Menachot 81b (פא:) — the Talmud in English

b. One who says,

“A thanksgiving-offering is incumbent upon me from non-sacred produce, and its loaves from tithe produce,”

must bring both it and its loaves from non-sacred produce.

Even though, had he said, “A thanksgiving-offering and its loaves are incumbent upon me from tithe produce,” he could bring them from tithe produce, as is explained later in the Mishna, the reason here is that his obligation to bring a thanksgiving-offering obligates him to bring loaves as well, and he no longer has the power to say that he will bring the loaves from tithe produce. d. One who says,

“A thanksgiving-offering

is incumbent upon me

from tithe produce, and its loaves from non-sacred produce,”

must bring it

if he wishes, as he vowed; that is, he may bring the thanksgiving-offering itself even from tithe produce, since that is what he vowed, whereas the loaves he must bring specifically from non-sacred produce.

One who says, “Behold, a

thanksgiving-offering, it and its loaves, from tithe produce,”

must bring

if he wishes, both of them from tithe produce.

And

when he is able to bring it from tithe produce,

he may not bring it from the actual wheat of second tithe

itself,

but only from money

obtained through redeeming

second tithe

alone. The Gemara will explain the reason.

Gemara:

Rav Huna said: One who says,

“The loaves of a thanksgiving-offering are incumbent upon me,”

without mentioning the thanksgiving-offering itself in his vow,

brings a thanksgiving-offering and its loaves.

The Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

He vowed only concerning the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering!

Because

this man certainly knows that loaves without a thanksgiving-offering are not offered

he knows that it is impossible to offer loaves without a thanksgiving-offering,

and he was saying

“a thanksgiving-offering and its loaves,”

[although he stated only the latter].

Thus, he certainly intended to obligate himself in both a thanksgiving-offering and its loaves.

And the fact that

he did not

say

anything other than

“the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering”

is only because

he mentioned the end of the matter

he mentioned only the final part; nevertheless, his essential intention was the entire matter.

And we raise an objection against Rav Huna from that which

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who says,

“A thanksgiving-offering from tithe produce, and its loaves from non-sacred produce,”

must bring it,

and he need not bring the thanksgiving-offering specifically from non-sacred produce.

According to Rav Huna, who holds that one who obligates himself in the loaves thereby becomes obligated in the thanksgiving-offering as well, this is difficult:

And why

may he bring the thanksgiving-offering from tithe produce? He said,

“Since he said

‘its loaves from non-sacred produce,’

and thereby became obligated—in Rav Huna’s view—in the thanksgiving-offering as well, we should consequently say that

he must bring both it and its loaves from non-sacred produce!”

And we answer:

And we answer:

It is different there,

when he explicitly said, “A thanksgiving-offering from tithe produce and its loaves from non-sacred produce,”

since he said

“a thanksgiving-offering from tithe produce,”

it is as though he said,

“Behold, bread is incumbent upon me, in order to discharge

the obligation of bread for

so-and-so’s thanksgiving-offering.”

And we challenge this answer:

If so,

in

the first clause, which teaches:

“One who says

‘a thanksgiving-offering

is incumbent upon me

from non-sacred produce, and its loaves from

tithe produce—he must bring both it and its loaves from non-sacred produce,’”

and because once he became obligated in the thanksgiving-offering he automatically became obligated in its loaves, and he must bring them from non-sacred produce like any other obligatory matter, so that although he said, “its loaves from tithe produce,” his words have no effect—why should he not bring its loaves from tithe produce?

Here too

let us say:

It is as though he said,

“Behold, a thanksgiving-offering is incumbent upon me to discharge so-and-so’s obligation for loaves”!

And we answer:

Can this really be compared?

Is the case under discussion comparable to the proof?

Granted, bread comes to exempt a thanksgiving-offering

bread indeed comes to discharge the obligation of a thanksgiving-offering, and it is reasonable to interpret his obligation in loaves as one that comes to complete the obligation of the thanksgiving-offering.

