Menachot 81a (פא.) — the Talmud in English

And do they initially designate an animal for the surplus?

Is it possible to designate an animal that will be a surplus thanksgiving offering when it is not actually a surplus thanksgiving offering? !?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta sat before Rav Naḥman, and sat and said

Rav Yitzḥak sat before Rav Naḥman and raised the following objection: There is a way to rectify the remaining animal, by bringing another animal with a different stipulation:

Let him bring an animal and loaves, and say: If this standing animal is a substitute, then this is the thanksgiving offering and these are its loaves.

And if this standing animal is the thanksgiving offering—

these are its loaves, and this shall be the substitute.

A substitute for a thanksgiving offering is eaten for one day and one night, but it does not require loaves—!?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to Rabbi Yitzḥak:

Answer me, my master

answer me, my master,

[with] forty on his shoulders, and it is valid

there are forty lashes between his shoulders, and the matter is valid—!? That is, are we to tell him to make a substitution and transgress a prohibition for which he is liable to lashes—!?

Rav Ulla bar Abba fell ill; Abaye and the Sages entered to him, and they sat and said

Rav Ulla fell ill, and Abaye and the Sages went up to visit him and sat and raised the following objection: There is a way to rectify the remaining animal by bringing loaves conditionally:

a. Above, on 78b, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disputed the matter. According to Reish Lakish, whenever the loaves are outside the wall of the Azara at the time of slaughter, the loaves do not become sacred. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, however, even if the loaves are outside the Azara, as long as they are in Jerusalem at the time of slaughter—which is the place where the loaves are eaten—the loaves become sacred.

b. In the above sugya, the Gemara raised the question: Why is there no way to rectify the thanksgiving offering? He can bring loaves conditionally, saying that if the existing animal is a substitute, the loaves will become non-sacred. The Gemara answered that one may not bring non-sacred food into the Azara. The Gemara’s discussion here revolves around that answer.

If Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling is indeed accepted

if the halakha is indeed in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who said:

even if the loaves were at the time of slaughter

outside the wall of the Azara,

they are nevertheless

sacred,

then why is there no way to rectify a thanksgiving offering that became intermingled with its substitute, when one of them died? After all:

Let him bring loaves and place them outside the wall of the Azara

so that he will not bring doubtful non-sacred food into the Azara,

and say: If this standing animal is a thanksgiving offering—

these are its loaves; and if not, let them go out

the loaves

to non-sacred status,

since in this case he has not brought doubtful non-sacred food into the Azara—!?

And we answer: He cannot do this

because there are four

loaves of teruma [one from each type] that he must

wave—

and

how should he perform it

how can he do so—!?

Let him wave them outside

if he waves them outside the Azara, this is impossible, because regarding waving it is

“before

the

Lord

it is written,” and this means in the Azara.

And if he waves them

inside

within the Azara, this too is impossible, because

he brings

doubtful

non-sacred food into the Azara—

Therefore it is impossible

to rectify the matter in this way.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, raised an objection to this,

but in any event he can bring loaves, because:

If Ḥizkiya’s ruling is indeed accepted

if the halakha is indeed in accordance with Ḥizkiya,

who said

above, on 78b, that if a thanksgiving offering was slaughtered over eighty loaves [twice the required number],

forty

of them

alone became sacred

only,

from among the eighty,

and the remainder are for backup—then why is there no way to rectify a thanksgiving offering that became intermingled with its substitute?

Let him bring an animal

in addition,

and bring eighty

loaves

with it

let him bring eighty loaves with it,

and say: If this standing animal is the thanksgiving offering, then this one shall also be a thanksgiving offering, and these are the eighty loaves for both of them

if the remaining animal is a thanksgiving offering, then the animal I brought shall also be a thanksgiving offering, and these are the eighty loaves required for the two thanksgiving offerings.

And

if this standing animal is a substitute, then this one shall be

a

thanksgiving offering, and these

the loaves that I brought—

are its loaves, and forty of them shall become sacred

automatically,

only

forty

from among the eighty,

and the remainder are for backup. And we answer:

Because he diminishes the eating

of the four,

that is, he diminishes the number of those who eat the four teruma loaves. For of the forty loaves, four are definite teruma, eaten by the kohanim for one day and one night בלבד, whereas the four additional loaves that he separates [because perhaps both animals are thanksgiving offerings] are only doubtful teruma. He will feed them only to kohanim, and at times there will not be enough kohanim to eat all eight, and they will become notar.

