Menachot 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

And it would be appropriate that a sin-offering for a transgression involving forbidden fat

that is, an ordinary sin-offering

require libations

like the other offerings, so that

the sinner should not profit; and why does it not require

libations

so that his offering should not be glorified.

It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon said

this reasoning, that

his offering should not be glorified, when one removes its handful

from a sinner’s offering,

it should likewise be rendered fit

by disqualified persons; the Mishna teaches us

that it is not fit when performed by disqualified persons.

If so, there too,

in tractate Zevakhim, at the beginning of chapter two, where we learned: “All the offerings whose blood was received by a non-priest, an acute mourner, one who immersed that day, etc.,”

let it teach

in this wording: “Both a sin-offering for forbidden fat and all the offerings whose blood was received by a non-priest, an acute mourner, etc.,”

and let it say that it is necessary according to Rabbi Shimon

just as, with regard to a sinner’s offering, the tanna stated it separately;

apparently

we see from this that

once he taught it

the wording

“all,” and did not teach “except”

for a particular offering,

it indicates all of them

and no additional wording is needed for Rabbi Shimon.

Here too,

in our Mishna,

once it taught “all” and did not teach “except” -

does it indicate all of them?

And we answer:

It was necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since we established

according to the view of Rabba and Rava that the

first clause

at the beginning of the chapter, which states that all meal-offerings whose handfuls were removed not for their own sake do not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

I might say that the

final clause too,

that is, our Mishna, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

as Rabbi Shimon disputes the final clause as well and deems a sinner’s offering fit when performed by disqualified persons.

It teaches us

through the superfluous Mishna, “both a sinner’s offering, etc.,” that Rabbi Shimon agrees with the final clause.

Rav said: If a non-priest removed the handful

from the meal-offering,

he shall return it

to the vessel, and a priest shall remove the handful again in accordance with the law.

And we object:

But we learned: “It is rendered invalid,”

in our Mishna, which implies that it is entirely invalid and that returning it will not help.

And we answer:

What is the meaning of “it is rendered invalid”? It is rendered invalid until he returns it

to the vessel; but once he returns it, he may remove the handful in the proper manner.

And we object:

If so, this is the opinion of ben Beteira,

who is mentioned in our Mishna: “He shall return it and remove the handful again,” etc. If so, what is Rav’s innovation? This is already a dispute between tannaim in the Mishna.

And we answer:

If the handful is present in its original form

in its entirety,

the Rabbis do not dispute ben Beteira’s view

that he should return it and remove the handful again

. They dispute the case in which the handful is lacking

from the amount that existed when he removed it.

The Rabbis hold that he may not bring material from his house and fill it,

as once the meal-offering was placed in the vessel, its status as a meal-offering was fixed, and if it subsequently became deficient, it became invalid.

Ben Beteira holds that he may bring material from his house and fill it,

as he maintains that the status of a meal-offering is fixed only through removal of the handful; if it became deficient beforehand, it did not become invalid, and here, since it was removed by a disqualified person, it is like the period before removal of the handful.

And we object:

If so,

why does it say

“Ben Beteira says: He shall return it and remove the handful again with his right hand”?

But

it should have said: “Ben Beteira says: He shall return it, bring material from his house and fill it, and remove the handful again with his right hand,”

since this is the essence of their dispute: whether he may complete it from his own supply!?

And we answer:

Rather,

in truth, according to the Rabbis he may not return it, and

when Rav said

“if a non-priest removed the handful, he shall return it,” he said this according to the view of

ben Beteira

.

And we object:

Is this obvious?!

What was Rav coming to teach us by this? And we answer:

Lest you say that ben Beteira deemed it fit to return it only

when he removed the handful

with his left hand, but with regard to the other disqualified persons

mentioned in our Mishna,

he did not say

that he should return it and remove the handful again

; it teaches us

that Rav maintains that in the case of all the disqualified persons, he should return it and remove the handful again properly.

And we wonder:

What is different

about removing the handful with the

left hand

that one might have considered saying that specifically in this case he should return it, since

we find that it is rendered fit on Yom Kippur

when the High Priest takes the spoon containing the incense in his left hand , whereas the disqualification of a

non-priest we also find rendered fit, in slaughter,

which is valid when performed by a non-priest? And we answer:

Slaughter is not a sacrificial service.

It is therefore not considered a precedent of fitness for the other services.

And we wonder:

Does slaughter not count as a service?

But Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav:

“The slaughter of the red heifer

by a non-priest

is invalid.” And Rav said concerning this:

What is the reason?

“Elazar”

the priest is written with regard to it, indicating that he must slaughter it [see Yoma 42b, where there is a dispute concerning this], and

“a statute”

is written with regard to it, implying that this requirement is indispensable;

it is written with regard to it,

so the slaughter by a priest is indispensable. If so, this implies that slaughter is a service, and therefore it is invalid when performed by a non-priest.

And we answer:

The heifer is different,

as slaughter by a non-priest is invalid in its case not because it is a service,

for

it is

consecrated for Temple maintenance,

and a service is not applicable to it. Rather, it must be that this is a decree of the verse that a non-priest is invalid in its case.

