Nazir 12a — the Talmud in English

Go out and betroth a woman for me"

without specification,

meaning that the sender did not specify to him from which city he should take [her] or which woman he should betroth for him,

and the agent died

before he testified before the sender who was the woman whom he had betrothed for him—the sender is

forbidden with all the women in the world—

to marry them!

And because

there is a presumption

concerning a

agent

that he

carries out

the

agency,

and we must assume that indeed the agent acted as he was requested and betrothed for the sender one of the women in the world, and the relatives of that woman became forbidden to the sender.

And since he did not specify to him

the sender to the agent which woman he should betroth,

then he does not know,

the sender,

which one he betrothed for him [that is, the sender does not know who the woman is who was betrothed to him], and consequently he does not know which women are the relatives of his wife and forbidden to him; and all the women in the world are included in this doubt, and therefore he is forbidden with all the women in the world.

[that is, the sender does not know which woman was betrothed to him]. Therefore, he does not know which women are relatives of his wife and forbidden to him, and all the women in the world are subject to this uncertainty. Thus, he is forbidden to all the women in the world.

And although most women in the world are permitted to him, and only a minority are forbidden to him, we should have attributed that the woman whom the sender came to marry is among the women permitted to him, for we hold: “Follow the majority

Nevertheless, she is forbidden to the sender by rabbinic law, because the Sages penalized the sender—who instructed the agent to betroth a woman without specifying which one, thereby placing himself in this uncertainty without taking precautions against a possible mishap — so that he may not rely on the majority to permit her, but must remain in his uncertainty.

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan:

”

Nevertheless, she is forbidden to the sender by rabbinic law, for the Sages penalized the sender—who instructed [the agent] to betroth without specification and brought himself into this doubt, without concerning himself that he might come to a mishap — so that he should not rely upon the majority to permit her, but should remain with his doubt. Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan: A. The man with a discharge and the woman with a discharge bring on the day after their immersion for purification a sacrifice for atonement: two turtledoves or two young pigeons [called together a “nest” in the language of the Sages], one for a sin-offering and one for a burnt-offering; and through bringing this sacrifice they are permitted to eat sacred food. Likewise, the impure nazir, the poor woman after childbirth, the poor leper, and those who deny under oath testimony that they know concerning monetary law for the benefit of a person, or concerning an oath of utterance of the lips, or concerning the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things [when they are poor], bring a nest.

B. A person may take for his sacrifice a nest of two birds without specifying at the time of its purchase which of the birds is for a sin-offering and which for a burnt-offering; rather, the koen specifies at the time of performing it which bird he makes for a sin-offering and which for a burnt-offering. Such a nest is called a “non-specified nest,” in which it is not specified which bird of it is for a sin-offering and which for a burnt-offering.

C. If the owners wish, they specify at the time of their purchase which bird is for a sin-offering and which for a burnt-offering, and it is called a “specified nest

” D. A sacrifice consecrated for the atonement of this person may not be brought by another.

A nest—

of turtledoves or young pigeons—

non-specified [in which the owners did not specify at the time of purchase which of them was for a sin-offering and which for a burnt-offering] —

[meaning that the owners did not specify at the time of purchase which of them was for the sin offering and which for the burnt offering] —

That one fledgling among them flew out into the open world.

Or one flew

one among them

among

other fledglings, which are among the five

sin-offerings that must die [among those five sin-offerings concerning which it is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai that they must die and may never be offered, such as a sin-offering whose owners died], and became mixed with them.

[among the five sin offerings that, by a halakha given to Moses at Sinai, must die and may never be sacrificed, such as a sin offering whose owner died], and became mixed with them.

Or one among them died.

Then he

shall take

from the marketplace a

mate for the second

that remained in the nest. Since the nest has not yet been specified, he may specify the remaining fledgling as a sin-offering or a burnt-offering as he wishes, and likewise he may specify the additional fledgling as he wishes.

But a specified nest has no remedy.

According to Tosafot, this passage is not read.

And now it is difficult: for it follows that the Mishna discusses only how to permit the fledgling that remained from that nest from which the fledgling flew,

whereas other nests in general, that is, if this person whose fledgling flew wished to take another nest from the marketplace for the atonement of another impurity, the fledglings in the world among which the fledgling that flew from him is mixed,

—that is, if the person whose young bird flew away wished to purchase another pair from the market for atonement for a different impurity, then the young birds in the world among which the bird that flew away became mixed—

are fit [they are valid for him].

[for him].

