Menachot 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

And since it is offered as a voluntary offering, it is certainly not possible to continue entertaining a thought that it is being performed not for its sake during its other services,

and

because a sacrifice that is

a voluntary offering—

is it permitted to alter its designation?!

Is it permitted to alter its designation during its services? But the verse says: “If his sacrifice is a sacrifice of peace-offerings,” from which it is learned that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of a peace-offering. And we raised the following question:

Shall we say that our Mishna,

which states that meal-offerings whose handfuls were removed not for their sake do not fulfill their owners’ obligation,

is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

as we find that Rabbi Shimon said that they even fulfill their owners’ obligation?

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal-offerings whose handfuls were removed not for their sake,

including even the sin-offering meal-offering, which our Mishna states is invalid, are

valid, and

even

they fulfill their owners’ obligation,

because

meal-offerings are not comparable to animal sacrifices.

Therefore, although with regard to animal sacrifices Rabbi Shimon agrees that slaughtering a sin-offering not for its sake invalidates it, and that with regard to other sacrifices it does not fulfill the owners’ obligation, with regard to meal-offerings Rabbi Shimon disagrees and deems even a sin-offering meal-offering valid so that it fulfills the obligation!

The reason for the distinction between meal-offerings and animal sacrifices according to Rabbi Shimon is that

the handful

of a

griddle

meal-offering, which is fried in a completely flat vessel and becomes hard,

for the sake of a deep-pan

meal-offering, which is fried in a deep vessel containing enough oil to make it bubble and become soft,

its physical characteristics

as a griddle meal-offering are evident, and

demonstrate concerning it

that it was made

for the sake of a griddle

and not for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering. Even when he says that he is making it for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering, his actions reveal that his statement is false!

Likewise, if one removes the handful of a sin-offering meal-offering that is

dry,

meaning that it contains no oil,

for the sake of

another meal-offering that is

mixed

with oil,

its physical characteristics,

as he did not pour oil over it and left it dry,

demonstrate concerning it

that it was not made for the sake of a mixed meal-offering,

for

it

is dry,

and it is evident that his statement is false.

But with animal sacrifices this is not so,

as there is no distinguishing feature in the services of one animal sacrifice as opposed to another, since the services of all animal sacrifices are identical:

one slaughtering for them all, one collection of the blood for them all, and one sprinkling for them all.

Therefore, if he altered their designation and thought that the service was not being performed for its proper designation, the alteration is effective, and the sacrifice does not fulfill its owners’ obligation.

Below, the Gemara presents an apparent contradiction between Rabbi Shimon’s statements concerning a meal-offering made not for its proper designation: in the beraita here, he says that it fulfills its owners’ obligation, whereas in another beraita he says that it does not fulfill its owners’ obligation. Several ways of resolving this contradiction in his statements are presented there, and from the amoraim’ explanations of Rabbi Shimon’s view there, it must be examined whether our Mishna is also consistent with his view.

And we say:

This works according to

the resolution of

Rav Ashi

there. It is possible to establish our Mishna even in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, because the beraita in which Rabbi Shimon says that the meal-offering fulfills its owners’ obligation deals with a case different from that of our Mishna.

And this is what is meant:

Rav Ashi said:

Rav Ashi said:

Here,

where Rabbi Shimon says that a thought that it is not being performed for its proper designation does not damage the offering, and that it fulfills its owners’ obligation, the case is one in which he says: “I am removing the handful of a griddle meal-offering

for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering,”

but he did not say “for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering”; he merely mentioned the name of the vessel, “deep-pan.” His words are meaningless and are not considered an alteration of the sacred designation. Whereas

here,

in the beraita in which Rabbi Shimon says, as does our Mishna, that it does not fulfill the obligation, the case is

one in which

he says: “I am removing the handful of a

griddle meal-offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering,”

and this is an alteration of the sacred designation, since he changed from a griddle meal-offering to a deep-pan meal-offering. In this case Rabbi Shimon agrees with our Mishna that it does not fulfill the owners’ obligation, since also in

the Mishna

the case is one of removing the handful of one

meal-offering

for the sake of

another meal-offering

;

that

is, as our Mishna explicitly states: “What is the case of ‘not for their sake and for their sake’ [with regard to a sin-offering meal-offering and a sota meal-offering]? For the sake of a voluntary meal-offering, and for the sake of a sin-offering meal-offering.” Therefore, it is well understood according to Rav Ashi that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with our Mishna.

