Moed Katan 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

And if you say

in accordance with Shmuel, that

a minor has

a dispute concerning him,

that with regard to his haircut there is a distinction between one born before the Festival and one born during the Festival, and if he was born before the Festival, it is prohibited to cut his hair during the Festival—if so, it should likewise be prohibited to cut the hair of a minor during his mourning, in accordance with the principle that anyone whose haircut is prohibited during the Festival may not have his hair cut during his mourning.

And now

it follows that mourning applies to a minor,

with regard to the prohibition against cutting his hair during his mourning.

And this is impossible. For:

And it was taught in a beraita: They tear the garment of a minor

as an act of mourning—

because of anguish!

They tear his garment in order to cause anguish to those present, so that they will cry and thereby increase the honor of the deceased. This proves that a minor does not observe mourning; rather, his garment is torn only because of anguish.

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: Does it teach

that the beraita, which states, “All those concerning whom they said that it is permitted to cut their hair during the Festival, it is permitted to cut their hair during their mourning,” also teaches the reverse principle of prohibition, namely, that

those

who do not cut their hair during the Festival

are prohibited

from cutting their hair during their mourning!?

Perhaps

those who do not cut their hair during the Festival are divided with regard to the prohibition against cutting their hair during their mourning:

some of them

are

prohibited

from cutting their hair during their mourning,

and some of them

are

permitted

to do so. And a minor is included among those for whom it is permitted.

Ameimar, and some say Rav Shisha son of Rav Idi, taught the sugya in this manner

in a different formulation:

And this is what

Shmuel said: It is permitted to cut the hair of a minor during the Festival;

there is no difference whether he was born during the Festival or whether he was born originally,

before the Festival.

And concerning this

Rav Pinchas said: We too have learned

in a beraita:

All those concerning whom they said that it is permitted to cut their hair during the Festival—

it is permitted to cut their hair during their mourning .

And we should infer:

those

who are

prohibited from cutting their hair during the Festival—

are prohibited from cutting their hair during their mourning.

And

if you say that a minor is prohibited

from having his hair cut during the Festival—

it follows that mourning applies to a minor.

And this is impossible. For:

And

it is taught:

They tear the garment of a minor because of anguish.

This proves that a minor's garment is torn only because of anguish, and not on account of mourning.

And concerning this

Rav Ashi said:

Is it indeed the case that

it teaches “those

Those

who are

prohibited

from cutting their hair during the Festival are prohibited from cutting their hair during their mourning”?

Perhaps some of them are prohibited and some of them are permitted.

The Gemara now explains the law governing a mourner during the Festival and its source:

A mourner does not observe his mourning during the Festival,

since there is a positive mitzva during the Festival to rejoice,

as it is stated

[Deuteronomy 16:14]: “

And you shall rejoice in your Festival.”

Therefore:

If it is mourning that began previously,

meaning that the mourner began observing his mourning before the Festival—

there comes

the positive

mitzva

of rejoicing during the Festival, which is a mitzva

of the many,

as all of Israel is commanded in it,

and it overrides the positive mitzva

of mourning, which is a mitzva

of an individual,

the mourner.

And if it is mourning that began now,

meaning that his relative died during the Festival—

the positive mitzva

of mourning

of an individual

does not override the positive mitzva

of rejoicing

of the many.

And now the Gemara raises a doubt: A person placed under a ban—

what

is the law as to whether he should observe his ban during the Festival?

Rav Yosef said: Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita in the Tosefta:

They judge

during the intermediate days of the festival

capital cases, cases involving lashes, and monetary cases.

And if he does not obey the judgment,

and if he does not comply with the judicial ruling—

we place him under a ban,

we excommunicate him during the intermediate days of the festival.

The Gemara assumed that just as cases are judged during the intermediate days of the festival, so too, if one does not comply with the judicial ruling, he is excommunicated during the intermediate days of the festival.

And if it enters your mind

that an excommunicated person

does not observe his excommunication during the festival,

how is it possible to excommunicate someone during the festival?

For if one who had already

been placed under a ban and then came initially

came to the festival while already under a ban, you said that

the festival comes

and

displaces it

from observing the laws of an excommunicated person.

As for one whom they had not yet excommunicated before the festival, would

now,

during the festival,

we excommunicate him!?

Would we now excommunicate him and obligate him from this point onward to observe the laws of an excommunicated person during the festival, and would the festival not displace the beginning of his observance as an excommunicated person?!

Rather, from here there is proof that one who was excommunicated before the festival observes his excommunication during the festival, and therefore they may even excommunicate someone during the festival.

Abaye said to

Rav Yosef:

Perhaps

the intention of the beraita that says that cases are judged during the intermediate days of the festival is that the court sits during the festival

to examine its case.

But they do not decide during the festival whether he is innocent or liable.

If so, one cannot infer from the beraita that they excommunicate during the festival, since if they do not decide the ruling, there is no one who will refuse to carry it out, and no one who will become liable for excommunication because of disobeying the court.

