Text version of this daf: original and translation
Menachot 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English
Menachot 2a (מנחות ב.): Introduction to the First Mishna We learned at the beginning of tractate Zevachim that one who entertains an inappropriate intention during the service of an offering—for…
Original text — Menachot 2a (ב.)
מתניתין:
כל המנחות
הטעונות קמיצה, כגון מנחת מרחשת,
שנקמצו שלא לשמן
, שחשב הכהן בשעת קמיצת המרחשת לשם מנחת מחבת, הרי הן
כשרות
, ומקטירין את הקומץ, והשיריים נאכלין לכהנים,
אלא שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה,
וצריכים הבעלים להביא מנחה אחרת לשמה, כדי לצאת ידי חובת הנדר.
חוץ ממנחת חוטא
, כגון הנשבע לשקר [והיה אותו החוטא דל ביותר, שאין ידו משגת להביא אפילו תורים או בני יונה לחטאתו, ואז דינו להביא מנחת חטאת],
ומנחת קנאות
שמביאה הסוטה, ונאמר בה "עוון". ובמנחות אלו אם חשב בהן הכהן שלא לשמן, הרי הן פסולות, כמו המחשב בזבח חטאת שלא לשמו, שנפסל הזבח.
ומבארת המשנה את עבודות המנחה, שאם חשב בהן מחשבה שלא לשמה פסלן, וארבעת עבודות הללו הם כנגד ארבעת עבודות הדם שבזבח.
א.
מנחת חוטא ומנחת קנאות שקמצן
הכהן במחשבה
שלא לשמן
ובדומה לשחיטת זבח החטאת שלא לשמה.
ב. ו
נתן
את הקומץ
בכלי
שרת כדי לקדשו, במחשבת שלא לשמו, ובדומה לקבלת דם זבח החטאת שלא לשמו.
ג.
והלך
עם הקומץ אל המזבח, במחשבה שלא לשמה, ובדומה להולכת דם זבח החטאת שלא לשמו.
ד.
והקטיר
את הקומץ שלהן על המזבח במחשבת
שלא לשמן
ובדומה לזריקת דם זבח החטאת שלא לשמו.
או
שאת ארבעת העבודות האלו במנחות חוטא וסוטה חלקם עשה
לשמן ו
חלקם עשה
שלא לשמן, או
שעשה חלקם במחשבת
שלא לשמן ו
חלקם
לשמן
הרי הן
פסולות!
ואין מקטירין את הקומץ ואין שייריהן נאכלין לכהנים, כי אין צריך לקלקל דווקא בכל ארבעת העבודות, אלא די אפילו בחלקם.
כיצד
הוא עושה את המנחה במחשבה
לשמן ו
במחשבה
שלא לשמן?
אם בתחילה חושב
לשם מנחת חוטא ו
אח"כ חושב
לשם מנחת נדבה!
והיאך הוא עושה את המנחה
שלא לשמן ולשמן?
אם בתחילה מחשב
לשם מנחת נדבה ו
אח"כ
לשם מנחת חוטא!
בכל האופנים הללו הוא פסל את המנחה.
גמרא:
והוינן בה: מדקתני "כל המנחות שנקמצו שלא לשמן כשירות אלא שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה" משמע שמנחה אשר לא נקמצה לשמה, הרי היא כשירה לכל דיניה, חוץ מענין זה בלבד - שלא עלתה לבעליה לשם חובה! כי
למה לי למיתנא
באריכות הלשון ולומר "
אלא
שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה",
ליתני
בקצרה "
ולא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה
"!? ומזה שהוסיף התנא במשנה את המילה "אלא", נראה ד
הא קא משמע לן
: שדווקא
לבעלים הוא דלא עלו
המנחות
לשום חובה
, משום שנעשו לשם מנחה אחרת,
הא מנחה גופה כשירה
, המנחה עצמה נשארת כשירה על אף שלא חישב בה כהלכתה!
ו
כיון שלמדנו שהמנחה עצמה נשארת כשרה, לגמרי, הדין הוא ש
אסור לשנויי
בה שינוי נוסף, שגם אם עבד בה עבודה אחת שלא לשמה, אסור להמשיך ולעשות בה עבודה נוספת שלא לשמה.
