Menachot 80b (פ:) — the Talmud in English

And if some remained

of the money, because he purchased a todah offering with only part of it, he

brings with it—

with the money that remained—

bread.

But if he set aside money

for the loaves of a todah offering, and some remained, he may not bring with it

with the money that remained, after he brought loaves with part of it,

a todah offering.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason

that he may bring loaves with money that was set aside for a todah offering, but he may not bring a todah offering with money that was set aside for the loaves of a todah offering? For:

Is it perhaps because of that which Rav Kahana said: Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the loaves of a todah offering

too

are called “todah”

as it is stated: “

And he shall present with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering unleavened loaves,”

and since they are called “todah,” he may bring them with money that was set aside for a todah offering—

But

if so—

for this reason he should also be able to bring a todah offering with money that was set aside for the loaves of a todah offering—

the reverse should also be true:

since he set aside money for the loaves of a todah offering—which are called “todah”—he should be able to bring a todah offering with that money!?

And we explain:

Bread is called “

todah,”

but

a todah is not called “

bread,”

and he did, after all, designate the money for “the loaves of a todah offering”; the todah itself is therefore not included.

And

Rabba

said further:

We learned in a beraita above (79b): From where is it derived that if one designated his todah offering and it was lost, and he designated another in its place, and the first was then found, so that both are standing ready for sacrifice, that whichever of them he wishes he may sacrifice first, together with its loaves? The verse states: “He shall sacrifice the todah”; one might have thought that the second animal to be sacrificed also requires loaves; the verse states: “He shall sacrifice it”—one, but not two. And the general principle is: Whenever one todah offering comes in place of another, whether the first todah is sacrificed or its replacement is sacrificed, the other one is exempt

If he designated his todah offering

of obligation

and it was lost, and he again designated another in its place, and it too was lost

and he again designated another in its place, and

then

the first ones were found, so that all three were standing ready:

If he

attained atonement

first

with the first

that he had designated and that was lost, then the

second, which is the replacement of the first,

does not require loaves

because the todah offering for which it was substituted has already been sacrificed, and this one is a surplus todah offering, which does not require loaves. But if he wishes to sacrifice the third after the first, it requires loaves, because the third is not the replacement of the first; rather, it is the replacement of the second, and the second has not yet been sacrificed. Therefore, it requires loaves.

And if he attained atonement first

with the third: then the

second does not require loaves, since its replacement was sacrificed; but the

first—if he wishes to sacrifice it before the second—

requires loaves, since its replacement has not yet been sacrificed.

And if he first attained atonement

with the middle one: then

both—both the first, of which the middle one is the replacement, and the third, which is the replacement of the middle one—

do not require loaves; the first, because its replacement was sacrificed, and the third, because the animal for which it was substituted was sacrificed.

both of them—

Abaye said: Even if he attained atonement with one of them,

meaning, whichever one he used first to attain atonement,

both—those that have not yet been sacrificed—

do not require loaves. And this is because all of them are replacements of one another [all of them are replacements of one another], since they were all designated by virtue of the first; and once one was sacrificed, the others were exempted from loaves. Rabbi Zeira said: And likewise the same law applies with regard to sin offerings. How so? If he designated his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another in its place, and it too was lost,

and he designated another in its place, and

then

the first ones were found, so that all three were standing ready:

if he

attained atonement with the first, then the

second,

which is the replacement of the first,

must die, because its owner attained atonement through the sin offering of which this animal is the replacement. But the

third—for its owner did not attain atonement through its replacement, since the third is the replacement of the second and not of the first—

must be left to graze

until it develops a blemish and is redeemed.

And if he

attained atonement with the third, then the

second must die, since its owner attained atonement through the third, which is its replacement,

while if the

first—of which the third is not the replacement—

must be left to graze.

And if he

attained atonement with the middle one, both must die, because the middle one is the replacement of the first, and its owner attained atonement through it; and the third came in place of the middle one, through which its owner had already attained atonement.

Abaye said: Even if he attained atonement with one of them,

meaning, it makes no difference with which one he attained atonement, and in every case the

two

that remained

must die, because

all of them are replacements of one another.

And we ask:

What is the meaning of “

and likewise”?

That is, why was it necessary to teach that the same law applies with regard to a sin offering? It is obvious that this is so!?

And we answer:

You might say

that I could distinguish between a todah and a sin offering and say:

There,

with regard to a todah,

it is possible to say that the third is not the replacement of the first; rather,

he is merely increasing the number of todah offerings,

since a todah may be brought as a voluntary offering.

But here,

with regard to a sin offering,

it is not possible to say of the third that

he is increasing the number of sin offerings, since a sin offering cannot be brought as a voluntary offering.

Say that it is not so: the third should not be left to graze, but should die.

because

This teaches us!

Rabbi Hiyya taught

a beraita: A

todah that requires loaves that became intermingled with its substitute,

which does not require loaves, so that it is unknown which is the todah and which is the substitute,

and one of them died, the

other

that remains

has no remedy

by which it can be sacrificed—

And this is because

what shall we do

[how shall we proceed]!?

