Menachot 56a (נו.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says:

to include the goats of idol worship

brought on behalf of the community when they erred on the basis of the ruling of the court,

for semikha.

Ravina strongly challenged this: This works according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who derives from the verse that the goat of Nahshon requires semikha; therefore, the exclusionary term “that one” is needed to exclude it from the requirement of the north. But

according to Rabbi Shimon,

who does not obligate a goat in semikha, and does not need to exclude the goat of Nahshon from semikha,

what can be said? What does the term “that one” come to exclude?

What does it come to exclude?

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:

But does this work according to Rabbi Yehuda? After all,

according to Rabbi Yehuda as well,

it should be difficult: Why is the term “that one” needed to exclude the goat of Nahshon? After all,

whatever was included

for semikha

was included, and whatever was not included was not included;

from where would you derive that, without the exclusionary term “that one,” the goat of Nahshon would require slaughtering in the north?

And if you would say: If the verse had not excluded

the goat of Nahshon from the law of the north,

I would have thought—

let

the slaughtering of the goat of Nahshon in the north

be derived by an a fortiori inference

from an ordinary sin-offering, you could not say this. For if the goat of Nahshon is included within the category of an ordinary sin-offering with regard to the law of the north, why was it necessary to include it explicitly with regard to semikha? The following difficulty would then arise:

semikha itself

with regard to the goat of Nahshon—

let the verse remain silent about it,

and I would know that it is obligated in semikha, as is an ordinary sin-offering;

and let

the requirement of semikha for the goat of Nahshon

be derived by an a fortiori inference

from an ordinary sin-offering.

Rather,

necessarily, the reason Rabbi Yehuda requires an explicit inclusion for semikha, rather than deriving it by an a fortiori inference, is that a ruling

for a temporary

ruling

for all generations cannot be derived from it.

And if so,

here too,

with regard to the law of the north, let us say that the sacrifices of

a temporary ruling cannot be derived from those of all generations.

The original difficulty therefore returns: Why was it necessary to use “that one” to exclude the goat of Nahshon from the requirement of the north?

We answered with another explanation:

Rather,

“that one” was necessary for the following exclusion:

“That one,”

the goat itself must be positioned at the time of slaughter

in the north, but the slaughterer

himself need not be

standing in the north!

Rather, he may stand in the south and slaughter the goat, which is standing in the north, using a long knife.

We challenge this: This law—that the slaughterer need not stand in the north—is not derived from the term “that one” stated with regard to the sin-offering of the ruler. Rather,

it is derived from Rabbi Aḥayya,

who derives it from another exclusionary term, “that one,” stated with regard to the burnt-offering!

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Aḥayya says:

With regard to the slaughter of a burnt-offering, it is stated:

“And he shall slaughter it on the northern side of the altar.”

“It”—

what does the verse come to teach?

What does it come to exclude?

Since we find with regard to the one who receives

the blood

that he stands in the north and receives

the blood

in the north, and if he stood

the receiver

in the south

and extended his hand

and received

the blood

in the north,

he is

unfit.

If so,

one might also think that this one,

the slaughterer who stood in the south and slaughtered in the north using a long knife,

likewise

his slaughter should be unfit, just like the receiver who stood in the south and received the blood in the north.

The verse therefore states, “And he shall slaughter

it,”

“it,”

to teach you:

“it,”

the offering itself is what must be standing at the time of slaughter

in the north, and the slaughterer need not be standing in the north.

Rather,

we offered another explanation: The term “that one” was necessary with regard to the ruler’s goat to teach us:

that one,

you slaughter

in the north, but

you need not perform melika on

a bird-offering in the north.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Let

the melika of a bird-offering in the north

be derived by an a fortiori inference from

the slaughter of

a sheep or goat

of a burnt-offering in the north—

And if a sheep or goat, for which the Torah did not designate a priest

to slaughter it, as slaughter is valid even when performed by a non-priest,

was designated the north

for its slaughter,

a bird-offering,

which is more stringent than it,

for which the Torah designated a priest

to perform its melika,

is it not logical that the Torah designated

the north

for its melika?!

And this is why “that one” was necessary with regard to the ruler’s goat: to exclude the melika of a bird-offering from the north.

We refute the a fortiori inference:

As for a sheep or goat,

which is more stringent,

for which the Torah designated a utensil,

a knife for slaughter and likewise a basin for receiving the blood—can you say the same with regard to a bird-offering, for which no utensil is used, neither for its slaughter nor for the sprinkling of its blood? Therefore, it cannot be derived by an a fortiori inference that its melika must be performed in the north. The original difficulty once again returns: Why is the exclusionary term “that one” necessary?

We answer with another explanation:

Rather, “that one”

is used to exclude the following: The ruler’s goat—you slaughter it

in the north, but

you do not slaughter a

Paschal offering in the north!

We challenge this: The fact that a Paschal offering does not require the north is not derived by excluding it through the term “that one.” Rather,

it is derived from Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that the Paschal offering requires the north.

And it is logically

appropriate that the Paschal offering should require the north because of its stringency—

for if a burnt-offering,

which is less stringent than it,

for which the verse did not establish

a

time for its slaughter, was designated the north for it, a Paschal offering,

which is more stringent,

for which the Torah established a time for its slaughter, on

the fourteenth of Nisan after midday,

is it not logical that the Torah designated the north for it!

