaths of error are permitted. What are oaths of error? For example, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi: one said, “An oath that this is what Rav said” [one said: I swear that Rav said such and such], and the other said: “An oath that this is what Rav said” [I swear that Rav said something different from the first one], for each one and one swore according to his own understanding [each one swore correctly according to his own understanding, and it is an “oath of error,” not an oath of falsehood, even though Rav certainly said it as one of them].

And in the Gemara, Shevuot 26a, this incident concerning Rav Kahana and Rav Asi is explained: “When they came before Rav, he said as one of them [when the amoraim who had sworn contradictorily concerning what Rav had said came before him], he said as one of them [Rav confirmed that he had said it as one of them]. The other said to him [the second said to Rav]: ‘Did I swear falsely [did I violate an oath of falsehood, since the truth was not as I said]?’ He said to him [Rav said to that amora]: ‘Your heart compelled you’ [you thought that you were swearing truthfully; that is, therefore your oath is an oath of error].”

And it is explained by the words of the Gemara that vows of error are considered “vows arising on account of compulsion.”

D. Vows arising on account of compulsion: for example, when a person prohibits his fellow from benefiting from him if he does not come to eat at his house, and that fellow did not come to eat at his house because he himself became ill, or his son became ill, or a river held him back. He is not forbidden to benefit from the one who imposed the prohibition, because the latter intended to prohibit him only if he refrained from coming to him without any compulsion at all, but through compulsion — no.

Alternatively, if you wish

to explain the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon in the final clause so that it does not contradict their position in the middle clause:

The final clause deals with a case in which he vowed from all of them, so that at the time of the vow he accepted upon himself all the prohibitions of a nazirite; and one cannot argue that he is not a nazirite because of “until he vows from all of them,” even according to Rabbi Shimon.

And the Sages and Rabbi Shimon, who disputed concerning the release of this nazirite,

in “

vows arising on account of compulsion” — that is, “

vows of error” which do not take effect because his heart compelled him —

are in dispute, whether, by rabbinic decree, they require inquiry, as it proceeds to explain.

whether, by rabbinic decree, consultation with the Sages is nevertheless required, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

That is: The explanation of our Mishna is that initially he accepted absolute naziriteship upon himself, but afterward realized that he cannot endure without drinking wine or without impurity from the dead; and because of this he comes today before the Sages so that they should release him, since his heart compelled him, for he had thought that he would be able to endure it, and now he realizes that he cannot endure it.

And this is what we learned: “I thought that the Sages would permit me,” meaning that this is what he says today to the Sages: it is appropriate to release him, since he did not know that he would be unable to endure it. And indeed the Sages release him; rather, the Sages and Rabbi Shimon dispute whether, by rabbinic decree, inquiry is required even for “vows of error.” According to Rabbi Shimon, inquiry is required by rabbinic decree, and therefore he forbids him, as it proceeds to explain.

And

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon disputed

in the dispute between Shmuel and Rav Asi,

whether, even though these are “vows arising on account of compulsion,” nevertheless, by rabbinic decree he is forbidden until he is questioned concerning his naziriteship!

For we learned

in tractate Nedarim:

Four vows the Sages released:

A.

Vows of urging;

B.

vows of exaggeration;

C.

vows of error;

D.

vows arising on account of compulsion.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Asi

concerning that Mishna in Nedarim:

These four vows —

including vows of error —

require inquiry by the Sages.

However — Rav Yehuda added —

when I said

this statement in the name of Rav Asi

before Shmuel, he said to me

Shmuel:

But

the tanna teaches “

the Sages released,” while

you say: They require inquiry by the Sages!?

The Rabbis

in the final clause of our Mishna

hold like Shmuel, that “vows of error” are entirely permitted, and therefore they release him in the final clause.

And

if

Rabbi Shimon

holds

like Rav Asi, that “vows of error” require inquiry by the Sages, therefore Rabbi Shimon forbids him in the final clause.

that “vows made in error” require consultation with the Sages, Rabbi Shimon therefore prohibits him in the final clause.

Mishna:

One who says: “It is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite” is obligated to bring the offerings of purification shaving, and he offers them for whichever nazirite he wishes, Rambam.

One who said:

“I am a nazirite, and

also

it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite” —

and his fellow heard

his words

and said,

his fellow: “

And I, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite” [that is: I too shall be a nazirite like my fellow, and likewise I accept upon myself to shave a nazirite], and both became obligated in naziriteship and in the obligation to shave another nazirite —

[то есть: «И я также буду назиром, как мой товарищ, и также принимаю на себя обязанность обрить другого назирея»]. Таким образом, оба стали обязанными соблюдать назирейство и обрить другого назирея.

then,

if they were

both

intelligent, they shave

one another,

each the other, for the first brings the offerings of the second, and the second those of the first; thus they have not “lost” through their acceptance more than one nazirite obligation, which includes conducting oneself as a nazirite and bringing offerings.

