Menachot 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

For the Master said: If the nazirite shaved

at the end of his naziriteship

on

a sacrifice

one of the three

—even if he shaved on a sin-offering—

he has fulfilled his obligation,

and he was thereby rendered fit to drink wine. If so, their qualification is not unique and specific, and therefore they are brought after death.

The Gemara raises an objection: A leper’s guilt-offering that was slaughtered not for its sake, or whose blood was not placed on the thumbs and toes

of the leper in the prescribed manner,

is nevertheless sacrificed upon the altar and requires

the leper’s guilt-offering to receive

libations

as prescribed. Since it is a valid sacrifice, except that it did not count for the leper’s obligation of rendering him fit to enter the camp [and to eat sacrificial food ],

and

therefore

he requires another guilt-offering to render him fit!?

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rav

who said above that a leper’s guilt-offering slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified, since it comes to render him fit but did not do so; whereas here it is explained that the sacrifice is valid.

A refutation!

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

disagrees with Rav

and says: The sheaf-offering, if its handful was removed not for its sake, is valid,

and not as Rav said, that it is disqualified,

but its remainder may not be eaten,

since it is included in the prohibition of ḥadash, the new grain, which has not yet been permitted,

until another sheaf-offering is brought and permits it,

as is the case with all new grain, which is permitted through the sheaf-offering.

And we object:

How can it be sacrificed?

How can the sheaf-offering whose handful was removed not for its sake be sacrificed? Is it not written, “

From the sustenance of Israel,”

and from this verse, stated in Ezekiel, we learn that sacrifices must be brought specifically

from that which is permitted to Israel?

Something that is forbidden to Israel because of any prohibition is likewise unfit to be sacrificed upon the altar. But this offering, since its handful did not render the new grain fit, is still forbidden to Israel on account of the prohibition of ḥadash; if so, it should also be unfit for the Most High?

And we answer:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Reish Lakish holds that there is no disqualification of

an offering due to its being

premature

—meaning, one who brought a sacrifice before its appointed time—

when its time will arrive later that same day.

If its time will arrive that day, then if it was brought earlier on that same day it is not considered premature. Accordingly, with regard to the sheaf-offering as well, since later that day the prohibition against eating the new grain will be lifted through the other offering that he will bring, this offering too is considered something permitted to Israel and is valid.

Rav Adda, son of Rabbi Yitzḥak, raised an objection:

We learned:

There are

laws concerning

bird-offerings

that

do not apply to meal-offerings,

and

there are

laws concerning meal-offerings

that do not apply to bird-offerings.

There are laws concerning bird-offerings

that do not apply to meal-offerings:

Bird-offerings may be brought as a joint voluntary offering,

meaning that several people may jointly bring a voluntary bird-offering;

and by those requiring atonement,

namely, a zav, a zava, a woman after childbirth, and a leper, who bring bird-offerings to render themselves fit to partake of sacrificial food;

and they were permitted

the birds

from the category of their prohibition

under which they were forbidden to ordinary people—

in the sacred sphere.

For an ordinary person, a non-sacred bird may be eaten only through slaughter and not through melika. But in the sacred sphere, birds were permitted through melika.

This is not so with regard to meal-offerings:

these laws do not apply to them. They cannot be brought as a joint offering, because the verse says “a person” concerning them, implying specifically one individual; they are not brought by those requiring atonement; and they do not possess any permission in the sacred sphere beyond that which applies to ordinary people.

And there are laws concerning meal-offerings

that do not apply to bird-offerings:

Meal-offerings require

being placed in a

vessel

specifically,

and

they require

waving and presentation

at the southwestern corner of the altar,

and they are brought by the community—

the sheaf-offering, which is brought on behalf of the community—

as well as by an individual; this is not so with bird-offerings.

These laws do not apply to bird-offerings: they do not require a vessel, since their melika is performed with the fingernail; waving and presentation are not stated with regard to them; and they are not brought by the community, since the verse calls them “his offering,” from which it is derived that specifically an individual, and not the community, brings a bird-offering.

And if it is so

with regard to what Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, that the sheaf-offering whose handful was removed not for its sake is valid, then it follows that one of the distinctions we stated concerning bird-offerings—that they are permitted from the category of their prohibition in the sacred sphere—can also be found

with regard to meal-offerings: in what case can one find that they are permitted from the category of their prohibition in the sacred sphere? In the case of the sheaf-offering.

