Menachot 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

And we said:

Indeed, that is so:

in truth, in this manner it effects acceptance, since the matter is evident

And what is meant by the continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement,

“that a meal-offering is not comparable to

sacrifices,”

which Rabbi Shimon stated above—that with sacrifices they do not count, since their procedures are similar to one another and the matter is not evident? This does not apply to all sacrifices; rather, he is referring to

most sacrifices. But there are sacrifices whose procedures demonstrate the intention, such as a calf or a bull that one slaughtered in the name of a Paschal offering or a guilt-offering.

The Gemara now returns to offer another resolution to the contradiction cited above in the statements of Rabbi Shimon.

Rava said: It is not difficult.

The statement of Rabbi Shimon is not difficult in light of the other statement of Rabbi Shimon:

in this case—

here

where Rabbi Shimon said that they count toward the obligation—

with the fistful of one meal-offering

taken

in the name of another meal-offering; and

here—

here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they do not count—

with the fistful of a meal-offering taken in the name of a sacrifice.

And the Gemara explains the distinction:

a meal-offering in the name of another meal-offering—it is written,

“

And this is the law of the meal-offering,”

and from this we derive:

one law for all meal-offerings.

Therefore, they count toward the obligation, since this is not considered a change. In contrast,

a meal-offering in the name of a sacrifice:

“And this is the law of the meal-offering” is written, but

“

And this is the law of the meal-offering and the sacrifice”

is not written. There is no single law for a sacrifice together with meal-offerings, and therefore this is considered a change.

And we challenge Rava’s resolution:

But the tanna

Rabbi Shimon, who said that a meal-offering taken in the name of another meal-offering is valid,

said this because its procedures demonstrate its nature.

That is the reason for validating a pan-offering taken in the name of a deep-frying-pan offering. If so, we should likewise validate a meal-offering taken in the name of a sacrifice, since its procedures demonstrate its nature.

And he answers:

This is what the tanna is saying:

even though

with regard to

a meal-offering taken in the name of another meal-offering,

the thought is not evident,

as it is not evident from his actions as it is from his thought; on the contrary, his actions demonstrate that he is not doing what he had in mind [the definition of “not evident” here is not similar to what was mentioned in Rabba’s statement],

and

there is greater reason to say that specifically in this manner it

should be disqualified,

because he is entertaining a thought that is manifestly false, and in order that people should not say that it is permitted to alter the designation of offerings, we should disqualify it [Rava’s reasoning is the reverse of Rabba’s]. The tanna therefore teaches us that nevertheless it is valid, and the reason is derived from the verse

“

And this is the law of the meal-offering”:

we learn that there is

one law for all meal-offerings.

And what is the meaning of the continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement,

“

But with sacrifices it is not so”? According to this reasoning, he should have said that with sacrifices they do count toward the obligation, since it is not evident that his statement is false—for the slaughtering of all of them is the same, and so forth, as we said above. Rather, this is what he is saying:

even though the slaughtering of all of them is the same,

and so forth, and they should have counted toward the obligation, since the change is not evident, and there is no reason to decree lest people say that it is permitted to alter the designation of sacred offerings, as we decreed with regard to a meal-offering taken in the name of another meal-offering, the verse teaches us:

“

And this is the law of the meal-offering”— -

one law specifically for all meal-offerings,

but “and the sacrifice” is not written, and there is no single law for sacrifices; therefore, they do not count toward the obligation.

And we challenge this:

If so, a sin-offering

that one brings for the prohibition against eating

forbidden fat, which he slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering

for the prohibition against eating

blood,

or

in the name of a sin-offering

that is brought for

idolatry,

or

in the name of a nazirite’s sin-offering,

or

in the name of a leper’s sin-offering—shall it be valid and effect acceptance

for its owner’s obligation?

For

the Merciful One

the Merciful One said,

“

And this is the law of the sin-offering,”

and from this verse we derive that there is

“one law for all sin-offerings,” and a change between types of sin-offerings does not disqualify. Yet in tractate Zevachim [2a] it is stated explicitly: “except for the Paschal offering and the sin-offering”—if they were slaughtered not for their sake, they are disqualified.

