Menachot 79a — the Talmud in English

It was slaughtered and found to have a blemish:

in this they disagreed—according to the view of Rabbi Meir—Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua:

Rabbi Eliezer says: It sanctified,

even though its disqualification preceded the slaughter, and later in the sugya its reason is explained

; Rabbi Yehoshua says: It did not sanctify.

The words of Rabbi Meir,

and as was explained in our Mishna.

Rabbi Yehuda said

to dispute Rabbi Meir’s words in two matters:

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree—

about

one who slaughtered it with the thought of

outside its time, that it sanctified

the bread, and in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s words.

And about

one that was found

to have a blemish, that it did not sanctify

the bread, and even according to Rabbi Eliezer, and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s words, who holds that according to Rabbi Eliezer it did sanctify.

And about what did they disagree? About

one who slaughtered it with the thought of

outside its place,

whether the bread was sanctified:

For Rabbi Eliezer says: It sanctified, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It did not sanctify,

and not in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s words, who holds that in this they did not disagree, and the bread is sacred according to everyone.

And Rabbi Yehuda adds and brings the exchange between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concerning a thanksgiving-offering that he slaughtered with the thought of eating outside its place, whether the bread was sanctified:

Rabbi Eliezer said: Since outside its time disqualifies

the offering,

and

also

outside its place disqualifies

the offering, we have grounds to say:

Just as outside its time,

even though the offering is disqualified in any event,

sanctified

the bread that comes with it,

so too outside its place,

we have grounds to say: even though the offering is disqualified in any event,

it sanctified

the bread that came with it.

He said,

he replied to him,

Rabbi Yehoshua,

“It is not so; rather, this is how we should reason:

Since outside its place disqualifies, and a blemished animal disqualifies, just as a blemished animal did not sanctify, so too outside its place did not sanctify.”

He said

[he replied]

to him, Rabbi Eliezer:

said to him:

I compared it—

to the thought of outside its place—

to outside its time, and

if

you compared it to a blemished animal,

come and

let us see to what it is similar—

If

it is found that it

is similar

to

outside its time,

then

we shall reason about it from outside its time,

and say that the bread is sacred.

And

if

it is found that it

is similar

to

a blemished animal, we shall reason about it from a blemished animal,

and say that the bread is not sacred.

Rabbi Eliezer began to reason

to whom it is similar:

We reason from one thought-disqualification

[he thought to eat it outside its place]

from another thought-disqualification

[he thought to eat it outside its time],

but we do not reason from a thought-disqualification

when he thought to eat it outside its place

from a bodily disqualification

such as a blemished animal.

Rabbi Yehoshua began to reason

to whom it is similar:

We reason from a disqualification for which there is no karet

for eating it, such as the disqualification of the thought of outside its place,

from a disqualification for which there is no karet

for eating it, such as a blemished animal.

And let outside its time not serve as proof, for it is a disqualification for which there is karet

for eating it.

Furthermore,

Rabbi Yehoshua added a reason for sanctifying the bread when he slaughtered it with the thought of outside its place:

We shall reason about it from the thanksgiving-offering that was slaughtered

without its proper designation,

not for its sake,

which did not sanctify the bread, for it is similar to it both according to your reasoning and according to my reasoning,

that it is a thought-disqualification

and

there is no karet in it,

and it is similar to a thanksgiving-offering slaughtered with the thought of outside its place.

And

he

Rabbi Eliezer was silent to him.

Here the Gemara returns to Rabbi Meir’s words, who holds according to Rabbi Eliezer that if it was found to have a blemish, the bread is sacred, and it raises an objection:

And

to

Rabbi Meir

let this be difficult:

What is different about “he slaughtered it and it was found to be a tereifa,” whose disqualification preceded slaughter, and what is different about “he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish,” whose disqualification did not precede slaughter!?

That is to say, what is different about “he slaughtered it and it was found to be a tereifa,” concerning which you say: since its disqualification preceded slaughter, the bread was not sanctified; and what is different about one found to have a blemish, concerning which, even though its disqualification preceded slaughter, Rabbi Meir nevertheless says that the bread is sacred!?

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer said that the bread is sacred when it was found to have a blemish only when it was found to have a blemish

in the transparent films of the eye

[a mark in the eye that constricts vision], whose blemish is not noticeable,

and according to Rabbi Akiva, who says:

blemished animals with transparent films of the eye:

if they went up

onto the altar,

they do not go down,

and since after the fact they do not go down, the bread is sacred even though the thanksgiving-offering was disqualified.

And the Gemara explains:

But the other one,

and Rabbi Yehuda, who holds according to Rabbi Eliezer that if it was found to have a blemish the bread was not sanctified, his reason is:

When Rabbi Akiva said

that

if they went up they do not go down—

specifically

with a bodily disqualification,

that is, concerning the body of the offering, that if it went up onto the altar it does not go down,

but with regard to the sanctification of the bread,

when slaughtering an animal with a blemish, he

did not

say so.

It was stated: A sin-offering

that he slaughtered outside its time: if it went up, it does not go down.

And if he slaughtered it outside its place:

that was slaughtered after its designated time: If it ascended, it does not descend.

Rabba said: It goes down.

Rava said: It does not go down.

Rabba follows Rabbi Yehoshua

in the beraita brought above, who compares outside its place to a blemished animal, and in the case of a blemished sin-offering the law is that if it went up, it goes down—

And Rava follows Rabbi Eliezer

in that beraita, who compares outside its place to outside its time, and in the case of a sin-offering outside its time the law is that if it went up, it does not go down—

And Rava retracted his position in favor of Rabba, just as Rabbi Eliezer retracted his position in favor of Rabbi Yehoshua,

[Rava retracted and conceded to Rabba, for Rabbi Eliezer too retracted and conceded to Rabbi Yehoshua, since he was silent].

