Menachot 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

The eastern horizon shone -

it permits [

And what we said—that its remainder may not be eaten until he brings another Omer offering—is because it is a mitzva to wait and not eat the new grain even after the eastern horizon has shone, until they bring the Omer offering, Rashi].

And we say:

But this statement of Reish Lakish

who said that an Omer offering whose kometz was taken not for its own sake is valid, and his reason is that he holds that the shining of the eastern horizon permits the new grain,

was not

stated explicitly, but was stated by inference

Reish Lakish did not state this ruling explicitly; rather, this is what we understood from his words.

As we learned: One may not bring

from new grain

meal-offerings, first fruits, or the meal-offering of an animal

that is, the libation meal-offering brought with an animal offering

before the Omer offering; but if he brought it -

it is invalid,

for the new grain is still forbidden by law, and it is not “from what is permitted to Israel”—from what is permitted to a Jew, Tosafot below, 68b].

Before the two loaves

also

he may not bring

these offerings, as it is written concerning the two loaves: “an offering of the first fruits”—that they should be the first of all the offerings;

but if he brought them, they are valid.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Reish Lakish said: They taught

that if one brought it before the Omer offering, it is invalid

only on the fourteenth and fifteenth

of Nisan, when the new grain had not yet become permitted. But

on the sixteenth

of Nisan,

if he brought

these offerings before the Omer offering,

it is valid; apparently, he holds that the eastern horizon -

permits

the new grain, and therefore, on the sixteenth of Nisan, it is valid.

And we say:

And Rava

disagrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish and

said: An Omer offering whose kometz was taken not for its own sake is valid, and

even

its remainder may be eaten

as usual;

and it does not require another Omer offering to permit it

rather, it is entirely valid. What is the reason? He holds that

a thought is effective

in rendering an offering invalid

only

under three conditions:

with regard to one who is fit for the Temple service, with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.

And we explain:

With regard to one who is fit for the Temple service

specifically—

to exclude a blemished kohen

or another person disqualified for the service , as such people do not render an offering invalid through thought.

And with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service

specifically, meaning that the item he is offering is fit to be an offering;

to exclude the Omer offering

which is brought from barley,

which is not fit

for an offering, as all meal-offerings are brought from wheat, and only here is barley brought,

as it is an innovation

with regard to the Omer offering, which is not fit for the Temple service.

And in a place that is fit for the Temple service

specifically—

to exclude a case where the altar was damaged,

when the place of the offering is not fit for the Temple service. If he had an invalidating intention at that time, it does not render the offering invalid; and if he repairs the altar that same day [so that the offering will not become invalid through being left overnight], he burns it.

The Sages taught

that it is stated concerning offerings [Leviticus 1:2–3]: “When a person brings an offering from you to the Lord, from animals, from cattle or from the flock, etc. If his offering is a burnt-offering from cattle, etc.” From the beginning of the verse we derive: “from animals”—to exclude an animal that copulated with a person or was the object of bestiality; “from cattle”—to exclude an animal that was worshipped, meaning an animal worshipped as an object of idolatry; “and from the flock”—to exclude an animal designated for idolatry [an animal designated for idolatry].

When it says “from cattle” below,

at the end of the verse [“If his offering is a burnt-offering, from cattle”],

which need not be stated,

as there is no need to state this, what does it come to teach us?

Rather, to exclude a tereifa,

which is unfit as an offering.

And we examine this matter: Why is a verse necessary for this?

Is this not a logical inference

from a kal va-chomer!

This matter can be derived by a kal va-chomer:

If

an animal

with a blemish, which is permitted to a common person

for consumption,

is forbidden

to be offered

on the altar, a tereifa, which is forbidden

for consumption

by a common person, should it not follow that it is forbidden

to offer it

on the altar!?

One can refute this: Ḥelev and blood prove it, as they are forbidden to a common person

for consumption,

but permitted

to be offered

on the altar.

And we reject this refutation, for ḥelev and blood differ from a tereifa:

What is notable about ḥelev and blood? They come from within what is permitted,

as the entire animal is permitted for consumption, and only the ḥelev and blood are forbidden.

Can you say the same with regard to a tereifa, which is entirely forbidden

for a common person? If so, can the matter still be derived by a kal va-chomer? The Gemara answers: Another objection can be raised against the kal va-chomer, for

melika

proves that

after all,

it is entirely forbidden and is forbidden to a common person,

as if one performs melika on an ordinary bird, the entire bird is forbidden, since it is an animal carcass, as melika is not slaughtering,

but is permitted on the altar

as an offering!

And we reject this refutation:

What is notable about melika? It is an act of

the

consecration

of the offering to the altar; that is, melika, which renders the bird fit for the altar, is itself what

forbids it

to a common person.

That is not so with regard to a tereifa, whose consecration does not forbid it

to a common person; its consecration does not cause the prohibition of tereifa. If so, a tereifa can indeed be derived by a kal va-chomer from an animal with a blemish, so why is a verse necessary for this?

