Menachot 3a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

They say:

those who see the service will say

perhaps

this really is a bird sin-offering, and although he performs squeezing in it as with a burnt-offering, it is possible that this is

the squeezing that follows the sprinkling

and the sprinkling has already taken place; and behold, squeezing the blood even above is valid,

for the Master said: If he squeezed its blood

of a bird sin-offering

anywhere on the altar—

it is valid.

And if so, its actions do not prove [what it is].

And we object:

A bird sin-offering that sprinkled

its

blood below

as its law requires, but [did so]

for the sake of a bird burnt-offering—

what will you say, for

behold,

its actions prove concerning it that it is a bird sin-offering

and not a burnt-offering?

For if it were a bird burnt-offering, he would perform it above, and

also

he would perform squeezing in it

and not sprinkling, since there is no sprinkling at all in a bird burnt-offering?

And we answer:

So too here:

in truth, Rabbi Shimon agrees in such a case that the offering is valid.

Rather, the phrase

“because meal-offerings are not similar to animal-offerings”

he said,

and that means specifically

to animal-offerings

they are not similar

and not to birds.

For the actions of animal-offerings are identical in all their services. But there are birds whose actions differ, and in this the birds resemble meal-offerings. Therefore, in a case such as this, where he sprinkled the blood of a bird sin-offering below for the sake of a bird burnt-offering, it counts for him for the sake of the obligation, since its actions prove that it is a sin-offering.

And we object:

most holy offerings—

whose law is that they be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard—

that he slaughtered in the north for the sake of

offerings

of lesser sanctity,

whose law is that they are slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard—

should they be accepted

and count for their owners toward the obligation, since

their actions prove concerning them that they are most holy offerings, for if they were offerings of lesser sanctity

they

would be performed in the south

as their law requires?

And we answer:

I can say that the Torah said

that the law of offerings of lesser sanctity is [that they are] in the south—that is, they may be slaughtered

also in the south.

But

in the south

specifically

and not

shall he slaughter them

in the north—who said

that the Torah [said so]!? And the proof is that the intention is “also in the south,” but certainly [slaughtering] in the north is also valid:

for we learned: “Offerings of lesser sanctity,

their slaughter is [permitted]

anywhere in the Temple courtyard.”

And if so, slaughtering in the north is not “actions that prove.”

And we object:

Offerings of lesser sanctity that he slaughtered in the south for the sake of most holy offerings,

whose law is that they be slaughtered only in the north,

should they be accepted

and count toward the obligation, since

their actions prove concerning them that they are offerings of lesser sanctity?

For if they were most holy offerings

they were,

he would perform them in the north

as their law requires?

And we answer:

They say:

those who see the action will say: in truth they

are most holy offerings, and

as for their being slaughtered in the south,

it is merely that he transgressed

he transgresses the law

and slaughtered them in the south,

not according to their law. But this is not “actions that prove.”

And we object:

If so,

that we say as a rationale that those who see will say that he transgressed the law, also in the case of

a griddle-offering for the sake of a pan-offering,

where we said above that it counts for the sake of the obligation because its actions prove concerning it,

also

let us say

this one,

since

he takes a handful from it

from his meal-offering that was made in a griddle

for a pan-offering

with the thought that it was for the sake of a pan-offering,

he said—

those who see will say:

this one,

the person bringing the meal-offering,

vowed [to bring it] in a pan—

indeed, he vowed a pan-offering—

and the fact that he brought it in a griddle is because it is a pan-offering,

that he vowed for the sake of a pan-offering,

and he merely transgressed

its law

and brought it in a griddle,

bringing it in a griddle not according to the law. But its actions do not prove?

And we reject this:

There—

when he brought it in a griddle and thought [of it] for the sake of a pan-offering, it must be a griddle-offering,

for even if he vowed [to bring it] in a pan,

even if he vowed a pan-offering,

when

when

he brings it in a griddle—

it is a griddle-offering,

it automatically becomes a griddle-offering,

as we learned: One who says, “It is incumbent upon me

to bring

in a griddle,” and he brought [it] in a pan,

or one who says, “It is incumbent upon me

in a pan,” and he brought [it] in a griddle,

the law is:

what he brought, he brought,

and if he actually brought it in a griddle, it is a griddle-offering,

but he has not fulfilled his vow

since he did not bring it as he vowed. Consequently, it must be a griddle-offering, and when he took a handful from it for the sake of a pan-offering, the thought is recognizable and its actions prove concerning it that it is a griddle-offering and not a pan-offering.

And we object: Even now, in the case of a griddle-offering for the sake of a pan-offering, its actions do not prove that it is a griddle-offering, for those who see may say that he truly vowed for the sake of a pan-offering, and he transgresses the law by bringing it in a griddle and makes it for the sake of a pan-offering. And although we said that the law is that it is a griddle-offering, it is possible for it to be a pan-offering.

