Menachot 55b — the Talmud in English

But behold,

this

verse

is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: “It shall not be baked ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

as leaven”

which is stated in the section of Tzav,

what does it come to teach?

For has it not already been stated

in the section of Vayikra: “Every meal-offering that you shall offer to the Lord

you shall not make as leaven”?

Rather, the verse comes to teach us:

Could it be that one is liable only

for one set of lashes

for all of them,

namely, for all the acts of the meal-offering that he performed with leavening,

the verse says: “It shall not be baked

as leaven.”

For indeed,

baking was included

among the other acts of the meal-offering,

was,

and it is obvious that he would also be liable for baking the meal-offering with leavening; and if so,

why did baking go out

from the general category of the acts to be written separately?

To compare the other acts to it

and to teach us:

Just as baking,

which is an act,

is a distinctive act, being a single act,

that is, an important act in itself,

and one is liable for it

with a liability of lashes for performing it with leavening

in itself, so too I will bring its kneading and its arranging

of the dough of the meal-offering,

and every single act in it, to include “smoothing,”

whereby he smooths the surface of the dough with water after he has arranged its form,

which is a single act

in itself, even though it is not so much an “act,”

and one is liable for it

with a liability of lashes in itself.

And if so, since this is what it comes to teach, from where do we know that one is liable even for the leavening of the remnants?

And we answer:

We

do not derive it from “It shall not be baked” by itself, for that verse is needed for that which was taught in a beraita. Rather,

from

the juxtaposition of the verse

“their portion”

to “It shall not be baked”

we say,

that one must learn from this juxtaposition that also for the remnants, which are the priests’ portion, one receives lashes because of leavening.

And we refute this:

But perhaps the entire

juxtaposition of “their portion” to “It shall not be baked”

comes for this purpose,

to teach that one is liable even for the leavening of the remnants; and from where do you have to say that also for the remnants he will be liable for three separate sets of lashes, for kneading them, arranging them, and baking them with leavening?

And we answer:

If so, let the Merciful One write

“their portion” —

“their portion

shall not be baked as leaven,”

and from this we would learn that one is liable for the remnants of the meal-offering because of leavening;

what is the meaning of “It shall not be baked as leaven

— their portion”?

You learn two things from it,

that one receives lashes for the leavening of the remnants, and that one receives lashes for each act separately.

We raise a difficulty:

But perhaps baking, which the Merciful One specified, should make one liable

for

one

set of lashes, whereas

the others,

kneading and arranging, which were not written specifically,

should make one liable for one

only

for all of them?

And we answer: Also for kneading and arranging one must be liable for each one individually,

because the act of baking was

an act of the meal-offering

that was included

among the acts of the meal-offering,

and went out of the general category

to be written separately,

to teach.

Therefore,

it did not go out to teach about itself

alone,

but went out to teach about the entire general category,

that one is liable for each act in itself.

We raise a difficulty:

But perhaps: “You shall not make” is a general statement, “It shall not be baked” is a specific statement,

and if so, it is

a general statement followed by a specific statement,

and according to the rules by which the Torah is expounded,

there is

in the general statement only what is in the specific statement: baking —

nothing else —

no!

And we answer:

Rabbi Aftoriki said: Because it is a general statement and a specific statement that are distant from one another,

for “You shall not make as leaven” was written in the section of Vayikra, while “It shall not be baked as leaven” was written in the section of Tzav,

and every general statement and specific statement that are distant from one another —

one does not expound them as a general statement and a specific statement.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection, and some say,

raised

an objection suitably,

the name of a Sage:

But

what about

a general statement and a specific statement that are distant from one another—does one not expound them as a general statement and a specific statement?

But it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated concerning the sin-offering goat of the prince:

“And he shall slaughter it in the place where he slaughters the burnt-offering.” Where is the burnt-offering slaughtered? In the north,

as the north is explicitly written concerning it.

This too,

the prince’s goat, is slaughtered

in the north.

And do we learn from here

for the slaughter of the sin-offering goat of the prince?

But it has already been stated: “In the place where one slaughters the burnt-offering, there shall he slaughter the sin-offering.”

And from this we learned that the slaughter of the sin-offering is in the north, just as the slaughter of the burnt-offering is in the north; and included in this teaching is also the slaughter of the prince’s goat, since it too is a sin-offering!?

Why, then, did this go out

the prince’s goat

to establish it,

for the verse repeated it concerning it to make the matter indispensable:

if he did not slaughter it in the north —

he invalidated it.

