Menachot 73a (עג.) — the Talmud in English

The verse states: “

And every menacha baked in the oven

and every one prepared in a pan and on a griddle shall belong to the koen who offers it; it shall be his. And every menacha mixed with oil or dry,

shall belong to all the sons of Aaron, one like his brother”;

the meaning is that they shall all eat from it, and they shall not divide menachot against animal sacrifices.

One might think that they may not divide menahot against zevahim

animals slaughtered with a knife, because

they did not replace them in a situation of poverty

a minha does not take the place of an animal offering when the one bringing it is poor. For a poor person brings a bird offering in place of an animal offering, and in the case of extreme poverty he brings a minha in place of a bird sin-offering,

but they may divide

the kohanim

menahot against birds, since they did replace them in a situation of

extreme

poverty?

Therefore,

the verse states: “

And every one made in a deep pan ...

shall be for all the sons of Aaron

each man like his brother.” The Torah did not need to specify the deep-pan minha; it would have sufficed for it to say, “And every minha shall be for all the sons of Aaron, each man like his brother.” Thus, this is a superfluous verse, which serves to include the teaching that they may not divide menahot against birds.

One might think that they may not divide menahot against birds,

even though they replace them in a situation of extreme poverty, because

the former are types of blood, whereas the latter are types of flour.

But

they may divide birds against animal offerings,

which they replace in a situation of poverty,

since both the former and the latter are types of blood—

Therefore,

the verse states: “

And

on a griddle ...

shall be for all the sons of Aaron

each man like his brother.” This too is a superfluous verse, and if it is not referring to menahot against animal offerings, since they are not of the same type—the former are types of blood and the latter are types of flour—apply it to animal offerings and birds.

One might think that they may not divide birds against animal offerings,

because

the former—

the melika of birds—

are performed by hand

with a fingernail,

whereas the latter—

the slaughter of animal offerings—

is performed with an implement

with a knife;

but they may divide menahot against menahot, since both the former and the latter are performed by hand

the taking of the handful from a minha is performed with the fingers of the hand—

Therefore,

the verse states: “

And every minha mixed with oil shall be for all the sons of Aaron

each man like his brother.” The mention of “mixed with oil” is superfluous, to teach that they may not divide menahot against menahot.

One might think that they may not divide

a

griddle

minha against

a

deep-pan

minha, nor

a

deep-pan

minha against a

griddle

minha, because

the former—

the minha made on a griddle, which is broad—

has a firm consistency, whereas the latter—

the deep-pan minha, made in a deep vessel—has a soft consistency;

but they may divide

the

griddle

minha brought by Reuben

against

the

griddle

minha brought by Simeon,

and

the

deep-pan

minha

against

the deep-pan minha, since in the former case both have a firm consistency, or in the latter case both have a soft consistency—

Therefore,

the verse states: “

And its dry portion shall be for all the sons of Aaron

each man like his brother.” “Its dry portion” is a superfluous expression, to teach that they may not divide one minha against another, even when they are of the same type. The same law applies to every offering: the kohanim divide each offering, but they do not divide one offering against another, even if both are sin-offerings or peace-offerings.

One might think that they may not divide

one offering against another

among the most sacred offerings,

like a minha,

but they may divide

one offering against another

among offerings of lesser sanctity.

He therefore explained that the essential teaching is that one person cannot compel his fellow to divide a minha against an animal offering. Without the verse, one might have thought that one person could compel his fellow to do so, under the principle of the law of Sodom, since no individual portion of the minha contains enough to eat. Similarly, in the case of partners, when an item is not large enough to be divided, one partner can compel the other under the law of “Take or I will take”—gud o agud. The verse teaches us that the law is that they must divide each minha separately. This is what Rashi wrote [see the commentary attributed to Rashi, s.v. “against animal offerings”]: “So that a kohen should not say to his fellow, ‘You take the animal offerings and I will take the menahot”—that is, when the other person objects. But if the entire priestly family agrees to divide a minha against another minha or against an animal offering, perhaps they are permitted to do so; this requires further examination for practical law. See also what his son-in-law noted there in a gloss. And Rashi in Kiddushin 53a explained the statement, “One might think that they may not divide among the most sacred offerings, but they may divide among offerings of lesser sanctity,” as follows: One might think that they may not divide one offering against another among the most sacred offerings, like a minha, but they may divide one offering against another among offerings of lesser sanctity, since they possess a share in them and can sell a portion of one offering in exchange for a portion of another; it is thus clear that the issue concerns agreement, and not coercion. In Hazon Ish [in Even HaEzer, section 148, in his novellae to Kiddushin there], he asked: It requires examination, for according to everyone there is a law of division with regard to offerings, in that each person acquires his portion for the mitzva of eating. If so, from where do we know that he cannot sell his portion? Perhaps the beraita means as follows: “One might think that they may not divide menahot against animal offerings”—that is, one person says, “Let us divide the minha separately and the animal offerings separately,” while the other says, “Let us divide the menahot against the animal offerings.” The law follows the one who says that each offering should be divided separately [that is: perhaps we should understand it as Sefat Emet did, that this is only a law that one cannot compel another]! He answered that it is obvious that giving one offering in exchange for another is not an equal division. Rather, it must necessarily be speaking of a division agreed to by everyone; nevertheless, this is not considered a division, and each person does not acquire his portion. The person who ate the minha may demand his portion of the animal offering, for he did not forfeit his share in the animal offering, since one cannot transfer his share to others. And if it were indeed possible to sell it for money, all the more so it would be possible to sell menahot in exchange for animal offerings. And he asked: If he possesses only the right of the mitzva, why is a verse needed to teach that they do not divide an animal offering against a minha? Since they cannot compel one another to divide an animal offering against a minha, even if they wish to do so it should not constitute a division, since he does not own it in a manner that would allow him to transfer it! And he answered: One might have thought that if they agree, this would constitute a fundamental division, and each person would acquire his portion for the mitzva of eating; see further in the lectures of Rabbi Shmuel on Kiddushin, where he cites the words of Tosafot of Rabbi Asher there and discusses the matter; see also Eilat HaShahar on Kiddushin there; and see further in Keren Ora on our passage; and see further in Hazon Ish, Bava Kamma, section 20, subsection 21.