He said

he raised the following objection

to Rav Kahana, Rav Ashi regarding Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement that when a thanksgiving offering became intermingled with its substitute and died, there is no way to rectify its fellow:

If Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling is indeed accepted, who said: If one designated a pregnant sin offering and it gave birth, if he wishes—

with it

with the mother—

he achieves atonement; if he wishes—

with its offspring he achieves atonement

; according to his view, if he designated the mother as a thanksgiving offering and it gave birth, we do not say that the offspring is a “surplus thanksgiving offering” and does not require loaves. Rather, if he wishes, he may make it a separate thanksgiving offering and bring loaves with it. If so, there is a way to rectify the intermingled offering, for:

Let him bring a pregnant animal

and designate it as a thanksgiving offering,

and wait for it until it gives birth

so that this offspring is dependent on his will: If he wishes, he makes it a thanksgiving offering and brings loaves with it; and if he does not wish, it is a “surplus thanksgiving offering,” which does not require loaves

; and let him bring eighty

loaves

with it

let him bring eighty loaves with them,

and say

and stipulate:

If this standing animal

if this animal standing before us from the intermingled pair

is a substitute,

then

it and its offspring are a thanksgiving offering,

that is, the offspring too shall be a thanksgiving offering like its mother,

and these are the eighty for both of them

and these eighty loaves are for the mother and the offspring—

And if this standing animal is a thanksgiving offering

if this animal standing before us from the intermingled pair is a thanksgiving offering,

then this one too is a thanksgiving offering

the mother that I designated as a thanksgiving offering is also a thanksgiving offering,

and these are the eighty for both of them

these eighty loaves are for both of them—

and this

the

offspring

shall be a surplus thanksgiving offering

as it truly is if he does not designate it as a thanksgiving offering, in which case it does not require loaves.

He said

Rav Kahana

to him

answered Rav Ashi:

Who can tell us

that

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said

was because

he holds: If he set it aside

the offspring for the sake of sacred offerings, it is

set aside? That is, how do you know that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the offspring remains under the authority of the one who consecrated it, enabling him to make it an offering in its own right, and that this is why Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he may achieve atonement through the offspring? Since it remains under his authority, you infer that just as he can make the offspring of a sin offering into a sin offering, so too he can make the offspring of a thanksgiving offering into a thanksgiving offering—

Perhaps

in truth,

if he set it aside, it is not set aside,

meaning that the offspring does not remain under the authority of the one who consecrated it, and this is not the reason that he achieves atonement through the offspring,

but

rather,

this is the reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling: He holds that a person achieves atonement through the increase of a consecrated offering.

That is, although the consecrated animal increased, nevertheless he can achieve atonement through it. If so, the offspring of a thanksgiving offering has only the status it possesses as a result of the consecration: It does not require loaves, and it is not under his authority to make it a complete thanksgiving offering and thereby require loaves.

That is, even though the consecrated offering has grown, one can nevertheless achieve atonement through it. If so, the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering has only the status it has by virtue of the consecration: it does not require bread, and it is not under his authority to make it a complete thanksgiving-offering and require bread.

Ravina happened to come to Damhuryā [

he came to a place called this],

said

he posed the following objection:

Rav Dimi, son

of Rav Huna of Damhuryā, said to Ravina:

Why is there no solution for a todah that became intermingled with its replacement-offering?!

Let him bring an animal

he should bring an additional animal,

and say “

It is incumbent upon me

a todah” [and designate this animal to fulfill his vow, as the Gemara will explain],

and let him bring

another

animal [

bring another animal for the responsibility of his vow, as the Gemara will explain], and there are now three animals before him],

and let him bring eighty with it [

and bring eighty loaves],

and say [

and stipulate]:

If this one standing here is the replacement-offering

then

these other two [

the two additional animals that I brought] shall be

todah-offerings [

one to fulfill the vow and the other as a voluntary offering],

and these eighty belong to both of them [

for these eighty loaves are required for both todah offerings].

And if this one standing here is the todah, and concerning the one of which he said “

incumbent upon me,”

let this one also be a todah,

that is, the second animal that I brought I shall designate to fulfill what I became obligated to bring by saying, “It is incumbent upon me,”

and these eighty belong to both of them—

And the other one—

the third animal that I brought—

shall be for the responsibility

of my vow, and he may offer it without bread, as is the law concerning an animal brought for the responsibility of a vow.

He said

he replied

to him,

Ravina said to Rav Dimi rhetorically:

The Torah

indeed

said [

Ecclesiastes 5]: “

It is better that you should not vow than that you should vow and not fulfill,”

and you are saying that he should come and vow initially

[and you are suggesting that he should undertake a vow initially]?!

Mishna:

One who says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a todah and its loaves,” may not bring them from second-tithe funds that he has, but must bring them from non-sacred funds. The Mishna below, on page 81a, derives from the verse that anything obligatory may be brought only from non-sacred funds. But if, at the time of his vow, he said that he would bring it from second-tithe funds, he brings it from second-tithe funds. Our Mishna explains the law when, in his vow, he mentioned only the todah or only the loaves.

A.

One who says “

It is incumbent upon me to bring a todah,”

even though he did not mention the loaves in his vow—

must bring it and its loaves from non-sacred funds,

because the todah is an obligatory offering, since he vowed to bring it; and once he obligated himself to bring a todah, he became obligated to bring loaves with it. The loaves, too, are therefore obligatory, and both may be brought only from non-sacred funds.