Menachot 56a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says: ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

to include the goats offered for idolatry

by the community, when they acted mistakenly on the basis of the ruling of the court,

for placing of hands.

Ravina raised an objection: This works well according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who derives that the goat of Nahshon is included for placing of hands; therefore, the verse’s exclusionary term “that one” is needed to exclude it from the requirement that the slaughter take place on the north side. But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who does not require placing of hands on a goat, and who therefore does not need to exclude the goat of Nahshon from that requirement,

what can be said?

What does “that one” come to exclude?

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:

But does this work according to Rabbi Yehuda? After all,

according to Rabbi Yehuda as well,

one can ask: Why is “that one” needed to exclude the goat of Nahshon? After all,

whatever was included

for the goat of Nahshon [for placing of hands

was included, and whatever was not included was not included;

from where would we infer that, without the exclusionary term “that one,” the goat of Nahshon would have been required to be slaughtered on the north side?

And if you would say: If the verse had not excluded

the goat of Nahshon from the requirement concerning the north side,

we would have said—

let

the requirement that the goat of Nahshon be slaughtered on the north side be derived

by an a-fortiori inference

from an ordinary sin-offering, this cannot be said. For if the goat of Nahshon is included within the category of an ordinary sin-offering with regard to the requirement concerning the north side, why is it necessary to include it explicitly for placing of hands? One could then ask:

The placing of hands itself

on the goat of Nahshon—

let the verse remain silent about it,

and I would know that one is obligated to place hands on it, just as on an ordinary sin-offering; and

let

the requirement of placing hands on the goat of Nahshon

be derived by an a-fortiori inference

from an ordinary sin-offering?

Rather,

necessarily, the reason Rabbi Yehuda requires an explicit inclusion for placing of hands, rather than deriving it by an a-fortiori inference, is that

a temporary

ruling

is not derived from a ruling applying for all generations,

and if so,

here too,

with regard to the requirement that the slaughter take place on the north side, let us say that sacred offerings designated

for a temporary purpose are not derived from offerings designated for all generations.

The original question therefore returns: Why is it necessary to use “that one” to exclude the goat of Nahshon from the requirement that it be slaughtered on the north side?

And we answered with another answer:

Rather,

“that one” is needed for this exclusion:

“that one,”

you must position the goat itself at the time of slaughter

on the north side, but the slaughterer

himself does not need to be

standing on the north side!

Rather, he may stand on the south side and slaughter the goat, which is standing on the north side, using a long knife.

And we ask: This law—that the slaughterer does not need to stand on the north side—is not derived from the word “that one” stated concerning the sin-offering of the ruler. Rather, it

is derived from the teaching of Rabbi Aḥayya,

who derives it from another exclusionary use of the word “that one,” stated concerning a burnt-offering!

As it was taught: Rabbi Aḥayya says:

With regard to the slaughter of a burnt-offering,

it is stated: “And he shall slaughter that one on the side of the altar, northward.”

“That one”—

what does the verse teach by stating this?

What does it come to exclude?

Since we find that the one who receives

the blood

stands on the north side and receives

the blood

on the north side, and if the one who receives

the blood stands

on the south side

and extends his hand

and receives

the blood

on the north side,

he is

disqualified.

If so,

one might also think that this

slaughterer, who stood on the south side and slaughtered on the north side with a long knife,

likewise

should have an invalid slaughter, just like one who received the blood while standing on the south side and receiving it on the north side.

The verse therefore states: “And he shall slaughter

that

one,”

to teach you:

that one,

the offering itself, is what must be standing at the time of slaughter

on the north side; the slaughterer does not need to be standing on the north side.

Rather,

we gave another answer: The word “that one” stated concerning the ruler’s goat is needed to teach us:

That one

you slaughter

on the north side, but you do not

need to perform pinching on

a bird offering on the north side.

For it

might have entered your mind that one should derive

the requirement that the pinching of a bird offering take place on the north side

by an a-fortiori inference from

the slaughter of

a sheep or goat offering

of a burnt-offering on the north side:

And if a sheep or goat offering, for which the Torah did not designate a koen

to perform its slaughter, since slaughter is valid even when performed by a non-koen,

was assigned the north side

for slaughter,

a bird offering,

which is more stringent than it,

for which the Torah did designate a koen

to perform its pinching,

should it not follow that the Torah assigned it

the north side

for pinching?

For this reason, the word “that one” stated concerning the ruler’s goat is needed to exclude the pinching of a bird offering from the north side.

And we challenge the a-fortiori inference:

What is distinctive about a sheep or goat offering,

which is more stringent,

is that the Torah designated a vessel for it,

a knife for slaughter and a basin for receiving the blood. Can you say the same concerning a bird offering, for which there is no vessel, neither for its slaughter nor for the sprinkling of its blood? Therefore, one cannot derive by an a-fortiori inference that its pinching must take place on the north side. The original question thus returns: Why is the exclusionary term “that one” needed?

And we answer with another answer:

Rather, “that one”

is excluded as follows: You slaughter the ruler’s goat

on the north side, but you do not

slaughter a

Paschal offering on the north side!

And we challenge this: The fact that a Paschal offering does not require the north side is not derived by excluding it through the word “that one.” Rather, it

is derived from the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering must be slaughtered on the north side.

And this is an a-fortiori inference,

that the Paschal offering should require the north side because of its stringency:

And if a burnt-offering,

which is less stringent than it,

for which the Torah did not designate

a specific

time for its slaughter, assigned it the north side, then a Paschal offering,

which is more stringent, because the Torah

assigned it a time for its slaughter, on

the fourteenth of Nisan after midday,

should it not follow that the Torah assigned it the north side!