But

does a thanksgiving-offering come to exempt loaves!?

Does the thanksgiving-offering come to discharge the obligation of the loaves, such that we should interpret his obligation in a thanksgiving-offering as one that comes to complete the obligation of the loaves he assumed? That is not so: the obligation of the thanksgiving-offering is the primary obligation, and the loaves come on account of the thanksgiving-offering. Therefore, once he became obligated in the thanksgiving-offering, he also became obligated in the loaves, and he cannot bring the loaves from tithe produce.

Come and hear: One who says,

“A thanksgiving-offering is incumbent upon me without loaves,”

or a sacrifice

[or he said, “A sacrifice is incumbent upon me]

without libations,”

we compel him and he brings a thanksgiving-offering and its loaves, and a sacrifice and libations.

And we raise an objection from this beraita against Rav Huna: It follows that

the reason is that he said

“a thanksgiving-offering”

alone—that is, specifically if he obligated himself in a thanksgiving-offering, he is then obligated to bring a thanksgiving-offering and loaves—

but if he did not say “a thanksgiving-offering,”

that is, if he said only “loaves,”

he is not

obligated in a thanksgiving-offering and loaves, contrary to Rav Huna!

And we answer: In fact,

the same law applies even though he did not say “a thanksgiving-offering”;

rather, if he obligated himself only in loaves, he is obligated in a thanksgiving-offering and loaves as well. The reason this is not mentioned in the beraita is:

Since it wished to teach

“a sacrifice without libations,”

and it could not teach

“libations without a sacrifice,”

because the beraita also deals with libations, and in that case specifically, if one obligates himself in a sacrifice he is obligated to bring libations as well, whereas if he obligates himself in libations he is not obligated to bring a sacrifice, since a person may volunteer libations independently, unlike the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering, which do not come independently, therefore

it also taught “a thanksgiving-offering”

alone, and did not teach “loaves” alone.

And we challenge what we learned in the beraita: “One who says, ‘A thanksgiving-offering is incumbent upon me without loaves, or a sacrifice without libations,’ we compel him and he brings a thanksgiving-offering and its loaves, and a sacrifice and libations”:

Why

must he bring loaves and libations? He has made

a vow together with its opening,

and therefore he should bring neither the thanksgiving-offering nor the sacrifice at all!? That is, when he said, “without loaves, without libations”—which is impossible, since once he obligated himself in a thanksgiving-offering he automatically became obligated in loaves—this constitutes a retraction from what he had obligated himself in through the thanksgiving-offering. He knows that there is no thanksgiving-offering without loaves, and since he said this within the time required for speech, his entire vow should be annulled, as though he had found an opening for his vow!?

He said that Hezekiah answered: Who is the author of this beraita?

He said

he answered:

“Whose opinion is this?

This beraita is

the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say

in a similar case,

“Grasp the wording of the first statement.”

Here too, one follows the first wording, by which he obligated himself in a thanksgiving-offering and a sacrifice, and one does not follow the later wording, in which he said, “without loaves, without libations.”

As we learned

in tractate Nazir 9a: One who says, “I am hereby a nazirite,” is prohibited from wine, which the Torah prohibits to him, and from all the other prohibitions of a nazirite. One who says,

“I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and pressed figs,”

Beit Shammai say:

He is

a nazirite,

because he said, “I am hereby a nazirite.” Although by saying, “from dried figs and pressed figs,” he retracted his initial statement, he is nevertheless a complete nazirite. The same applies here: according to their view, saying “without loaves, without libations” is ineffective in annulling what he became obligated in through the thanksgiving-offering and the sacrifice.

And Beit Hillel say: He is not a nazirite,

since this is like “a vow together with its opening.”

