Nazir 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

Go and betroth a woman for me"

without specification,

that is, the sender did not specify for him from which city he should take her or which woman he should betroth for him,

and the agent died

before he testified before the sender who the woman was whom he had betrothed for him—the sender is

forbidden to all the women in the world—

to marry them!

And because

there is a presumption

that a

agent

is

carrying out

his

agency, we must assume that the agent indeed did as he was requested and betrothed one of the women in the world for the sender, and the relatives of that woman are forbidden to the sender.

And since

And since he did not specify to him

which woman the sender instructed the agent to betroth,

he did not know

the sender

which one he had betrothed for him [that is, the sender does not know who the woman was who became betrothed to him]; consequently, he does not know which women are his wife's relatives and are forbidden to him, and all the women in the world are subject to this uncertainty. Therefore, he is forbidden to all the women in the world.

[that is, the sender does not know which woman was betrothed to him]. Therefore, he does not know which women are relatives of his wife and forbidden to him, and all the women in the world are subject to this uncertainty. Thus, he is forbidden to all the women in the world.

And although most women in the world are permitted to him, and only a minority are forbidden to him, we should have assumed that the woman whom the sender came to marry was one of the women permitted to him, since the principle is established: "Follow the majority

" ; and from the words of Tosafot in Ketubot 15a, s.v. "perhaps," it appears that they explain the matter of the majority differently, as was already explained in the note to the introduction; see also the commentary of the Rosh. For this reason, since "follow the majority," everyone in the world is permitted to marry women, and they need not be concerned that this is the woman who was betrothed by the agent. Although the sender cannot rely on the majority because of the penalty, the Sages imposed the penalty only upon him and not upon others, Tosafot. Nevertheless, she is forbidden to the sender by rabbinic law, for the Sages penalized the sender—who instructed the agent to betroth a woman without specification and thereby exposed himself to this uncertainty, without taking care lest he come to stumble — so that he may not rely on the majority to permit her, but must remain with his uncertainty.

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan:

”

a. A zav and a zava bring, on the day after immersing for their purification, an offering for atonement: two turtledoves or two young pigeons, together called a ken in the language of the Sages, one for a sin-offering and one for a burnt-offering. By bringing this offering, they become permitted to eat sacrificial food. Likewise, an impure nazirite, a poor woman who has given birth, a poor leper, and those who deny under oath, concerning testimony they know in monetary cases for another person's benefit, or concerning an oath of utterance, or concerning the impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, when they are poor, bring a ken.

b. A person may purchase for his offering a ken of two birds without specifying at the time of purchase which bird is for the sin-offering and which is for the burnt-offering. Rather, the koen specifies at the time he performs the sacrificial service which bird he is making a sin-offering and which a burnt-offering. Such a ken is called an unspecified ken, since it was not specified which bird in it is for the sin-offering and which for the burnt-offering.

c. If the owners wish, they specify at the time of purchase which bird is for the sin-offering and which is for the burnt-offering, and it is called a specified ken

.

A ken—

of turtledoves or young pigeons—

unspecified [that is, the owners did not specify at the time of purchase which of them was for the sin-offering and which for the burnt-offering] —

[meaning that the owners did not specify at the time of purchase which of them was for the sin offering and which for the burnt offering] —

if one fledgling flew away from it into the open air.

Or if

one of them

flew among

other fledglings, which were among the five

sin-offerings that must die [that is, among those five sin-offerings concerning which it was transmitted to Moses from Sinai that they must die and may never be sacrificed, such as a sin-offering whose owner died], and became mixed with them.

[among the five sin offerings that, by a halakha given to Moses at Sinai, must die and may never be sacrificed, such as a sin offering whose owner died], and became mixed with them.

Or if one of them died.

In that case,

he shall take

from the market a

pair for the one

remaining in the ken. Since the ken has not yet been specified, he may designate the remaining fledgling as a sin-offering or a burnt-offering as he wishes, and he may likewise designate the additional fledgling as he wishes. [

But in the case of a specified ken, there is no remedy].

According to Tosafot, this clause is not to be included.

And now the difficulty arises: It appears that the Mishna is discussing only how to permit the fledgling that remained from the ken from which the fledgling flew away,

whereas other nests in general—

that is, if this person whose fledgling flew away wished to take another ken from the market for the atonement of another impurity, then all the fledglings in the world among which the fledgling that flew away is mixed—

are fit

[that is, they are valid for him].

And

if it is as you say,

why

can he take fledglings from the market for the atonement of another impurity!?

But

let us say

with regard to

each and every one

of the fledglings that he comes to take,

perhaps this is it!?

Perhaps this bird is the fledgling that flew away, and it is an offering designated for atonement for another impurity, so he cannot achieve atonement with it for the impurity for which he is now coming to atone!?

That is: Although according to the fundamental law, since most fledglings are valid for him and only a minority are forbidden, we should permit him to take fledglings from the market, because one follows the majority, nevertheless, according to your position we should penalize him and prevent him from following the majority, since through his negligence, by failing to safeguard his ken, he brought himself into this uncertainty.

He said—

he replied

to him,

Rabbi Yohanan to Reish Lakish:

What I said—that because of the penalty he may not follow the majority in order to resolve his uncertainty—does not apply to every uncertainty concerning a prohibition in which one could say, "Follow the majority

"

. Rather, it applies only to an uncertainty resembling a case of kavua, in which one does not follow the majority, as will be explained. In such a case the Sages said, because of the penalty, that it is treated like kavua, in which one does not follow the majority. And if so, your objection is of no consequence, for:

I was speaking of a woman, who does not move,

for I forbade a woman who was not moving when the uncertainty arose concerning her, whether she was his relative or not; and the established principle is, "Anything fixed is considered as half and half," as though no majority of permitted women were before us—

and although, according to the fundamental law, the rule "anything fixed is considered as half and half" does not apply here, since there is no distinct forbidden item and distinct permitted item before us, but rather we are uncertain concerning this woman whether she is permitted or forbidden, and in any such case the law of kavua is not applied—

nevertheless, since this case resembles kavua, the Sages said that, because of the penalty, this uncertainty is to be treated according to the law of kavua, in which "it is considered as half and half."

