Menachot 81a — the Talmud in English

And do they initially designate for the surplus,

and is it possible to designate an animal that will be the surplus of a thanksgiving-offering without it actually being the surplus of a thanksgiving-offering

?! Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta sat before Rav Naḥman, and sat and said

[Rabbi Yitzḥak sat before Rav Naḥman and raised an objection]: In any event, there is a remedy for this one that remained, by bringing an additional animal with a different stipulation:

Let him bring an animal and bread, and say: If this one that stands [before us] is a substitute, this is the thanksgiving-offering and this is its bread.

And if this one that stands [before us] is a thanksgiving-offering—

this is its bread, and this shall be a substitute,

and a substitute of a thanksgiving-offering is eaten for one day and one night, but does not require bread ?!

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rabbi Yitzḥak:

Answer me, my master

[answer me, my teacher]

! Forty upon his shoulders, and it is fit

[forty lashes between his shoulders, and is this matter fit]?! That is to say, should one tell him to exchange it and transgress a negative commandment for which one is liable to lashes ?!

Rav Ulla bar Abba fell ill. Abaye and the Sages entered to him, and they sat and said

[Rav Ulla became ill, and Abaye and the Sages went up to visit him and sat and raised an objection]: In any event, there is a remedy for this one that remained, by bringing bread conditionally:

a. Above, on 78b, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed: According to Reish Lakish, whenever the bread is outside the wall of the Temple courtyard at the time of slaughter, the bread does not become sacred; whereas according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, even if the bread was outside the courtyard, as long as at the time of slaughter the bread was in Jerusalem, which is the place where the bread is eaten, the bread becomes sacred.

b. In the discussion above, the Gemara asked: Why is there no remedy for a thanksgiving-offering? After all, he can bring bread conditionally, so that if this one that remains is a substitute, the bread will become non-sacred! The Gemara answered that one does not bring unconsecrated property into the Temple courtyard; and the words of the Gemara here revolve around and proceed from this answer.

If the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is so

[if indeed the law is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan],

who said:

even if the bread was at the time of slaughter

outside the wall of the Temple courtyard,

it is

sacred,

if so, why is there no remedy for a thanksgiving-offering that became mixed with its substitute, and one of them died?! After all:

Let him bring bread and place it outside the wall of the Temple courtyard

[let him place the bread outside the wall of the Temple courtyard], so as not to bring doubtful unconsecrated property into the Temple courtyard,

and say: If this one that stands [before us] is a thanksgiving-offering—

this is its bread, and if not, let it go out

the bread

to unconsecrated status,

for there is no bringing of doubtful unconsecrated property into the Temple courtyard here ?!

And we answer: He therefore cannot do this,

because there are four

loaves of teruma [one from each type] that he must

wave—

and

how should he act

[how should he act]?!

Let him wave them outside

[if he waves them outside the courtyard], this is impossible, because concerning waving

“before

the

Lord

” it is written, and this means in the courtyard.

And if he waves them

inside

[within the courtyard], this too is impossible, because

he is bringing

doubtful

unconsecrated property into the Temple courtyard—

Therefore it is not possible

to remedy it in this manner.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, challenged this,

for in any event he can bring bread, because:

If the statement of Ḥizkiya is so

[if indeed the law is in accordance with Ḥizkiya],

who said

above, on 78b, that a thanksgiving-offering slaughtered over eighty loaves [twice the required number],

only forty

of

them

become sacred

from among eighty,

and the remainder are for responsibility; if so, why is there no remedy for a thanksgiving-offering that became mixed with its substitute?

Let him bring an animal

in addition,

and let him bring eighty

loaves

with it

[let him bring eighty loaves with it],

and say: If this one that stands [before us] is a thanksgiving-offering, this one too shall be a thanksgiving-offering, and here are eighty [loaves] for both of them

[if this one that remains is a thanksgiving-offering, this one that I brought shall also be a thanksgiving-offering, and these are the eighty loaves required for the two thanksgiving-offerings].

And

if this one that stands [before us] is a substitute,

let this one

be a thanksgiving-offering, and this one—

the loaves that I brought—

be its bread, and let forty of them become sacred

automatically,

only

from

among eighty,

and the remainder are for responsibility. And we answer:

Because he diminishes the eating

of four,

that is to say, he diminishes the number of those who eat the four loaves of teruma; for of the forty loaves, four of them are definite teruma, eaten by priests for one day and one night only, whereas the four additional loaves that he will separate [because perhaps both are thanksgiving-offerings] are only doubtful teruma, and he will feed them only to priests; and sometimes there will not be enough priests to eat all eight, and they will come to the status of leftover .

