Menachot 79b (עט:) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, agrees with his father’s opinion

he agrees with his father’s view]

as he said: Anything that is destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had been sprinkled.

The Master said

in our Mishna: The libations that were sanctified in a vessel, and the offering was found to be disqualified,

if there is another offering, they shall be sacrificed with it;

and if they remained overnight, they become disqualified because of linah:

And we raise a difficulty:

But didn’t Rav Ḥisda say: Oil that one designated for this meal-offering

and the meal-offering became disqualified—the oil

is disqualified for another meal-offering?

And likewise we should say with regard to libations: If they were designated for this offering and it became disqualified, they are disqualified for another offering!?

He said

in answer:

Rabbi Yannai:

Here we are dealing with communal libations, and they are valid for another offering because

the disposition of the court

of priests

stipulates concerning them

at the time of their designation that

if they are needed

for this offering,

they are needed; and if not, they shall be for another offering.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so, the oil

of communal meal-offerings

also

should be possible to use for another meal-offering on the basis of this stipulation!?

And we answer: Oil is different, because when the meal-offering becomes disqualified, the oil is also disqualified, since

the oil is an integral part of the meal-offering

as the meal-offering is mixed with it. But libations, which are sacrificed separately, are not disqualified as a result of the disqualification of the offering; and if they were designated for this offering, he may redirect them to another offering, because the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them. And we raise a difficulty against this: Since even redirecting them to another offering is possible only because of the court’s stipulation, then with regard to disqualification through remaining overnight as well, they should not become disqualified,

and

because

it should have stipulated concerning them

the court

that they leave for non-sacred use

that they become non-sacred] if they are not needed for this offering!?

And we answer:

It is a rabbinic decree

because of

lest those who see

the libations that were sanctified in a vessel being released for non-sacred use say:

They remove items from a service vessel for non-sacred use,

since they are unaware of the stipulation; therefore, if the libations remained overnight, they become disqualified because of linah.

And we raise a difficulty:

Now too,

when we say that, since the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them, it is possible to redirect them to another offering, should we not be concerned about those who see this and say that they should not be sacrificed with another offering:

Lest they say: Libations that one designated for a particular offering are valid for another offering?

And we answer:

Didn’t Mattithiah ben Judah teach

a beraita explaining the Mishna: They said that it is possible to redirect them to another offering because of the court’s stipulation only in a case

where there was an offering slaughtered at that time,

when the first offering became disqualified, since those who see it will say: They were designated for the second offering.

And we raise a difficulty:

But if there was no offering slaughtered at that time, what

is the status of the libations? It is impossible to redirect them to another offering, and

the libations become disqualified

because

of remaining overnight!?

If so, the following difficulty arises:

Rather than teach the latter clause

until we learned in the end of our Mishna]: “

as we learned in the latter clause of our Mishna: “

If they remained overnight”—

they become disqualified because of remaining overnight,”

let it distinguish and teach the matter itself

let the Mishna distinguish in the manner of the first clause, namely, when there is another sacrifice there]:

let the Mishna distinguish in the manner of the first clause, namely, when there is another offering]:

In what case is this statement said,

that he may sacrifice them with another offering? Only in a case

where there was an offering slaughtered at that time; but if there was no offering slaughtered at that time—

no.

And we answer:

This too is what it says

indeed, this is the intention of the Mishna]:

indeed, this is the Mishna’s intention]:

In what case is it stated

that the libations may be sacrificed with another offering? Specifically, in a case

where there was an offering slaughtered at that time; but if there was no offering slaughtered at that time, they are treated as though they became disqualified through remaining overnight, and are disqualified.

And we raise an objection: In our Mishna it is clear that even if the sacrifice became disqualified, the libations were sanctified so as to become disqualified through remaining overnight. And it was explained in the Gemara above that our Mishna is also according to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, because our Mishna deals with a case where the blood was spilled, and the libations were sanctified so as to become disqualified through remaining overnight because Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon agrees with his father that “anything that is standing to be sprinkled is considered as though it had been sprinkled.” If so, there is a difficulty: How can we explain our Mishna as also being according to the view of Rabbi Shimon, that the libations should be offered with another sacrifice because “the heart of the court stipulates concerning them”

And we raise a difficulty: It is clear in our Mishna that even if the offering became disqualified, the libations were sanctified so as to become disqualified through remaining overnight. And it was explained earlier in the Gemara that our Mishna also accords with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, since our Mishna is dealing with a case where the blood was spilled, and the libations were sanctified so as to become disqualified through remaining overnight because Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, agrees with his father that “anything that is destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had been sprinkled.” If so, the following difficulty arises: How can we say, in explaining our Mishna, that it also follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that the libations may be sacrificed with another offering because “the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them”

—

and does Rabbi Shimon hold that the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them

and does Rabbi Shimon accept the principle that “the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them,” so that you can attribute this reasoning to his opinion?