And

if it is as you say,

why can he take fledglings from the marketplace for the atonement of another impurity!?

can he take young birds from the market for atonement for a different impurity?!

But

let us say,

let it be said concerning

each and every one

of the fledglings that he comes to take,

perhaps this is it!? Perhaps this fledgling is the fledgling that flew, and it is a sacrifice designated for the atonement of another impurity, and he cannot achieve atonement through it for the impurity for which he now comes to atone!?

Perhaps this young bird is the bird that flew away, and it is an offering designated for atonement for a different impurity; therefore, he cannot attain atonement through it for the impurity for which he now seeks atonement?!

That is: although according to the strict law, since most of the fledglings are valid for him and only a minority are forbidden, we should permit him to take fledglings from the marketplace, because “follow the majority,” nevertheless, according to your words we should penalize him, so that he may not follow the majority, since through his negligence, in not guarding his nest, he brought himself into this doubt.

He said,

he replied,

to him,

Rabbi Yohanan to Reish Lakish:

This that I said—that because of the penalty he is not permitted to follow the majority in order to resolve his doubt—this penalty does not apply to every doubt of prohibition concerning which one can say, “Follow the majority

” Rather, only to a doubt resembling kavu'a, in which one does not follow the majority, as he explains and proceeds: in this matter the Sages said, because of the penalty, that it is like kavu'a, in which one does not follow the majority.

And if so, your difficulty is nothing, for:

I am speaking of a woman who does not move, for I forbade a woman who was not mobile at the time when the doubt arose concerning her, whether she was his relative or not, and we hold: “Anything fixed is considered like half-and-half,” as though there were no permitted majority before us—

since I forbade a woman who was not mobile at the time the uncertainty arose concerning her—whether she was his relative or not. The established rule is, "Anything fixed is considered half and half," as though there were no majority of permitted women before us—

And although according to the strict law it is not applicable to judge here, “Anything fixed is considered like half-and-half,” since a prohibition by itself and a permitted item by itself are not identifiable before us; rather, we have a doubt concerning this woman whether she is permitted or forbidden, and in any such case we do not apply the law of “fixed

” nevertheless, since it resembles kavu'a, the Sages therefore said, because of the penalty, to judge this doubt according to the law of kavu'a, which is “considered like half-and-half

” And you would apply to me the prohibition of a mobile item!?

Whereas you come to infer from my words and forbid all the fledglings in the world to this person because of the doubt that perhaps it is the forbidden fledgling, even though the prohibited item is mobile and is not kavu'a at all!?

And if you should say,

perhaps you will say:

here,

with regard to the woman whom the sender betroths for him,

she too is mobile, for

perhaps

perhaps he found her in the marketplace [perhaps the sender found her in the marketplace]

[perhaps the sender found her in the marketplace]

and

afterward

betrothed her!?

That is: perhaps you will challenge me: behold, you too forbade all the women in the world because of the doubt, and included in your words is that the sender cannot betroth a woman whom he found in the marketplace, and there the doubt arose for him whether she was his relative or not; and in the marketplace she is not fixed and does not resemble a fixed item at all, so you should have permitted her, just as you permit all the fledglings in the world!? I say to you: nevertheless, a woman does not resemble a fledgling, for:

There,

with regard to the woman whom I forbid even when he found her in the marketplace,

she will return to her place of fixedness,

for ultimately she will return to her place of fixedness, and therefore the Sages forbade her because of the penalty.

But

with regard to a nest, does it return!?

But concerning a fledgling that we permit and concerning which we do not fear that perhaps it is the fledgling that flew, does the fledgling return to its place of fixedness!?

And since it is not possible to include it within the law of kavu'a, in which one does not follow the majority, therefore even its owner, who was negligent with it, is permitted to take it, and he does not fear the doubt that perhaps this is his fledgling that flew.

Rava said: And Rabbi Yohanan concedes

that he forbade the sender with all the women in the world:

For the sender is permitted

with a woman [that is, to marry a woman]

[that is, to marry a woman]

who does not have:

not a daughter,

so that we should be concerned that perhaps she was betrothed to him, and this woman would be forbidden to him as his mother-in-law.

and not a daughter’s daughter,

for there is concern that perhaps she was betrothed to him, and this woman would be forbidden to him as the “mother of his mother-in-law

” and not a son’s daughter,

so that we should be concerned concerning this one that she is forbidden to him as the “mother of his father-in-law

” and not a mother,

so that this one would be forbidden to him as his wife’s daughter.

and not a mother’s mother,

so that this one would be forbidden to him by Torah law as his wife’s daughter’s daughter.

and not a sister,

so that this one would be forbidden to him as his wife’s sister.