But if not,

if they do not possess this intelligence, they

shave other nazirites,

in addition to the offerings of their own naziriteship; thus they have “lost” through their acceptance more than another nazirite, for they must bring two sets of offerings.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma before them:

One who says: “I am a nazirite, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,” and

his fellow heard and said

“And I,”

and did not add further to say: “And it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,”

what

is the law of the one who heard?

Does “and I”

refer to the entire utterance

of the first

mean [does it relate to all the first one’s utterance], and the one who heard became obligated both in naziriteship and in shaving another nazirite?

that it relates to all of the first person’s statement, and the one who heard thereby became obligated both in naziriteship and in providing the haircutting offerings of another nazirite?

Or perhaps: “

And I”

refers to half of the utterance

of the first

mean [does it relate to half of the first one’s utterance], and the second became obligated only in half of the first one’s utterance?

that it relates to half of the first person’s statement, and the second person became obligated only in half of the first person’s statement?

And the Gemara adds to deliberate:

if you should conclude that “and I”

что слово «и я»

refers to half of the utterance —

Does it

refer to the first clause

of his utterance — “I am a nazirite” — and the one who heard is obligated only in naziriteship?

Or perhaps “and I”

refers to the final clause

of the utterance — “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite” — and he is obligated to shave a nazirite but is not obligated in naziriteship?

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

“I am a nazirite and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,” and his fellow heard and said

“And I, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,”

if they were intelligent, they shave one another,

and thereby each fulfilled his naziriteship and his obligation to shave.

And

since it says

the tanna said that the second one said: “

And I, and it is incumbent upon me,”

it follows that had he said “and I” alone, he would not have become obligated in all this, but only in half of the first one’s utterance; and

learn from it: “

And I”

refers to half of the utterance

of the first

mean.

The yeshiva students say

about this:

No,

indeed, one can learn from our Mishna—the foundational compilation of the Oral Torah—that the word “and I” by itself

means: I take on only the latter part of the statement—

However,

the second uncertainty still remains: does “and I” refer

to the beginning

of the first person’s statement,

or to the end?

The Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—says:

And from this

the place where we resolved the first uncertainty, you can also resolve the second uncertainty!

Since

the tanna, a sage of the Mishnaic era, said that the second person, in addition to saying “and I,” said:

“And I must shave a nazirite”

and did not say, “And I am a nazirite,”

learn from this:

“And I”

refers to the beginning of the statement,

and accepting naziriteship is included in the words “and I.” Therefore, he adds what is not included in the words “and I,” namely, “and I must shave a nazirite.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava

to reject the entire proof from our Mishna, as well as the first uncertainty—whether “and I” refers to the entire statement of the first person or only to half of it:

From where do you know that this is so,

that you can learn from our Mishna that “and I” refers only to half of the statement?!

I could always say to you

that

“and I”

refers to the entire statement,

and even if he had not added, “and I must shave a nazirite,” he would have been obligated in everything that the first person accepted upon himself—

And if you raise this

from the fact that he added the words

“and I”

“must shave a nazirite,” which seems to imply that had he not added these words, he would not have become obligated to shave a nazirite,

that is not so. These words do not prevent the acceptance itself, which was already included in the word “and I.” So

what does he mean [

and what is he saying by]

“and I”

“must shave a nazirite”?

It means: in this matter!

That is to say: What I had already accepted [with the words “and I”]—namely, to shave a nazirite—is merely a repetition of the wording, as people commonly repeat themselves. However, the law is the same even if he did not say, “and I must shave a nazirite”: because he said “and I,” he becomes obligated both in naziriteship and in shaving the hair of another nazirite.

For if you do not say this,

but instead say as you have argued—that the tanna had to add to the second person’s words, “and I must shave a nazirite,” in order for him to become obligated to shave, because without this addition he would have become obligated only by one part of the first person’s statement and not by both parts—

then

what does the latter clause say

of our Mishna [in the following Mishna]? One who said:

“It is incumbent upon me to shave half a nazirite’s hair,” and another person heard him and said:

“And I, and I must”

“shave half a nazirite’s hair”

the first shaves one complete nazirite’s hair, and the second shaves one complete nazirite’s hair—

Is there really a second matter there [

meaning, are there two statements in the words of the first person]?!

That is to say: Is there, in fact, a division into two parts in the first person’s statement, so that you could say that if the second person had not added, “and I must shave half a nazirite’s hair,” he would have become obligated by only one statement of the first person?!