And

didn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The daily offerings—

that were not needed by the community:

According to Rabbi Shimon, unblemished animals may not be redeemed,

since they were sanctified with inherent sanctity;

and

according to the Sages, unblemished animals may be redeemed,

because “the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them”: If they are needed, they are needed, and if not, they may be redeemed.

Thus, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle that “the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them.” How, then, can we explain that the reason for our Mishna is “the disposition of the court stipulates concerning them”?

And we answer:

That case is different,

with regard to the daily offerings,

as they have a remedy

there is a remedy so that those daily offerings will not be lost]

there is a remedy so that those daily offerings will not be lost]

through re’iyah, grazing in the pasture until they develop a blemish, at which point they may be sold. Therefore, the court does not stipulate concerning them. But with regard to libations that were not needed by the community, if not for the court’s stipulation, their eventual fate would be to be burned; therefore, the court stipulates concerning them from the outset that they shall be for another offering.

Mishna:

The offspring of a thanksgiving-offering and its substitute

of a thanksgiving-offering, where the thanksgiving-offering was standing before him and he said, “This is in place of that,” and the Torah stated [Leviticus 27:10]: “And if he shall indeed exchange an animal for an animal, then both it and its substitute shall be sacred”—

and one who designates a thanksgiving-offering, and it was lost, and he designated another in its place,

and the first was found after the second had been sacrificed, or it was found before the second was sacrificed and he sacrificed one of them, and he now comes to sacrifice the remaining one—

each of these may be sacrificed, but

does not require bread, as it is stated: “

And he shall sacrifice with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering

unleavened loaves,” teaching that

the thanksgiving-offering requires bread, but neither its offspring nor its replacement

that is, it was lost and he designated another]

that is, the animal that was lost and for which another was designated]

nor its substitute requires bread.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is written: “If he sacrifices it as a thanksgiving-offering, he shall sacrifice with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering unleavened loaves.” The verse could have stated: “If as a thanksgiving-offering, he shall sacrifice with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering loaves.” The word “he shall sacrifice it” is therefore expounded in two parts: “he shall sacrifice” and “he shall sacrifice it”

What does it say

‘he shall sacrifice a thanksgiving-offering’,

to teach:

From where is it derived concerning one who designates his thanksgiving-offering and it was lost, and he designated another in its place, and the first was found,

and

both are standing before him,

since he has not yet sacrificed the one that he designated in place of the first,

from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever of them he wishes

first

and

bring

its bread with it?

The verse states: “

He shall sacrifice the thanksgiving-offering”—“and he shall sacrifice with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering,”

to include every thanksgiving-offering. And the two standing before him are thanksgiving-offerings, and each is fit to have bread.

One might have thought that

even the

second

for sacrifice

after he sacrificed one and comes to sacrifice the second]

would require it as well

bread?

The verse states: “

He shall sacrifice it”

which comes to exclude this: Only

the extra nun and vav] which comes to exclude: Only one

shall fulfill “and he shall sacrifice with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering loaves,”

but not

two.

two.

After the verse has included

them for sacrifice

and excluded

them with regard to bread—

From where is it derived to include offspring, replacements, and substitutes for sacrifice?

The verse states: “

If as a thanksgiving-offering.”

The word “with” is an inclusion, to include all of these.

One might have thought that they require bread,

that is, from where is it derived that the offspring and substitutes do not require bread?

The verse states: “

And he shall sacrifice with the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering,”

which is an exclusion, teaching:

A thanksgiving-offering requires bread, but neither its offspring nor its replacement nor its substitute requires bread.

Rabbi Ḥananya sent

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia

in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

They taught

that these do not require bread

only

after atonement; but before atonement, they require bread,

and he proceeds to explain it.

Rav Amram considered: With regard to which case

Rav Amram found it difficult: concerning which of these three was this law stated]!?

Rav Amram found this difficult: With regard to which of these three cases was this law stated]!?

If you say it is referring to the replacement of a mandatory thanksgiving-offering, that is, if Rabbi Yoḥanan intended to say that when a person says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanksgiving-offering,” and designates a thanksgiving-offering to fulfill his obligation, and it was lost, and he designated another in its place, since he is responsible for it, and the first was found; then, if he first sacrificed the first one that he found, after atoning through it he sacrifices the second one that he designated, and indeed he does not bring bread with the replacement of the thanksgiving-offering. But if he first sacrifices the second one that he designated, the replacement of the thanksgiving-offering requires bread, while the first one that was lost is sacrificed without bread—this cannot be said, because:

If it concerns the period before atonement,

we have already

learned

that it requires bread, as we learned in a beraita—which deals with an obligatory thanksgiving offering, as it states: “From where is it derived with regard to one who sets aside his thanksgiving offering,” and it does not state: “From where is it derived with regard to one who sets aside a thanksgiving offering”? From where is it derived that whichever of them he wishes he may offer, with its bread alongside it.

If it concerns the period after atonement,

we have already

learned

that it does not require bread, as we learned in the beraita that only the first one offered requires bread, whereas the second is exempt.