Menachot 6a — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

Is that so?

That is to say,

is tzitzit merely a need of an ordinary person?

But is it not

a mitzva,

and a need of the One on High?

Rather,

how can this be rejected?

What is there to say concerning diverse kinds

in the case of the One on High,

whose mitzva is specifically in this manner

?

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

A verse is therefore needed

because one might say: Let the reasoning return, and let it come

that a tereifa is permitted for the One on High

by

a derivation of

the common aspect:

for

what

did you reject

concerning melika,

that it is impossible to derive from it,

because its sanctity prohibits it.

If so,

fat and blood will prove it,

for their sanctity does not prohibit them, and they are permitted for the One on High but not for an ordinary person.

And what did you reject, that one cannot derive from them?

What is there to say concerning fat and blood, for they come from within the category of what is permitted?

If so,

melika will prove it,

for it does not come from within the category of what is permitted.

And the reasoning returns: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one,

but

the common aspect in them

is

that they are forbidden to an ordinary person and permitted for the One on High. I, too, will bring a tereifa,

for

even though it is forbidden to an ordinary person, it should be permitted for the One on High,

and therefore a verse is needed to teach that it is forbidden for the One on High.

And we reject this: It is impossible to derive from this, for it is possible to challenge:

What is there to say concerning the common aspect in them, for their mitzva is in this manner?

Can you say this concerning a tereifa, whose mitzva is not in this manner, for he can bring an unblemished animal?!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

A verse is therefore needed to disqualify a tereifa as a sacrifice

because one might say: From the outset of the

place where you wished to derive

the reasoning,

a kal va-chomer

can be refuted!

From where do you bring it

for the kal va-chomer?

From an animal with a physical defect,

which is permitted to an ordinary person for eating and forbidden for the One on High; all the more so, a tereifa, which is forbidden to an ordinary person, should be forbidden for the One on High.

What is there to say concerning an animal with a physical defect, for he made in its case

the law of

“those who offer” as “those offered,”

for just as that which is “offered,” namely the sacrifice, is disqualified by a physical defect, so too that which “offers,” namely the koen, is disqualified by a physical defect; can you say this concerning a tereifa, where “those who offer” are not like “those offered,” for the sacrifice is disqualified in the case of a tereifa, but a koen who is in the category of a “tereifa” is fit for service?!

Rav Aha the Elder said to Rav Ashi: A fetus delivered by cesarean

will prove it, for in its case he did not make “those who offer” as “those offered,”

for a koen who was born as a “fetus delivered by cesarean” is fit for service, whereas a sacrifice that was born as a “fetus delivered by cesarean” is disqualified for offering, as we learned from that which is written, “when it is born”—excluding a fetus delivered by cesarean;

and it is permitted to an ordinary person and forbidden for the One on High,

and we shall derive from here the kal va-chomer concerning a tereifa.

And we challenge:

What is there to say concerning a fetus delivered by cesarean, for it is not sanctified with the sanctity of the firstborn,

as the verse specifically says “that which opens the womb,” whereas this one did not emerge through the womb, but through an incision in its mother’s side; can you say this concerning a tereifa, which is sanctified with the sanctity of the firstborn when it is born a tereifa? If so, it is impossible to derive the kal va-chomer.

And we say:

An animal with a physical defect will prove it,

for it is sanctified with the sanctity of the firstborn, and from it we shall derive the law concerning a tereifa. And if you wish to challenge,

what is there to say concerning an animal with a physical defect, for in its case he made “those who offer” as “those offered”?

I will say to you:

A fetus delivered by cesarean will prove it. And the reasoning returns: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one; the common aspect in them is that they are permitted to an ordinary person and forbidden for the One on High. I, too, will bring a tereifa, which is forbidden to an ordinary person, that it should be forbidden for the One on High.

And we challenge:

What is there to say concerning the common aspect in them, for they were not permitted from within their general prohibition;

there is no permission in any case for their prohibition.

Can you say this concerning a tereifa, which was permitted from within its general prohibition?

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: The tereifa

that you said was permitted from within its general prohibition—

what is it?

Where was it permitted?

If you say it is the melika of the bird burnt offering for the One on High,

which is made a tereifa initially through the melika, for one cuts its spine and neck before cutting the signs, then, if you are speaking about birds, also in the case of an animal with a physical defect it was permitted from within its general prohibition, for

with regard to an animal with a physical defect among birds, it was indeed permitted,

since the rule is:

“perfection,”

that the sacrifice must be unblemished,

and “male,”

that a burnt offering must be specifically male, are stated only

with regard to an animal. And there is no

law of

“perfection” and “male” with regard to birds.

Rather, what was permitted from within the general prohibition of a tereifa?

The bird sin offering,

which is a tereifa, and is permitted

to the priests

for eating. But in the case of an animal with a physical defect and a fetus delivered by cesarean, we do not find that they were permitted from within their general prohibition for eating by the priests, for there is no prohibition of eating in their case at all.

