Menachot 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

Is that so?

That is to say,

is tzitzit merely a need of an ordinary person?

But

it is a mitzva,

and it is a need of Heaven.

Rather,

how can this be rejected?

What can be said about diverse kinds,

which are for sacred use,

that this is precisely how their mitzva is performed

only?

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

The verse is therefore necessary

because one could say: Let the derivation return, and let it establish

that a tereifa is permitted for sacred use

by

a derivation of

a common side.

For

what

did you reject

with regard to melika,

which cannot serve as a source,

because its sanctity renders it forbidden?

If so,

milk and blood will prove

the point, for their sanctity does not render them forbidden, and they are permitted for sacred use but not for an ordinary person.

And what did you reject, saying that they cannot serve as a source?

What can be said about milk and blood? They come from a category that is otherwise permitted;

if so,

melika will prove

the point, as it does not come from a category that is otherwise permitted.

And the derivation returns: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one,

but

the common denominator between them

is

that they are forbidden to an ordinary person but permitted for sacred use. I, too, will include a tereifa,

which

although it is forbidden to an ordinary person, should be permitted for sacred use,

and therefore a verse is necessary to teach that it is forbidden for sacred use.

And we reject this: It is impossible to derive the matter from these sources, for one could challenge it:

What can be said about the common denominator between them? Their mitzva is performed in this manner.

Can you say the same with regard to a tereifa, whose mitzva is not performed in this manner, since one can bring an unblemished animal instead?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The verse is therefore necessary to disqualify a tereifa as a sacrifice

because one could say that, from the outset,

where you wished to derive

the law,

a kal va-chomer

can be refuted!

From where would you derive it

by means of a kal va-chomer?

From a blemished animal,

which is permitted for an ordinary person to eat but forbidden for sacred use; all the more so, a tereifa, which is forbidden to an ordinary person, should be forbidden for sacred use.

What can be said about a blemished animal? The law of

the

one who offers and the one that is offered

applies to it: Just as the “one that is offered,” namely, the sacrifice, is disqualified when blemished, so too the “one who offers,” namely, the priest, is disqualified when blemished. Can you say the same with regard to a tereifa, where the one who offers is not like the one that is offered, since a sacrifice is disqualified if it is a tereifa, but a priest who is in the halakhic category of a tereifa is fit for the Temple service?

Rav Aḥa the Elder said to Rav Ashi: A creature delivered by caesarean section

will prove the point, for the law of the one who offers and the one that is offered does not apply to it.

For a priest who was born by caesarean section is fit for the Temple service, whereas an animal born by caesarean section is disqualified from being offered, as we learned from the verse “when it is born”—excluding one delivered by caesarean section.

And it is permitted to an ordinary person but forbidden for sacred use,

and the kal va-chomer can be derived from here with regard to a tereifa.

And we challenge this:

What can be said about one delivered by caesarean section, since it does not become sanctified as a firstborn?

The verse specifically states “that which opens the womb,” whereas this one did not emerge through the womb, but through an incision in its mother’s side. Can you say the same with regard to a tereifa, which does become sanctified as a firstborn when it is born as a tereifa? If so, the kal va-chomer cannot be derived.

And we say:

A blemished animal will prove the point,

for it does become sanctified as a firstborn, and the law with regard to a tereifa can be derived from it. And if you wish to challenge this by saying,

What can be said about a blemished animal? The law of the one who offers and the one that is offered applies to it,

I will say to you:

One delivered by caesarean section will prove the point. And the derivation returns: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one; the common denominator between them is that they are permitted to an ordinary person but forbidden for sacred use. I, too, will include a tereifa, which is forbidden to an ordinary person, so that it should be forbidden for sacred use.

And we challenge this:

What can be said about the common denominator between them? They are not permitted under any circumstances from within their general prohibition.

There is no case in which their prohibition is set aside.

Can you say the same with regard to a tereifa, whose prohibition is set aside in some case?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: The tereifa

that you said is permitted in some case—

what is it?

Where is it permitted?

If you say it is the melika of a bird burnt offering for sacred use,

which is rendered a tereifa through the melika at the outset, as its spine and neck are severed before its identifying organs are severed, then, since you are speaking about birds, a blemished animal, too, is permitted in some case,

for a blemish in birds is entirely permitted.

This is because the principle is that

“wholeness,”

meaning that a sacrifice must be unblemished,

and “maleness,”

meaning that a burnt offering must specifically be male, apply only

to animals. And

the laws of

wholeness and maleness do not apply to birds.

Rather, what is the case in which the prohibition of a tereifa is set aside?

The bird sin offering,

which is a tereifa and is permitted

to the priests

to eat. But with regard to a blemished animal and one delivered by caesarean section, we do not find that their prohibition is set aside to permit their consumption by priests, since there is no prohibition against eating them at all.

