Menachot 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

They said:

those who see the service will say:

Perhaps

this is in fact a bird sin-offering, and although he performs mitzui with it as with a burnt-offering, perhaps this is

the extraction performed after the sprinkling:

the sprinkling has already been performed, and the extraction of the blood is valid even above.

For the Master said: The extraction of its blood

of a bird sin-offering

anywhere on the altar

is valid.

And therefore, its actions do not prove what it is.

And we raise an objection:

A bird sin-offering whose blood was sprinkled

on

the lower part of the altar

in accordance with its law, but

in the name of a bird burnt-offering—

will you say that

it is acceptable?

After all, its actions prove that it is a bird sin-offering

and not a burnt-offering,

for if it were a bird burnt-offering, he would perform it above, and

he would also

perform the extraction with it,

and not sprinkling, since a bird burnt-offering involves no sprinkling at all?

And we answer:

So too here:

Rabbi Shimon indeed concedes in such a case that the offering is valid.

Rather, when he said, “

because meal-offerings are not comparable to animal-offerings,”

he was saying

that this applies specifically

to animal-offerings:

they are not comparable

to birds. Animal-offerings have identical procedures in all their services. Birds, however, sometimes have different procedures, and in this respect birds are comparable to meal-offerings. Therefore, in a case such as this, where the blood of a bird sin-offering was sprinkled below in the name of a bird burnt-offering, it counts for the owner’s obligation, since its actions prove that it is a sin-offering.

And we raise an objection:

Offerings of

most sacred קדשים—

which must be slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard—

that were slaughtered in the north in the name of

offerings of

lesser sanctity,

which must be slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard—

should they be acceptable

and count for the owners’ obligation, since

their actions prove that they are offerings of most sacred קדשים, for if they were offerings of lesser sanctity

they

would have been performed in the south

as required by their law?

And we answer:

Perhaps the Torah said

that the law of offerings of lesser sanctity is that they may be slaughtered

also in the south.

But

in the south

specifically

and not

may one slaughter them

in the north—who said

that the Torah said this? The proof that the intention is that they may be slaughtered also in the south, but that slaughtering them in the north is certainly valid, is

as we learned: “Offerings of lesser sanctity

may be slaughtered

anywhere in the Temple courtyard.” Therefore, slaughtering in the north is not an action that proves what they are.

And we raise an objection:

Offerings of lesser sanctity

that were slaughtered in the south in the name of offerings of most sacred קדשים,

which by law must be slaughtered only in the north,

should they be acceptable

and count as fulfilling the obligation, since

their actions prove that they are offerings of lesser sanctity.

For if they were offerings of most sacred קדשים,

they

would have been performed in the north,

as required by their law?

And we answer:

They said:

those who see the act will say that they are indeed

offerings of most sacred קדשים, and

the fact that they were slaughtered in the south

is merely a transgression:

he transgressed the law

and slaughtered them in the south,

not in accordance with their law. But this does not constitute an action that proves what they are.

And we raise an objection:

If so, if we say that the observers will assume that he transgressed the law, then also in the case of

a

shallow pan in the name of a deep pan,

where we said above that it counts for the owner’s obligation because its actions prove what it is,

also

let us say

this: since

he

scoops from it—

from the meal-offering that was made in a shallow pan—

for a deep pan,

with the intention that it be for a deep pan,

he said:

the people who see it will say that

this

person bringing the meal-offering

vowed a deep-pan offering—

indeed, he vowed a deep-pan meal-offering—

and the fact that he brought it in a shallow pan is because it is a deep-pan offering,

as he vowed it as a deep-pan offering,

and it is merely a transgression

of its law,

and he brought it in a shallow pan,

bringing it in a shallow pan contrary to the law. But its actions do not prove what it is?

And we reject this:

There,

when he brought it in a shallow pan and had the intention that it be for a deep pan, it must be a shallow-pan meal-offering,

because even if he vowed a deep-pan offering,

even if he vowed a deep-pan meal-offering,

when

he

brings it in a shallow pan,

it is a shallow pan offering,

and it automatically becomes a shallow-pan meal-offering,

as we learned: One who says, “It is incumbent upon me”

to bring

a shallow-pan offering,” but brings it in a deep pan,

or one who says, “It is incumbent upon me

to bring a deep-pan offering,” but brings it in a shallow pan,

the law is:

what he brought, he brought,

and if he actually brought it in a shallow pan, it is a shallow-pan meal-offering,

but he has not fulfilled his vow,

since he did not bring it as he vowed. Thus, it must be a shallow-pan meal-offering, and when he had the intention that it be for a deep pan, his intention is apparent and its actions prove that it is a shallow-pan meal-offering, not a deep-pan meal-offering.

And we raise an objection: Even so, in the case of a shallow pan in the name of a deep pan, its actions do not prove that it is a shallow-pan meal-offering, for the observers may say that he did indeed vow a deep-pan offering, but transgressed the law, brought it in a shallow pan, and made it for the sake of a deep pan. Although we said that the law is that it is a shallow-pan offering, it is possible that it is a deep-pan offering.

