Menachot 56b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says: ![](pamud.bmp "

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it too may be slaughtered on that same blemish

that was caused in it through the bloodletting.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if it will die

if they do not let its blood—

they may not let its blood!

Rabbi Yehuda agrees with Rabbi Meir that it is prohibited to let its blood where this causes a blemish. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda is concerned that if it will be permitted to let its blood in order to save the firstborn, even without causing a blemish, then, because a person is distraught over his property, he will come to let its blood even where doing so causes a blemish.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Everyone agrees,

meaning, all the tannaim who disagree about whether one may inflict an additional blemish in a firstborn that is already blemished agree

with regard to leavening

the meal offering

after another has leavened it,

after it had already become leavened previously — for example, if one person kneaded it so that it became leavened and another person baked it so that it became leavened—

he

the second person

is liable.

The reason that everyone agrees that when one leavens after another has leavened each one is liable is

because it is written

in the Torah, in the prohibition against leavening, in two verses:

A. “Any meal offering that you sacrifice to the Lord

shall not be made leavened.”

B.

“And it shall not be baked leavened,

as their portion I have given it from My offerings.”

We learn that one is liable for every act of leavening.

Likewise, everyone agrees

with regard to castrating after another has castrated

an animal, even if it is non-sacred,

that he is liable,

for example, if the first person cut the testicles from the body but left them in the scrotum, and the second then severed them from the scrotum and removed them entirely; both are liable.

The reason for this is

because it is written: “Crushed, smashed, severed, and cut;

you shall not offer them to the Lord, and in your land you shall not do so.”

If for cutting

the testicles from the body

he is liable, then for severing

the testicles completely and throwing them out of the scrotum

is it not all the more so

that he is liable? And why did the Torah add this?

Rather,

the verse comes

to include one who severs after another has cut, that he is liable,

just like the one who cuts.

They disagree

the tannaim

only with regard to inflicting a blemish on an already blemished animal.

Rabbi Meir

holds that one expounds from the verse,

“There shall be no blemish in it.”

The word “any” is an amplification, and it comes to include even a consecrated animal that is blemished: one may not inflict a blemish in it.

And the Rabbis hold

that one expounds the beginning of the verse, which states,

“It shall be unblemished for acceptance;

there shall be no blemish in it.” This implies that in the case of that offering which is unblemished and fit to be accepted, one may not inflict a blemish in it; but if the offering is already blemished, it is no longer included in this warning.

And we raise an objection:

But according to Rabbi Meir as well,

does the beginning of the verse not indeed imply that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an unblemished animal, since it is written,

“It shall be unblemished for acceptance”?!

And we answer:

That

verse comes

to exclude one that was initially blemished,

meaning that it was blemished even before it was consecrated. The Torah comes to say that one does not transgress by inflicting an additional blemish in it.

And we ask: But

one initially blemished—

it is merely

a palm tree!

For it is like one who consecrates a palm tree as an offering; that is, an already blemished animal does not become consecrated with sanctity of the body. Why, then, is a verse needed to exclude it?!

Rather,

—

to exclude disqualified consecrated animals after their redemption,

and to permit inflicting a blemish in them. For

it might have entered your mind that, since

a certain measure of the honor due to consecrated animals applies to disqualified consecrated animals, as

they are prohibited from shearing and labor,

I might have said

that they too should be prohibited from having a blemish inflicted in them

as part of their blemish. Therefore

the verse teaches us

through the statement, “It shall be unblemished for acceptance,” that after they have been redeemed, it is permitted to inflict a blemish in them.

The Gemara now explains the reasoning of the Rabbis:

And according to the Rabbis as well, it is written

the amplification

“There shall be no blemish in it,”

which implies that it comes to include the prohibition against inflicting a blemish in an already blemished animal. And we answer:

That

amplification

is needed

by the Sages

for that which is taught in a beraita:

“And there shall be no blemish in it”—I have derived only that one may not inflict a blemish in it.

[This is the version in tractate Bekhorot. According to the version here, Rashi explains it to mean: “There shall not be a blemish in it,” that is, one may not inflict a blemish in it.]

From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish in it

through others—

that one may not place dough or a fig on the ear

of the offering

so that a dog will come and take it

together with the dough or fig, thereby making it blemished?

The verse states: “Any blemish.”

For

it said

the verse

“blemish,”

and that would have sufficed; yet the verse added

and said

“any blemish,”

to teach you that even causing a blemish in an offering is prohibited.

Rabbi Ami said: If one placed sourdough on dough

of a meal offering

and went and sat down, and it became leavened

the dough

on its own,

he is liable for it as for an “act of Shabbat,”

just as a person who places meat on coals on Shabbat and the meat roasts on its own is liable for it on account of cooking on Shabbat.

And we challenge this:

And in a case of an “act of Shabbat” like this—

is one liable?!