And you are telling me about a prohibition that moves!?

But you seek to infer from my statement and prohibit all the fledglings in the world to this man because of the uncertainty that perhaps one is the forbidden fledgling, even though the forbidden item moves and is not kavua at all!?

And if you would say—

perhaps you will say:

here,

with regard to the woman whom the sender betroths,

she also moves,

because

perhaps he found her in the marketplace

[perhaps the sender found her in the marketplace]

and

afterward

betrothed her!?

That is: Perhaps you will challenge me as follows: You, too, prohibited all the women in the world because of the uncertainty, and included in your statement is that the sender cannot betroth a woman whom he found in the marketplace, where the uncertainty arose for him whether she was his relative or not; and in the marketplace she is not fixed and does not resemble a fixed item at all, so you should have permitted her, just as you permit all the fledglings in the world! I will say to you: Even so, a woman does not resemble a fledgling, for:

There,

with regard to the woman whom I prohibit even when he found her in the marketplace,

she will return to a state of fixedness,

for ultimately she will return to her place of fixedness; therefore, the Sages prohibited her because of the penalty.

But

But

as for a ken, will it return!?

But with regard to the fledgling that we permit, without concern that perhaps it is the fledgling that flew away, does the fledgling return to its place of fixedness!? And since it cannot be included within the general law of kavua, in which one does not follow the majority, even its owner, who was negligent with it, is permitted to take it, and he need not be concerned about the uncertainty that perhaps this is his fledgling that flew away.

Rava said: And Rabbi Yohanan concedes

that he prohibited all the women in the world to the sender:

The sender is permitted

to a woman

[that is, to marry a woman]

who has neither:

neither a daughter,

so that we should be concerned that she was betrothed to him and is forbidden to him as his mother-in-law.

nor a daughter's daughter,

for we must be concerned that she was betrothed to him and is forbidden to him as his mother-in-law's mother.

nor a son's daughter,

for we should be concerned that she is forbidden to him as his father-in-law's mother.

nor a mother,

so that she would be forbidden to him as his wife's daughter.

nor a mother's mother,

so that she would be forbidden to him by Torah law as his wife's daughter's daughter.

nor a sister,

so that she would be forbidden to him as his wife's sister.

And even more than this:

Even though she had a sister ,

that one—

that is, the woman whom he is now coming to marry—

is permitted!

And the Gemara explains this further.

What is the reason—that is, what is the case in which she did not have a sister and now has one?

that is, what is the case in which she did not have a sister and now has one?

The Gemara explains: For example,

at the time when he said to him,

the sender said to the agent, "Go and betroth a woman for me,"

there was

that sister

married to a man

[that is, her sister was still married to another man]. In such a case, even if she became divorced afterward and was unmarried when the agent sought a woman for the sender, the agent could not betroth her, as the reason will be explained below. Therefore, this woman is not forbidden to him because of the uncertainty that she might be his wife's sister, even though she has a sister.

The reason the agent cannot betroth one who was married to another man at the time the agency was appointed, even though at the time the agent comes to betroth her she is available for betrothal, is that the Sages assessed the sender's intent as follows:

For

when a person appoints

an

agent for a matter that stands before him

[a person's intention is not to ask his agent to do something unless that matter is ready before him to be done immediately], that is, one who appoints an agent to betroth a woman for him intends only a woman who, at the time the agency is appointed, is fit for the agent to carry out his agency with her—namely, women who are unmarried at the time the agency is appointed and are already fit for betrothal.

But

with regard to a matter that does not stand before him

[a matter that is not ready before him to be done], such as a woman who is married to another man at the time the agency is appointed and is then not fit for the agency to be carried out with her,

he does not appoint an agent.

The sender has no intention of including her at all, and the agent cannot betroth her for him through his agency.

The Gemara challenges this premise, assuming that if this principle is valid with regard to agency, the same should apply to one who undertakes to shave any nazirite: He intends to fulfill his undertaking only with regard to a nazirite who had already taken a nazirite vow and was ready, at the time of his undertaking, for the undertaking to be performed with him; but he does not intend to fulfill his undertaking with regard to a nazirite who had not yet taken a nazirite vow at all. If so, the difficulty is from what

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who says: "

I am a nazirite, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,"

and his fellow heard and said, "

I too, and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite,"

if they are intelligent, they shave one another,

that is, the first shaves the second, and the second shaves the first,

and if not, they shave

other

nazirites.

And if the matter is indeed as the principle we stated, the difficulty is:

Granted, the latter

[the last one] can fulfill his obligation by shaving the first, because

the first is standing before him

[because the first was ready before him at the time of the second's undertaking, since he was already a nazirite]. That is, when the second said, "And it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite," meaning one of the nazirites, he intended that, if he wished, he could shave this nazirite standing before him, who was already ready to become liable for the nazirite offerings once his naziriteship ended.

But the first

[the first one]—why can he fulfill his undertaking by shaving the second!? When the first said, "And it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite

"

[was the latter already standing before him, ready in his naziriteship]? He had not yet taken a nazirite vow at all!?

According to you, we should have said that the first undertook to shave only one of the nazirites who had already taken a nazirite vow at the time of his undertaking, and not to shave this one, who had not yet taken a nazirite vow at that time!?