And we wonder:

Is it not a fortiori

that slaughter is called a service? If the red heifer, which is

consecrated for Temple maintenance, requires priesthood

for its slaughter because its slaughter is considered a service, then

consecrated offerings,

with which all the services are performed,

surely

their slaughter

requires priesthood

because it is a service!? This proves that the Torah permitted slaughter by a non-priest, as we find a service that may be performed by a non-priest!?

And we answer:

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

In truth, slaughter is not called a service. The reason a priest is required for the heifer is a decree of the verse,

just as the examination of afflictions is not a service, yet requires priesthood.

The law is that specifically a priest must inspect the afflictions, although this is not a service, and it must therefore be a decree of the verse. Likewise, the requirement of a priest for the slaughter of the heifer is a decree of the verse, and consequently there is no proof that slaughter is a service.

And we object: The statement that Rav said, “If a non-priest removed the handful, he shall return it,” and you said that he said it according to ben Beteira—why was it necessary for him to teach this?

Let us derive it from a private altar,

where a service performed by a non-priest was rendered fit. Offerings were brought there before Aaron was consecrated, and the service was performed by the firstborn, who were non-priests. Therefore, just as when the handful was removed with the left hand he should return it because it has a precedent of fitness on Yom Kippur, so too, when it was removed by a non-priest, it is obvious that he should return it, since it has a precedent of fitness at a private altar !?

And if you would say that we do not derive laws from a private altar,

because Aaron had not yet been consecrated and the concept of a non-priest had not yet existed,

but it was taught in a beraita: From where do I derive that an item taken outside

from the sacrificial portions of a sin-offering or burnt-offering beyond the curtains,

that

although it is invalid,

if it was placed upon the altar, it need not be removed,

as we find that an item taken outside

was

in some context

fit—

at a private altar,

since there were no curtains there, and any disqualification that has a precedent of fitness elsewhere, if it was placed upon the altar, need not be removed. We see that one derives a law from a private altar even though the concept of curtains did not yet exist. If so, with regard to a non-priest who removed the handful, we should derive from a private altar that he should return it!?

And we answer: The

tanna

who teaches the law of an item taken outside

relies on “This is the law of the burnt-offering,”

from which we derive: “One law applies to all offerings placed upon the altar: if they were placed upon it, they need not be removed.”

He relies on this verse.

The tanna’s statement, “as we find that an item taken outside was fit at a private altar,” is merely support for his words; in truth, one may not derive the law from a private altar.

And we object:

Rather, the reason Rav taught us

that ben Beteira said that in the case of all disqualified persons he should return it and remove the handful again is that

if not for this, I would have thought that ben Beteira invalidated it in the case of the other disqualified persons?

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, say: Ben Beteira deemed it fit in the case of all the disqualified persons.

And

there is further proof that ben Beteira said this with regard to all disqualified persons, as

it was taught

that it is written: “And he shall bring it to the sons of Aaron, the priests,

and he shall remove his handful from there.”

This implies that

from the place where the feet of the non-priest

who brought the meal-offering stand, he removes the handful. This is the place where Israelites tread, which is eleven cubits to the east of the Temple courtyard. It teaches us that he need not be in the north, as with offerings whose service is performed in the north; rather, the entire courtyard is valid for removal of the handful.

Ben Beteira says: From where is it derived that if he removed the handful with his left hand

he should return it and remove the handful again with his right hand? The verse states: “And he shall remove his handful from there,”

which implies that he should remove the handful

from the place where he had already removed it

and returned it there because of the disqualification. Since the verse, “And he shall remove his handful from there,” is stated without qualification,

what difference is there between the left hand and the other disqualified persons?

The verse gives no greater indication concerning the left hand than concerning the other disqualifications .

Rather,

the Gemara retracts what it had said, that Rav’s innovation is that this applies even to the other disqualified persons:

Rav teaches us this

by his statement, “If a non-priest removed the handful, he shall return it”: -

He removed the handful, and even performed the placing in the vessel

that is, he placed the handful in a service vessel; nevertheless, he shall return it,

excluding the opinion of these tannaim.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei ben Yosei ben Yasyn and Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: We said this only when he removed the handful but did not perform the placing in the vessel; but

when he removed the handful and

performed the placing in the vessel—

it is invalid.

Some say

that this is what Rav said:

If he removed the handful

alone,

no;

but if he had already

performed the placing in the vessel,

in the vessel,

no! According to whom?

According to those tannaim,

and not according to the first tanna, who disputes them in the beraita and says that even if he performed the placing in the vessel, he should return it.

Rav Naḥman challenged this: What do these tannaim hold? If

they maintain that

removal of the handful by disqualified persons is a service

and is considered valid service that invalidates the meal-offering, then

even though he did not perform the placing in the vessel,

the meal-offering should become invalid, since a disqualified service has already been performed through the removal of the handful itself. And

if

they maintain that

removal of the handful by disqualified persons is not a service

because it was performed by disqualified persons, then

when he performs the placing in the vessel, what difference does it make?

That too is not considered a service.

Rav Naḥman subsequently said: In truth,

removal of the handful by disqualified persons

is a service, but its service is not complete

until the removal of the handful is completed

by performing the placing in the vessel.

Therefore, only when he completed the entire service did he invalidate the meal-offering.