For if you do not say this—

the capital cases that it teaches

which are also listed in the beraita as being judged during the festival:

does it also mean that they kill him

the person sentenced to death through them during the festival itself?

That cannot be. For:

would they not thereby refrain

these judges

from the joy of the festival ?

.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that the Sanhedrin that executed a person

according to their ruling

do not taste

any food or drink

that entire day—

the verse states [Leviticus 19]: “

You shall not eat over the blood.”

You shall not eat over the blood.”

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that all the discussion of capital cases before a court during the festival is only

to examine its case,

whether he is liable or innocent.

If so,

here too,

with regard to monetary cases, the court sits only

to examine its case.

Rav Yosef said to him,

to Abaye:

If so,

if they merely examine his case during the festival but do not decide it by declaring him liable or innocent—

you have caused his judgment to be delayed!

Once they have examined it, the litigant expects to learn the decision, and delaying until after the festival to hear the verdict causes him the distress of a delayed judgment.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that they judge and conclude the case during the festival, whether in capital cases, cases involving lashes, or monetary cases. It follows from this that if he does not comply with the judgment, they also excommunicate him during the festival.

As for your difficulty: In capital cases, the judges are required to fast on the day on which they executed the person, and this would prevent them from experiencing the joy of the festival—there is a solution: they can arrange matters so that they do not fast.

For example:

they come

the judges

in the morning,

from early in the day,

and examine his case,

but they do not decide it immediately. Rather, the judges leave for their homes,

enter, eat, and drink throughout the entire day,

and fulfill the mitzva of rejoicing on the festival.

And afterward they come

and return to the court

at sunset,

at the end of the day,

and we conclude

then

his case, and execute him.

The delay during the day does not constitute the prohibition of delaying judgment.

Abaye said: Come and hear

a proof from our Mishna to the contrary: An excommunicated person does not observe his excommunication during the intermediate days of the festival. For we learned in it:

And an excommunicated person whom the Sages released.

This implies that the Mishna's intention is every excommunicated person: because of the festival, the Sages released him from observing his excommunication.

Rava said: Does it teach

in our Mishna the wording

“whom the Sages released,”

so that you could infer from this wording that the Sages released every excommunicated person from observing his excommunication during the festival?!

But it says: “The excommunicated person

whom the Sages released”

it teaches.

This implies that it refers only to a particular excommunicated person, whose excommunication happened to be released by the Sages of his generation. For example, he had been excommunicated because of a claim brought by his litigant,

who went

the excommunicated person went

and appeased his litigant.

And he came before the Sages,

the excommunicated person came before the Sages after appeasing his litigant,

and they released him,

and released him from his excommunication.

But one cannot infer from here that every excommunicated person is permitted to act as one who is not excommunicated during the festival.

After the Gemara presents the dispute between Rav Yosef and Abaye concerning the observance of excommunication by an excommunicated person during the festival, it raises a similar question concerning a leper:

A leper—

what is the law: may he observe

the laws of

his leprosy,

not entering the camp and not shaving his hair,

during the festival?

That is, does the mitzva of the festival override the mitzva of observing the leper's laws in those practices that conflict with the joy of the festival?

Abaye said: Come and hear

to resolve this question from our Mishna, for we learned in it:

And the nazirite and the leper

who

emerges from his impurity to his purity during the festival may shave during the festival, since he was unable to shave beforehand.

during the festival may shave during the festival, since he was unable to shave before it.

Abaye infers: It is only because the leper emerged from impurity to purity during the festival that he is permitted to shave then.

This

means that as long as the leper is still

during the days of his impurity—

he observes,

he observes the prohibition against shaving even during the festival.

The Gemara rejects the proof: The tanna in our Mishna may have used the expression

“it is not necessary”

he states

in our Mishna.

“It is not necessary”—

there is no need to say that

during the days of his impurity

the leper

does not observe

the prohibition against shaving during the festival, since the mitzva of rejoicing on the festival overrides it.

But

in the case of a leper who emerged from his impurity

to his purity during the festival, and is required by Torah law to shave,

during the festival, although he is required by Torah law to shave,

let us decree

against him a prohibition on shaving during the festival, since once he shaves he becomes obligated to bring offerings for his purification, and there is concern

that he might delay his offerings and not bring them until the final day of the festival, when he would offer them; yet it is prohibited to offer an individual's offerings on a festival.

and not bring them until the last festival day, when he will offer them; but it is prohibited to offer an individual’s offerings on a festival.

It teaches us

that they did not issue such a decree, and he is permitted to shave during the intermediate days of the festival when he emerges from impurity to purity. Even while he is still impure, he is permitted to shave, since the mitzva of rejoicing on the festival overrides the prohibition against shaving.

Rava said: Come and hear

from the beraita that expounds the verse in Leviticus [chapter 13],

“And the leper”—

to include the High Priest,

who too must observe the laws of a leper if he becomes a leper.