But according to Rabba and Rava,

who did not resolve the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s statements as Rav Ashi did, but offered other resolutions that will be explained below,

what can be said?

Is our Mishna indeed not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon?

And if you would say

that perhaps it is possible to resolve

as Rabba resolves

the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s statements:

Here,

where Rabbi Shimon says that it fulfills the owners’ obligation, the case is

an alteration of the sacred designation,

where he changed from a griddle meal-offering to a deep-pan meal-offering. Since the physical characteristics of a griddle meal-offering demonstrate that it is a griddle meal-offering, he is making a false statement when he says that he is making it for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering, as it was not made in the manner of a deep-pan meal-offering. Therefore, such an alteration is not considered damaging. Whereas

here,

where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not fulfill the owners’ obligation, the case is

an alteration of the owners,

where the priest intended that it fulfill the obligation of someone who is not the owner of the meal-offering. Its physical characteristics do not demonstrate for whom it is being made, and therefore a thought involving an alteration of the owners is effective in causing damage, so that the sacrifice does not fulfill its owner’s obligation. Our Mishna, which states that it does not fulfill the owners’ obligation, deals with an alteration of the owners.

It is impossible to resolve our Mishna in this manner and establish it as consistent with Rabbi Shimon,

for

in

the Mishna

the case is one of

an alteration of the sacred designation! As it teaches: What is the case of ‘for their sake and not for their sake’?

For example, a sin-offering meal-offering whose handful was initially removed

for the sake of a sin-offering meal-offering and

afterward

for the sake of a voluntary meal-offering.

That is, the type of meal-offering was changed, and not the owners. Therefore, according to Rabba’s resolution, it is impossible to establish our Mishna as consistent with Rabbi Shimon.

Alternatively,

we may wish to resolve

as Rava resolves

the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s statements:

Here—

where Rabbi Shimon says that it fulfills the obligation—

the handful of a meal-offering was removed for the sake of another meal-offering,

such as a griddle meal-offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal-offering, because the verse states: “This is the law of the meal-offering,” from which it is learned that there is one law for all meal-offerings.

Here—

where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not fulfill the obligation—

the handful of a meal-offering was removed for the sake of an animal sacrifice,

as it was not stated with regard to a meal-offering and an animal sacrifice that they are governed by one law. Therefore, in such an alteration it does not fulfill the owners’ obligation. It is impossible to resolve matters in this way and establish our Mishna as dealing with removing the handful for the sake of an animal sacrifice and as being in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, since

our Mishna deals with a meal-offering for the sake of another meal-offering, as it teaches:

The Mishna explicitly states

“not for their sake and for their sake: for the sake of a voluntary meal-offering, for the sake of a sin-offering meal-offering,”

and not for the sake of an animal sacrifice.

Rather, according to

the resolutions of

Rabba and Rava,

it is necessarily the case that

it is clear that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara now presents the apparent contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s statements and the amoraim’ resolutions of it.

And they raise a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says,

it is stated concerning a meal-offering:

“It is most holy, like the sin-offering and like the guilt-offering.”

A meal-offering is called a sin-offering and is also called a guilt-offering. How so? If it is

a sin-offering meal-offering, it is like a sin-offering,

whose law is that if it was slaughtered not for its proper designation, it is invalid, as it is stated at the beginning of Tractate Zevachim: “All sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, but they do not fulfill their owners’ obligation, except for the Paschal offering and the sin-offering,” which are entirely invalid.

Therefore, if its handful was removed not for its proper designation,

it is

invalid like a sin-offering.

But if it is

a voluntary meal-offering, it is like a guilt-offering; therefore, if its handful was removed not for its proper designation,

it is

valid

like all other sacrifices,

and

its law

is like that of a guilt-offering: Just as a guilt-offering is valid but does not effect acceptance,

as we learned in the Mishna at the beginning of Tractate Zevachim, meaning that the sacrifice is valid but does not fulfill the owners’ obligation,

so too a voluntary meal-offering is valid but does not effect acceptance!

If so, this presents a difficulty with Rabbi Shimon’s statement above, in which he said that all meal-offerings whose handfuls were removed not for their sake are valid and even fulfill their owners’ obligation. Here we see that even a voluntary meal-offering, although valid, does not fulfill the obligation?

