Menachot 3b — the Talmud in English

And we say:

Indeed, that is so:

in truth, in this manner it effects atonement, since the matter is recognizable

And what is the continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s words: “

that the meal-offering does not resemble

sacrifices”?

When Rabbi Shimon said above that, with sacrifices, they did not count, since their procedures resemble one another and the matter is not recognizable, this does not apply to all the sacrifices; rather, he said

most sacrifices.

But there are sacrifices whose procedures demonstrate [what they are], such as a calf and a bull that one slaughtered for the sake of the Passover-offering and the guilt-offering.

The Gemara now returns to establish another resolution to the contradiction brought above in Rabbi Shimon’s words.

Rava said: It is not difficult

from one statement of Rabbi Shimon to the other:

Here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they counted for the fulfillment of the obligation—

with the handful of one meal-offering

for the sake of

another meal-offering, and

here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they did not count—

with the handful of a meal-offering for the sake of

a sacrifice.

And the Gemara explains the distinction:

a meal-offering for the sake of a meal-offering—

it is written: “

And this is the law of the meal-offering,”

and from this we learn: “

one law for all the meal-offerings.”

Therefore, they counted toward the fulfillment of the obligation, since this is not considered a change; whereas with

a meal-offering for the sake of a sacrifice,

“And this is the law of the meal-offering” is written—but

“And this is the law of the meal-offering and the sacrifice”

is not written,

and the sacrifice does not have one law together with the meal-offerings; therefore it is considered a change.

And we raise an objection to Rava’s resolution:

But the tanna

Rabbi Shimon, who said that a meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering is valid,

said it because its procedures demonstrate its identity.

That is the reason for validating a pan-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan offering; if so, let us also validate a meal-offering for the sake of a sacrifice, since its procedures demonstrate its identity?

And he answers:

This is what the tanna means:

the tanna says,

even though

with a meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering

the thought is not recognizable,

for it is not recognizable in his actions as it is in his thought; on the contrary, in his actions it is recognizable that he is not doing as he is thinking [the definition “not recognizable” here is not similar to what was mentioned in Rabbah’s words],

and

there is greater reason to say that precisely in this manner it

should be invalidated,

because he is entertaining a thought that is manifestly false, and in order that people should not say that it is permitted to make a change in sacrifices, we should invalidate it, [and Rava’s reasoning is the reverse of Rabbah’s]; it teaches us that nevertheless it is valid, and the reason for the matter is from the verse

“And this is the law of the meal-offering,”

from which we learn

one law for all the meal-offerings.

And what is the continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s words,

“

But with sacrifices it is not so”?

According to this reasoning, he should have said concerning sacrifices that they count toward the fulfillment of the obligation, since it is not recognizable that it is false—for there is one slaughtering for all of them, and so on, as we said above? Rather, this is what he means:

even though there is one slaughtering for all of them,

and so on, and they should have counted toward the fulfillment of the obligation, since the change is not recognizable, and there is no reason to decree lest people say that it is permitted to make a change in consecrated offerings, as we decreed with a meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering, the verse teaches us:

“

And this is the law of the meal-offering”—one law specifically for all the meal-offerings,

but “and the sacrifice” is not written,

and there is not one law for the sacrifices; therefore they do not count toward the fulfillment of the obligation.

And we raise an objection:

If that is so, a sin-offering

which he brings for the prohibition against eating

fat, if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin-offering

for the prohibition against eating

blood, or

for the sake of

a sin-offering

which comes for

idolatry, or

for the sake of

a nazirite’s sin-offering, or

for the sake of

a leper’s sin-offering, should be valid and effect atonement

for the fulfillment of his obligation,

for

the Merciful One

said: “

And this is the law of the sin-offering,”

and from this verse we learn that “

there is one law for all the sin-offerings,” and a change between the types of sin-offerings does not invalidate. Yet in tractate Zevahim [2a] it is explicitly stated: “except for the Passover-offering and the sin-offering,” that if they were slaughtered not for their sake, they are invalid?

And we resolve:

According to Rabbi Shimon, this is also so:

a change between the types of sin-offerings does not invalidate and effects atonement; and that which was said in Zevahim, that this is invalid, is

according to the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Shimon.

Rava said: A sin-offering for fat, if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin-offering for blood,

or

for the sake of

a sin-offering for idolatry—

it is valid,

since the designation of a sin-offering was not removed from it. But if he brought it

for the sake of a nazirite’s sin-offering,

or

for the sake of

a leper’s sin-offering—

it is invalid.

For these are burnt-offerings—together with the nazirite’s and the leper’s sin-offering, burnt-offerings also come, and we are concerned that people will say that the sin-offering was slaughtered for the sake of a nazirite’s or a leper’s burnt-offering, and in such a case it is certainly invalid. [And see further in Rashi and the Shita Mekubetzet.]

Rav Aha son of Rava taught all of them

sin-offerings—including even a sin-offering for fat for the sake of a sin-offering for blood—

as invalid.

What is the reason? For it is written: “

And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering,”

and from the verse we learn that specifically

for the sake of that sin-offering; but if it was not slaughtered for the sake of its particular sin-offering, it is invalid.

Another resolution to the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s words:

Rav Ashi said: It is not difficult; here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they counted—

when

he

took the handful of the meal-offering and said, “I am taking

the handful of a pan-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan offering,”

and he did not mention the word “meal-offering”;

here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they did not count—

when

he took the handful and said, “I am taking

the handful of the pan-offering meal-offering for the sake of the shallow-pan meal-offering.”

