Menachot 5b — the Talmud in English

The eastern horizon has brightened -

it permits [

And what we said—that the remainder of the meal-offering may not be eaten until another omer meal-offering is brought—is because it is a mitzva to wait and not eat the new produce even after the eastern horizon has brightened, until the omer meal-offering is brought, Rashi.]

And we say:

But this statement of Reish Lakish,

who said that if the handful of the omer meal-offering was taken with an improper intention, the offering is valid, and his reason is that he holds that the brightening of the eastern horizon permits the new produce,

was not

stated explicitly, but was inferred from another statement:

Reish Lakish did not state this law explicitly; rather, this is what we understood from his words.

As we learned in a Mishna: One may not bring

from new grain

meal-offerings, first fruits, or the meal-offering of an animal

that is, the meal-offering of libations brought with an animal offering

before the omer; and if one brought it,

it is invalid,

because the new produce is still forbidden under the prohibition of new grain [and therefore it is not “from what is permitted to the Jewish people,” Tosafot below, 68b].

Before the two loaves

also

one may not bring

these offerings, as it is written concerning the two loaves: “an offering of the first portion”—meaning that it must be the first of all offerings,

but if one brought it, it is valid.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Reish Lakish said: They taught

that if one brought it before the omer, it is invalid

only on the fourteenth and fifteenth

of Nisan, when the new produce had not yet been permitted. But

on the sixteenth

of Nisan,

if one brought

these offerings before the omer meal-offering,

it is valid; evidently, he holds that the eastern horizon -

permits

the new produce, and therefore on the sixteenth of Nisan the offering is valid.

And we say:

But Rava

disagrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish and

said: If the handful of the omer meal-offering was taken with an improper intention, the offering is valid, and

even

its remainder may be eaten

according to its law;

and it does not require another omer meal-offering to permit it.

It is completely valid. What is the reason? He holds that

an intention does not take effect

to invalidate

unless

there are three conditions:

the person must be fit to perform the service, the object must be fit for the service, and the place must be fit for the service.

And we explain:

The person must be fit to perform the service

specifically—

to exclude a blemished priest

or another person disqualified from the service for such people do not invalidate an offering through their intention.

The object must be fit for the service

specifically, meaning that the object being offered must be fit as an offering,

to exclude the omer meal-offering,

which is brought from barley,

which is not fit

for an offering, since all meal-offerings are brought from wheat, and only here is barley used.

This is an innovation

of the omer meal-offering, which is not fit for the service.

And the place must be fit for the service,

specifically,

to exclude a damaged altar,

when the place of offering is not fit for the service. If, at that time, one had an invalidating intention, it does not invalidate the offering; and if one repairs the altar that same day [so that the offering will not become invalid through being left overnight], he may burn it.

The Sages taught: Concerning offerings it is stated [Leviticus 1:2–3]: “When a person brings an offering to the Lord, from animals, from cattle, or from the flock … If his offering is a burnt-offering from cattle …” From the beginning of the verse we learn “from animals” to exclude an animal that mated unnaturally or was mated with unnaturally; “from cattle” to exclude an animal worshipped as an idolatrous offering; and “from the flock” to exclude an animal designated for idolatry [an animal set aside for idolatrous worship].

that it is stated concerning offerings [Leviticus 1:2–3]: “When a person brings an offering from you to the Lord, from animals, from cattle or from the flock, etc. If his offering is a burnt-offering from cattle, etc.” From the beginning of the verse we derive: “from animals”—to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or was the object of bestiality; “from cattle”—to exclude an animal that was worshipped, meaning an animal worshipped as an object of idolatry; “and from the flock”—to exclude an animal designated for idolatry [an animal designated for idolatry].

When it says “from cattle” later,

at the end of the verse [“If his offering is a burnt-offering, from cattle”],

which need not be stated,

since there is no need for the verse to state this again, what does it teach us?

Rather, it excludes an animal with a fatal physical defect,

which is disqualified as an offering.

We examine this matter: Why is a verse needed for this?

Is it not an inference

that follows logically?

This matter can be learned through an a-fortiori inference:

Just as

an animal

with a blemish, which is permitted to a non-consecrated person

for consumption,

is forbidden

to be offered

on the altar, an animal with a fatal defect, which is forbidden

to a non-consecrated person

for consumption, surely should be forbidden

to offer

on the altar!?

One can challenge this inference: Fat and blood prove otherwise, for they are forbidden to a non-consecrated person

for consumption,

but are permitted

to offer

on the altar.

We reject this challenge, since fat and blood differ from an animal with a fatal defect:

What is distinctive about fat and blood is that they come from something otherwise permitted,

as the entire animal is permitted for consumption, and only the fat and blood are forbidden.

Can you say the same about an animal with a fatal defect, whose entire body is forbidden

to a non-consecrated person? If so, can the matter still be learned through an a-fortiori inference? The Gemara answers that another challenge can be raised against the inference:

The nipping of the neck

proves otherwise, for

indeed

the entire bird is forbidden and is forbidden to a non-consecrated person,

because if one nips the neck of an unconsecrated bird, the entire bird is forbidden, since it is an unslaughtered carcass—nipping is not slaughter—

yet it is permitted on the altar

as an offering!

