Menachot 57a (נז.) — the Talmud in English

But did not Rabba bar bar Ḥana say

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one placed meat on coals

on Shabbat, then if he

turned it over

turning the meat afterward onto its other side,

he is liable

for it on account of cooking on Shabbat; but if

he did not turn it over,

he is

exempt,

and the reason for this will be explained below. If so, how can placing leaven on dough, for which one is liable, be compared to an act performed on Shabbat?

And we answer:

Rava said: What is the meaning of “he is liable,” which he also stated

with regard to one who places leaven on dough and it becomes leavened?

It is like the act of roasting on Shabbat.

That is, with regard to dough, one becomes liable even for merely placing the leaven on it, just as one becomes liable for performing an act of roasting on Shabbat. Indeed, with regard to roasting on Shabbat, the liability applies only when he turns the roast onto its other side and it becomes fully roasted; but with regard to the one who places leaven on the dough, the liability applies even for merely placing the leaven on it.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one placed

on Shabbat

meat on coals—

if he turned it over

the meat in order to roast the other side,

he is liable; if he did not turn it over, he is exempt.

And we raise a question:

What are the circumstances?

If we say that if he did not turn it over it would not cook,

meaning that without turning it onto its other side the piece would not cook,

it is obvious

that he is exempt, since no roasting occurred here at all.

Rather,

the case is

that if he did not turn it over it would also cook,

meaning that the piece would cook even without turning it onto its other side; if so, even without turning it over,

why is he not liable?

And we answer:

It is necessary, as if he did not turn it over

and roasted the piece on only one side,

it would cook on one side

to the degree of the food of ben Derosai,

as they would eat a dish cooked to only one-third of its full cooking,

but when he turns it over

so that it is roasted on the other side as well,

it cooks on both sides to the degree of the food of ben Derosai.

And it teaches us this:

Any dish that has been cooked

on one side

only to one-third

to the degree of the food of ben Derosai—

it is nothing!

Since cooking to the degree of ben Derosai is not full cooking, if it was done on only one side it is not considered cooking at all. The fact that we consider cooking to one-third to be cooking applies specifically when it was cooked to that degree on both sides.

Rava said: But if he roasted in it

fully, to the measure of

a dried fig in one place

on one side,

he is liable!

And this is so even though the rest of the piece was not roasted.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

It follows from your words that only if he roasted in it a measure of a dried fig on one side

in one place—

yes,

he is indeed liable for it. But if he roasted in it a measure of a dried fig

in

a combination of

two or three places

different places,

he is not

liable for it.

But we learned in the Mishna: One who drills

on Shabbat

any amount—

is liable

[for building or for striking the final hammer blow].

And Ravina analyzes this:

What are the circumstances

in which one is liable for any drilling?

If we say

that it is one who drills

in one place,

it cannot be said this way, because a small drilling measuring

“any amount”—what is it fit for?

It is not useful for anything and is not significant enough to be considered a labor!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the statement that one who drills any amount is liable refers to one who drills

in two or three places

different places, and they combine to form one drilling because

they are fit to be combined [as carpenters do when they need to make a hole: they drill three small holes next to one another and afterward join them into one hole]. If so, the same should apply here: Why do we not combine several places in which a small amount of meat was roasted, until they amount to a dried fig, so that he will be liable for cooking on Shabbat?

And we answer:

No, actually

the statement that one who drills any amount is liable refers to one who drills

in one place,

one hole of any amount,

because it is fit

and this hole is suitable

for a keyhole,

that is, to insert the pointed end of the key there, by means of which one opens and locks. Therefore, such a small hole is considered a labor on Shabbat, since it is suitable for use.

And there are those who say—

Rava said:

If he roasted in it a measure of a dried fig on one side,

even

if the measure of a dried fig was combined

from two or three places,

he is liable.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: We too have learned this

as support for your words:

One who drills

on Shabbat

any amount is liable.

And Ravina analyzes this:

What are the circumstances? If we say

that it is one who drills

in one place, any amount—

what is it fit for? Rather, is it not

one who drills

in two or three places,

and is liable because

they are fit to be combined;

and if so, we see that several places can be combined and considered one labor, both with drilling and with roasting.