And the reasoning for the distinction is:

“Pan-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan offering”—he is thinking about the vessel,

for the thought of the change is concerning the vessel, since he did not mention the meal-offering at all;

and a thought concerning the vessel does not invalidate,

for a thought concerning the vessel does not invalidate, whereas

“the pan-offering meal-offering for the sake of the shallow-pan meal-offering”—he is thinking about a meal-offering, in which a thought invalidates.

He is damaging it with his thought in a matter that is fit to be invalidated through thought, since certainly thought invalidates a meal-offering—for example, when he thought to eat it outside its time or outside its place; therefore, when he thought concerning it not for its sake, it did not count.

And we raise an objection:

But

the reason of the

tanna—

Rabbi Shimon, who said that they counted—is

said to be because its procedures demonstrate its identity.

If so, also with a pan-offering meal-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan meal-offering, let it count for the owners, since its procedures likewise demonstrate its identity?

And we answer:

This is what he means: even though

a pan-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan offering

is a recognizable thought,

and this is a reason to say that it

should be invalidated,

since it is evident to everyone that his thought is false, and there is room to invalidate it lest people say that it is permitted to make a change, nevertheless it is valid if he did not mention “meal-offering.”

And what

did the tanna say,

“

But with sacrifices it is not so,” that their procedures resemble one another and therefore they did not count? On the contrary, this is a reason to validate, since it is not evident that he lied? His intention is:

even though there is one slaughtering for all of them, one throwing for all of them, one receiving for all of them,

and if so there is reason to say that it should not be invalidated, nevertheless it is invalidated because

he is thinking about slaughtering, in which a thought invalidates,

for it is fit to be invalidated through thought; and since he thought concerning it, it became invalid, and this is like one who says, “the pan-offering meal-offering for the sake of the shallow-pan meal-offering.”

Rav Aha son of Rava said to Rav Ashi:

But if he offered a meal-offering

without oil,

and said

for the sake of a meal-offering

a meal-offering

mixed

with oil,

why did Rabbi Shimon say

that they counted? After all, there is no distinction between the vessel of a meal-offering without oil and the vessel of a meal-offering mixed with oil; if so, necessarily he was thinking about the meal-offering itself, and it should be invalidated?

He said to him:

Since he did not say, “a meal-offering without oil for the sake of a meal-offering mixed with oil,” but rather “for the sake of a mixed one,” these are merely empty words, and it is as though he said

for the sake of something mixed

—a mixed thing—

in general,

and his intention is not at all for a meal-offering.

And we raise an objection:

If so, when he brings a burnt-offering

for the sake of

peace-offerings,

which Rabbi Shimon said did not count,

also let us say that this is what he means:

“

for the sake of peace in general”—

to make peace between me and my Master, and not for the sake of a peace-offering—and they should count?

And we reject this:

How can these be compared?

What is the comparison?

There,

with a burnt-offering for the sake of peace-offerings,

the sacrifice itself is called peace-offerings;

peace-offerings is the name of the sacrifice,

as it is written: “

He who offers the blood of the peace-offerings, he who throws the blood of the peace-offerings.”

Therefore, we say that his intention is for a peace-offering. But

here, is the meal-offering itself called ‘mixed’?

“For every meal-offering mixed with oil”

is written,

and if so,

“

mixed with oil”

specifically

is called so.

But

‘mixed’ without specification is not called so; therefore, when he said “for the sake of a mixed one” without specification, his intention is for something mixed in general, but not for the sake of a meal-offering.

And we say:

All of them—

the amoraim who resolved the difficulty of one statement of Rabbi Shimon against the other—

did not say

the resolution of

Rabbah,

who resolved that what Rabbi Shimon said, “they counted,” refers to a change in the sacred designation, where his procedures demonstrate that he is lying, whereas here—where they did not count—it refers to a change in ownership, where the actions do not demonstrate it. The other amoraim did not accept his statement, since it is possible to reason the opposite:

on the contrary, the recognizable thought

specifically

the Merciful One invalidated,

so that people should not say that it is permitted to make a change in a sacrifice, but a thought that is not recognizable does not invalidate.

And

the

resolution of

Rava they did not say,

who resolved that what Rabbi Shimon said, “they counted,” in a pan-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan offering, is because it is written, “This is the law of the meal-offering,” and we learn from this that there is one law for all the meal-offerings, whereas what he said, “they did not count,” concerns the handful of a meal-offering for the sake of a sacrifice. The other amoraim did not accept his statement, since

“

And this is the law

of the meal-offering”

does not appear to them to expound it in this manner. For it is difficult for them: “And this is the law of the sin-offering” is also written, and we would learn that even a sin-offering for fat that he brought for the sake of a nazirite’s sin-offering would be valid, as with meal-offerings; yet we do not find such a law.

And

the

resolution of

Rav Ashi they did not say,

who resolved that a pan-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan offering is a change concerning the vessel, and in this a thought does not invalidate, whereas a pan-offering meal-offering for the sake of a shallow-pan meal-offering is a change of thought concerning the meal-offering itself and is invalid,

because of the difficulty of Rav Aha son of Rava. For if so, why, when he brought a meal-offering without oil for the sake of a meal-offering mixed with oil, is it valid? This too is not a change concerning the vessel. And Rav Ashi’s resolution is not plausible to them—that it is valid because it is like one who says, “I am taking the handful for the sake of something mixed” without specification, and these are merely empty words—for even “mixed” without specification is a meal-offering.

Because of the question raised by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava,

if so, why is a meal-offering without oil offered for the sake of a meal-offering mixed with oil valid? That too does not involve a change concerning the vessel. Nor did they find Rav Ashi’s answer plausible—that it is valid because it is like one who says, “I am taking the handful for the sake of something mixed” without qualification, which is merely empty speech—because even “mixed” without qualification refers to a meal-offering.