Menachot 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

? And we explain:

Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda holds: Anything that is

a mixture of

one species with its own species and

also

another substance,

which is not its species, is mixed into it, we say:

Remove its own species as though it were absent, and the substance that is not its own species

that is mixed with it

predominates over it and nullifies it!

And this is the case here as well: The oil does not nullify the oil because it is of the same species, but the fine flour of the kometz nullifies the oil absorbed in it from the libation offering. Consequently, one cannot say that this oil still exists in the libation offering; rather, it belongs to the kometz. Thus, with regard to the kometz, it is a case of “its oil was increased,” whereas with regard to the meal-offerings, it is a case of “its oil was diminished.” [The Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda of the Mishna and deem valid a kometz that became mixed with a libation offering, follow their own approach that offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another, even when one species is mixed with another species — explanation of the sugya according to the Rashash and the commentary of Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Mishna].

It was stated: A kometz of

taken from

a sinner’s meal-offering [

and the law of a sinner’s meal-offering is that no oil is placed in it at all]

whose oil was placed on it,

that is, oil was placed on the kometz,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is invalid! And Reish Lakish said: It itself

—the kometz—has this as the beginning of its mitzva:

he immerses it

the kometz of the sinner’s meal-offering

in the remainder of the log

of oil from another meal-offering that contains oil

! And

only after he rubs the kometz in oil

does he offer it

on the altar . And all the more so is it valid to offer it when he applied oil to the kometz.

And we raise an objection to Reish Lakish:

But it is written

with regard to a sinner’s meal-offering:

“He shall not place oil on it and shall not put frankincense on it”?

And we answer:

That

verse means this:

He shall not establish oil for it

for the sinner’s meal-offering before the kemitza

as for its counterparts,

as is done with the other meal-offerings, for which the oil is established before their kemitza. But after the kemitza, if he applies oil to the kometz, it is valid. 80 .

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish:

It is taught in a beraita: A kometz

that is dry,

which contains no oil,

that became mixed with one mixed with oil,

with a kometz of a meal-offering mixed with oil

—he shall offer

everything on the altar

! Rabbi Yehuda says: He shall not offer it! [

The Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda follow their respective positions, as they disagreed in the Mishna.]

Is it not

apparently the beraita is speaking about

a kometz of a sinner’s meal-offering

which is dry,

that became mixed

with

a kometz of a voluntary meal-offering

which is mixed with oil ? And specifically because it became mixed with another kometz, both of which are offerings that ascend to the altar, the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that “he shall offer it.” But if one simply placed oil [which is not an offering that ascends to the altar] on the kometz of a sinner’s meal-offering, the Rabbis would agree that it is invalid for offering. This is difficult for Reish Lakish, is it not?

And we answer:

No,

the beraita is not speaking about a mixture of the kometzim of a voluntary meal-offering and a sinner’s meal-offering. Rather, it is speaking of a mixture in which

the meal-offering of bulls and rams,

which are relatively “dry,” since they contain only two log of oil per isaron of flour, became mixed

with the meal-offering of sheep,

which is relatively “mixed with oil,” since it contains three log of oil per isaron of flour. Since the meal-offering of bulls and rams is also mixed with oil, but is dry in comparison with the meal-offering of sheep, the beraita used the expression “a dry one that became mixed with one mixed with oil.” Only in this case did the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree. Rabbi Yehuda’s reason for declaring it invalid is that the consistency of its mixture changed—from a thick mixture to a thin mixture. But in the case of a kometz of a sinner’s meal-offering, which contains no oil at all, everyone agrees that it is not invalidated when oil is placed on it after its kemitza!

And we challenge this:

But it explicitly teaches it

with regard to the meal-offering of bulls and rams at the beginning of that same beraita, as it teaches:

The meal-offering of bulls and rams

that became mixed

with the meal-offering of sheep, and

likewise

a dry one that became mixed with one mixed with oil—

he shall offer it. Rabbi Yehuda says—

he shall not offer it!

If so, you are compelled to say that the phrase “a dry one that became mixed with one mixed with oil” does not refer to the meal-offering of bulls and rams, but rather to a kometz of a sinner’s meal-offering that became mixed with a voluntary meal-offering.

And we answer: The beraita is indeed speaking of a meal-offering of bulls that became mixed with a meal-offering of sheep, and the phrase “a dry one that became mixed with one mixed with oil”

is an explanation of it,

meaning that it explains what was stated initially, “the meal-offering of bulls,” and so it says: The meal-offering of bulls, and so on—that is, a dry one that became mixed with one mixed with oil!

Rava raised a dilemma: If a kometz expressed its oil

that was absorbed within it

onto the wood

of the arrangement on the altar, and he then placed the kometz itself on that wood and burned it there,

what is

the law? Is it invalidated because the kometz was diminished?

Do we say:

Attachments of offerings—the oil in the wood, which became attached to the kometz when he again placed the kometz on the wood containing the oil—

are considered offerings

as though the oil were absorbed in the kometz, so that the kometz was not diminished and is valid,

or are they not considered offerings

and it is invalid? [Another interpretation:

Attachments of offerings

—that is, the oil attached to the kometz—

are considered offerings

and must be burned, for if he does not burn it, it is as though he burned an incomplete kometz; and if it was expressed onto the wood, he must burn the kometz together with the wood,

or are they not considered offerings

and it is not considered a kometz that was diminished.]