And we reject this:

No,

you cannot prove this from drilling, because

actually

the case concerns one who drills

in one place

only, and the reason he is liable for any amount of drilling is

that it is fit for a keyhole.

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning the meal offering, at the conclusion of the passage concerning the minḥat marḥeshet: “Every meal offering that you bring to the Lord—you shall not make leavened.” They expound the verse:

Had it stated

only the end of the verse,

“

that you bring to the Lord—you shall not make leavened,” I would say: The prohibition “you shall not make leavened” applies only to the handful,

since only with regard to it can one say “that you bring,” as only the handful is burned on the altar, and the intent of the verse would be to prohibit leavening only the handful. But

the meal offering,

which has not yet had its handful removed,

from where

do we know that it is prohibited to leaven all of it?

The verse states: “The meal offering

that you bring to the Lord—you shall not make leavened,” meaning that the prohibition applies not only to the handful, but to the entire meal offering.

And I would know this only with regard to the minḥat marḥeshet, concerning which this verse is stated. But

the other meal offerings—from where

do we know that they too are all prohibited from being leavened?

The verse states: “Every meal offering.”

And we further expound: “

That you bring to the Lord”—

specifically a

valid

meal offering that is fit to be brought may not be leavened,

but not an invalid one.

For example, a meal offering that became impure, or that went outside after it had been consecrated in a service vessel. Since the meal offering became invalid, one no longer transgresses the prohibition against leavening it.

From here they said: One who leavens

the

valid

meal offering

is liable; but one who leavens the invalid meal offering is exempt.

After we have learned that one who leavens an invalid meal offering is exempt, the Gemara raises the following question:

Rav Pappa asked: If he leavened

the kneaded dough of the meal offering,

and it went out

outside and became invalid through the prohibition of “going out,”

and he then leavened it again,

a second time, by performing another act of leavening during its baking—

what is the halakha?

Is he liable also for the second act of leavening, on account of “one who leavens after one who leavens,” or not?

The sides of the question are:

Since it went out

the meal offering,

it became invalid through “going out.” And when he then leavens it,

when he returns and leavens it again,

he is not liable for it on account of “one who leavens after one who leavens,”

as we have learned that one who leavens an invalid meal offering is exempt.

Or perhaps, since he leavened it

before it became invalid through going out,

the invalidation of going out does not take effect upon it,

because once it became invalid on account of being leavened, its consecration is not complete enough for it to become invalid through going out; it has only the invalidation of leavening.

And when he then leavens it, he is liable for it on account of “one who leavens after one who leavens.”

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved!

Rav Mari asked: If he leavened

the handful

on top of the altar,

before burning it,

what is the halakha?

The sides of the question are: “

That you bring,” said the Torah,

meaning that as long as it is still lacking being brought, it is prohibited to leaven it.

But it has been brought

already to the top of the altar, and since it has already been brought, even though it has not yet been burned, he is not liable for leavening it.

Or perhaps,

since the handful is still

lacking burning

in practice, even though it has already been brought to the altar,

it is considered as lacking an act of completion?!

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved!

And we raise a question:

Now, since it has been derived

that it is prohibited to leaven the entire meal offering before its handful is removed,

from “every meal offering,”

if so,

“that you bring,”

whose meaning is specifically the handful that is brought,

why do I need it?

And we answer:

It is needed

for the phrase “that you bring”

as it is taught:

It is stated,

“

that you bring,”

and we expound it:

to include the libation meal offering in

the prohibition of leavening,

lest you say that this prohibition of leavening was stated only with regard to meal offerings whose remnants are eaten [as is the case with the minḥat marḥeshet] and not with regard to the libation meal offering, which is entirely burned on the altar—

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Rabbi Akiva says: To include the showbread in

the prohibition of

leavening.

Lest it be said that the Torah prohibited leavening only with regard to meal offerings from which a handful is removed, since they are brought on the altar, but with regard to the showbread, from which nothing is brought onto the altar, there is no prohibition against leavening it; it therefore teaches us that it too may not be leavened.

And we are astonished: How does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili include

the libation meal offering

in the prohibition of leavening? The libation meal offering contains a large amount of oil, and the Gemara understands that there is no need to add water so that it can be kneaded. If so, since it is kneaded only with oil,

they are fruit juices,