Rabbi Yohanan said

to explain the beraita differently:

You may even say

that this beraita is

the opinion of Beit Hillel,

and nevertheless this is not “a vow together with its opening,” because the beraita is dealing

with one who says:

“Had I known that one does not make a vow in this manner

a thanksgiving-offering without loaves, or a sacrifice without libations,

I would not have made such a vow

as I did say,

but rather this way”

[“A thanksgiving-offering with loaves is incumbent upon me; a sacrifice with libations is incumbent upon me.”] That is, he interprets his words as meaning that it was not a retraction, but that he did not know that one could not make such a vow; had he known, he would have undertaken the obligation in the same manner as anyone who undertakes a thanksgiving-offering or a sacrifice.

And we challenge this:

What is meant by

“we compel,”

as we learned in the beraita? That is, he agrees to bring loaves and libations once his error has become known, so why is coercion necessary!? And we answer:

Because he wishes to retract

he wishes to retract, and therefore we compel him, since it has become clear from his initial words that this is not “a vow together with its opening.”

Granted, according to Hezekiah—

who interprets the first beraita as reflecting the view of Beit Shammai—

it works well,

as this beraita also reflects the view of Beit Shammai—

But according to Rabbi Yohanan—

who interprets the first beraita as referring to one who says, “Had I known, I would have vowed to bring a thanksgiving-offering and a sacrifice with bread and libations”—

it is difficult,

for this beraita, since he did not say this, but rather, “I would not have vowed at all”!

Rabbi Yohanan could say to you: This—

this beraita—

is certainly in accordance with Beit Shammai.

The Gemara explains the wording of the beraita: “They force him and say to him, ‘Observe and heed’”:

What

does “observe and heed” mean?

He said—

explained

Abaye:

“Observe”

means:

Bring a thanksgiving-offering—

“And heed”

means:

Bring

also

its loaves.

Rava said

to explain the wording of the beraita:

“Observe”

means:

Bring a thanksgiving-offering and its loaves.

“And heed”

means:

Do not make a practice of doing this,

of vowing to bring a thanksgiving-offering without bread and a sacrifice without libations. We learned in the Mishna: [The one who says,]

“It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanksgiving-offering, it and its loaves, from second-tithe produce,”

may bring:

And we raise a difficulty against the wording

And we challenge the wording

“may bring”:

Is it the case that

he has no choice but to bring it [that is, is he obligated to bring it specifically in this manner] and cannot bring both of them

from non-sacred produce, when certainly, if he wishes to bring everything from non-sacred produce, he is deserving of blessing!?

Rav Nahman and Rav Hisda said

[they answered]: This is the intent of our Mishna:

If he wishes, he may bring

from second-tithe produce;

if he does not wish, he need not bring

from second-tithe produce, but rather from non-sacred produce.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he may not bring it from wheat of second tithe, but only from money of second tithe:

Rav Nahman and Rav Hisda both said:

They did not teach this—

that he may not bring the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering from second-tithe produce itself—

except from wheat of second tithe,

that is, the wheat itself that was designated as second tithe;

but from wheat purchased with money of second tithe

after he redeemed the second tithe and purchased wheat with it for a purpose other than the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering, and now wishes to make loaves of a thanksgiving-offering from it—

he may bring them.

Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira, sitting and saying: They did not teach

that he may not bring

except from wheat of second tithe, but from wheat purchased with money of second tithe—

even though it was not purchased for the sake of the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering—

he may bring them;

and this is in accordance with Rav Nahman and Rav Hisda.

He said to him: Rabbi! You say this,

but

I say: He may not bring them even from wheat purchased with money of second tithe,

unless he initially purchased wheat with the second-tithe money for the sake of the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering.

And let me state my reason

and

let me state your reason

[I will explain my reasoning and yours]:

Your reason is as follows:

Thanksgiving-offering—

that is, the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering—

from where do you derive

that he may bring it from money of second tithe [when he did not undertake to bring a thanksgiving-offering],

from peace-offerings,

for the Torah calls the thanksgiving-offering “the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings.” And just as with peace-offerings he may purchase them with money of second tithe [as the Gemara proceeds to explain], so may he bring the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering from that money.