Menachot 57a — the Talmud in English

But Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said ![](pamud.bmp "

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Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one placed meat upon coals

on Shabbat, then if

he turned it over

turning the meat afterward onto its other side,

he is liable

for it on account of cooking on Shabbat, but if

he did not turn it over

then he is

exempt,

and the reason for this matter will be explained below. But if so, how can one compare placing leaven upon dough, for which he is liable, to an act on Shabbat?

And we answer:

Rava said: What is the meaning of “he is liable,” also, that he says

with regard to one who placed leaven upon dough and it became leavened—

like the act of roasting on Shabbat.

That is to say, with dough he becomes liable even through merely placing the leaven, just as one is liable for the act of roasting on Shabbat. Indeed, with the act of roasting on Shabbat, the liability is only when he turns the roast onto its other side and it becomes a complete roast; but with the offering, the liability is even through merely placing the leaven.

The body of the matter: Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one placed

on Shabbat

meat upon coals—

he turned it over

the meat in order to roast the other side—

he is liable; if he did not turn it over, he is exempt.

And we pondered it:

What are the circumstances?

If you say that if he did not turn it over it would not cook,

that is, that without the act of turning it onto the other side the piece would not cook,

it is obvious

that he is exempt, since no roasting was performed here at all.

Rather,

in such a manner

that if he did not turn it over, it would also cook,

that is, the piece cooks even without turning it onto its other side; if so, even without his turning it over,

why is he not liable?

And we answer:

It is necessary, for if he did not turn it over

and roasted the piece on one side בלבד,

it would cook on one side

to the extent of the food of Ben Derosai,

for they would eat a dish that had been cooked only to one-third of its cooking,

but when he turns it over

so that it is also roasted on the other side,

it cooks on both sides to the extent of the food of Ben Derosai.

And it teaches us this, that every

cooked dish

on one side

only to one-third

to the extent of the food of Ben Derosai—

is nothing!

Since cooking to the extent of Ben Derosai is not complete cooking, if it is done only on one side it is not considered cooking at all; and that we consider cooking one-third cooking is specifically when it was cooked to this extent on both sides.

Rava said: And if he roasted in it

a complete roasting, to the measure of

a dried fig in one place

on one side—

he is liable!

Even though the rest of the piece was not roasted.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

It follows from your words that only if he roasted in it the measure of a dried fig on one side

in one place—

yes,

indeed he is liable for it. But if he roasted in it the measure of a dried fig

in

a combination of

two or three places

different

, no,

he is not liable for it.

But we learned: One who drills

on Shabbat

any amount—

is liable [A0082][on account of building or on account of striking the final blow].

[for building or for completing a utensil].

And Ravina infers:

What are the circumstances

for liability for any drilling?

If you say

that he is drilling

in one place,

it is impossible to say this, because drilling a small measure of

“any amount”—what use is it?

It is not fit for anything and is not significant as a labor!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that what was said, “one who drills any amount,” refers to one who drills

in two or three places

different, and they combine into one drilling because

they are fit for combination [A0097][as carpenters do: when they need to make a hole, they drill three small drillings next to one another, and afterward join them into one hole]. And if so, the same law should apply here: why do we not combine together several places in which a little meat was roasted, to the measure of a dried fig, and he should be liable on account of cooking on Shabbat?

And we answer:

Not ever

is the statement that one who drills any amount referring to one who drills

in one place,

one hole of any amount,

which is fit

and this hole is suitable

for a key-bow,

that is, to insert there the head of the key, which is sharp, and by means of it to open and lock. Therefore such a small hole is considered a labor on Shabbat, since it is suitable.

And there are those who say—

Rava said:

If he roasted in it the measure of a dried fig on one side,

even

if the measure of the dried fig was combined

in two or three places,

he is liable.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: We too have learned this

as proof of your words:

One who drills

on Shabbat

any amount is liable.

And Ravina infers:

What are the circumstances? If you say

that he is drilling

in one place, any amount—

what use is it? Rather, is it not

that he is drilling

in two or three places,

and he is liable because

it is fit for combination,

and if so, we see that several places can be combined to consider them one labor, both in drilling and in roasting?

And we reject this:

No,

you cannot prove it from drilling, because

always

it is referring to one who drills

in one place

alone; and the reason that he is liable for drilling any amount is

because it is fit for a key-bow.