ודין זה, שגם לאחר שחישב באחת מעבודותיה שלא לשמה בכל זאת אסור לעשות בה שינוי נוסף, הוא
כד
אמר
רבא
לענין זבחים.
דאמר רבא: עולה
ששינה בה כ
ששחטה
במחשבה
שלא לשמה
, שאינה עולה לבעלים לשם חובה,
אסור
להמשיך ו
לזרוק
את
דמה שלא לשמה!
ואת טעם הדין הזה ניתן ללמוד בשני אופנים:
איבעית אימא
מ
סברא, ואיבעית אימא קרא
ישנו מקרא שמלמדנו!
ומבארת הגמרא
איבעית אימא סברא
: וכי
משום דמשני בה
ששינה כשחשב שלא לשמה באחת העבודות, האם
כל הני
עבודות נוספות
לישני בה וניזיל?
ימשיך לשנות בהם? והרי מנחה כשירה היא וחייב להשלים את עבודותיה במחשבת לשמה המחוייבת בה!?
ואיבעית אימא קרא
: דכתיב "
מוצא שפתיך
תשמור ועשית כאשר נדרת לה' אלהיך נדבה
". ויש לדייק בלשון הכתוב:
נדבה?
וכי קרבן נדבה הוא [שאין עליו חיוב אחריות] והרי בתחילת הפסוק נאמר ש
נדר הוא!?
[וחייב באחריותו].
אלא
, בא הכתוב ללמדנו,
אם כמה שנדרת עשית
, שחשבת בו לשמו כהלכתו -
יהא
בהקרבתו כהלכתו קיום ה
נדר
שנדרת.
ואם לאו
, שחשבת בו מחשבת שלא לשמו -
יהא
אותו קרבן כשר וקרב בתורת
נדבה,
אך לא תצא בו ידי חובת נדרך.
Translation
Introduction to the First Mishna We learned at the beginning of tractate Zevachim that one who entertains an inappropriate intention during the service of an offering—for example, shinui kodesh, a change of sacred designation, meaning that he had the intention during its service that it be for the sake of another offering; or shinui ba'alim, a change of ownership, meaning that he had the intention that someone other than the offering's owner achieve atonement through this offering—such an intention does not disqualify an olah or a shelamim, but does disqualify a sin offering. However, even if this intention does not disqualify an olah or a shelamim, the owners do not fulfill their obligation through such an offering. Rather, they must bring another offering, which must be sacrificed properly, for its own sake and for the sake of its owners. The same halakha was stated regarding the four services of a meal offering, which correspond to the four services involving the blood: kemitza corresponds to slaughter; placing the kometz in a service vessel corresponds to receiving the blood; carrying corresponds to carrying; and burning the kometz corresponds to sprinkling the blood. An intention involving a change of designation does not disqualify the offering, but the owners do not fulfill their obligation—except in the case of an inappropriate intention concerning a sinner's meal offering [and the meal offering of a sotah brought as a jealousy offering, whose law is also like that of a sinner's meal offering], in which such an intention disqualifies the offering, just as it disqualifies a sin-offering sacrifice. Mishna:
All meal offerings
that require kemitza, such as a meal offering prepared in a deep pan,
that were pinched not for their own sake,
meaning that the priest had the intention, while performing kemitza on the meal offering prepared in a deep pan, that it be for the sake of a meal offering prepared on a griddle,
are valid,
and the kometz is burned, while the remainder is eaten by the priests,
but they do not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation,
and the owners must bring another meal offering for its own sake, in order to fulfill the obligation of their vow.
Except for a sinner's meal offering,
such as in the case of one who swore falsely [and that sinner was extremely poor, unable even to afford turtledoves or young pigeons for his sin offering, in which case his law is to bring a sinner's meal offering],
and a jealousy offering,
which the sotah brings, and concerning which the verse says “iniquity.” In these meal offerings, if the priest had the intention that they not be for their own sake, they are disqualified, just as when one has an intention concerning a sin-offering sacrifice that it not be for its own sake, in which case the sacrifice is disqualified.
The Mishna explains which services of the meal offering disqualify it if one had an intention that it not be for its own sake; these four services correspond to the four services involving the blood of a sacrifice.
a.