And more than this:

And even though she had a sister ,

that one—that is, this woman whom he now comes to marry—

that is, the woman whom he now wishes to marry—

is permitted!

And he explains it as he proceeds.

What is the reason, that is, what are the circumstances in which she did not have a sister and now has one?

that is, what is the case in which she did not have a sister and now has one?

And the Gemara explains: for example,

that at the time when

the sender said to the agent, “Go out and betroth a woman for me,”

that

that sister

was married to a man [her sister was still married to a man]; in such a case, even if she was divorced afterward and was unmarried at the time when the agent sought a woman for his sender, the agent cannot betroth her, as he explains the reason and proceeds; therefore this woman is not forbidden to him as a possible wife’s sister, even though she has a sister.

[her sister was still married to a man]. In such a case, even if she was divorced afterward and was unmarried when the agent sought a woman for the sender, the agent could not betroth her, as the reason will be explained. Therefore, this woman is not forbidden to him because of the uncertainty that she is his wife's sister, even though she has a sister.

And the reason that the agent cannot betroth one who was married to a man at the time of the appointment of the agency, although at the time when the agent comes to betroth her she is available for betrothal, is that it is an assessment: the Sages assessed the sender’s intention:

For

For when

a person

appoints an agent for a matter that stands before him [a person does not intend to ask his agent to do something unless that thing stands ready before him to be done now], that is, one who appoints an agent to betroth a woman for him intends only for a woman who, at the time of appointing the agency, is fit for the agent to perform his agency upon her—namely, women who are unmarried at the time of appointing the agency, who are already fit for betrothal.

[a person does not intend to ask his agent to do something unless that thing is ready before him to be done immediately], that is, one who appoints an agent to betroth a woman intends only a woman who, at the time the agency is assigned, is eligible for the agent to perform his agency with her—namely, women who are unmarried at the time the agency is assigned and are already eligible for betrothal.

But

for a matter that does not stand before him [for a matter that is not ready before him to be done], such as a woman who is married to a man at the time of appointing the agency, and at that time she is not fit for the agency to be performed upon her,

[something that is not ready before him to be done], such as a woman who is married at the time the agency is assigned and at that time is not eligible for the agency to be performed with her,

he does not appoint an agent.

The sender has no intention concerning her at all, and the agent cannot betroth her for him through his agency.

The Gemara challenges this principle: assuming that this rule applies to agency, the same should be true of one who undertakes to shave any nazirite, since he intends to fulfill his undertaking only with regard to a nazirite who had already taken a nazirite vow and was ready, at the time of his undertaking, for the undertaking to be performed with him. He does not intend to fulfill his undertaking with regard to a person who had not yet taken a nazirite vow at all. If so, there is a difficulty from what

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who says: “

I am a nazir, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazir,”

and his fellow heard and said: “

And I too, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazir,”

if they are intelligent, they shave one another,

that is, the first shaves the second, and the second the first,

and if not, they shave

they

other nazirites.

And if indeed the matter is so, according to the principle we stated, it is difficult:

Granted, the latter [the last one] can fulfill his obligation through shaving the first,

[the second] can fulfill his obligation by shaving the first, because

because the first is before him [because the first is ready before him at the time of the second’s undertaking, since he is already a nazir], that is, when the second said, “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazir,” namely, one of the nazirites, his intention was that, if he wished, he would shave this nazir standing before him, who was already ready for the obligation of nazirite offerings when his naziriteship ended.

[because the first was ready before him when the second undertook the obligation, since he was already a nazirite]. That is, when the second said, "and I undertake to shave a nazirite," meaning one of the nazirites, he intended that, if he wished, he could shave this nazirite standing before him, who was already ready to become obligated in the nazirite offerings once his nazirite term ended.

But the first [the first one]—why can he fulfill his undertaking through shaving the second!? For when the first said, “and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazir,”

[why can he fulfill his undertaking by shaving the second? When the first said, "and I undertake to shave a nazirite,"

was the latter already before him [was the second already ready in his naziriteship before him]? He had not yet undertaken naziriteship at all!?

[was the second already ready in his nazirite status before him]? He had not yet taken a nazirite vow at all!

And according to your words, we should have said that the first accepted upon himself to shave only one of the nazirites who had already undertaken naziriteship at the time of his acceptance, and not to shave this one who had not yet undertaken naziriteship at that time!?