Menachot 4a — the Talmud in English

And we say: this

matter—

the distinction between recognizable thought and unrecognizable thought—

which was obvious to Rabba in this direction

that Rabba maintains that specifically unrecognizable thought invalidates, but recognizable thought does not invalidate,

and to Rava in this direction—

whereas Rava maintains the opposite, that there is greater reason to invalidate recognizable thought; this matter

was a question for Rav Oshaya.

For Rav Oshaya asked—and some say, Rav Oshaya asked Rav Asi: A meal-offering

that he brought

for the sake of a sacrifice ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

what did Rabbi Shimon say—

what would Rabbi Shimon say in this matter? Shall we say that

the reason of Rabbi Shimon

who validates [an offering] in a pan when [it was brought] for the sake of a deep pan is because recognizable thought does not

invalidate, and

therefore

this

meal-offering [brought] for the sake of a sacrifice also is

recognizable thought

and will not be invalidated;

or perhaps, the reason of Rabbi Shimon is because it is written “

And this is the law of the meal-offering,”

and he expounds: “One law for all the meal-offerings,” and that means specifically a meal-offering [brought] for the sake of a meal-offering, but not a meal-offering [brought] for the sake of a sacrifice, for “And this is the law of the meal-offering”

and of a sacrifice is not written.

He said to him

Rav Asi,

“Have we reached the end of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion at all?!”

That is, we have not reached the end of his opinion, and we do not know what his reason is.

He did not resolve it for him according to Rabba—

Rav Asi did not wish to resolve for Rav Oshaya in accordance with Rabba, that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is because unrecognizable thought does not invalidate,

because of Abaye’s difficulty,

who raised the objection: What difference is there between a change of sacred designation and a change of owner? And although Rabba answered this above, one may say the opposite of his reasoning, as was explained above.

He did not resolve it for him according to Rava, because “And this is the law of the sin-offering” is difficult

[as we said above].

He did not resolve it for him according to Rav Ashi, because of the difficulty of Rav Aha son of Rava

[as above].

We learned in our Mishna:

except for the sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy,

for if he took their handful not for their sake, they are invalid.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, the sinner’s meal-offering

that was taken not for its sake is invalid because

the Torah called it a sin-offering,

as it is written: “

He shall not put oil upon it and shall not place frankincense upon it, for it is a sin-offering,”

and therefore it is invalid when not for its sake, just as a sin-offering is invalid when not for its sake;

but as for the meal-offering of jealousy, from where do we derive

that it is invalid when not for its sake?

And we say:

For a tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: The meal-offering of jealousy, its surplus—

if he set aside money to purchase barley for the meal-offering of a woman suspected of adultery, and money remained for him after the purchase, that money falls to

a free-will offering,

for in the Temple there were thirteen collection boxes into which money was donated, and when the altar was idle, when there were no sacrifices to offer, lambs for burnt-offerings were purchased with this money.

Rav Naḥman said to him,

the one who taught this law before him,

“You have spoken well,

that its surplus goes to a free-will offering, for

“remembrance of iniquity”

is written concerning it

in the meal-offering of jealousy,

and concerning a sin-offering

“iniquity” is also written,

as it is written: “

And He gave it to you to bear the iniquity of the assembly”;

and we learn:

Just as the sin-offering, its surplus goes to a free-will offering

[as expounded in Temura 23b],

so too, the meal-offering of jealousy, its surplus goes to a free-will offering.

And if so, we have learned that the meal-offering of jealousy is like a sin-offering, concerning which “iniquity” is stated with regard to the law of its surplus going to a free-will offering; and now we shall come to learn that the meal-offering of jealousy is invalid when made not for its sake:

And just as a sin-offering is invalid when not for its sake, so too, the meal-offering of jealousy is invalid when not for its sake.

And we raise a difficulty:

But from now

that we derive “iniquity, iniquity” from a sin-offering,

a guilt-offering

also

should be invalid when not for its sake,

for we can say

that he derives

a gezera shava “

iniquity, iniquity”

from a sin-offering,

for concerning a guilt-offering too it is written: “And he did not know, and he incurred guilt and bore his iniquity”?

And we answer:

They derive

by a gezera shava specifically “

iniquity”

from iniquity,

which are identical words,

but they do not derive “

his iniquity”

from iniquity,

for they are not completely identical.

And we raise a difficulty:

What difference does it make

that the words are not completely similar? Is that why one refrains from expounding a gezera shava?

But the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught,

it is stated in the passage concerning the afflictions of houses: “

And the priest shall return,” “

And the priest shall come”—

this returning is that coming,

and in the Torat Kohanim they are learned from one another by a gezera shava. Even though the words are not literally identical, we learn that just as upon his coming he removes the stones, scrapes and plasters the house, and gives it a week, so too when he returns the law is so. And even though the words there are not literally identical, since the meaning in both is coming to the house, they are learned by a gezera shava; here too, let us learn “iniquity” from “his iniquity”?