A sinner's meal offering and a jealousy offering whose kometz he pinched
the priest with the intention
that they not be for their own sake,
analogous to slaughtering a sin-offering sacrifice not for its own sake.
b. And
placed
the kometz
in a vessel
of service in order to sanctify it, with the intention that it not be for its own sake, analogous to receiving the blood of a sin-offering sacrifice not for its own sake.
c.
And carried
the kometz to the altar with the intention that it not be for its own sake, analogous to carrying the blood of a sin-offering sacrifice not for its own sake.
d.
And burned
their kometz on the altar with the intention
that they not be for their own sake,
analogous to sprinkling the blood of a sin-offering sacrifice not for its own sake.
Or
he performed some of these four services of the sinner's and sotah's meal offerings
for their own sake and
some of them
not for their own sake; or
he performed some of them with the intention
that they not be for their own sake and
some of them
for their own sake—
they are
disqualified!
The kometz may not be burned, and their remainder may not be eaten by the priests, because it is not necessary to corrupt the offering specifically in all four services; it is sufficient even to do so in only some of them.
How
does he perform the meal offering with the intention
that it be for its own sake and
with the intention
that it not be for its own sake?
If at first he has the intention
that it be for the sake of a sinner's meal offering and
afterward has the intention
that it be for the sake of a voluntary meal offering!
And how does he perform the meal offering
not for its own sake and for its own sake?
If at first he has the intention
that it be for the sake of a voluntary meal offering and
afterward
for the sake of a sinner's meal offering!
In all these cases, he disqualifies the meal offering.
Gemara:
The Gemara raises a difficulty: Since the Mishna teaches, “All meal offerings whose kometz was pinched not for their own sake are valid, but they do not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation,” it implies that a meal offering whose kometz was not pinched for its own sake is valid in all respects, except for this one matter alone—that it does not count for its owners as fulfillment of their obligation.
Why do I need it to teach
this at length, saying,
“but
they do not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation”?
Let it teach
concisely,
“and they do not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation”!
And from the fact that the tanna added the word “but” in the Mishna, it appears that
this teaches us:
specifically
for the owners they do not count,
the meal offerings,
as fulfillment of any obligation,
because they were performed for the sake of another meal offering;
but the meal offering itself is valid,
the meal offering itself remains valid even though he did not have the proper intention concerning it.
And
since we have learned that the meal offering itself remains completely valid, the law is that
it is prohibited to make another change
to it: Even if he performed one service of it not for its own sake, it is prohibited to continue and perform another service of it not for its own sake.
This law—that even after having an intention concerning one of its services not for its own sake, it is nevertheless prohibited to make another change to it—was
as
stated by
Rava
with regard to sacrifices.
For Rava said: An olah
in which he made a change when he
slaughtered it
with the intention
that it not be for its own sake,
so that it does not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation,
is prohibited
to continue and
sprinkle
its
blood not for its own sake!
The reason for this law can be learned in either of two ways:
One might say—
from
reasoning; or one might say, from a verse—
there is a verse that teaches us this!
The Gemara explains
“one might say, from reasoning”:
But is it the case that
because he made a change in it,
because he changed it by having an intention not for its own sake in one of the services,
all these
additional services
should he continue to change in it?
Should he continue to make such changes in them? But the meal offering is valid, and he is obligated to complete its services with the intention for its own sake, as required of it!?
And one might say, from a verse:
As it is written:
“That which has issued from your lips
you shall observe and perform, as you have vowed to the Lord your God—a freewill offering.”
The Gemara analyzes the wording of the verse:
“A freewill offering”?
Is it a voluntary offering [for which there is no further obligation of responsibility]? But at the beginning of the verse it says that
it is a vow! [
and he is liable for its responsibility].
Rather,
the verse comes to teach us:
If you performed it as you vowed,
meaning that you had the proper intention concerning it, for its own sake—
there shall be
in offering it properly the fulfillment of the
vow
that you made.
But if not,
meaning that you had an intention concerning it not for its own sake—
there shall be
that offering, valid and sacrificed as a
freewill offering,
but you will not fulfill through it the obligation of your vow.