He said

raised an objection

to him, Rav Ashi to Rav Kahana, concerning what Rabbi Ḥiyya said: A thanksgiving-offering that became mixed with its substitute and died—its fellow has no remedy:

If the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is so, who said: If one separated a pregnant sin-offering, and it gave birth, he wishes

with it

[with the mother]

to achieve atonement, he wishes

with its offspring

to achieve atonement;

and according to his method, if he separated the mother for a thanksgiving-offering and it gave birth, we do not say that the offspring is “the surplus of a thanksgiving-offering” and does not require bread; rather, if he wishes, he can make it a separate thanksgiving-offering and bring bread with it; if so, there is a remedy for this one that became mixed, because:

Let him bring a pregnant animal

and separate it for a thanksgiving-offering

and wait for it until it gives birth,

and it follows that this offspring depends on his will: if he wishes, he makes it a thanksgiving-offering and brings bread with it; and if he does not wish, it is “the surplus of a thanksgiving-offering,” which does not require bread

; and let him bring eighty

loaves

with it

[let him bring eighty loaves with them],

and say

[and stipulate]:

If this one that stands [before us]

[if this one standing before us from the mixture]

is a substitute,

then

it and its offspring are a thanksgiving-offering,

that is, the offspring too shall be a thanksgiving-offering like its mother,

and here are eighty [loaves] for both of them

[and here are eighty loaves for the mother and the offspring]—

And if this one that stands [before us] is a thanksgiving-offering

[if this one standing before us from the mixture is a thanksgiving-offering],

this one too is a thanksgiving-offering

[the mother that I separated for a thanksgiving-offering is also a thanksgiving-offering]

and here are eighty [loaves] for both of them

[and here are eighty loaves for both of them]—

and this one

[the offspring]

shall be the surplus of a thanksgiving-offering

[as it truly is if he does not separate it for a thanksgiving-offering], for it does not require bread.

He said

answered

to him,

Rav Kahana to Rav Ashi:

Who can say to us

that

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said

was because

he holds: If he set it aside

for the sake of offerings, the offspring is

set aside? That is to say, from where do you know that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the offspring is under the authority of the one who consecrated it, to make it an offering in its own right, and for this reason Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he can achieve atonement through the offspring—because it is under his authority to make it a sin-offering—so that you say: Just as he can make the offspring of a sin-offering a sin-offering, so he can make the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering a thanksgiving-offering—

Perhaps

in truth

if he set it aside, it is not set aside,

that is to say, the offspring is not under the authority of the one who consecrated it to make it an offering,

and it is not for this reason that he achieves atonement through the offspring,

but

rather

this is the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan: he holds that a person achieves atonement through the increase of the sacred.

That is to say, although the sacred property increased, nevertheless he can achieve atonement through it. And if so, the offspring of a thanksgiving-offering has only its status as a result of the consecration: it does not require bread, and it is not under his authority to make it a complete thanksgiving-offering and require it to have bread.

Ravina happened to come to Damhurya [

he happened to come to a place called this],

he said

he challenged

Rav Dimi, son

of Rav Huna from Damhurya, to Ravina:

Why, then, is there no remedy for a todah that became mixed with its temura?!

Let him bring an animal,

he should bring an additional animal,

and let him say "

Behold, upon me

a todah" [and he should designate this animal to fulfill his vow, as he explains below],

and let him bring

another

different animal [

he should bring another animal for the liability of his vow, as he explains below], and behold, three animals are before him,

and let him bring eighty with it [

and he should bring eighty loaves],

and let him say [

and he should stipulate]:

If this one that is standing is a temura,

behold,

these two [

the two additional animals that I brought] shall be

todot [

one to fulfill the vow, and the other as a voluntary offering],

and these eighty are for both of them [

and behold, the eighty loaves, which are required for both todot].

And if this one that is standing is a todah, and this is what I said "

upon me"

shall also be a todah,

that is, the second animal that I brought, I designate to fulfill what I became obligated in saying, "A todah is upon me,"

and these eighty are for both of them—

And the other one—

the third animal that I brought—

shall be for the liability

of my vow, and he shall offer it without bread, according to the law of an animal brought for liability.

He said

he answered

him,

Ravina to Rav Dimi, by way of astonishment:

The Torah

behold

said [

Ecclesiastes 5]: "

It is better that you should not vow than that you should vow and not pay,"

and you say: Let him establish and vow initially [

and you propose that he should make a vow ab initio]!?

Mishna:

One who says, "A todah and its bread are upon me," cannot bring them from second-tithe money that he has, but he should bring them from non-sacred funds, as the Mishna teaches below, on page 81a, from the verse: Whatever is an obligatory matter comes only from non-sacred funds; but if he said at the time of his vow that he would bring it from the tithe, he brings it from the tithe. And our Mishna explains what the law is when he mentioned in his vow only the todah or the bread.

a.

One who says "

A todah is upon me,"

even though he did not mention the bread in his vow—

shall bring it and its bread from non-sacred funds,

for the todah is an obligatory matter, since he vowed to bring it; and once he obligated himself in a todah, he became obligated to bring bread with it, and the bread too is an obligatory matter, and both of them come only from non-sacred funds.