Therefore,

the verse states: “

And every minha mixed with oil and its dry portion shall be for all the sons of Aaron,

each

like his brother ...

and if it is a thanksgiving-offering,”

which is an offering of lesser sanctity. The juxtaposition teaches:

Just as they do not divide

one offering against another

in

a minha that is

most

sacred,

so they do not divide

one offering against another

in

a thanksgiving-offering that is

of lesser sanctity.

And therefore it is stated: “

Each

like his brother,” in order to teach:

Each

kohen

divides

in offerings,

even

a kohen

with a physical defect

who is unfit for the Temple service—

But a minor

who is not “a man”

does not divide

in offerings,

even

if he is

without a physical defect.

Thus, every part of the verse is expounded for a different matter. If so, from where do we know that the remnants of the omer minha and the sotah minha are eaten by the kohanim?!

And we answer:

That—

the teaching derived in the beraita concerning the law of division from this verse—

is derived from the extra word

“

all,”

which is superfluous, since it could have said, “A minha mixed with oil and its dry portion.” But Hezekiah derived from the essential wording of the verse that the remnants of the omer minha and the sotah minha are eaten by the kohanim.

And we challenge this:

But you have used it—the word “all”

for this purpose [for “all” is needed to teach

the teaching of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda

above, on 63b, that a baked-in-an-oven minha consists either entirely of loaves or entirely of wafers]?!

Rather,

that—the teaching derived in the beraita concerning division

is derived

from the word “

and all” [from the extra letter vav], while “all” itself is used for the teaching of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

Ravina

disputed Hezekiah concerning the source of the law that the remnants of the omer minha and the sotah minha belong to the kohanim, and

said:

It is derived—the remnants of these menahot

from

what Levi taught [from a beraita taught by Levi]; for Levi taught:

from a

beraita taught by Levi];

for Levi taught:

It is written in the passage concerning the gifts to the kohanim [Numbers 18:9]: “This shall be yours from the most sacred things, from the fire:

all their offerings for every minha

and for every sin-offering

and for every guilt-offering

that they render to Me; it shall be most sacred for you and for your sons.” And the beraita expounds: “

All

“All”

their offerings”—to include the log of oil of the leper

who has become pure. From that log, the kohen pours into his palm, sprinkles before the Lord, and places some on the leper; the remainder of the log is eaten by the kohanim—

And therefore the verse needed to include the log of oil of the leper, for

it might enter your mind to say:

its remainder should not be eaten by the kohanim, because “

from the fire”

the Merciful One wrote,

which implies that the portion remaining from the fire is eaten, whereas nothing of the leper’s log of oil remains from the fire, since none of it is offered on the altar; rather, some of it is placed on the leper—

This teaches us: “all” serves to include the leper’s log of oil. “

For every

minha”—to include the omer minha and the sotah minha

whose remnants are eaten by the kohanim—

And therefore the verse needed to include them, because

it might enter your mind to say: “

And they shall eat those things by which atonement was effected

for them,”

the Merciful One said [Exodus 29:33]

concerning the eating of the kohanim—that is, the kohanim eat and the owners attain atonement—

And

if

this one—

the omer minha—

comes to permit

the new produce to Israel,

and the other—

the sotah minha—also

comes to clarify

the woman’s sin,

comes, I might have thought that their remnants should not be eaten by the kohanim, because I cannot apply to them the verse, “And they shall eat those things by which atonement was effected for them.”

This teaches us otherwise. “

For every

sin-offering”—to include the bird sin-offering

which is eaten by the kohanim. The verse therefore needed to include the bird sin-offering, because

it might enter your mind to say:

the bird sin-offering

is an animal carcass,

since it was not slaughtered but rather its nape was pinched with a fingernail, and therefore its consumption should be forbidden to the kohanim—

This teaches us: “

For every

guilt-offering”—to include the guilt-offering of a

impure nazir and

the guilt-offering of a leper

who has become pure, which are eaten by the kohanim.

And we challenge this: Was it necessary for the verse to include the leper’s guilt-offering as belonging to the kohen? After all,

the leper’s guilt-offering is explicitly written

[Leviticus 14]: “And the kohen shall take the one lamb and offer it as a guilt-offering. And he shall slaughter the lamb in the place where he slaughters the sin-offering and the burnt-offering [on the northern side of the altar],

for like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering is for the kohen;

it is most sacred”—so it is explicitly “for the kohen”?!

Rather,

say this:

to include the guilt-offering of an impure nazir

so that it may be eaten by the kohanim

like the leper’s guilt-offering.

The verse needed to include it, because:

It might enter your mind to say:

the guilt-offering of an impure nazir

comes to enable

the nazir

to do so

[to enable him to undertake a period of nazirite purity], and it does not come to effect atonement; therefore, the verse “And they shall eat those things by which atonement was effected for them” does not apply to it—

This teaches us otherwise. “

Which they shall restore”—

this is the stolen property of a convert

who died without heirs [for a convert who converts is considered like a newborn child], and when the robber returns the stolen property to the kohanim, he gives it to them.

To you it belongs and to your sons",

to teach:

It belongs to you—

the stolen property of a convert—

and to your sons,

that they should be like non-sacred property, which has no sanctity whatsoever, for it is the owners' property, and

even to betroth a woman with it.