And we answer:

According to Rabbi Shimon, indeed, that is so:

a change between types of sin-offerings does not disqualify, and the offering effects acceptance. That which was stated in Zevachim that it is disqualified applies

to the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Shimon.

Rava said: A sin-offering for forbidden fat that one slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering for blood

or

in the name of a sin-offering for idolatry—

is valid,

since the designation “sin-offering” was not removed from it. But if he brought it

in the name of a nazirite’s sin-offering

or

in the name of a leper’s sin-offering—

it is disqualified.

For these are burnt-offerings:

together with a nazirite’s and a leper’s sin-offering, burnt-offerings are also brought, and we are concerned that people may say that the sin-offering was slaughtered in the name of a nazirite’s or leper’s burnt-offering, in which case it would certainly be disqualified. [See also Rashi and the Shita Mekubetzet.]

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught all the sin-offerings

as disqualified—even a sin-offering for forbidden fat slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering for blood—

as disqualified.

What is the reason? For it is written:

“

And he shall slaughter it as a sin-offering,”

and we derive from the verse that it must be slaughtered specifically

in the name of that same sin-offering. But if it was not slaughtered in the name of its particular sin-offering, it is disqualified.

Another resolution of the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s statements:

Rav Ashi said: It is not difficult; here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they count—

when

he took the fistful from the meal-offering and said, “I am taking

the fistful of a pan-offering in the name of a deep-frying-pan offering,”

without mentioning the word “meal-offering”;

here—

where Rabbi Shimon said that they do not count—

when

he took the fistful and said, “I am taking

the fistful of a pan-offering meal-offering in the name of a deep-frying-pan meal-offering.”

And the reasoning behind the distinction is:

“A pan-offering in the name of a deep-frying-pan offering”—he is entertaining the thought with regard to the vessel:

the thought of the change concerns the vessel, since he did not mention the meal-offering at all.

And a thought concerning the vessel does not disqualify;

a thought concerning the vessel cannot disqualify. In contrast,

“a pan-offering meal-offering in the name of a deep-frying-pan meal-offering”—he is entertaining a thought concerning the meal-offering, with regard to which a thought can disqualify:

he is corrupting it through a thought concerning something that is fit to be disqualified by a thought, since a thought certainly disqualifies a meal-offering—for example, when he intended to eat it beyond its allotted time or outside its designated area. Therefore, when he entertained a thought concerning it that it was not for its sake, it did not count.

And we challenge this:

But

the reason of the

tanna—

Rabbi Shimon, who said that they count—is

because its procedures demonstrate its nature,

as he said. If so, even with regard to a pan-offering meal-offering taken in the name of a deep-frying-pan meal-offering, it should count for its owners, since its procedures also demonstrate its nature.

And we answer:

This is what he is saying: Even though

a pan-offering taken in the name of a deep-frying-pan offering is

a thought whose falsity is evident,

which provides reason to say that it

should be disqualified,

since it is obvious to everyone that his thought is false, and there is reason to disqualify it lest people say that it is permitted to alter the designation of offerings, nevertheless it is valid if he did not mention “meal-offering.”

And what

is meant by what the tanna said,

“But with sacrifices it is not so,”

that their procedures are similar and therefore they do not count? On the contrary, this should be a reason to validate them, since it is not evident that he lied. His intention is as follows:

even though the slaughtering of all of them is the same, the sprinkling of all of them is the same, and the receiving of all of them is the same,

and therefore there is reason to say that it should not be disqualified, nevertheless it is disqualified because

he is entertaining a thought concerning the slaughtering, with regard to which a thought can disqualify:

it is subject to disqualification through a thought, and once he entertained such a thought concerning it, it became disqualified. This is analogous to one who says, “a pan-offering meal-offering in the name of a deep-frying-pan meal-offering.”