After all, the new grain is still forbidden to ordinary people, while it has already been permitted for the Most High?

And we answer:

Since

we have said

that there is no disqualification of prematurity when its time will arrive that same day, it is not a prohibition,

the matter is considered as though the other offering had already been sacrificed and the prohibition of ḥadash had been lifted; therefore, this is not a case of something permitted from the category of its prohibition.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection,

as we learned in a beraita: A leper, whose procedure requires placing blood and afterward oil on his thumbs and toes—if he

placed the oil before the blood, he fills

the log-measure with

oil and again places the oil after placing the blood

as prescribed; and if he placed the

blood on the thumbs and toes before the seven sprinklings

—for he sprinkles seven times with his finger toward the entrance of the Sanctuary—

he fills

the log-measure with

oil

and sprinkles from it toward the entrance of the Sanctuary,

and again places the blood on the thumbs and toes after the seven sprinklings.

And if you say that there is no disqualification of prematurity when its time will arrive that same day,

and it is considered as though the offering that permits the new grain had already been brought,

why

is it necessary here, in the case of the leper, that he

again place

oil on the thumbs and toes? Let it be said that since he can sprinkle toward the entrance of the Sanctuary later that same day, there is no deficiency in placing the oil on the thumbs and toes before the seven sprinklings. After all, there is no issue of prematurity concerning something that can be corrected that same day, and the correction is considered to us as though it had already been performed. If so, once he placed the oil on the thumbs and toes,

whatever he did is done;

why should he have to return and place it on them after the sprinkling toward the entrance of the Sanctuary?

And he answers:

Rav Pappa said: The laws of the leper are different, as the Torah wrote with regard to them that they must be performed in a particular sequence, as the verse says: “

This shall be the law of the leper,” “

shall be”

means

it shall be in its prescribed state,

that is, specifically in its prescribed order.

Rav Pappa raised an objection:

The leper’s guilt-offering precedes the sin-offering. If

he preceded

the leper’s

sin-offering to his guilt-offering, we do not

say that

there should be

a person

continually stirring its blood,

the blood of the sin-offering, so that it would not coagulate while he meanwhile brought the guilt-offering, sprinkled its blood, and then placed the blood of the sin-offering in the prescribed order.

Rather,

they leave the sin-offering until the next day so that

its form will pass,

meaning that its appearance of moist flesh will disappear from it and it will become disqualified through being left overnight,

and

then

it goes to the place of burning [but as long as it has not been disqualified through being left overnight, it is not burned unless the disqualification is intrinsic to it]. If so, we find that there is disqualification due to prematurity even when its time will arrive that same day, for otherwise, why would it become disqualified? The sin-offering is fit to be offered that same day.

And we are astonished:

What is Rav Pappa objecting? Rav Pappa

himself

is the one who said

in response to the earlier objection: “

The laws of the leper are different, as the Torah wrote with regard to them that they must be performed in a particular sequence,”

and if so, here too they must be performed specifically in their prescribed order?

And we say:

Rather, this is what Rav Pappa found difficult: Say that this statement

that we made—that the procedure of a leper must be performed in its prescribed order because the Torah used the expression “shall be” with regard to it—applies specifically to

the sacrificial service,

since the verse was stated with regard to the service. But

slaughter

is

not a service,

as it is valid even when performed by a non-priest, and the expression “shall be” was not written with regard to it to require that it be performed in the prescribed order; if so, the objection returns to its original place:

and if there is no

disqualification of prematurity when its time will arrive that same day, let another person continually stir its blood

and let him sacrifice the guilt-offering and afterward sacrifice the sin-offering?

Rather, Rav Pappa said: This is the reason for Reish Lakish’s

statement that “the sheaf-offering whose handful was removed not for its sake is valid”: Although, seemingly, it is not from that which is permitted to Israel, since the new grain is still forbidden,

he holds that when the eastern horizon brightens

meaning, when the sixteenth day of Nisan dawns—

it permits

the new grain, even if the sheaf-offering has not yet been sacrificed, because the day itself permits it. And this is

in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, both of whom say: Even while the Temple is standing

and the sheaf-offering is brought,