You say: For this purpose,

so that its slaughter in the north should be indispensable,

you went out,

this verse in which the north is written concerning the prince’s sin-offering;

or perhaps

you did not go out to teach that it is indispensable,

but rather

in order to say

that this,

the prince’s goat,

requires the north

for its slaughter,

and no

other

sin-offering requires the north

for its slaughter; and the verse that says, “In the place where one slaughters the burnt-offering, there shall he slaughter the sin-offering,” refers only to the prince’s sin-offering!?

The verse says

a third verse:

“And he shall slaughter the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering.”

And this third verse

establishes a principle for all sin-offerings,

to teach concerning them

that

all of them

require

slaughtering in the

north.

And now Rav Adda bar Ahava concludes his refutation, and this is how he reasons:

The reason is that the Merciful One wrote

the third verse,

“And he shall slaughter the sin-offering

in the place of the burnt-offering”;

otherwise, I would have said that this,

the prince’s goat, alone

requires the north, and no

other

sin-offering requires the north.

And

what is the reason

that I would have said this? After all, the verse in the section of Tzav, “In the place where one slaughters the burnt-offering, there shall he slaughter the sin-offering,” is a verse stated, seemingly, concerning every sin-offering?

Is it not because this was

the verse in the section of Tzav

a general statement,

whereas the verse stated in the section of Vayikra, concerning the prince’s goat, “And he shall slaughter it in the place where he slaughters the burnt-offering,” is

a specific statement, and even though

they are a general statement and a specific statement that are

distant from one another,

nevertheless

one expounds them as a general statement and a specific statement,

and I would have said that there is in the general statement only what is in the specific statement, and only the prince’s goat requires the north; therefore we need the third verse to teach us that all sin-offerings require the north.

And it follows that a general statement and a specific statement that are distant from one another are expounded as a general statement and a specific statement, and this is difficult for what we answered above, that a general statement and a specific statement that are distant from one another are not expounded as a general statement and a specific statement!?

Rav Ashi strongly challenged it:

But is

this —

a general statement and a specific statement?!

For behold,

it is a specific statement and a general statement?!

For “And he shall slaughter it,” which is stated concerning the prince’s goat [which is “a specific statement”], is written first, in the section of Vayikra, while the verse “In the place where one slaughters the burnt-offering, there shall he slaughter the sin-offering” [which is the verse teaching about the general category of sin-offerings] is written afterward, in the section of Tzav.

And

if so, since it is a specific statement and a general statement,

the general statement becomes an addition to the specific statement.

For according to the rules by which the Torah is expounded, the teaching of a specific statement and a general statement means that

all things are included for them!

Rather, it follows that a specific statement and a general statement, or a general statement and a specific statement, that are distant from one another are not expounded, as we answered above.

And as for the fact that Rav Adda bar Ahava inferred from the initial assumption of the tannaitic author in the beraita that only the prince’s sin-offering would require the north, this is not difficult:

Rather, the tanna

found the exclusion of “And he shall slaughter

it”

which is written concerning the prince’s goat

difficult for him, and this is what he says:

Or perhaps

the exclusion of “it” comes to teach

only that this,

the prince’s goat,

requires the north, and no

other sin-offering goat

requires the north,

because

the Merciful One wrote “it”? The verse says a third verse: “And he shall slaughter the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering”!

And we raise a difficulty:

And now, since he derives from the third verse, from

“And he shall slaughter the sin-offering

in the place of the burnt-offering,” that all sin-offerings require the north, if so, the word

“it”

which is written concerning the prince’s goat, which is an exclusion,

what does it exclude?

And we answer:

To exclude

[Nachshon, shachat, of, in Pesach as a mnemonic]!

And this is how we expound it:

“It,”

the sin-offering goat of the prince, which comes to atone for the prince’s sin, is slaughtered

in the north

specifically,

but the goat of Nachshon,

which was brought for the inauguration of the altar and was not brought to atone for a sin, does not require slaughtering

in the north.

ограничение словом «его»: козел Нахшона не требует северной стороны.

And the fact that we need to exclude it from slaughtering in the north, even though it is a sanctified offering of a particular time and does not come for atonement, is because

it might enter your mind to say that it is like an ordinary sin-offering,

since it was included

the goat of Nachshon

with regard to placing of hands

as the law of an ordinary sin-offering; say

that it should also be included with regard to the north; this teaches us

the exclusion of “it,” that the goat of Nachshon does not require the north.

And we explain:

And the placing of hands itself

on the sin-offering of Nachshon,

from where do we know it?

For it was taught in a beraita:

It is written concerning the prince’s goat, which comes for a sin:

“And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat,”

and this “goat” is superfluous, for he could have written, “And he shall place his hand upon its head,” and it comes

to include the goat of Nachshon for placing of hands,

even though it did not come to atone,

the words of Rabbi Judah.

хотя он не был принесён для искупления,

это слова рабби Иехуды.