Rather,

necessarily, in the latter clause,

what does he mean

by “and I”?

It means

“in this matter,”

and this is merely a repetition of the wording.

And if so,

here

in the opening clause

too, when he says

“and I”

it means: in this matter,

and this is merely a repetition of the wording.

Rava said

to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

How can you compare these cases [

how can you compare the opening clause with the latter clause]?!

For

it is understandable if you say that, in the opening clause,

indeed, it

is necessary—

that is, the addition of the words “and I must shave a nazirite” is necessary for him to become obligated in what the first person became obligated, as I maintain—and only

in the latter clause

is the addition of “and I must shave half a nazirite’s hair”

not necessary. This is understandable, because one can say that

the latter clause states

“and I must shave a nazirite,” even though

“and I must shave a nazirite” is

not necessary,

because of

the

addition written in

the opening clause, which

indeed

is necessary

.

But if you say

as you have argued, that

the opening clause does not require

this addition, because “and I” refers to the entire statement, and that

the latter clause also does not require

this addition—

can one really say that

the opening clause teaches something unnecessary, and it also teaches

the

latter clause, which is unnecessary?!

Why would the tanna teach something unnecessary?!

It must be, then, that if he had not said, “and I must shave a nazirite,” the words “and I” would have referred only to half of the statement. Therefore, he had to add, “and I must shave a nazirite,” and the uncertainty is resolved.

A. One who betroths a woman is prohibited by Torah law from marrying her mother, who is his mother-in-law; her mother’s mother; her father’s mother; her sister; her daughter; her daughter’s daughter; and her son’s daughter. Even if his wife dies, he remains prohibited from all of these women except her sister. If he divorces her, he is prohibited even from her sister.

B. We accept the principle, “Follow the majority.” Therefore, if a man betrothed a woman but does not know who her relatives are, and then wishes to betroth another woman, he need not be concerned that the woman he is now betrothing is one of his first wife’s relatives and therefore forbidden to him. Most women in the world are permitted to him, and we assume that this woman belongs to the majority and is permitted to him.

C. Similarly, you say [in Ketubot 15a]: If a city is inhabited mostly by men of unblemished lineage, whose intercourse does not disqualify the women with whom they have intercourse from marrying a kohen—that is, a man of the priestly status—and a minority of the men in the city are men whose intercourse disqualifies a woman from marrying a kohen, and an unmarried woman had intercourse with one of the men of the city, but it is not known with whom she had intercourse, the woman is fit to marry a kohen, because we assume that she had intercourse with one of the men of unblemished lineage, who constitute the majority.

D. However, there is a distinction in this matter [as explained there]. If she had intercourse with him in the marketplace, outside the place where he is established—that is, outside his home—we indeed assume that she had intercourse with a man of unblemished lineage. But if we know that she went to the home of one of the men of the city and had intercourse with him in his established place, that is, his home, but we do not know whose home she entered—whether the home of a man of unblemished lineage or the home of a disqualified man—we do not assume that she had intercourse with a man of unblemished lineage. She remains uncertain, perhaps she had intercourse with a disqualified man. This is what the Sages received as a tradition: “Anything established in its place is considered like half and half,” meaning that it is as though there were not a majority of men of unblemished lineage and a minority of disqualified men, but half were men of unblemished lineage and half were disqualified. Since it is uncertain with whom she had intercourse, this is a matter of uncertainty concerning a Torah prohibition, and one rules stringently. This is what the Sages say everywhere:

“What separates”

from the majority

“has separated,”

for you follow the majority only when the item has separated from its place.

E. Despite what was stated in section D, a man who does not know his wife’s relatives and wishes to marry a woman may marry her, because we assume that she belongs to the majority, whether he found her in the marketplace, outside her established place, and there became uncertain whether she is his wife’s relative, or whether he found her in her home, her established place.

You might ask: What is the difference between the man, whose status is uncertain, and this woman, whose permissibility is uncertain? After all, both are in their established places?!

That is not so; there is a distinction between them [according to Tosafot]. In the first case, “the forbidden item [that is, the disqualified person] is recognizable by itself, and the permitted item [that is, the person of unblemished lineage] is recognizable by itself.” Our uncertainty is only which home she entered. In any such case, since the matter is in its established place, it is considered established and “like half and half.” By contrast, when a man marries a woman whose status is uncertain to him—whether she is fit to marry him—even when he marries her in her established place, “the forbidden item is not recognizable by itself.” For the uncertainty concerns this woman: whether she is permitted or forbidden. Therefore, this is not included in the rule of an item established in its place, and one follows the majority.

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

One who says to his agent: