Menachot 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

And we said: This

matter—

the distinction between recognizable and unrecognizable intent,

which was obvious to Rabba in this direction

in that Rabba was inclined to say that it is specifically unrecognizable intent that invalidates, whereas recognizable intent does not invalidate,

and to Rava in the opposite direction—

and Rava was inclined to say the opposite: that there is greater reason to invalidate recognizable intent—this matter

was uncertain to Rav Oshaya.

For Rav Oshaya asked—and some say that Rav Oshaya asked Rav Asi: A meal-offering

that was brought

for the sake of an animal-offering

what would Rabbi Shimon say—

what would Rabbi Shimon say in this case? Shall we say that

the reason of Rabbi Shimon

who validates a meal-offering prepared in a shallow pan when it was brought for the sake of a deep pan is that recognizable intent does not

invalidate, and

therefore

this meal-offering brought for the sake of an animal-offering is also

a case of

recognizable intent

and should not be invalidated?

Or perhaps, the reason of Rabbi Shimon is because it is written: “

And this is the law of the meal-offering,”

and he expounds: “There is one law for all meal-offerings”; and that applies specifically when one meal-offering is brought for the sake of another meal-offering, but not when a meal-offering is brought for the sake of an animal-offering, for although it is written, “And this is the law of the meal-offering,”

and an animal-offering is not mentioned.

Rav Asi said to him,

Rav Asi said to Rav Oshaya:

Have we reached the full understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion?!

That is to say, we have not reached the full understanding of his opinion, and we do not know his reasoning.

He did not answer him in accordance with Rabba—

Rav Asi did not wish to resolve Rav Oshaya’s question in accordance with Rabba, that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is that unrecognizable intent does not invalidate,

because of Abaye’s objection,

who asked: What difference is there between a change in the sacred designation and a change in ownership? Although Rabba answered this question above, one can argue the opposite of his reasoning, as explained above.

He did not answer him in accordance with Rava, because of the difficulty posed by “And this is the law of the sin-offering”

as we said above.

He did not answer him in accordance with Rav Ashi, because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava

as above.

We learned in our Mishna:

Except for the sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy,

which, if he performed the handful-taking not for their sake, are invalid.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, the sinner’s meal-offering,

which, if its handful was taken not for its sake, is invalid, because

the Merciful One calls it a sin-offering,

as it is written: “

He shall neither place oil upon it nor put frankincense upon it, for it is a sin-offering.”

Therefore, it is invalid when performed not for its sake, just as a sin-offering is invalid when performed not for its sake.

But from where do we derive

that the meal-offering of jealousy is invalid when performed not for its sake?

And we say:

A tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: The meal-offering of jealousy—its surplus—

if one set aside money to purchase barley for the meal-offering of a sota and money remained after the purchase, that money falls to

the free-will offerings.

There were thirteen collection boxes in the Temple into which people donated money; and when the altar was idle, when there were no offerings to bring, sheep were purchased with this money as burnt-offerings.

Rav Naḥman said to him,

to the one who had taught this law before him:

You have spoken well,

that its surplus goes to free-will offerings, for

“it recalls iniquity”

is written concerning it,

the meal-offering of jealousy,

and concerning a sin-offering

“iniquity” is also written,

as it is written: “

And He gave it to you to bear the iniquity of the assembly.”

And we learn:

Just as the surplus of a sin-offering goes to free-will offerings,

as expounded in Temura 23b,

so too, the surplus of the meal-offering of jealousy goes to free-will offerings.

Thus, we have learned that the meal-offering of jealousy is like a sin-offering, since “iniquity” is stated with regard to it concerning the law that its surplus goes to free-will offerings; and we can now derive that the meal-offering of jealousy is invalid when performed not for its sake:

And just as a sin-offering is invalid when performed not for its sake, so too, the meal-offering of jealousy is invalid when performed not for its sake.

And we raise a difficulty:

If that is so,

since we derive “iniquity” by means of a verbal analogy from a sin-offering,

a guilt-offering

also

should be invalid when performed not for its sake,

for one could say

that he derives

the verbal analogy

“iniquity, iniquity”

from a sin-offering, since it is also written with regard to a guilt-offering: “He did not know, and he is guilty, and he shall bear his iniquity”?

And we answer:

We derive

by verbal analogy

specifically

“iniquity”

from “iniquity”,

since they are identical words,

but we do not derive

“his iniquity”

from “iniquity”,

since they are not completely identical.

And we raise a difficulty:

What difference does it make

that the words are not completely alike? Does this prevent us from expounding a verbal analogy?

But the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught—

it is stated in the passage concerning the affliction of houses:

“And the priest shall return”, and

“And the priest shall come”—

this returning is the same as that coming.

These are derived from one another by a verbal analogy in the Torat Kohanim, even though the words are not entirely identical. We learn that just as when he comes he removes the stones, scrapes and plasters the house, and closes it for seven days, so too, when he returns the law is the same. Although the words there are not entirely identical, since in both cases the meaning is coming into the house, they are learned by verbal analogy. Here too, one should derive “iniquity” from “his iniquity.”

