Text version of this daf: original and translation

Menachot 2a — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the First Mishna We learned at the beginning of tractate Zevahim that one who thinks an improper thought at the time of performing the service of the offering, such as “a change of…

Original text — Menachot 2a

מתניתין:

כל המנחות

הטעונות קמיצה, כגון מנחת מרחשת,

שנקמצו שלא לשמן

, שחשב הכהן בשעת קמיצת המרחשת לשם מנחת מחבת, הרי הן

כשרות

, ומקטירין את הקומץ, והשיריים נאכלין לכהנים,

אלא שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה,

וצריכים הבעלים להביא מנחה אחרת לשמה, כדי לצאת ידי חובת הנדר.

חוץ ממנחת חוטא

, כגון הנשבע לשקר [והיה אותו החוטא דל ביותר, שאין ידו משגת להביא אפילו תורים או בני יונה לחטאתו, ואז דינו להביא מנחת חטאת],

ומנחת קנאות

שמביאה הסוטה, ונאמר בה "עוון". ובמנחות אלו אם חשב בהן הכהן שלא לשמן, הרי הן פסולות, כמו המחשב בזבח חטאת שלא לשמו, שנפסל הזבח.

ומבארת המשנה את עבודות המנחה, שאם חשב בהן מחשבה שלא לשמה פסלן, וארבעת עבודות הללו הם כנגד ארבעת עבודות הדם שבזבח.

א.

מנחת חוטא ומנחת קנאות שקמצן

הכהן במחשבה

שלא לשמן

ובדומה לשחיטת זבח החטאת שלא לשמה.

ב. ו

נתן

את הקומץ

בכלי

שרת כדי לקדשו, במחשבת שלא לשמו, ובדומה לקבלת דם זבח החטאת שלא לשמו.

ג.

והלך

עם הקומץ אל המזבח, במחשבה שלא לשמה, ובדומה להולכת דם זבח החטאת שלא לשמו.

ד.

והקטיר

את הקומץ שלהן על המזבח במחשבת

שלא לשמן

ובדומה לזריקת דם זבח החטאת שלא לשמו.

או

שאת ארבעת העבודות האלו במנחות חוטא וסוטה חלקם עשה

לשמן ו

חלקם עשה

שלא לשמן, או

שעשה חלקם במחשבת

שלא לשמן ו

חלקם

לשמן

הרי הן

פסולות!

ואין מקטירין את הקומץ ואין שייריהן נאכלין לכהנים, כי אין צריך לקלקל דווקא בכל ארבעת העבודות, אלא די אפילו בחלקם.

כיצד

הוא עושה את המנחה במחשבה

לשמן ו

במחשבה

שלא לשמן?

אם בתחילה חושב

לשם מנחת חוטא ו

אח"כ חושב

לשם מנחת נדבה!

והיאך הוא עושה את המנחה

שלא לשמן ולשמן?

אם בתחילה מחשב

לשם מנחת נדבה ו

אח"כ

לשם מנחת חוטא!

בכל האופנים הללו הוא פסל את המנחה.

גמרא:

והוינן בה: מדקתני "כל המנחות שנקמצו שלא לשמן כשירות אלא שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה" משמע שמנחה אשר לא נקמצה לשמה, הרי היא כשירה לכל דיניה, חוץ מענין זה בלבד - שלא עלתה לבעליה לשם חובה! כי

למה לי למיתנא

באריכות הלשון ולומר "

אלא

שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה",

ליתני

בקצרה "

ולא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה

"!? ומזה שהוסיף התנא במשנה את המילה "אלא", נראה ד

הא קא משמע לן

: שדווקא

לבעלים הוא דלא עלו

המנחות

לשום חובה

, משום שנעשו לשם מנחה אחרת,

הא מנחה גופה כשירה

, המנחה עצמה נשארת כשירה על אף שלא חישב בה כהלכתה!

ו

כיון שלמדנו שהמנחה עצמה נשארת כשרה, לגמרי, הדין הוא ש

אסור לשנויי

בה שינוי נוסף, שגם אם עבד בה עבודה אחת שלא לשמה, אסור להמשיך ולעשות בה עבודה נוספת שלא לשמה.