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

Let him derive

a gezera shava with the very same word, “

his iniquity”—“

his iniquity”:

the “his iniquity” written concerning a guilt-offering,

from the “iniquity” of hearing the voice

of witnesses who were adjured, whose offering is a sin-offering,

as it is written

concerning it: “

If he does not declare it, he shall bear his iniquity,”

and it should be invalid when not for its sake?

Rather, when they learned—

when the Sages received from their teachers to learn the

gezera shava

of “iniquity—iniquity”—

for

the matter of

the surplus [going to] a free-will offering

specifically

is what they learned it,

for only with regard to this matter was the gezera shava received, to learn the law of the surplus going to a free-will offering. But with regard to the law that it is invalid when not for its sake, like a sin-offering, the gezera shava was not stated to teach this.

And if you would say,

but there is a rule that

“there is no partial gezera shava,”

and if so, we are compelled to learn from the gezera shava also with regard to [doing it] for its sake;

the Torah explicitly revealed concerning a sin-offering

that we should not learn from the gezera shava with regard to [doing it] for its sake: “

And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering”—

it

specifically—that is, a sin-offering; concerning it they say:

when [done] for its sake it is valid, when [done] not for its sake it is invalid.

But

all

other

sacred [offerings], whether for their sake or not for their sake—

are valid.

And if so, we must return and clarify:

But the sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy, which are invalid when not for their sake—

from where do we derive it?

And we answer:

A sin-offering

which is invalid when not for its sake—we have said:

What is the reason? Because it is written concerning it

“sin-offering

it,”

and we derive from the exclusion “it” that specifically when it was slaughtered for its sake is it valid, but not when it was slaughtered not for its sake; and if so,

so too

in the sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy,

it is written concerning them

“it”: in the sinner’s meal-offering, “and he shall not place frankincense upon it, for it is a sin-offering”; in the meal-offering of jealousy, “for it is a meal-offering of jealousy.” And this is the source for invalidating them when they were made not for their sake.

And we raise a difficulty: If so,

a guilt-offering too

would be invalid when it was made not for its sake,

for is it not written concerning it: “And the priest shall burn them upon the altar, a fire-offering to the Lord; it is a guilt-offering”?

“It”

And we answer:

That

“

it”

that

is written concerning a guilt-offering,

is written only after the burning of the sacrificial parts, “And the priest shall burn them, and so on; it is a guilt-offering.”

As it was taught. But

concerning a guilt-offering it was not stated

“

it”

except after the burning of the sacrificial parts,

after the act of acceptance through the sprinkling of the blood, unlike a sin-offering, concerning which “it is a sin-offering” is written at slaughter. Therefore, if he slaughtered it not for its sake, it is invalid, but it is impossible to learn that a guilt-offering is invalid when not for its sake. And even to say that a guilt-offering whose sacrificial parts were burned not for its sake should be invalid is impossible, for the law is that

it itself—

a guilt-offering—

whose sacrificial parts were not burned

at all

is valid,

for the burning of the sacrificial parts does not prevent [its validity]; and if so, it certainly will not be invalidated by the burning of the sacrificial parts not for its sake.

And we raise a difficulty:

But then “

it”

that is written concerning a guilt-offering,

why do I need it,

for we have explained that it is impossible to learn from this that when it is not for its sake it is invalid?

And we answer: The verse is needed

to

teach us

in accordance with what Rav Huna said in the name of Rav,

who said:

A guilt-offering

that its owners designated as an offering and it was lost, and its owners achieved atonement through another one, shall graze until it develops a disqualifying blemish, and it shall be sold, and its value shall go to a free-will offering. However, the law is

that if it was transferred

already

for grazing

—

that they gave it to a shepherd—

and they slaughtered it without specification

and not for the sake of a burnt-offering—

it is valid for the sake of a burnt-offering,

because its designation as a guilt-offering was already removed from it by giving it for grazing, and from then onward it stands for a burnt-offering, since an unspecified [free-will] offering is brought as a burnt-offering.

If transferred, yes,

this is the law; but

if not transferred

for grazing, when they had not yet given it to a shepherd,

no,

for if they slaughtered it without specification it is invalid,

since

the verse says “

it,”

in its state shall it remain

, for it is a guilt-offering, and since he achieved atonement through another one he is no longer obligated to bring a guilt-offering, while a guilt-offering is not brought as a free-will offering; therefore it is invalid until it is given to a shepherd and its designation as a guilt-offering is removed from it.

Rav said: The omer meal-offering

that is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan in order to permit the new grain—

whose handful was taken not for its sake,

although other meal-offerings whose handfuls were taken not for their sake are valid, this meal-offering is

invalid

and it is not burned, nor are its remainder eaten. What is the reason?

Since it came

this meal-offering

to permit

the new grain for eating,

and

in practice

it did not permit it,

for its handful was not taken for its sake.

since its handful was not removed for its proper sake.