Moed Katan 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

And one whom the Sages released

from his ban during Chol HaMoed [since as long as he was under a ban, he was forbidden to launder].

And likewise, one who consulted

during Chol HaMoed

a sage

concerning his vow, by which he had prohibited laundering to himself,

and was released

from his vow by the sage now, during Chol HaMoed.

Hand towels

towels

for the hands,

with which one dries his hands, and which have become soiled from extensive use .

And hand towels

of

barbers,

which people customarily place over those who are having their hair cut during the haircut. The people who were permitted to have their hair cut during Chol HaMoed had their hair cut, and the towels became soiled .

And bathing towels,

the towels used to dry oneself after bathing, which are soiled.

And likewise, towels

of men with gonorrhea and women with gonorrhea ,

and menstruating women, and women who have given birth .

And

likewise,

all those who ascend from impurity to purity—

these are permitted

to launder, immersing their garments and thereby purifying them.

But all other people—

are forbidden

to shave and launder during Chol HaMoed.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: "But all other people are forbidden to cut their hair and launder during Chol HaMoed."

And

we inquire:

"All other people"—

for what reason are they forbidden?

After all, haircuts and laundering are needs of Chol HaMoed, and they should be permitted, despite the fact that they are forms of labor!?

And we answer: The reason for the prohibition is that the Sages were concerned that people might become negligent and leave the labors of shaving and laundering to be performed during Chol HaMoed, when they are idle from their work. They would thereby enter the Festival in a disgraceful state, without having shaved and wearing soiled garments.

And we find an example of this concern—that people might postpone laundering and haircuts and remain in their disgraceful state:

As we learned:

The priests who are

members of the watch,

who serve in the Temple during the period of their appointed watch in the Temple service.

And

likewise the Israelites,

members of the standing delegation,

who are representatives of the Jewish people standing by the communal sacrifices at the time they are offered. They rotate from week to week, and during that week they do not engage in their occupations—

are forbidden to cut their hair and launder

during that week.

And

only

on

Thursday

are they permitted

to cut their hair and launder,

in honor of Shabbat .

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: What is the reason

that members of the watch and members of the standing delegation are forbidden to cut their hair and launder during the time of their service?

In order

that they not become negligent and postpone their haircut and laundering until this week, during which they are idle from their occupations—

so that they should not enter their watch in a disgraceful state .

Here too,

with regard to haircuts and laundering during Chol HaMoed, the Sages decreed a prohibition

so that they should not enter the Festival

in a disgraceful state .

Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma:

A person who

lost an object on the eve

of the festival,

and did not launder his clothes or have his hair cut before the festival because he was preoccupied searching for his lost object:

since he was compelled,

as he was not negligent,

is it permitted

for him to cut his hair and launder his clothes during the festival?

Or perhaps, since the matter is not evident,

as the people who see him cutting his hair and laundering his clothes during the festival do not know that he was not negligent—

they did not

permit him!

Abaye said:

Indeed, they decreed even against one who was not negligent, because of those who observe him.

This is like what we find concerning the baking of matzot for Passover: the Sages decreed that one may not make designs in them, because of the concern that he might delay while making the designs and thereby cause the matzot to become leavened.

And even in the case of the people of the “House of Baitos,” who had molds for making designs in matzot and did not delay at all when placing the dough into the molds, the Sages prohibited them from making designed matzot, because of the concern that people unfamiliar with the manner in which the House of Baitos worked would wonder and

say: All serikin

[matzot decorated with a special matza design, so called because they “comb” them]

are prohibited, but the serikei of Baitos are permitted!?

The Gemara challenged Abaye:

And according to your reasoning,

that we are concerned about those who see him performing labor and do not know that it is being performed permissibly,

then

this statement that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Anyone who has only one garment—

is permitted to launder it during the intermediate days of the festival—

there too,

people will say: All garments are prohibited, but this person’s garment is permitted! Just as, according to your words, there is reason for this concern with regard to matza, that they will

say: All serikin are prohibited, but the serikei of Baitos are permitted!

And we answer:

It was stated concerning this,

with regard to Rabbi Yohanan’s statement permitting one who has only a single garment to launder it:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: His belt

the belt of one laundering his only garment, which the Sages required him to wear over his miktorno while laundering it—

proves his status!

That is, the Sages required him to wear a belt over the outer garment that he is wearing while laundering the garment, so that it will be a sign to everyone that he is laundering permissibly, since he has only one garment.

Rav Ashi taught

the dilemma of Rabbi Zeira in the following manner:

Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma:

A

professional barber

who cuts the hair of many people on the eve of Yom Tov,

who lost an object on the eve of the festival,

and the many people who come to him for haircuts see him laboring to search for his lost object, and therefore he was compelled and did not have time to cut his own hair—

what is the law?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Since he is a professional,

and many people are present with him on the eve of the festival,

the matter is evident

that he was prevented from cutting his own hair because of his lost object, and therefore it may be possible to permit him to cut his hair during the festival.

Or perhaps, since the matter is not evident

to everyone

as in these cases,

like the cases listed in the Mishna as permitted, in which everyone knows that they were prevented from cutting their hair before the festival—

they did not

permit him to cut his hair, because of observers who do not know that he was prevented!?