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

Let him derive

a verbal analogy using the very same word,

“his iniquity”—“his iniquity”:

“his iniquity”

which is written concerning a guilt-offering

from “the iniquity” of hearing the voice

of witnesses who were adjured, whose offering is a sin-offering,

as it is written

concerning it: “

If he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity,”

and it should consequently be invalid when performed not for its sake.

Rather, when the verbal analogy was transmitted—

when the Sages received from their teachers the tradition to derive

the verbal analogy of “iniquity—iniquity,”

for the matter of the surplus going to free-will offerings,

it

was transmitted specifically for the

matter of the surplus going to free-will offerings.

Only for this purpose

was it transmitted: the verbal analogy was accepted only to derive the law that its surplus goes to free-will offerings. But with regard to the law that it is invalid when performed not for its sake, like a sin-offering, the verbal analogy was not stated to teach this.

And if you would say,

but there is a general principle that

“a verbal analogy cannot be partial,”

then we are compelled to derive from the verbal analogy also with regard to performing it for its sake;

therefore,

the Merciful One explicitly revealed concerning a sin-offering

that we should not derive from the verbal analogy with regard to performing it for its sake:

“And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering”—

it

specifically, meaning a sin-offering, is the one concerning which we say that

when performed for its sake it is valid, and when performed not for its sake it is invalid.

But

all

other

sacred offerings, whether performed for their sake or not for their sake, are

valid.

And therefore we must return and clarify:

But from where do we derive that the sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy are invalid when performed not for their sake—

from where?

And we answer:

A sin-offering that is invalid when performed not for its sake—we have already said:

what is the reason?

Because it is written concerning it

“sin-offering”

“it.”

And we derive from the restrictive term “it” that it is specifically when it is slaughtered for its sake that it is valid, but not when it is slaughtered not for its sake.

So too,

with regard to the sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy,

“it” is written concerning them:

“it”—with regard to the sinner’s meal-offering: “He shall neither put frankincense upon it, for it is a sin-offering”; and with regard to the meal-offering of jealousy: “For it is a meal-offering of jealousy.” This is the source for invalidating them when performed not for their sake.

And we raise a difficulty: If that is so,

a guilt-offering too

should be invalid when performed not for its sake,

for “it” is written concerning it: “And the priest shall burn them on the altar, a fire-offering to the Lord; it is a guilt-offering”?

And we answer:

That

“it” written concerning a guilt-offering

is written only after the burning of the sacrificial portions, as it is stated: “And the priest shall burn them, et cetera; it is a guilt-offering.”

As it was taught. But

a guilt-offering is not stated to be

“it”

until after the burning of the sacrificial portions,

after the atonement has been effected through the sprinkling of the blood. This is not so with a sin-offering, concerning which “it is a sin-offering” is written at the time of slaughter; therefore, if it was slaughtered not for its sake, it is invalid, but one cannot derive that a guilt-offering is invalid when performed not for its sake. Nor can one say that a guilt-offering whose sacrificial portions were burned not for its sake is invalid, for

the offering itself—

a

guilt-offering—

whose sacrificial portions were not burned

at all is

valid,

since the burning of the sacrificial portions is not indispensable. Therefore, it certainly cannot be invalidated through the burning of the sacrificial portions not for its sake.

And we raise a difficulty: But then, “it” that is written concerning a guilt-offering why do I need it, for we have explained that it is impossible to derive from it that an offering performed not for its sake is invalid?

even if its sacrificial portions were not burned

at all,

is valid,

as the burning of the sacrificial portions does not prevent the offering from being valid. Therefore, it certainly cannot be disqualified because its sacrificial portions were burned not for its proper sake.

And we answer: The verse is needed

to

teach us

in accordance with what Rav Huna said in the name of Rav.

He said:

A guilt-offering

that its owners set aside as an offering, which was lost, and its owners achieved atonement through another offering, is left to graze until it becomes unfit, then it is sold, and the proceeds go to free-will offerings. However, the law is

that

if it was already

transferred

for grazing—

that they had handed it over to a shepherd—

and they slaughtered it without specifying

and not for the sake of a burnt-offering, it is

valid for the sake of a burnt-offering,

because its designation as a guilt-offering had already been removed when it was handed over for grazing; from that point onward it stands for a burnt-offering, since an unspecified free-will offering is destined for a burnt-offering.

If it was transferred,

yes, this is the law; but

if it was not transferred

for grazing, meaning that they had not yet handed it over to a shepherd,

no: if they slaughtered it without specification, it is invalid, for

the verse says

“it”—

it shall remain as it is.

It is still a guilt-offering, and once its owner has achieved atonement through another offering, he is no longer obligated to bring a guilt-offering; and a guilt-offering cannot be brought as a free-will offering. Therefore, it remains invalid until it is handed over to a shepherd and its designation as a guilt-offering is removed.

Rav said: The omer meal-offering

that is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan in order to permit the new grain—

if its handful was taken not for its sake,

although other meal-offerings whose handfuls were taken not for their sake are valid, this meal-offering is

invalid,

and it is not burned, nor are its remnants eaten. What is the reason?

Since it came

this meal-offering

to permit

the new grain for consumption,

and

in practice

it did not permit it,

since its handful was not taken for its sake.

Since it came

this meal-offering

to permit

the new grain to be eaten,

and

in practice it

did not permit it,

since its handful was not removed for its proper sake.