If

we bring loaves with it

[with the one that remains], then

perhaps it is the substitute,

and a substitute does not require loaves; and if

we do not bring loaves with it, then

perhaps

it is the todah, and a todah requires loaves. He cannot bring loaves because of the uncertainty, because perhaps it is not a todah, in which case he would be bringing unconsecrated food into the Temple courtyard, as will be explained later in the sugya. Nor can he bring an additional animal and make a stipulation concerning it, saying: If the one that remains is a substitute, this animal is a todah and these are its loaves; and if the one that remains is a todah, these loaves are for it, while the other animal shall be a peace offering, which does not require loaves. This is because one may not bring an animal that is possibly a peace offering and possibly a todah: peace offerings may be eaten for two days and the intervening night, whereas a todah may be eaten only for one day and the intervening night. Thus, he would cause the peace offering to be eaten, due to the uncertainty, only for one day and the intervening night, thereby bringing sacred offerings into a situation of disqualification, as will be explained later in the sugya. Nevertheless, the Gemara asks that there is a remedy for this doubtful todah, since he can, in several ways, bring an additional animal together with loaves and stipulate: If the one that remains is a substitute, this animal shall be a todah and these are its loaves; and if the one that remains is a todah, these loaves are for it, while the animal that I brought shall be a todah that does not require loaves, as will be explained in the Gemara through several ways of doing this. And we ask: And if

the beraita is dealing with a case in which he said, “

It is incumbent upon me

to bring a todah,” and this animal that became intermingled with its substitute was designated to fulfill his vow, then

it is not possible that he should not bring another animal and loaves,

that is, he is obligated to sacrifice a todah, and he can designate another todah as a responsibility offering. If so, he should bring another todah together with loaves,

and

say

[and stipulate]:

If this one that remains is a substitute,

if the one that remains is a substitute, then

this one—the other todah that I brought—shall be

a todah, and this is its bread.

And

if this one that remains is a todah

[if the one that remains is the todah],

these are its loaves,

the loaves that I bring shall be for it,

while this one—the other todah that I brought—

shall be

for a responsibility offering, so that if the first is lost, this one will take its place.

He sacrifices both of them, and the loaves are automatically associated with the todah, while the other animal is sacrificed without loaves, because if it is a substitute, it does not require loaves, and if it is a responsibility offering, it likewise is sacrificed without loaves.

And we answer:

No, it is necessary; the beraita is dealing with a case in which he said, “

This is

a todah,” meaning that he is not obligated to provide a replacement for it. Therefore, he may not bring another todah except as a voluntary offering, and that offering requires loaves in its own right.

Mnemonic

for the questions that follow against this beraita: lamdin; Marta

[this is Bar Marta];

Aila

[referring to Rav Ila, who was weak];

Shisha [namely, Rav Shisha]; Shakhen [an acronym for Rav Ashi and Rav Kahana]; Rai [an acronym for “Ravina arrived”]; Dedama [Rav Dimi of Mehadureya]. Another mnemonic for the questions themselves: Ḥalash [an acronym for unconsecrated, peace offerings]; surplus; substitute; outside; Hezekiah; designated a sin offering; for responsibility. They said they raised the question while learning before Rabbi, [he is Levi, and he raised this question in the presence of the other students]:

And why does it have no remedy,

and let him bring bread and say [

let him bring bread and stipulate]:

If this one standing before us is a todah, this is its bread [if this todah before us is indeed a todah, then this bread is for it]

if this animal standing before us is a thanksgiving-offering, this bread is for it].

and

if not, that is, if it is a temura, which does not require bread, then

but rather it is a replacement-offering, which does not require bread, then

let

the bread

become non-sacred;

and he will eat it according to the law of todah bread, in a state of uncertainty!?

He said

he answered

them,

Rabbi:

But do they bring [

a doubtful case of]

non-sacred produce into the Temple courtyard,

as the bread must enter the Temple courtyard for the waving, as will be explained later in the sugya.

The “students before Rabbi” further raised this difficulty: He can remedy the one that remains by bringing another animal, whose obligation to bring bread depends on the status of the remaining animal:

And let him bring an animal and bread and say [

let him bring an animal and bread and stipulate]:

If this one standing before us is a temura, then this—

the animal that I brought—shall be

a todah, and this is its bread.

And

And if this one standing before us is a todah—

this is its bread, and

if

this—

the animal that I brought—

shall be shelamim,

which do not require bread.

He said

he answered

them,

Rabbi:

Because he thereby diminishes the period in which the shelamim may be eaten,

since the time for eating shelamim is two days and one night, whereas a todah may be eaten only for one day and one night. After that time it becomes noten and must be burned. Therefore, if he brings an animal that is possibly shelamim and possibly a todah, it turns out that he is bringing consecrated food into a situation in which it may become disqualified: if it is not eaten within one day and one night, he will be forced to burn it, even though it may be shelamim and the time allotted for its eating has not ended.

He said

he challenged

Levi to Rabbi, suggesting that the remaining animal be remedied by bringing another animal on a different stipulation:

to remedy the one that remains by bringing another animal with a stipulation in a different manner:

And let him bring an animal and bread and say [

let him bring an animal and bread and stipulate]:

If this one standing before us is a temura, then this is a todah and this is its bread.

And if this one standing before us is a todah—

this is its bread, and

if

this shall be “

the surplus of a todah” [

a todah that was lost and for which one obtained atonement through another offering, or the offspring of a todah], which is offered as a todah and eaten for only one day and one night, and does not require bread!?

He said to him

Rabbi to Levi:

I think that he has no [

for Levi]

brains in his skull—