Menachot 79b — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon agrees with his father’s view [

he holds according to his father’s opinion]

for he says: Anything that is standing to be sprinkled is considered as though it had been sprinkled.

The master said in our Mishna:

the libations that were sanctified in a vessel, and the sacrifice was found to be disqualified,

if there is another sacrifice, they shall be offered with it;

and if they remained overnight, they become disqualified through remaining overnight:

And we raise an objection:

But Rav Ḥisda said: Oil that they designated for this meal-offering

and the meal-offering became disqualified, the oil is

disqualified for another meal-offering.

And so we should also say concerning libations: if they were designated for this sacrifice and it became disqualified, they are disqualified for another sacrifice!?

He said

he answered:

Rabbi Yannai:

Here, with what are we dealing? With public libations, and they are fit for another sacrifice because

the heart of the court

of the priests

stipulates concerning them

at the time of their designation that

if they are needed

for this sacrifice,

they are needed; and if not, they shall be for another sacrifice.

And we answer:

If so, the oil

of public meal-offerings

also

should be capable of being given in another meal-offering because of this stipulation!?

And we answer: Oil is different, for when the meal-offering becomes disqualified, the oil too becomes disqualified, because

the oil is the body of the meal-offering

since the meal-offering is mixed with it. But libations, which are offered separately, are not disqualified through the disqualification of the sacrifice; and if because they were designated for this sacrifice, he can change them to another sacrifice, it is because the heart of the court stipulates concerning them. And we raise an objection against this: Since even changing them to another sacrifice is only by virtue of a stipulation of the court, then also with regard to disqualification through remaining overnight they should not become disqualified,

and

because

it should stipulate concerning them

the court

that they should go out to non-sacred status [

that they should go out to non-sacred status] if they were not needed for this sacrifice!?

And we answer:

It is a rabbinic decree,

because

perhaps those who see

the libations that were sanctified in a vessel going out to non-sacred status will say:

They remove [offerings] from a service vessel to the non-sacred;

for not everyone knows of the stipulation. Therefore, if they remained overnight, they become disqualified through remaining overnight.

And we raise an objection:

Now too,

when we say that since the heart of the court stipulates concerning them it is possible to change them to another sacrifice, let us be concerned for those who see and say that they should not offer them with another sacrifice:

A decree: perhaps they will say, “Libations that one designated for this sacrifice are fit for designation for another sacrifice.”

And we answer:

Matityah son of Judah taught

a beraita explaining the Mishna: They said that he may change them to another sacrifice because of the stipulation of the court only in

a case where there was a sacrifice slaughtered at that time,

when the first sacrifice became disqualified, for those who see will say: They were designated for the second sacrifice.

And we raise an objection:

But if there is no sacrifice slaughtered at that time, what

is the status of the libations!? They cannot be changed to another sacrifice, and

they become disqualified

the libations

through remaining overnight!?

If so, raise the following difficulty:

Instead of teaching the end [

until we learned in the end of our Mishna]: “

If they remained overnight”—

because there is no other sacrifice there—

they become disqualified through remaining overnight,”

let it distinguish and teach it in that case itself [

let the Mishna distinguish in the manner of the first clause, namely, when there is another sacrifice there]:

In what case are these words said,

that he may offer them with another sacrifice? Only in a case where

there was a sacrifice slaughtered at that time; but if there is no sacrifice slaughtered at that time—

no.

no.

And we answer:

This too is what it says [

indeed, this is the intention of the Mishna]:

In what case are these words said,

that the libations are offered with another sacrifice? Specifically in a case where

there was a sacrifice slaughtered at that time—

but if there is no sacrifice slaughtered at that time, it is treated as though they became disqualified through remaining overnight and are disqualified.

And we raise an objection: In our Mishna it is clear that even if the sacrifice became disqualified, the libations were sanctified so as to become disqualified through remaining overnight. And it was explained in the Gemara above that our Mishna is also according to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, because our Mishna deals with a case where the blood was spilled, and the libations were sanctified so as to become disqualified through remaining overnight because Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon agrees with his father that “anything that is standing to be sprinkled is considered as though it had been sprinkled.” If so, there is a difficulty: How can we explain our Mishna as also being according to the view of Rabbi Shimon, that the libations should be offered with another sacrifice because “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them”

—and does Rabbi Shimon hold that “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them”?

And does Rabbi Shimon have

“the heart of the court stipulates concerning them,”

and does Rabbi Shimon hold the principle “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them,” so that you would say this principle according to his view?