And if you refute it,

if you find a rejection of the kal va-chomer, we will return to the derivation from the verse:

When it says “from cattle” below, which need not be stated -

to exclude a tereifa.

And we ask:

What does “and if you refute it” mean?

What could have been raised as an objection?

Rav said: Because one could say: The Omer offering proves it, as it is forbidden to a common person,

since it is made from the new grain, which has not yet become permitted to a common person,

but is permitted on the altar!

And we challenge this objection:

What is notable about the Omer offering,

which is superior,

as it permits the new grain,

whereas a tereifa permits nothing, and therefore should be forbidden on the altar?

And the Gemara explains: This is what Rav said: The Omer offering

in the Sabbatical year

proves it, for there is no new grain in the Sabbatical year, and it permits nothing.

And we challenge this:

In the Sabbatical year as well,

the Omer offering is superior,

as it permits the safiḥin

that grew on their own during the Sabbatical year?

And we say: Rav’s objection follows

the view of Rabbi Akiva, who says that safiḥin are forbidden

in the Sabbatical year

from the time of the removal period onward. According to Rabbi Akiva, since there is a rejection of the kal va-chomer, we derive from the verse “from cattle” that a tereifa is excluded.

And we challenge this:

According to Rabbi Akiva as well, let us refute

the question on the basis of the Omer offering:

What is notable about the Omer offering, as it

permits new grain outside Eretz Yisrael during the Sabbatical year,

where the Sabbatical year does not apply, and there is new grain that requires the Omer offering to permit it?

And even according to the one who says

that the prohibition of

new grain outside Eretz Yisrael is not by Torah law,

and this objection cannot be raised, another objection can be raised:

What is notable about the Omer offering, as it comes to permit the prohibition

of “And you shall eat neither bread nor parched grain nor fresh grain”

that is within it,

the offering itself, so that if one eats from the remainder of the offering, he will not violate the prohibition of new grain, but only the prohibition against eating safiḥin of the Sabbatical year; whereas a tereifa permits nothing!?

And we answer:

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina,

perhaps this is why the verse “from cattle” is necessary: We might have thought that

a tereifa too may be offered, and it would permit the prohibition

of tereifa

that is within it,

so that one who ate it would not violate the prohibition of tereifa.

And we say:

But according to Rabbi Akiva as well,

there is a rejection of the objection:

What is notable about the Omer offering? Its mitzva is

specifically

in this manner,

to bring it from the new grain; specifically an offering from the new grain permits the new grain. This is not so with regard to an offering, for one may bring a valid offering, and its mitzva does not require that it be a tereifa. If so, the kal va-chomer returns to its place, and why do I need the verse?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish said,

the kal va-chomer can be rejected as follows:

Because one could say: The preparer of the incense proves it, as it is forbidden to a common person but permitted on the altar.

And we ask:

The preparer of the incense!?

After all,

it is a person,

and what relevance is there to saying that it is permitted on the altar?

And we explain:

Rather, the preparation of the incense proves it, as it is forbidden to a common person

to prepare incense for a common person’s needs,

but permitted for

the needs of

the altar.

And we reject this refutation:

What is notable about the preparation of the incense? Its mitzva is specifically in this manner,

whereas with regard to an offering, one is not obligated to bring specifically a tereifa!

Mar, son of Ravina, said:

the kal va-chomer can be challenged as follows:

Because one could say: Shabbat proves it, as it is forbidden to a common person but permitted

on the altar,

as offerings are brought on Shabbat!

And we reject this:

What is there about Shabbat, since it was permitted in its general category,

the general prohibition was permitted

for ordinary use, in the case of circumcision,

as circumcision is performed on Shabbat.

And we raise an objection:

Is that so?

Can it be that

circumcision is a need of ordinary use,

such that you said it was permitted for ordinary use? After all,

circumcision is a mitzva,

and it is also a need of Heaven.

Rather,

this is how you should reject the challenge:

What is there about Shabbat, since its mitzva is specifically in that manner,

as the time for the daily and additional offerings is specifically on that day, and it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva on another day; whereas in the case of an animal with a wound rendering it tereifa, it is possible to bring a kosher animal instead!

Rav Adda bar Abba said:

This is how you should reject the kal va-chomer:

because one can say that kilayim,

that is, shaatnez in a garment,

proves the point: they are prohibited for ordinary use but permitted

for sacred use,

in the priestly garments, in the belt of the High Priest [this is the version of the Shita Mekubetzet in Rashi; see Birkat HaZevach, which does not have the word “High,” for if this refers to the High Priest, he has kilayim also in the ephod and breastplate].

And we reject this:

What is there about kilayim, since it was permitted in its general category for

ordinary use in tzitzit,

as the prohibition of kilayim was permitted for the purpose of the mitzva of tzitzit!