Rava infers:

But the High Priest, throughout the entire year

all of it, is

like

the time of

the festival in everyone's view.

Nevertheless, he observes the practices of a leper when he becomes a leper.

For we learned: The High Priest offers

the offerings even when he is

an onen, but he does not eat.

An ordinary person who is an onen, however, is prohibited even from sending his offerings to be offered in the Temple while he is an onen, since he does not rejoice during his period of acute mourning, and this constitutes a deficiency in the “completeness of the person.” For the mitzva of offering an offering applies only to a “complete person.” Thus the Sages expounded: “Peace-offerings”—when he is complete, but not when he is an onen.

But on a festival, the onen sends his offerings, because the mitzva of rejoicing on the festival overrides the mitzva of conducting himself as an onen.

And since the entire year is regarded as festival time for the High Priest, as he offers his offerings throughout the year even when he is an onen [just as an onen sends his offerings on a festival], and nevertheless we find that the High Priest observes the laws of tzaraat.

This proves

that every person afflicted with tzaraat

observes the laws of his tzaraat on a festival.

And we conclude: Indeed, this proves it.

The Gemara now explains the law concerning a mourner's haircut:

And the Kehillot Yaakov explained the Gemara's comparison according to his approach as follows: With regard to a person afflicted with tzaraat on a festival, two laws stand before us that contradict one another: on the one hand, the joy of the festival, and on the other hand, the mitzva concerning a person afflicted with tzaraat. Likewise, with regard to the High Priest, two laws stand before us: on the one hand, the mitzva of the High Priesthood, and on the other hand, his tzaraat. Accordingly, just as we find regarding the High Priest that the mitzva of the High Priesthood does not override the laws of the person afflicted with tzaraat that apply to him, so too the joy of the festival does not override the laws concerning a person afflicted with tzaraat. The Kli Hemda (Tazria) raised the following difficulty: In Horayot (12b), Rava himself was uncertain whether, when the High Priest becomes afflicted with tzaraat, the laws of the High Priest still apply to him and he remains forbidden to marry a widow, or whether the sanctity of the High Priesthood that rests upon him is removed. If so, how did Rava prove here that, similarly, a person afflicted with tzaraat observes the laws of tzaraat on a festival? Could one not explain the reason in the case of the High Priest as being that he had already ceased to be subject to the law of the High Priest, for although before the laws of the person afflicted with tzaraat took effect he still possessed the sanctity of the High Priest, nevertheless, once we determine that the designation “person afflicted with tzaraat” applies to him, he descends from his elevated status? This is unlike the case of a festival, which applies even to those afflicted with tzaraat. The Porat Yosef raised the same difficulty. It is apparent from our sugya that the High Priest is equivalent to a festival with regard to the laws of a person placed under a ban. Seemingly, the same should apply with regard to mourning: mourning does not apply to the High Priest, just as the Gemara proved that tzaraat applies to the High Priest in the same manner as it applies on a festival; conversely, one should likewise prove that mourning does not apply to the High Priest from the fact that it does not apply on a festival. The later authorities raised this difficulty here against the Rambam (Mourner 7:6), who ruled that all the laws of mourning apply to him. And the Keren Ora wrote in defense of the Rambam's view that he interprets the matter in accordance with the Ritva mentioned in the preceding note, and therefore there is no source for equating their laws in every respect. It follows from his words that, according to Rashi and the Ramban mentioned above, even on a festival the prohibition of aninut against eating sacrificial meat applies, and we find no distinction at all between a festival and the High Priest. Accordingly, one may again say that mourning does not apply to the High Priest at all. See also the Kehillot Yaakov. And the Minhat Hinukh introduced the following distinction: Even according to the Rambam, one must distinguish between a case in which a person became High Priest and only afterward became obligated in mourning, and a case in which he became obligated in mourning and only afterward became High Priest. In the first case, mourning does not apply to him, since he had previously become obligated in the positive commandment concerning the High Priest, and one positive commandment does not override another positive commandment. It is specifically when he became High Priest before the mourning and was already subject to the laws of mourning that the positive commandment concerning the High Priest does not remove the prior obligation of mourning. But according to what the Keren Ora explained regarding the Rambam's view, there is no basis for this distinction, since with regard to the other practices of mourning his law is in no way like that of a festival. The Minhat Hinukh also noted concerning the Rambam that he omitted from his work the law we learned here, that the High Priest sends his offerings during his mourning, and likewise that on a festival a mourner is permitted to send his offerings. But —

he is forbidden to cut his hair.

The source of the law is:

For the Merciful One said to

Eleazar and Itamar,

the sons of Aaron,

when their brothers Nadav and Avihu died [Leviticus 10]: “

Do not let your heads grow wild” [

“wild” means allowing the hair to grow],

by inference

the verse prohibited them from allowing their hair to grow during their mourning, but commanded them specifically to let their hair grow — you learn

that everyone is forbidden

to shave his head during his mourning.