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi:

But if he offered a meal-offering

without oil

and said

“because of”

a meal-offering

mixed

with oil,

why did Rabbi Shimon say

that they count? There is no distinction between the vessel of a meal-offering without oil and the vessel of a meal-offering mixed with oil. Therefore, you are forced to say that he entertained a thought concerning the meal-offering itself, and it should be disqualified.

He said to him:

Since he did not say, “a meal-offering without oil in the name of a meal-offering mixed with oil,” but rather “in the name of a mixed one,” these are merely empty words, like one who says

“in the name of something mixed”—

a mixed thing—

in general

and his intention was not at all directed toward a meal-offering.

And we challenge this:

If so, when he brings a burnt-offering

in the name of a peace-offering,

which Rabbi Shimon said does not count,

it should

also

be said that this is what he meant:

“in the name of peace in general”— -

to make peace between me and my Creator, and not in the name of a peace-offering—and it should count.

And we reject this:

How can these cases be compared?

What is the comparison?

There, with regard to a burnt-offering in the name of a peace-offering,

the sacrifice itself is called a peace-offering.

“Peace-offering” is the name of the sacrifice,

as it is written:

“

One who offers the blood of the peace-offerings, one who sprinkles the blood of the peace-offerings.”

Therefore, we say that his intention was in the name of a peace-offering. But

here, is the meal-offering itself called “mixed”?

“Mixed” is not the name of a meal-offering, for

“

and every meal-offering mixed with oil”

is written, and therefore

“

mixed with oil”

is what is called by that term.

But

“mixed” without qualification is not called that,

and therefore, when he said “in the name of a mixed one” without qualification, his intention was in the name of something mixed in general, but not in the name of a meal-offering.

And we say:

All of them—

the amoraim who resolved the difficulty between Rabbi Shimon’s statements—

like

the resolution of

Rabba, did not say

that he offered the explanation that when Rabbi Shimon said that they count, this was with regard to a change in sacred designation, in which case the procedures demonstrate that he is lying; whereas here, where they do not count, it is with regard to a change in ownership, where the procedures do not demonstrate this. The other amoraim did not accept his reasoning, since the opposite reasoning can be proposed:

on the contrary, it is specifically a thought whose falsity is evident

that

the Merciful One disqualified,

so that people should not say that it is permitted to alter the designation of an offering; but a thought whose falsity is not evident does not disqualify.

And

like

the resolution of

Rava, they did not say,

who resolved that when Rabbi Shimon said that they count, this referred to a pan-offering taken in the name of a deep-frying-pan offering, because it is written, “This is the law of the meal-offering,” from which we derive that there is one law for all meal-offerings; whereas when he said that they do not count, it referred to the fistful of a meal-offering taken in the name of a sacrifice. The other amoraim did not accept his reasoning, because

“

And this is the law of the meal-offering”

does not seem to them to warrant this exposition. It is difficult for them, since “And this is the law of the sin-offering” is also written, and we would derive that even a sin-offering for forbidden fat brought in the name of a nazirite’s sin-offering would be valid, as with meal-offerings; yet we do not find such a law.

And

like

the resolution of

Rav Ashi,

they did not say,

who resolved that a pan-offering taken in the name of a deep-frying-pan offering constitutes a change in the vessel, and a thought does not disqualify in that case; whereas a pan-offering meal-offering taken in the name of a deep-frying-pan meal-offering constitutes a change in the thought concerning the meal-offering itself and is disqualified,

because of Rav Aḥa, son of Rava’s challenge. For if so, why is a meal-offering without oil brought in the name of a meal-offering mixed with oil valid? That too is not a change in the vessel. Nor did Rav Ashi’s resolution seem plausible to them—that it is valid because it is like one who says, “I am taking the fistful in the name of something mixed” without qualification, which is merely empty words—for even “mixed” without qualification is a meal-offering.

if so, why is a meal-offering without oil offered for the sake of a meal-offering mixed with oil valid? That too does not involve a change concerning the vessel. Nor did they find Rav Ashi’s answer plausible—that it is valid because it is like one who says, “I am taking the handful for the sake of something mixed” without qualification, which is merely empty speech—because even “mixed” without qualification refers to a meal-offering.