And we answer:

Rabba said: It is not difficult; here it is referring to an alteration of the sacred designation, whereas there it is referring to an alteration of the owners.

As explained above, when there is an alteration of the sacred designation, it fulfills the owners’ obligation, whereas when there is an alteration of the owners, it does not fulfill the obligation.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

Since,

after all,

the thought that the Merciful One invalidated

with regard to a meal-offering

is derived by means of an analogy,

as this matter is learned through an analogy between a meal-offering and animal sacrifices, from the verse: “It is most holy, like the sin-offering and like the guilt-offering.” Just as a thought invalidates animal sacrifices, as it is written: “The one who offers it, it shall not be reckoned,” so too a thought invalidates a meal-offering. If so, since we derive the law from animal sacrifices,

what difference is there between an alteration of the sacred designation and an alteration of the owners?

After all, with regard to animal sacrifices both are invalidating; from where do you derive that their laws differ with regard to a meal-offering?

Rabba said to him

to Abaye:

“Its physical characteristics demonstrate,”

as Rabbi Shimon says

that there is a distinction between meal-offerings and animal sacrifices—

it is a logical consideration, and Rabbi Shimon expounds the reason of the verse.

He expounds the reason underlying the verse, and therefore he holds that

a thought whose falsity is not apparent,

where his actions do not reveal that he is making a false statement, such as an alteration of the owners, since the action itself does not reveal whether he is performing the service for one owner or another,

the Merciful One invalidated

even with regard to a meal-offering, since this is considered an invalidating thought. But

a thought whose falsity is apparent,

such as an alteration of the sacred designation, where he removed the handful of a voluntary meal-offering for the sake of a sin-offering meal-offering, and his actions reveal that his thought is false, since he places oil and frankincense in it, neither of which is present in a sin-offering meal-offering—regarding this,

the Merciful One did not invalidate.

Therefore, although there is an analogy between a meal-offering and animal sacrifices, Rabbi Shimon distinguishes, on the basis of logical reasoning, between an alteration of the sacred designation and an alteration of the owners.

Mnemonic: A burnt-offering, a burnt-offering, pinching and squeezing; a bird sin-offering; offerings of the most sacred order; offerings of lesser sanctity.

Mnemonic: A burnt offering, a burnt offering—pinching and draining; a bird sin offering; most sacred offerings; lesser sacred offerings.

The Gemara now raises difficulties and offers answers concerning various forms of alteration, in which one might seemingly say that the physical characteristics demonstrate the true designation.

And we raise an objection:

But from now,

given that we have said that when the physical characteristics contradict his thought, the thought does not invalidate the offering,

a bird burnt-offering

whose pinching is performed above the midpoint line, if it happened

that he pinched it above

the midpoint line with the intention of making it

for the sake of a bird sin-offering [

as a sin-offering is performed below the midpoint line],

will it effect acceptance—

will it fulfill the obligation, since

its physical characteristics

of having been performed above

demonstrate concerning it that it is a bird burnt-offering, for if it were a bird sin-offering,

he would have performed it below

as that is the law of a bird sin-offering? And why, then, does the Mishna in Zevachim [65a] state concerning this case that it did not fulfill the owners’ obligation?

And we answer: This is not a case in which “its physical characteristics demonstrate” that it is a burnt-offering and not a sin-offering, because

is that so?

The pinching of a

bird sin-offering above—is it not valid?!

Is a sin-offering not found above, and is it not valid when performed there?

For the Master said:

“Pinching is valid anywhere on the altar,”

even above. Therefore, pinching a bird burnt-offering above for the sake of a sin-offering is a thought whose falsity is not apparent, since it is possible that this is a sin-offering; and that is why it did not fulfill the obligation.

And we raise a difficulty from another case:

A bird burnt-offering whose blood was squeezed above

the midpoint line

for the sake of a bird sin-offering—will it effect acceptance!

The law of a bird burnt-offering is that its blood is squeezed against the wall of the altar and above, whereas the law of a bird sin-offering is that its blood is first sprinkled and afterward squeezed, and this is performed below the midpoint line. If so,

its physical characteristics demonstrate concerning it that it is a bird burnt-offering. For if it were a bird sin-offering, he would have performed it below, and

also

the sprinkling

before the squeezing

he would have performed for it?