And we reject this: The fact that the priests eat them is because

they acquire them from the table of Heaven,

and this is considered permission for sacred use rather than for an ordinary person. And with regard to sacred use, we also find a case in which the prohibition of a blemished animal is set aside—in birds. If so, it is possible to derive the law of a tereifa by means of a common side from these cases, and the original question returns: Why do I need a verse?

And we say:

Rather, challenge it in this manner: What can be said about the common denominator between them? Their blemish is recognizable,

for a blemished animal is disqualified specifically when its blemish is visible and apparent, and a creature delivered by caesarean section is likewise publicly known, as the matter becomes known and everyone is aware of it.

Can you say the same with regard to a tereifa, whose blemish is not recognizable

specifically, since sometimes its condition involves the intestines and is not apparent? If so, it is impossible to derive the law by means of a common side from these cases, and therefore a verse is necessary.

And we ask:

Does the disqualification of a tereifa emerge from here,

from the verse “from cattle”? Surely

it emerges from there,

from the fact that it is written

“from the nourishment of Israel,”

from which we learn that a sacrifice must be

from that which is permitted to Israel

specifically, whereas a tereifa is forbidden for an Israelite to eat.

Alternatively,

from

“from all that passes under the rod,”

we learn this, as we derive from there

an exclusion of a tereifa

that does not pass

under the rod: An animal whose legs were severed above the knee joint is a tereifa and cannot pass under the rod, and it is disqualified for the tithe of animals. This verse is written with regard to the tithe of animals, and we derive from there the other sacrifices by means of a gzera shava [Bekhorot 57a]?

And we answer:

All are necessary,

all these verses.

For if

you were to learn only from the verse

“from the nourishment of Israel,” we would say that it excludes

specifically

a case in which it never had an opportunity to become fit,

namely, one that became a tereifa while still in its mother’s womb,

analogous to orla and the produce of a vineyard planted with diverse kinds [which we learned in tractate Pesaḥim from that verse that they are nullified in two hundred], since they never had an opportunity to become fit.

But if it had

an opportunity to become fit,

the tereifa

we might say that it should become fit.

Therefore

the Merciful One writes, “all that passes,” and if the Merciful One had written

only

“all that passes,” we would say that it excludes

specifically a case in which it

became a tereifa and was subsequently consecrated,

for that resembles the tithe, in which it first became a tereifa and afterward passed under the rod. But if it

was consecrated and subsequently became a tereifa, at the time it was consecrated it was fit,

and only afterward became a tereifa,

we might say that it should become fit.

Therefore the Merciful One writes “from cattle.” Hence,

all are necessary.

Mishna:

Both a sin-offering meal offering

which is a meal offering brought on account of a sin,

and all the meal offerings

which are meal offerings brought voluntarily,

if a non-priest performed their kemitza,

or

an acute mourner

whose dead relative has not yet been buried, or

one who immersed that day

who immersed in order to purify himself from impurity but has not yet awaited sunset, or

one lacking the priestly garments

who is not properly dressed in the priestly garments, or

one lacking atonement

who immersed and awaited sunset but has not yet brought his atonement offering, or

one who did not wash his hands and feet, and a

priest who is

uncircumcised

because his brothers died as a result of circumcision and therefore he was not circumcised, or

impure,

or who performed the service while

seated,

for the law requires him to stand during the service, as it is written, “to stand and minister,” or

standing

during his service

on top of utensils,

or

on top of an animal,

or

on top of his fellow’s feet,

and the law requires that nothing interpose between his feet and the floor—in all these cases the kemitza is

disqualified. If he performed the kemitza

with his

left hand, it is disqualified. Ben Betira says: He should return

the kometz to the vessel

and perform the kemitza again with his right hand,

as required. The same law applies, according to Ben Betira, to the other disqualified individuals listed at the beginning of the Mishna: He returns the kometz and performs the kemitza again properly.

If he performed the kemitza and there entered his hand

together with the kometz

a pebble, a grain of salt, or a particle of frankincense, it is disqualified, because they said: If the kometz is more or less than

its prescribed measure, it is

disqualified!

Here, since a pebble or the like entered his hand, that amount is lacking from the measure of the kometz.

And which is

a kometz

that is excessive? One taken in a heaping manner,

that is, heaped [alternatively, flour is visible as an interposition between the tips of his fingers and the palm of his hand, Rashi].

And which is

a kometz

that is deficient? One taken with the tips of his fingers,

and he did not fill his entire palm. 2 .

Gemara:

And we ask:

Why was it necessary to teach, “Both a sin-offering meal offering

and all the meal offerings”?

Why did the tanna distinguish and teach the law of a sin-offering meal offering separately from that of the other meal offerings?

Let him teach: “All the meal offerings if a non-priest or an acute mourner performed their kemitza,”

and the sin-offering meal offering would be included.

And we answer:

It was necessary because of Rabbi Shimon,

to state the sin-offering meal offering separately.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon said: By right, it should be

also

required for a sin-offering meal offering

to bring

oil and frankincense

like the other meal offerings,

so that the sinner should not profit; and why is it not required to contain

oil and frankincense? So that

his offering should not be glorified.