ודין זה, שגם לאחר שחישב באחת מעבודותיה שלא לשמה בכל זאת אסור לעשות בה שינוי נוסף, הוא

כד

אמר

רבא

לענין זבחים.

דאמר רבא: עולה

ששינה בה כ

ששחטה

במחשבה

שלא לשמה

, שאינה עולה לבעלים לשם חובה,

אסור

להמשיך ו

לזרוק

את

דמה שלא לשמה!

ואת טעם הדין הזה ניתן ללמוד בשני אופנים:

איבעית אימא

מ

סברא, ואיבעית אימא קרא

ישנו מקרא שמלמדנו!

ומבארת הגמרא

איבעית אימא סברא

: וכי

משום דמשני בה

ששינה כשחשב שלא לשמה באחת העבודות, האם

כל הני

עבודות נוספות

לישני בה וניזיל?

ימשיך לשנות בהם? והרי מנחה כשירה היא וחייב להשלים את עבודותיה במחשבת לשמה המחוייבת בה!?

ואיבעית אימא קרא

: דכתיב "

מוצא שפתיך

תשמור ועשית כאשר נדרת לה' אלהיך נדבה

". ויש לדייק בלשון הכתוב:

נדבה?

וכי קרבן נדבה הוא [שאין עליו חיוב אחריות] והרי בתחילת הפסוק נאמר ש

נדר הוא!?

[וחייב באחריותו].

אלא

, בא הכתוב ללמדנו,

אם כמה שנדרת עשית

, שחשבת בו לשמו כהלכתו -

יהא

בהקרבתו כהלכתו קיום ה

נדר

שנדרת.

ואם לאו

, שחשבת בו מחשבת שלא לשמו -

יהא

אותו קרבן כשר וקרב בתורת

נדבה,

אך לא תצא בו ידי חובת נדרך.

Translation

Introduction to the First Mishna We learned at the beginning of tractate Zevahim that one who thinks an improper thought at the time of performing the service of the offering, such as “a change of sacred designation,” when he thought during its service that it was for the sake of another offering, or “a change of owners,” when he thought that through this offering someone who is not the owner of the offering would attain atonement, such a thought does not invalidate an olah or shelamim offering, but only a sin-offering. But even if this thought does not invalidate an olah or shelamim, the owners do not fulfill their obligation through such an offering; rather, they must bring another offering, which will be sacrificed for its proper designation and for the sake of its owners, as is proper. Likewise, in the four services of the meal-offering, which correspond to the four services of the blood [kemitza = slaughter; placing the handful in a service vessel = receiving; conveying = conveying; burning the handful = sprinkling the blood], the same halakha was stated: that a thought of change does not invalidate it, but the owners do not fulfill their obligation, except for a thought of change in a sinner’s meal-offering [and the meal-offering of jealousy of a sota, whose law is also that of a sinner’s meal-offering], in which a thought of change invalidates them just as it invalidates the sin-offering of an animal sacrifice. Mishna:

All the meal-offerings

that require kemitza, such as the meal-offering baked in a deep pan,

that were taken by the handful not for their sake,

which means that the priest thought, at the time of taking the handful of the meal-offering baked in a deep pan, that it was for the sake of the meal-offering baked on a griddle, they are

valid,

and the handful is burned, while the remainder is eaten by the priests,

except that they do not count for the owners for the sake of their obligation,

and the owners must bring another meal-offering for its sake, in order to fulfill the obligation of the vow.

Except for a sinner’s meal-offering,

such as one who swore falsely [and that sinner was extremely poor, unable to afford even turtledoves or young pigeons for his sin-offering, in which case his law is to bring a sin-offering meal-offering],

and the meal-offering of jealousy

that the sota brings, and concerning which “iniquity” was stated. And with these meal-offerings, if the priest thought of them not for their sake, they are disqualified, like one who thinks, with regard to a sin-offering animal sacrifice, that it is not for its sake, in which case the sacrifice is disqualified.

And the Mishna explains the services of the meal-offering: that if he thought in them a thought not for their sake, he disqualified them; and these four services correspond to the four services of the blood in an animal sacrifice.

a.