Perhaps

the meal-offering

“this”

that I am bringing in a deep pan

he said,

and in such a case it is a deep-pan meal-offering even when he brings it in a shallow pan,

as we learned:

a meal-offering

“this one I will bring in a shallow pan,” but he brought it in a deep pan,

or

“in a deep pan,” but he brought it in a shallow pan—this is disqualified!

And we resolve:

According to the Rabbis,

who say this in the Mishna,

so too here

one could raise this objection, that its actions do not prove what it is. But we are discussing the view of Rabbi Shimon.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon said

in that Mishna, “One who says, ‘It is incumbent upon me to bring a shallow-pan offering,’ but brings it in a deep pan,

has even fulfilled his vow,”

it is evident

that he holds that

the designation of the vessel—

the designation of the utensil—

is of no consequence,

it has no significance.

And it makes no difference whether he said

“this one”

or whether he said

“it is incumbent

upon me”;

therefore, if he brings it in a shallow pan, it is a shallow-pan offering, and when he scoops from it with the intention that it be for a deep pan, this is a recognizable intention and its actions prove what it is.

And we raise an objection:

A burnt-offering,

which comes only from a male,

that he slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering,

which ordinarily is female—

will you say

that it is acceptable, since it is recognizable that it is a burnt-offering, as

this one

is required to be a

male, whereas this one

is required to be a

female?

And we answer:

Since there is the ruler’s goat, which

although it is a sin-offering

is a male, it is not recognizable

what it is, since they may say that this is a sin-offering, specifically the ruler’s goat.

And we raise an objection: But even so, if he

said

“I am slaughtering it”

in the name of an individual’s sin-offering, what can be said

about this? Surely it is recognizable that the offering is not an individual’s sin-offering, since an individual’s sin-offering comes specifically as a female!?

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty from the opposite case:

An individual’s sin-offering that he slaughtered in the name of a burnt-offering—will you say

that it is acceptable, since

a sin-offering

of an individual is a

female, whereas a burnt-offering

comes specifically as a

male, and a burnt-offering never comes as a female?

And we resolve: The matter is not recognizable, because the place indicating that Rachel is female

is covered

by its tail fat

—

by its tail—

and it is not recognizable that this is a female.

And we raise an objection:

This works when he brought a ewe,

for then it truly is not recognizable. But when

he brought a she-goat,

which has no tail,

what can be said?

Surely it is recognizable that it is female?

And we resolve:

Rather,

another answer must be stated: the distinction

between males and females is not something to which people pay attention;

people do not pay attention to distinguishing between them, and therefore this is not considered recognizable.

And we raise an objection: A

Paschal offering that he slaughtered in the name of

an

guilt-offering—should it be acceptable,

since the matter is recognizable,

for this one

—the Paschal offering—must be brought as

a one-year-old, whereas this one,

the guilt-offering, must be brought as

a two-year-old?

And we answer:

Since there is the nazirite’s guilt-offering and the

leper’s guilt-offering,

which also come as one-year-olds,

it is not conclusive for him—

it is not proven that this offering is not a guilt-offering but a Paschal offering, since it could be the guilt-offering of a nazirite or the guilt-offering of a leper.

And we raise an objection: Even so, in a case where he slaughtered a one-year-old Paschal offering and

said

“I am slaughtering it”

in the name of a guilt-offering for robbery and in the name of a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property,

which by law must be brought as two-year-olds—

what can be said

then? Surely in such a case it is certainly recognizable that this is a Paschal offering, and it should count as valid?

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty from the opposite case:

A guilt-offering for robbery and a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property,

which by law must be brought as two-year-olds,

that he slaughtered in the name of a Paschal offering,

whose law is that it must specifically be a one-year-old—

should it be acceptable,

since the matter is certainly recognizable,

for a Paschal offering is a one-year-old, whereas these

—the guilt-offering for robbery and the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property—are

two-year-olds?

And we resolve:

Rather,

another answer must be stated: the distinction

between a one-year-old and a two-year-old is not something to which people pay attention;

people do not distinguish between them,

for

there is

a large one-year-old

that is

seen

as

a two-year-old, and there is a two-year-old

that is small

and is seen as a one-year-old.

And we raise an objection:

A he-goat,

the male goat of a sin-offering, burnt-offering, or peace-offering,

that he slaughtered in the name of a guilt-offering—should it be acceptable,

since a guilt-offering comes only from sheep or rams, and therefore it is recognizable that this is not a guilt-offering,

for this one

—the guilt-offering—

comes from sheep, which have

wool, whereas this one

—the he-goat—has

hair?

And we answer:

They said—the observers will say: It is possible that this is a guilt-offering, and that this is not a he-goat but

a black ram,

a black ram, which is also fit to be a guilt-offering. [The ordinary he-goats are black, which is why the Gemara mentions “black.”] Therefore, it is not recognizable from the fact that he brought a he-goat, since it resembles a ram that is fit to be a guilt-offering.

And we raise an objection:

A calf and a bull,

sin-offerings [such as a bull brought by an anointed priest who sinned]

that he slaughtered in the name of a Paschal offering

or

a guilt-offering—should they be acceptable,

since the matter is recognizable,

for there is no calf or bull for a Paschal offering or a guilt-offering,

as these come only from the flock?

for there is no calf or bull among Paschal or asham-offerings,

which come only from sheep or goats?