And perhaps

a meal-offering

“this”

I will bring in a pan

he said,

and in such a case it is a pan-offering even when he brings it in a griddle,

as we learned: a meal-offering

“this, to bring in a griddle, and he brought it in a pan”,

that one said he would bring in a griddle, but he brought in a pan,

or

“in a pan, and he brought it in a griddle—this is invalid!”

And we resolve:

According to the Rabbis,

who say this in the Mishna,

so too here

it would be possible to object in this manner, that its actions do not prove. But we are discussing according to Rabbi Shimon.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon said

in that Mishna: “One who says, ‘It is incumbent upon me [to bring it] in a griddle,’ and he brought it in a pan,

he has also fulfilled his vow,”

apparently

he holds that

the designation of the vessel—

the designation of the vessel—

is nothing

it has no importance.

And it makes no difference whether he said “

this” [or]

whether he said

“it is incumbent

upon me”;

therefore, if he brings it in a griddle, it is a griddle-offering, and when he takes a handful from it for the sake of a pan-offering, the thought is recognizable and its actions prove [what it is].

And we object:

A burnt-offering,

which comes only from a male,

that he slaughtered for the sake of a sin-offering,

which ordinarily is female—

what will you say,

for it is recognizable that it is a burnt-offering, since

this one

its law is with a

male, and this one

its law is with a

female?

And we answer:

Since there is the ruler’s goat, which

even though it is a sin-offering

is a male, it is not known

the matter is not recognizable, since they will say: this is a sin-offering, and it is the ruler’s goat.

And we object: But still,

he said

“I am slaughtering it

for the sake of an individual’s sin-offering”—what is there to say?

For it is certainly recognizable in the offering that it is not an individual’s sin-offering, since an individual’s sin-offering comes specifically as a female!?

Furthermore,

and there is another difficulty from the opposite case:

An individual’s sin-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of a burnt-offering—what will you say, for

behold, an

individual’s sin-offering

is a

female, and a burnt-offering

specifically is a

male,

and a burnt-offering does not come as a female at all?

And we resolve: The matter is not recognizable, because the place indicating the femaleness of the ewe

is covered

covered

by its tail—

by its tail, and it is not recognizable that this is a female.

And we object:

This works where he brought a ewe,

for then it truly is not recognizable. But where he

brought a she-goat,

which has no tail,

what is there to say?

For it is recognizable that it is a female.

And we resolve:

Rather,

one must say another resolution: the distinction

between males and females is not in people’s awareness;

people do not pay attention to distinguish this, and therefore it is not considered that the matter is recognizable.

And we object: A

Passover-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of

an

asham—should it be accepted,

since the matter is recognizable,

for this one

the Passover-offering must be brought as

a one-year-old, whereas this one,

the asham, must be brought as

a two-year-old?

And we answer:

Since there is the nazirite’s asham and the leper’s

asham,

which also come as one-year-olds,

it is not conclusive for him—

it is not proven that this offering is not an asham but a Passover-offering, since it is possible that this is a nazirite’s asham or a leper’s asham.

And we object: Still, where he slaughtered a one-year-old Passover-offering and

said

“I am slaughtering it

for the sake of a guilt-offering for robbery and for the sake of a guilt-offering for misuse”—

which are required to be brought as two-year-olds—

what is there to say?

For in such a case the matter is certainly recognizable, that this is a Passover-offering, and it should count?

Furthermore,

there is another difficulty from the opposite case:

a guilt-offering for robbery and a guilt-offering for misuse,

which are required to be brought as two-year-olds,

that he slaughtered for the sake of a Passover-offering,

whose law is specifically that it be a one-year-old—

should they be accepted,

since the matter is certainly recognizable,

for a Passover-offering is a one-year-old, whereas these

—a guilt-offering for robbery and a guilt-offering for misuse—

are two-year-olds?

And we resolve:

Rather,

one must say another resolution: the distinction

between a one-year-old and a two-year-old is not in people’s awareness;

people do not distinguish between these,

for

behold,

there is a one-year-old

that is large

and appears

that it appears

as a two-year-old, and there is a two-year-old

that is small

and appears as a

one-year-old.

And we object:

A he-goat,

a male goat of a sin-offering, burnt-offering, or peace-offering,

that he slaughtered for the sake of an asham—should it be accepted,

since an asham comes only from sheep or rams, and if so, the matter is recognizable that it is not an asham,

for this one

the asham-offering comes from sheep that have

wool, whereas this one

the he-goat has

hair?

And we answer:

They say—

those who see will say: it is possible that this is an asham, and this is not a male goat but

a black ram,

it is a black ram, and it is fit even for an asham [and ordinary he-goats are black, which is why “black” was stated]. And if so, the matter is not recognizable merely because he brought a he-goat, for it resembles a ram that is valid for an asham.

And we object:

A calf and a bull,

a sin-offering [such as the bull brought by an anointed priest who sinned]

that he slaughtered for the sake of a Passover-offering—

or

for

an asham—should they be accepted,

since the matter is recognizable,

for there is no calf or bull for a Passover-offering or an asham,

as they come only from the flock?