Rabina said to Rav Ashi:

But

is this not

the same dispute as that

of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish? For it was stated: One who offers

outside the Temple courtyard

a limb

from a sacrifice

that does not contain an olive-bulk, and a bone completes it to an olive-bulk [

which is the measure for liability to karet for offering outside the Temple courtyard]

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable,

as one who offers an olive-bulk of consecrated matter outside the Temple courtyard.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt!

And we explain their reasoning:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable

because he holds that

attachments of offerings

—namely, the bone attached to the flesh, which is an “offering”—

are considered offerings, whereas Reish Lakish said: He is exempt

because he holds that

attachments of offerings are not considered offerings.

And we reject this: Our question is not comparable to their dispute. Rather,

it is a question according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, and it is a question

also

according to Reish Lakish.

The question according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Yoḥanan stated there

that attachments of offerings are considered offerings

only with regard to a bone, which is of the same species

as

the flesh, but here,

the oil

is not of the same species as the kometz,

as the latter is flour and the former is oil. Perhaps

not

do we say that attachments of offerings are considered offerings.

Or perhaps

the opposite may be said:

Even Reish

Lakish stated

that attachments of offerings are not considered offerings

only with regard to a bone, which is separable;

it can be separated from the flesh.

And if it separates

from the arrangement and falls,

there is no mitzva to return it. But oil, which is not separable

from the flour,

not

do we say that it is not considered an offering,

or perhaps there is no difference?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Mishna:

Two meal-offerings that had not yet undergone kemitza

still

and became mixed with one another—if

they became mixed in such a way that some flour sufficient for a kometz remained from each meal-offering, unmixed with the other meal-offering and discernible on its own, and

he can take a kometz from

one meal-offering

separately, and from

the other meal-offering

separately,

the meal-offerings

are valid. But if not,

that is, if all the flour of the two meal-offerings became mixed with one another, both of them are

invalid,

since a meal-offering is valid only when the entire kometz is from that meal-offering itself, and not when flour from another meal-offering became mixed with it.

A kometz that became mixed with a meal-offering

of another offering

that had not undergone kemitza—

he shall not burn

the entire mixture, since one may not burn together with the kometz something that is not subject to burning. Nor can he now take two kometzim for the two meal-offerings from the place where the kometz became mixed into the mixture, because perhaps each kometz will contain flour from the other meal-offering.

And if he burned

the entire mixture,

the one that had undergone kemitza has fulfilled its owners’ obligation

and they have discharged their vows, since its kometz, which was in the mixture, was burned on the altar;

but the one that had not undergone kemitza has not fulfilled its owners’ obligation,

because it is not permitted without kemitza.

If its kometz became mixed

of a meal-offering

with its remnants,

of that same meal-offering,

or with the remnants of its counterpart —

he shall not burn

the mixture, since the remnants of a meal-offering are prohibited for burning. This is because anything part of which is offered on the altar is subject by Torah law to the prohibition against burning its other parts. 85 .

And if

he nevertheless

burned it, it has fulfilled the owners’ obligation,

since the kometz of their meal-offering was burned on the altar.

Gemara:

Rav Ḥisda said:

A piece of meat

of an unslaughtered animal

that became mixed with two pieces of meat from a slaughtered animal

is nullified

the unslaughtered piece [by the majority]

among the slaughtered pieces,

and if a person touched one of the pieces, he is not impure, because this mixture is considered a mixture of one species with another species, to which the law of nullification by the majority applies.

For it is impossible

ever

for the slaughtered piece to become an unslaughtered animal

and render one impure; therefore, with regard to the slaughtered piece, the unslaughtered piece is considered another species. 86 .

And a slaughtered piece

that became mixed with two pieces of an unslaughtered animal

is not nullified among the unslaughtered pieces .

And if teruma touched one of the pieces, it is not certainly impure; rather, it is possibly impure, and one does not burn it , because

it is possible for the unslaughtered piece to become slaughtered

that is, it is possible for the unslaughtered piece to have the status of a slaughtered piece in this respect—that it does not render one impure. This is

for when it becomes putrid,

when the meat of the unslaughtered animal putrefies and is no longer fit for consumption,

its impurity departs,

and therefore it is considered the same species and is not nullified. According to Rav Ḥisda, then, one follows the majority that effects the nullification: If the majority can become like the minority, they are considered one species; if not, they are considered different species.

And Rabbi Hanina said:

we follow the nullified substance. Therefore,

anything that can cause

the nullified minority

to become like it,

like the majority that nullifies it—for example, a minority of neveila that became mixed with a majority of slaughtered meat—is considered min be-mino, and

is not

nullified; and anything that cannot cause

the nullified substance

to become like it,

like the substance that nullifies it—for example, a minority of slaughtered meat that became mixed with a majority of neveila—is considered min be-she-eino mino, and

is nullified,

and all the pieces are considered certainly impure, and teruma that came into contact with one of them is burned.

And we inquire:

According to whom

did Rav Hisda and Rabbi Hanina disagree?