And we reject this: That which the priests eat,

they acquire from the table of the One on High,

and it is considered permitted for the One on High and not for an ordinary person; and with regard to the One on High we also find, in the case of an animal with a physical defect, permission from within a prohibition—among birds. If so, it is possible to derive a tereifa from these by the common aspect, and the question returns to its place: Why do I need a verse?

And we say:

Rather, challenge it in this manner: What is there to say concerning the common aspect in them, for their defect is recognizable,

for an animal with a physical defect is disqualified specifically when its defect is recognizable and exposed, and a fetus delivered by cesarean also has a public indication of this, and the matter is publicized and everyone knows.

Can you say this concerning a tereifa, whose defect is not recognizable

specifically, for sometimes its being a tereifa is in the intestines and is not recognizable? If so, it is impossible to derive from these by the common aspect, and therefore a verse is needed.

And we ask:

Is the tereifa derived from here,

from the verse “from cattle”? But

it is derived from there,

from that which is written

“from the drink of Israel,”

from which we learn that a sacrifice must be

from that which is permitted to Israel

specifically, whereas a tereifa is forbidden for eating to Israel.

Alternatively,

from

“from all that passes under the rod,”

we learn this, for from there we learn

excluding a tereifa

that does not pass

under the rod: an animal whose legs were severed above the knee joint is a tereifa and cannot pass, and it is disqualified for the animal tithe. This verse is written concerning the animal tithe, and we learn from there the other sacrifices by a gzera shava [Bekhorot 57a]?

And we answer:

They are all necessary,

all these verses.

For if

you were to learn only from the verse

“from the drink of Israel,” it might have entered your mind to exclude

specifically

where it never had a time of fitness,

that is, it became a tereifa in its mother’s womb,

similar to orla and the diverse kinds of the vineyard

[which we learned in tractate Pesaḥim from that verse that they are nullified in two hundred, and they never had a time of fitness],

but if it had

a time of fitness

before becoming a tereifa, it might enter your mind that it should be made fit;

therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “all that passes,” and if the Merciful One had written

only

“all that passes,” it might have entered your mind to exclude

specifically where it

became a tereifa and afterward was consecrated,

for then this resembles the animal tithe, which first became a tereifa and afterward passed under the rod; but if

it was consecrated and afterward became a tereifa, for at the time that it was consecrated it was fit,

and only afterward became a tereifa,

it might enter your mind that it should be made fit.

Therefore the Merciful One wrote “from cattle”; consequently,

they are necessary.

Mishna:

Whether a sin-offering meal offering

which is the meal offering brought on account of a sin

or any of the meal offerings

which are meal offerings brought voluntarily,

if a non-koen took their handful,

or

an acute mourner

whose dead relative died and has not yet been buried, or

one who immersed that day

who immersed from his impurity but the sun has not yet set for him, or

one lacking garments

who is not wearing the priestly garments as required, or

one lacking atonement

who immersed and the sun set for him but has not yet brought his atonement sacrifice, or

one who did not wash his hands and feet, and

a

uncircumcised

koen whose brothers died because of circumcision and therefore he was not circumcised, and

an impure one ,

or if he performed the service while

sitting,

for the law is that he must stand at the time of the service, as it is written, “to stand to minister,” or

standing

during his service

on top of utensils

or

on top of an animal

or

on top of the feet of his fellow,

for the law is that there must be nothing intervening between his feet and the floor—in all these cases he is

disqualified. He took the handful

with his

left hand—he is disqualified. Ben Betera says: He should return

the handful to the vessel

and again take the handful with the right hand,

as required; and likewise, in the other disqualified persons brought at the beginning of the Mishna, the law according to Ben Betera is that he should return it and again take the handful as required.

He took the handful and there came up in his hand

together with the handful

a pebble, or a grain of salt, or a particle of frankincense—he is disqualified, because they said: A handful that is more or less

than its measure

is disqualified!

And here, since a pebble or the like came up in his hand, that measure of the pebble has been lacking from the handful.

And which is

a handful

that is excessive? One whose handful he took in a heaped manner,

that is, heaped [another expression: flour appears to intervene between the tips of his fingers and the palm of his hand, Rashi].

And which is

a handful

that is lacking? One whose handful he took with the tips of his fingers,

and did not fill his entire palm. 2 .

Gemara:

And we ask:

Why is it necessary to teach, “whether a sin-offering meal offering

or any of the meal offerings”?

Why did the tanna distinguish and teach the sin-offering meal offering separately from the other meal offerings?

Let him teach: “All the meal offerings if a non-koen or an acute mourner took their handful,”

and so on, and the sin-offering meal offering is included.

And we answer:

It was necessary for Rabbi Shimon

to state the sin-offering meal offering separately.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon said: It is fitting that

also

the sin-offering meal offering should require

the bringing of

oil and frankincense

as do the other meal offerings, so that

the sinner should not profit; and for what reason does it not require

oil and frankincense? So that

his sacrifice should not be splendid.