There is a basis for refuting the a-fortiori inference:

What is distinctive about a burnt-offering

is that it is more stringent than a Paschal offering,

as

it is entirely burned

as a whole

on the altar. Can you say the same concerning a Paschal offering, which is eaten by those registered for it? Therefore, it is logical that it should not require the north side.

And if you would say that we should derive it by an a-fortiori inference

from a sin-offering,

which is not entirely burned but is eaten by the kohanim, and which has no fixed time, yet requires the north side—then an a-fortiori inference should establish that a Paschal offering, which is more stringent than a sin-offering in that it has a fixed time, should require the north side.

There is still a basis for refuting the a-fortiori inference from a sin-offering:

What is distinctive about a sin-offering

is that it has a stringency not found in a Paschal offering,

as

the sin-offering

atones for those liable to excision,

people who inadvertently violated a prohibition whose intentional violation carries the punishment of excision. Can you say the same concerning a Paschal offering, which does not atone for such people?

And if you would say that we should derive it by an a-fortiori inference

from a guilt-offering,

which does not come to atone for those liable to excision, has no fixed time, and requires the north side—then an a-fortiori inference should establish that a Paschal offering, which has a fixed time, should require the north side.

There is still a basis for refuting this:

What is distinctive about a guilt-offering is that

it is

of the most sacred order,

whereas it is more stringent than a Paschal offering, which is only of lesser sanctity.

And if you would say that it can be derived by a common feature

from all of them

—from a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a guilt-offering—that their common feature is that they require the north side, and I will likewise include a Paschal offering as requiring the north side, there is

also

a basis for refuting this: What is distinctive about the common feature of all of them is

that

they are all

of the most sacred order.

Can you say the same concerning a Paschal offering, which is less stringent than them, as it is only an offering of lesser sanctity?

And since it has been established from the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov that there is no basis for deriving, either by an a-fortiori inference or by a common feature, that a Paschal offering must require the north side, the original question returns: Why is the exclusionary term “that one,” written concerning the ruler’s sin-offering, needed? There could have been no thought that a Paschal offering must require the north side!

And we answer:

Rather, in fact,

this exclusionary term “that one,” stated concerning the ruler’s goat, comes

as we initially said:

“That one,”

the goat must be standing

on the north side, but the slaughterer

does not need to be standing

on the north side.

And if this is difficult for you,

that this teaching

is derived from Rabbi Aḥayya

and emerges

from the word “that one” stated concerning a burnt-offering, explain it as follows:

Rabbi Aḥayya did not come to exclude the slaughterer from the north side;

the slaughterer’s exclusion from the north side is derived from the word “that one” stated concerning the ruler’s sin-offering.

Rather, this is what he is saying:

The word “that one,” written concerning the slaughter of a burnt-offering on the north side, comes to teach us that

the slaughterer

is not required to stand

on the north side,

but

the one receiving the blood

is required to stand

on the north side.

And we ask: The law that

the one receiving

the blood must stand on the north side is derived

from the word “and he shall take,”

as we expound it:

“He shall take for himself,”

and from there it

emerges

that the one receiving the blood must move himself to the north side, and it is not derived from the exclusionary word “that one” stated concerning a burnt-offering!

And we answer: This exposition of

“he shall take”—

“and he shall take” does not indicate

this to Rabbi Aḥayya. Therefore, he derives it from the fact that the exclusionary word “that one” is needed concerning a burnt-offering to teach that the slaughterer is not required to stand on the north side, thereby teaching that the one receiving the blood is indeed required to stand on the north side.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one is liable for kneading it, for arranging it, and for baking it

when the meal-offering has become leavened.

Rav Pappa said: If he baked it

when the meal-offering was leavened,

he receives two lashes—

one for arranging it and one for baking it,

since the act of baking also includes an act of arranging.

And we ask:

But you said

earlier:

Baking is distinctive, because it is a single act, and one is liable for it independently,

so how can it be said here that one is liable to receive two sets of lashes for baking?

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

There is baking for which one becomes liable to receive two sets of lashes—that is, also for arranging—and there is baking for which one is liable independently.

This

case, in which he is liable for baking alone, refers to a situation

in which one person arranged it and he baked it,

and since he performed both acts but had already become liable for arranging it earlier, he is not made liable again for arranging it when he bakes it.

And

this

case, in which he is liable to receive two sets of lashes for baking, refers to a situation

in which another person arranged it and gave it to him,

handing it to him already arranged, and he went

and baked it.

In this case he becomes liable to receive two sets of lashes through the act of baking, because the baking includes arranging as well.

The Sages taught: With regard to a firstborn animal that was seized by a flow of blood,

which is an illness caused by an excess of blood, and whose treatment is to let blood from it, several tannaim disagreed about its status:

One may let its blood in a place where this does not cause a blemish,

that is, anywhere on its body, because afterward it will recover,

but one may not let its blood in a place where this causes a blemish.

That is, in its ear or its eye, because the injury to the ear or eye remains and does not heal;

these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: One may let its blood even in a place where this causes a blemish,

because once it has been seized by a flow of blood, it is already called a blemished animal, since if its blood is not let, it will die. The Sages permitted letting its blood in order to save it, even if the letting of blood takes place in a spot that causes a blemish.

Provided that he does not slaughter it

before it is slaughtered

on account of that blemish

that occurred as a result of the letting of blood. Rather, he must wait until another blemish appears in it, because a firstborn animal may be eaten outside the Temple only when it is blemished. The Sages decreed that he may not benefit from the infliction of the blemish that was permitted for the purpose of saving the firstborn animal, because they were concerned that people might act deceitfully and let its blood even when it had not been seized by a flow of blood, in order to permit it to be eaten.