And we conclude:

teiku .

We learned in the Mishna: One who comes

from overseas

is permitted to cut his hair during the festival.

The Gemara explains:

The Mishna is

not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

!

As it was taught in a beraita, Rabbi Yehuda says: One who comes from overseas—

may not cut his hair, because he left without permission.

That is, he was not compelled to leave because he was under the authority [or obligation] of others; rather, he left of his own volition.

Rava said:

If he left without any need at all, but only in order to travel and

sail

around the wide world—

everyone agrees [

the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda]

that it is prohibited

for him to cut his hair during the festival, since he was not compelled at all.

But if he left

for

the purpose of bringing

provisions

for his sustenance—

everyone agrees that it is permitted,

since such a person is considered to have left under compulsion, and he is permitted to cut his hair.

They did not disagree

the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda

except

in the case of one who has sufficient provisions where he lives, but leaves

to profit,

to increase his property and earn more.

One master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

compares him to one who sails for pleasure,

and prohibits him from cutting his hair during the festival.

And one master,

the Sages,

compares him to one who leaves for

provisions,

for sustenance ,

since he leaves under compulsion, and they permit him to cut his hair during the festival.

Meitiv:

Rava is challenged from a beraita in the Tosefta, as it was taught:

Rabbi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct

in forbidding one who came from overseas to shave during the Festival,

when he left without permission.

And

the statement of the Sages appears correct

in permitting him

to shave,

when he left with permission.

And the Gemara infers:

What

in what circumstance did Rabbi say that the statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in forbidding one who left

without permission?

If you say

that it is referring to one who left

for pleasure,

that cannot be so. For:

But you said

Rava himself said that, in the case of one who leaves for pleasure,

everyone agrees that it is forbidden

for him to shave during the Festival. How, then, could Rabbi say that in this case the statement of Rabbi Yehuda “appears correct”?!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that, in Rabbi’s view, the statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in forbidding one who left

to obtain sustenance.

That too cannot be so. For:

But you said,

Rava said that, in the case of one who leaves to obtain sustenance,

everyone agrees that it is permitted!

Rather, it is obvious

that one must say that, in Rabbi’s view, the statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct in the case of one who left

to make a profit.

And if so, according to Rava, Rabbi’s statements in the first clause contradict his statements in the latter clause.

For

let us consider the latter clause: The statement appears correct

to Rabbi,

the statement of the Sages

in permitting him to shave—

when he left with permission.

What does it mean that he “left

with

permission”?

If you say

that it refers to one who left

to obtain sustenance—

you said that everyone agrees

{and this includes Rabbi Yehuda}

that it is permitted!

Rather,

it must necessarily be that Rabbi considered the Sages’ position correct in permitting one who left with permission

to make a profit!

And if so, this is difficult:

But you said

in the first clause that

the statement appears correct

to Rabbi,

the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in this case,

namely, that one who leaves to make a profit is forbidden to shave!

It follows that according to Rava, Rabbi’s statement in the first clause contradicts his statement in the latter clause: In the first clause, Rabbi considers it correct to forbid one who leaves to make a profit, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda; whereas in the latter clause, he permits this, in accordance with the Sages!

Rather, necessarily, the explanation is not like Rava—that the dispute concerns only one who leaves to make a profit. Instead, the dispute concerns one who leaves for pleasure and one who leaves to obtain sustenance!

And we answer: Rabbi did not intend at all to state his own position as to when it is permitted or forbidden. Rather, he came only to explain the positions of the disputants.

And

this is what

Rabbi meant in this beraita:

The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct to the Sages

in forbidding one

when he left without permission.

And what is that?

One who left for pleasure.

For even the Sages did not disagree with him

in permitting it

except

in the case of one who left

to make a profit.

But

one who leaves

for pleasure—

they agree with him

in forbidding it.

And the statement of the Sages appears correct to Rabbi Yehuda

in permitting it

when he left with permission.

And what is that?

One who leaves

to obtain sustenance.

For even Rabbi Yehuda did not disagree with them

in forbidding it

except

in the case of one who leaves

to make a profit; but

one who leaves

to obtain sustenance—

he agrees with them

in permitting it.

Shmuel said: A minor born during the Festival—

it is permitted to shave him

during

during the Festival.

Since

there is no one

who emerges from “

a prison”

greater than he.

For the fetus was confined in its mother’s womb, and he was under duress.

And the Gemara infers from Shmuel’s statement: If the minor was born

during the Festival—

yes,

only then is it permitted to shave him during the Festival. But if the minor was born

previously,

before the Festival, and they did not shave him—

no,

they may not shave him during the Festival, since they could have shaved him before the Festival.

Rabbi Pinhas challenged

Shmuel from a beraita in the Tosefta, in which we learned:

All those concerning whom they said

the Sages that it is

permitted to shave during the Festival—

it is permitted to shave during the days of his mourning.

And Rabbi Pinhas infers the prohibition from the general formulation of the permission:

Does this mean

that anyone concerning whom the Sages said that it is

forbidden

for him

to shave during the Festival—

it is forbidden

for him

to shave during the days of his mourning?