But Rav Idi bar Avin said that Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The daily offerings

—which are sanctified with intrinsic sanctity and cannot be redeemed without a defect—

that were not needed by the public:

According to Rabbi Shimon, unblemished animals may not be redeemed,

According to Rabbi Shimon, unblemished animals are not redeemed,

for they were sanctified with intrinsic sanctity;

but according to the Sages, unblemished animals are redeemed,

because “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them”: if they are needed, they are needed, and if not, they are redeemed.

It is therefore clear that Rabbi Shimon does not hold “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them”; how then can we explain the reason for our Mishna as “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them”!?

And we answer:

That case is different,

with regard to the daily offerings,

for they have a remedy [

there is a remedy so that those daily offerings will not be lost]

through grazing

in the pasture until a defect occurs in them, after which they are sold; therefore the court does not stipulate concerning them. But in the case of libations that were not needed by the public, if not for the stipulation of the court their end would be that they would be burned; therefore the court stipulates concerning them from the outset that they should be for another sacrifice.

Mishna:

The offspring of a thanksgiving-offering and its substitute

of a thanksgiving-offering, where the thanksgiving-offering was standing and he said, “This is in place of that,” and the Torah said [Leviticus 27:10]: “And if he shall surely substitute an animal for an animal, then it and its substitute shall be holy”—

And one who designates a thanksgiving-offering, and it was lost, and he designated another in its place,

and the first was found after the second had been offered, or it was found before the second had been offered and he offered one of them, and he comes to offer the one remaining—

each one of these is offered and

does not require bread, as it is stated:

“And he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering

unleavened cakes,” the verse teaches that

the thanksgiving-offering requires bread, but neither its offspring nor its replacement [

that is, it was lost and he designated another]

nor its substitute require bread.

nor its substitute requires bread.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written: “If he offers it for a thanksgiving-offering, and he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering unleavened cakes.” The verse could have said: “If for a thanksgiving-offering, and he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering cakes,” and the word “he shall offer it” comes to be expounded in two parts [“he shall offer”—“he shall offer it”];

what does it say

“he shall offer a thanksgiving-offering,”

to teach:

From where is it derived concerning one who designated his thanksgiving-offering and it was lost, and he designated another in its place, and the first was found,

and

both are standing,

for he has not yet offered the one that he designated in place of the first,

from where is it derived that whichever of them he wishes he may offer

first

and

bring

its bread with it?

The verse therefore says

“the thanksgiving-offering he shall offer”—“and he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering,” to include every thanksgiving-offering; and the two standing before him are thanksgiving-offerings, and each one is fit for bread.

“and he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering.” This includes every thanksgiving-offering. The two offerings standing before him are both thanksgiving-offerings, and each one is fit to be accompanied by loaves.

One might have thought that

even the

the second one

for offering [

requires

also

bread?—

The verse therefore says:

“he shall offer it” [

the extra nun and vav], which comes to exclude: only with

one

shall he fulfill “and he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering cakes,”

and not with

with

two.

After the verse included

for offering

and excluded

from the bread—

From where is it derived to include offspring, replacements, and substitutes for offering?

The verse therefore says:

“If for a thanksgiving-offering.”

“For” is an inclusion, to include all these.

One might have thought that they require bread,

that is, from where is it derived that the offspring and substitutes do not require bread?

The verse therefore says

“and he shall offer with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering,”

which is an exclusion, to teach:

A thanksgiving-offering requires bread, but neither its offspring nor its replacement nor its substitute require bread.

Rabbi Ḥananya sent

—from the Land of Israel to Babylonia—

in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

They taught

—that these do not require bread—

only

after atonement, but before atonement they require bread,

and he proceeds to explain it.

Rav Amram pondered concerning it: With regard to which one [

Rav Amram found it difficult: concerning which of these three was this law stated]!?

If you say, concerning the replacement of an obligatory thanksgiving-offering,

that is, if Rabbi Yoḥanan intended to say that when a person said, “A thanksgiving-offering is incumbent upon me,” and designated a thanksgiving-offering for his obligation, and it was lost, and he designated another in its place—for he is responsible for it—and the first was found; in that case, if he first offered the first one that he found, and after he attained atonement through it he offers the second one that he designated, indeed he does not bring bread with the replacement of the thanksgiving-offering; but if he first offers the second one that he designated, the replacement of the thanksgiving-offering requires bread, and he offers the first one that was lost without bread—this cannot be said, for:

But if it was before atonement,

already

we taught

that it requires bread, for we learned in a beraita—which deals with an obligatory thanksgiving-offering, since it teaches, “From where is it known concerning one who sets aside his thanksgiving-offering,” and does not teach, “From where is it known concerning one who sets aside a thanksgiving-offering”—from where is it known that whichever of them he wishes he may offer, and its bread with it.

But if it was after atonement,

already

we taught

that it does not require bread, for we learned in a beraita that only the first for offering requires bread, whereas the second is exempt.