And some say:

Even though Rabbi Eliezer retracted his position in favor of Rabbi Yehoshua, Rava did not retract his position in favor of Rabba,

[although Rabbi Eliezer retracted, Rava did not retract]—

For

there he said

to Rabbi Eliezer:

“

We shall reason about it—

from one slaughtered

outside its place—

from one slaughtered not for its sake,”

and because of this argument Rabbi Eliezer retracted—

But here—

with regard to a sin-offering slaughtered outside its place, and which went up, whether it should go down—

if you reason about it from one slaughtered not for its sake

[if you come to learn the case of a sin-offering outside its time from a sin-offering not for its sake]—then certainly

if it went up, it does not go down,

for in the case of other offerings the offering is fit even initially, only it did not count for its owners as their obligation; and if so, even in the case of a sin-offering, which is disqualified when not for its sake, nevertheless, if it went up, it does not go down, and even Rabba agrees to this. And if we compare outside its place to not for its sake, the law will be that if it went up, it does not go down.

We learned in the Mishna:

He slaughtered

[the thanksgiving-offering]

not for its sake,

and likewise the ram of the inauguration and likewise the two sheep of Shavuot, if he slaughtered them not for their sake, the bread was not sanctified:

he said,

astonished,

Rav Pappa:

The tanna of our Mishna left out

[left aside and did not mention]

the nazirite’s ram—

which

comes with bread,

and whose law is like all those mentioned in the Mishna—

which is common,

for it applies for generations,

and mentioned the ram of the inauguration,

which is uncommon, for it does not apply for generations.

And

we explain the reason of

the tanna of our Mishna: he stated the essential matter

the tanna; that is, the tanna mentioned the ram of the inauguration because it preceded all the offerings that sanctify the bread that comes with them.

Mishna:

The libations—

that come with the offering—

that were sanctified in a vessel,

which he placed in a service vessel and they were sanctified through it with bodily sanctity,

and the

offering was found to be disqualified:

If there is

with him, during the day—before they become disqualified through overnight stay—

another offering

to offer together with it the libations,

they shall be offered

the libations

with it.

And if they remained overnight

[the night passed over them],

they become disqualified through overnight stay,

for they were sanctified with bodily sanctity to become disqualified through overnight stay.

Gemara:

Zeiri said: The libations are not sanctified

with bodily sanctity, to become disqualified through being taken outside, through impurity, and through overnight stay,

except through the slaughter of the offering

with which they come, and even if they were not sanctified in a vessel. But if they were sanctified in a vessel and the offering was not slaughtered for them, they were not sanctified to become disqualified through any of these.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

For

the verse says

[Leviticus 23]:

“Offering”

[a term referring to slaughter]

and libations,”

to teach us: the libations depend on the slaughter with regard to their sanctification.

And we object to Zeiri from that which

we learned

in our Mishna:

The libations that were sanctified in a vessel, and the offering was found to be disqualified: if there is another offering, they shall be offered with it, and if they remained overnight, they become disqualified through overnight stay;

and indeed:

Is it not that it was disqualified through slaughter,

and if so, the slaughter did not sanctify it, and nevertheless they become disqualified through overnight stay by means of the sanctification of the vessel, contrary to Zeiri, according to whom the sanctification depends only on the slaughter of the offering!?

And we answer:

No,

not as you explained our Mishna, that it deals with an offering disqualified through slaughter; rather, our Mishna deals with a case

where it was disqualified through the sprinkling,

and the libations had already been sanctified through the valid slaughter, and therefore they become disqualified through overnight stay.

It was taught above, on 72b: The two sheep of Shavuot do not sanctify the bread except through slaughter. How so? He slaughtered them for their sake and sprinkled their blood for their sake—the bread is sacred; he slaughtered them not for their sake and sprinkled their blood not for their sake—the bread was not sanctified; he slaughtered them for their sake and sprinkled their blood not for their sake—the bread is sacred and is not sacred [that is, the bread is sacred but is not permitted to the priests for eating, as Rava explained above, on 47a], the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: It is never sacred until he slaughters them for their sake and sprinkles their blood for their sake.

And the Gemara discusses:

According to whom

is our Mishna, such that you explain it: since the slaughter of the offering was valid, the libations dependent upon it became sanctified? Seemingly it is

according to Rabbi, who says: two things

[slaughter and sprinkling]

that permit

the offering and that which depends upon it—such as the slaughter and sprinkling of the two sheep of Shavuot, which permit the offering to burn its portions and permit it for eating, and permit the two loaves for eating; or the slaughter and sprinkling of an offering, which permit the offering and the libations dependent upon it—these

raise one without the other.

That is, slaughter alone suffices to raise that which depends upon it by one level, to sanctify it with bodily sanctity, even though that which depends upon it is not completely permitted except together with the sprinkling.

And the Gemara explains that this is not so, but

even if you say

that our Mishna is

Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Shimon’s,

who holds that that which depends upon the offering is sanctified only when the two permitting acts have been performed—

For Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Shimon said that that which depends upon the offering is not sanctified only in a case where there was a disqualification in the sprinkling, such as when it was sprinkled not for its sake. But

with what are we dealing here

in our Mishna?

With a case where he received their blood

[the blood of the offering]

in a cup,

and it was already fit for sprinkling,

and

afterward

it was spilled

[and it was not disqualified through the sprinkling]—