There is room to refute this a fortiori inference:

As for a burnt-offering,

which is more stringent than a Paschal offering,

for

it is burned

entirely

on the altar—can you say the same with regard to a Paschal offering, which is eaten by those registered for it? Therefore, it is logical that it should not require the north.

And if you would say that it should be derived by an a fortiori inference

from a sin-offering,

which is not burned entirely, but is eaten by the priests, and which has no fixed time, yet requires the north—and all the more so a Paschal offering, which is more stringent than a sin-offering in that it has a fixed time, should require the north—

there is still room to refute the a fortiori inference from a sin-offering:

As for a sin-offering,

which has a stringency that a Paschal offering does not have,

for

the sin-offering

atones for those liable for karet,

who inadvertently violated a prohibition for which one is liable to karet when violating it intentionally—can you say the same with regard to a Paschal offering, which does not atone for such sins?!

And if you would say that an a fortiori inference should be derived

from a guilt-offering,

which does not come to atone for those liable for karet, and has no fixed time, yet requires the north—and all the more so a Paschal offering, which has a fixed time, should require the north—

there is still room to refute it:

As for a guilt-offering, for

it

is most sacred,

and it is therefore more stringent than a Paschal offering, which is merely of lesser sanctity.

And if you would say that it can be derived by a common feature

from all of them

—from a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a guilt-offering—that the common feature among them is that they require the north, so too I will include a Paschal offering as requiring the north—there is

also

room to refute this: As for the common feature among all of them,

for

they are all

most sacred,

can you say the same with regard to a Paschal offering, which is less stringent than them, as it is merely of lesser sanctity?

And once it has been established from the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov that there is no basis for deriving, either by an a fortiori inference or by a common feature, that a Paschal offering should require the north, the original difficulty returns: Why is the exclusionary term “that one,” written with regard to the sin-offering of the ruler, necessary? After all, there could have been no thought that a Paschal offering should require the north?!

And we answer:

Rather, in fact,

this exclusionary term “that one,” stated with regard to the ruler’s goat, comes

as we originally said—

“that one,”

the goat must stand

in the north, but the slaughterer

need not stand

in the north.

And as for the difficulty raised to you

that this teaching

from Rabbi Aḥayya

is derived,

as he derives it from “that one” stated with regard to a burnt-offering, answer:

Rabbi Aḥayya did not come to exclude the slaughterer from standing in the north;

the slaughterer’s exclusion from the north is derived from “that one” stated with regard to the ruler’s sin-offering.

Rather, this is what he is saying:

The fact that “that one” is written with regard to the slaughter of a burnt-offering in the north comes to teach us that

the slaughterer

is not obligated to stand

in the north,

but

the receiver of the blood

is indeed obligated to stand

in the north.

We ask: The fact that the

receiver

of the blood must stand in the north is derived

from “and he shall take,”

as we expound:

“He shall take”—he must take

himself from the south to the north;

it is derived

from there that the receiver must move himself to the north, and not from the exclusionary term “that one” stated with regard to a burnt-offering?!

And we answer: This exposition of

“he shall take”—

“and he shall take” does not indicate

anything to Rabbi Aḥayya. Therefore, he derives it from the fact that the exclusionary term “that one” was necessary with regard to the burnt-offering to teach that the slaughterer is not obligated to stand in the north; this teaches that the receiver is indeed required to stand in the north.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he is liable for kneading it, for arranging it, and for baking it,

the leavened meal-offering.

Rav Pappa said: If he baked it

when the meal-offering was leavened,

he receives two sets of lashes—

one for arranging it and one for baking it,

since the act of baking also includes the act of arranging it.

We ask:

But you said

above:

“What is distinctive about baking? It is a single act, and one is liable for it in its own right,”

and how, then, can it be said here that one is liable to two sets of lashes for baking?

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

There is baking for which he becomes liable to two sets of lashes, meaning that he is liable also for arranging it, and there is baking for which he is liable in its own right.

This

refers to the case in which he is liable for baking alone, namely, when

he arranged it himself and baked it himself,

and since he performed the two acts and had already become liable for arranging it beforehand, he is not made liable a second time for arranging it through the act of baking.

And

this

case, in which he is liable to two sets of lashes for baking, refers to a situation in which

another person arranged it and gave it to him,

handing it to him already arranged, and he then

baked it.

In this case, he becomes liable to two sets of lashes through the baking, because the baking also includes arranging it.

The Sages taught in a beraita: With regard to a firstborn animal that was afflicted with an excess of blood,

which is an illness caused by an excess of blood, and whose treatment is that blood must be let from it, several tannaim disputed its law:

The blood may be let from it in a place where this does not create a blemish,

meaning anywhere on its body, because afterward it will recover,

but the blood may not be let from it in a place where this creates a blemish.

That is, in its ear or its eye, because an injury to the ear or eye remains and does not heal,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: One may let the blood even in a place where this creates a blemish,

because once it was afflicted with an excess of blood, it is already called an animal with a blemish, since if its blood is not let, it will die. The Sages permitted letting its blood in order to save it, even if the letting of blood is performed in a place where it creates a blemish.

Provided that he does not slaughter it

the firstborn

on account of that same blemish

that occurred in it as a result of the letting of blood. Rather, he must wait until another blemish appears in it, because a firstborn animal may be eaten outside the Temple only when it has a blemish. The Sages decreed that he may not benefit from the infliction of the blemish that was permitted for the purpose of saving the firstborn, as they were concerned that people might manipulate the procedure and let the blood even when the animal was not afflicted with an excess of blood, in order to permit it for eating.