We reject this challenge:

What is distinctive about the nipping of the neck is that

the act of

its sanctification

for the altar—that is, the nipping, which makes it fit for the altar—is itself

what forbids it

to a non-consecrated person.

This is not so with an animal with a fatal defect, whose sanctity is not what forbids it: its sanctity does not cause the prohibition of an animal with a fatal defect. Thus, an animal with a fatal defect can still be learned through an a-fortiori inference from a blemished animal. Why, then, is a verse needed?

And if you dismiss this answer,

if you find a way to reject the a-fortiori inference, we return to the derivation from the verse:

When it says “from cattle” later, which need not be stated -

to exclude an animal with a fatal defect.

And we ask:

What is meant by “if you dismiss this answer”?

What challenge could be raised?

Rav said: Because one could say: The omer meal-offering proves otherwise, for it is forbidden to a non-consecrated person,

since it is made from new grain, which has not yet been permitted to a non-consecrated person,

but is permitted on the altar!

We challenge this response:

What is distinctive about the omer meal-offering,

which is superior,

is that it permits new grain,

whereas an animal with a fatal defect permits nothing, and therefore should be forbidden even on the altar.

The Gemara explains: This is what Rav said: The omer meal-offering

in the Sabbatical year

proves otherwise,

for there is no new grain in the Sabbatical year, and therefore the offering permits nothing.

We challenge this:

Even in the Sabbatical year,

the omer meal-offering is superior,

since it permits aftergrowths

that grew on their own during the Sabbatical year.

And we say: Rav’s challenge follows the view

of Rabbi Akiva, who says that aftergrowths are forbidden

in the Sabbatical year

from the time of removal onward. According to Rabbi Akiva, since the a-fortiori inference has been rejected, we learn from the verse “from cattle” to exclude an animal with a fatal defect.

We challenge this:

Even according to Rabbi Akiva, one can reject

the challenge from the omer meal-offering:

What is distinctive about the omer meal-offering is that

in the Sabbatical year it permits new grain outside the Land of Israel,

where the laws of the Sabbatical year do not apply, yet there is new grain that requires the omer meal-offering to permit it.

And even according to the one who says that the

prohibition of

new grain outside the Land of Israel is not a Torah prohibition,

and therefore this challenge cannot be raised, another challenge can be raised:

What is distinctive about the omer meal-offering is that it comes to permit a prohibition

of “You shall eat no bread, parched grain, or fresh grain”

contained within it

?

We answer:

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Perhaps the verse “from cattle” is needed because we might have thought that

an animal with a fatal defect may also be offered and may permit the prohibition

of an animal with a fatal defect

contained within it,

so that one who eats it would not violate the prohibition against eating an animal with a fatal defect.

And we say:

But even according to Rabbi Akiva,

there is a response to this challenge:

What is distinctive about the omer meal-offering is that its mitzva

is specifically

in this respect,

to bring it from the new grain; only a meal-offering from the new grain permits new grain. This is not so with an offering, which can be brought in a valid form, and whose mitzva is not specifically to use an animal with a fatal defect. If so, the a-fortiori inference stands, and why do I need the verse?

We answer:

Reish Lakish said that the a-fortiori inference can be rejected as follows:

Because one could say: The preparation of the incense proves otherwise; it is forbidden to a non-consecrated person but permitted on the altar.

And we ask:

The preparation of the incense!?

It concerns

a person,

and how can one speak of its being permitted on the altar?

And we explain:

Rather, the preparation of the incense proves otherwise: It is forbidden to a non-consecrated person

to prepare incense for a non-consecrated person’s use,

but it is permitted for

the use of

the altar.

We reject this challenge:

What is distinctive about the preparation of the incense is that this is precisely its mitzva

to be prepared in this manner. Can you say the same about an offering, for which one is not required to bring specifically an animal with a fatal defect?

Mar, son of Ravina, said:

This is another way to challenge the a-fortiori inference:

Because one could say: Shabbat proves otherwise; it is forbidden to a non-consecrated person but permitted

on the altar,

since offerings are brought on Shabbat!

on the altar,

as offerings are brought on Shabbat!

And we reject:

What of Shabbat, since it is permitted from its general rule,

the general prohibition was permitted

for an ordinary person, in circumcision,

for they circumcise on Shabbat.

And we are astonished:

Is it so

that

circumcision is a need of an ordinary person

that you said it was permitted for an ordinary person? For

circumcision is a mitzva,

and it too is a need of the One Above.

Rather,

so should you reject the objection:

What of Shabbat, since its mitzva is specifically so,

for the time of the daily offerings and additional offerings is specifically on that day, and it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva on another day, unlike in the case of a tereifa, for it is possible to bring a fit one!

Rav Adda bar Abba said:

so should you reject the kal va-chomer:

because one may say: kilayim,

shaatnez in a garment,

proves [the point], which are forbidden to an ordinary person and permitted

for the One Above,

in the priestly garments, in the belt of the High Priest [this is the version of the Shita Mekubetzet in Rashi; and see Birkhat ha-Zevach, who did not read “High,” for if it is the High Priest, he has kilayim also in the ephod and breastplate].

And we reject:

What of kilayim, since it was permitted from its general rule for

an ordinary person through ritual fringes,

for for the purpose of the mitzva of ritual fringes the prohibition of kilayim was permitted!