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning the meal-offering, at the conclusion of the passage concerning the pan-baked meal-offering: “Every meal-offering that you bring to the Lord—you shall not make leavened.” And they expound the verse:

If it had been stated

only at the end of the verse,

“that you bring to the Lord,”

“you shall not make leavened,” I would say: I have only a handful in “you shall not make leavened,”

since only concerning it can one say “that you bring,” because only the handful is burned upon the altar, and the intent of the verse would be to prohibit leavening only the handful; but

a meal-offering,

which has not yet had a handful taken from it,

from where

do I know that it is prohibited to leaven all of it?

The verse states: “a meal-offering

that you bring to the Lord—you shall not make leavened,” and the meaning is not only the handful alone, but the entire meal-offering.

And I have only the pan-baked meal-offering, concerning which this verse was stated; but

the other meal-offerings—from where

do I know that they too are all prohibited through leavening?

The verse states: “every meal-offering.”

And we further expound:

“That you bring to the Lord”—

specifically a

valid

meal-offering that is fit to be brought is prohibited from being leavened,

but not an invalid one.

For example, a meal-offering that became impure, or that went outside after it had been sanctified in a service vessel; since the meal-offering became disqualified, one no longer transgresses the prohibition of leavening it.

From here they said: One who leavens the

meal-offering

that is valid is liable. And the

meal-offering

that is invalid—he is exempt.

After we have learned that one who leavens an invalid meal-offering is exempt, the Gemara raises a question:

Rav Pappa raised a question: If he leavened

the kneaded dough of the meal-offering,

and it went out

outside and became disqualified through “going out,”

and he returned and leavened it.

A second time, by adding an act of leavening in its baking—

what is the law?

Is he also liable for the second leavening, on account of leavening after leavening, or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Since it went out

the meal-offering,

it became disqualified through “going out.” And when he then leavens it,

when he returns and leavens it again,

he is not liable for it on account of leavening after leavening,

for we learned that one who leavens an invalid meal-offering is exempt.

Or perhaps, since he leavened it

before it became disqualified through going out,

the disqualification of going out does not take effect in it,

because once it became disqualified on account of its leavening, its sanctity is not complete enough to become disqualified through going out; rather, it has only the disqualification of leavening,

and when he then leavens it, he is liable for it on account of leavening after leavening.

And we conclude:

teiku!

Rav Mari raised a question: If he leavened

the handful

at the top of the altar,

before its burning,

what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

“That you bring,” said the Merciful One,

that whenever it is still lacking offering, there is a prohibition against leavening it,

but it has been brought

already to the top of the altar, and since it has already been brought, even though it has not yet been burned, he is not liable for its leavening,

or perhaps,

since the handful is still

lacking burning

in practice, even though it has already been brought to the altar, it is

considered like something lacking an act?!

And we conclude:

teiku!

And we pondered it:

And now, since it has emerged

that it is prohibited to leaven the entire meal-offering before a handful has been taken from it

from “every meal-offering,”

if so,

“that you bring,”

whose meaning is specifically the handful that is brought,

why do I need it?

And we answer:

It is needed for him

for “that you bring”

as it is taught:

it is stated,

“that you bring,”

and we expound:

to include the meal-offering of libations in

the prohibition of

leavening,

so that you should not say that this prohibition of leavening was stated only with regard to meal-offerings whose remnants are eaten, [as was stated concerning the pan-baked meal-offering, which is eaten,] and not with regard to the meal-offering of libations, which is offered entirely upon the altar,

the words of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.

Rabbi Akiva says: To include the showbread in

the prohibition of

leavening.

So that it should not be said that the Torah prohibited leavening only with regard to meal-offerings from which a handful is taken, since they are brought upon the altar, but with regard to the showbread, from which nothing is brought upon the altar, there is no prohibition against leavening it; it teaches us that it too is prohibited to leaven.

And we wonder: How does Rabbi Yosei the Galilean include

the meal-offering of libations

in the prohibition of leavening? After all, the meal-offering of libations has a large measure of oil, and the Gemara understands that therefore it is unnecessary to add water so that it will be possible to knead it; and if so, since it is kneaded only with oil,

they are fruit juices,