The sinner’s meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy, whose handful he took

the priest with the thought

not for their sake,

and this is similar to slaughtering a sin-offering animal sacrifice not for its sake.

b. And

placed

the handful

in a vessel

of service in order to sanctify it, with the thought that it was not for its sake, and this is similar to receiving the blood of a sin-offering animal sacrifice not for its sake.

c.

And conveyed

the handful to the altar, with the thought that it was not for its sake, and this is similar to conveying the blood of a sin-offering animal sacrifice not for its sake.

d.

And burned

their handful on the altar with the thought

not for their sake,

and this is similar to sprinkling the blood of a sin-offering animal sacrifice not for its sake.

Or

if he performed these four services in the sinner’s and the sota’s meal-offerings, part of them

for their sake and

part of them

not for their sake, or

if he performed part of them with the thought

not for their sake and

part of them

for their sake—

they are

disqualified!

The handful is not burned, and their remainder is not eaten by the priests, for it is not necessary to cause the deterioration specifically in all four services; rather, even in part of them it is sufficient.

How

does he perform the meal-offering with the thought

for its sake and

with the thought

not for its sake?

If at first he thinks

for the sake of a sinner’s meal-offering and

afterward thinks

for the sake of a freewill meal-offering!

And how does he perform the meal-offering

not for its sake and for its sake?

If at first he thinks

for the sake of a freewill meal-offering and

afterward

for the sake of a sinner’s meal-offering!

In all these cases he disqualified the meal-offering.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection concerning this: Since it teaches, “All the meal-offerings whose handfuls were taken not for their sake are valid, except that they do not count for the owners for the sake of their obligation,” it follows that a meal-offering whose handful was not taken for its sake is valid for all its laws, except for this matter alone—that it does not count for its owners for the sake of their obligation! For

why is it necessary for him to teach

at length and say

“except”

“that they do not count for the owners for the sake of their obligation,”

let him teach

briefly,

“and they do not count for the owners for the sake of their obligation”!

And from the fact that the tanna added the word “except” in the Mishna, it appears that

this teaches us:

specifically

it is for the owners that they do not count

the meal-offerings

for the sake of any obligation,

because they were performed for the sake of another meal-offering;

but the meal-offering itself is valid,

the meal-offering itself remains valid even though he did not think of it according to its law!

And

since we have learned that the meal-offering itself remains entirely valid, the law is that

it is forbidden to make another change

in it; even if he performed one service in it not for its sake, it is forbidden to continue and perform another service in it not for its sake.

And this law—that even after he thought in one of its services not for its sake, he is nevertheless forbidden to make another change in it—

as

said

Rava

with regard to animal sacrifices.

For Rava said: An olah

in which he made a change,

when he slaughtered it

with the thought

not for its sake,

which does not count for the owners for the sake of their obligation,

it is forbidden

to continue and

sprinkle

its

blood not for its sake!

And the reason for this law can be learned in two ways:

Alternatively, one may say—

from

reasoning; alternatively, one may say, from a verse—

there is a verse that teaches us this!

And the Gemara explains:

Alternatively, one may say, from reasoning:

Is it the case that

because he changed it,

because he changed it when he thought not for its sake in one of the services,

all these

additional services

should he change in it and continue?

Should he continue to change them? But the meal-offering is valid, and he is obligated to complete its services with the thought for its sake that is required in it!?

And alternatively, one may say, from a verse:

as it is written:

“That which emerges from your lips

you shall guard and perform, as you vowed to the Lord your God, a freewill offering.”

And one should be precise in the wording of the verse:

“A freewill offering”?

Is it truly a freewill offering [which has no obligation of responsibility attached to it]? But at the beginning of the verse it is stated that

it is a vow! [

And he is liable for its responsibility.]

Rather,

the verse comes to teach us:

if you performed it as you vowed,

having thought of it for its sake according to its law—

there shall be

in its sacrifice according to its law fulfillment of the

vow

that you vowed.

But if not,

having thought of it with a thought not for its sake—

there shall be

that offering, valid and sacrificed as a

freewill offering,

but you will not fulfill through it the obligation of your vow.