Menachot 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

Because they maintain that the fact that the verse referred to burning in the language of eating comes to teach us a different law, and this is how they expound the verse:

This

that the Merciful One expressed

burning

in the language of eating -

it is to tell you:

It makes no difference whether, when formulating an intention

concerning something that is to be burned,

he uses the language of "eating" with regard to the altar ,

for example, if he intended to "feed" the kometz to the altar on the following day ,

or whether he formulates an intention using the language of "burning" with regard to the altar

on the following day: It is piggul.

Alternatively,

or one may say that according to the Rabbis, the fact that the verse referred to burning in the language of eating comes to teach

that just as eating requires an olive-bulk, so too burning requires an olive-bulk ,

so that there is no piggul intention concerning burning involving less than an olive-bulk, just as there is no piggul intention concerning eating involving less than an olive-bulk.

And "eating" forever

in the verse means an intention of eating

in its ordinary sense,

namely, to burn the kometz and eat the remainder. [It follows that the two answers of the Gemara disagree concerning the Rabbis' view of the law when one intended burning using the language of eating, for example, "to feed the altar on the following day": According to the first answer in the Gemara, it is piggul; according to the second answer in the Gemara, it is not piggul.]

That is, the two answers of the Gemara disagree about the following according to the Rabbis: if one intended burning in the language of eating—for example, “to feed the altar on the following day”—is this pigul or not? According to the first answer in the Gemara, it is pigul. According to the second answer in the Gemara, it is not pigul.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who learns from the verse also the law that an intention concerning the eating of a person applies to the altar, and so on, says to you:

If so,

in accordance with the Rabbis' position that an intention concerning the eating of a person does not apply to the altar, nor an intention concerning the eating of the altar to a person,

the Merciful One should have written, "If he eats, he eats." Alternatively,

He should have written,

"If he shall eat, he shall eat." What is the meaning of "eat, eat"?

Why did the verse change its wording? Rather, since the verse changed its wording,

you learn two things

from it: two laws are derived. First, the law of the Rabbis [either that formulating an intention in the language of eating with regard to the altar is piggul, according to the first answer in the Gemara, or that burning requires an olive-bulk, just as eating does, according to the second answer in the Gemara]. Second, the law of Rabbi Eliezer: An intention to burn something that is destined to be eaten, or to eat something destined to be burned, is likewise a piggul intention.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: And if Rabbi Eliezer's reason is indeed this,

that he derives his law from the fact that the verse changed its wording by saying "eat, eat"

-

he should also be liable for karet

And should you say that this is indeed so,

that according to Rabbi Eliezer one is liable for karet, then I will challenge you:

But you,

Rav Asi,

are the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that one is not liable for karet?!

He said to him,

Rav Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: The dispute

is a dispute among tanna'im according to Rabbi Eliezer

as to whether one is liable for karet or not:

There is one who says

that according to Rabbi Eliezer it is

invalid

by

Torah law,

because he derives it from "eat, eat," and it carries liability for karet. [This accords with Rabbi Zeira's understanding: If it is derived from the verse, it is complete piggul.]

And there is one who says

that according to Rabbi Eliezer it is only

invalid by rabbinic law,

for they invalidated it so that people would not come to validate an intention that follows the ordinary manner, from person to person or from altar to altar.

And the proof that tanna'im disagree according to Rabbi Eliezer is:

As it was taught in a beraita: One who slaughters the offering

and intended

to drink from its blood, [

that is, an intention of a person concerning the eating of the altar,]

on the following day,

or who intended

to burn from its flesh [

that is, an intention of the altar concerning the eating of a person,]

on the following day ,

or

to eat from its sacrificial portions [

that is, an intention of a person concerning the eating of the altar,]

on the following day,

the offering is

valid,

for the offering is invalidated only when one formulates an intention concerning the eating of a person with regard to the eating of a person, or concerning the eating of the altar with regard to the eating of the altar.

And Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it,

because he maintains that an intention concerning the eating of a person with regard to the eating of the altar, or concerning the eating of the altar with regard to the eating of a person, invalidates.

If he intended

to leave some of its blood

of the offering

until the following day,

although this intention involves neither the eating of a person nor the eating of the altar,

Rabbi Yehuda invalidates it! [

And the reason for his view will be explained below.]

Rabbi Elazar said: In this case as well,

where he intended to leave its blood until the following day,

Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it, and the Rabbis validate it

because this is not an intention concerning eating.

And we raised the following question:

Rabbi Yehuda,

who invalidates one who intends to leave some of its blood until the following day,

according to whom

does he hold?

If you say that it is according to the Rabbis,

who say that an intention concerning the eating of the altar does not apply to the eating of a person, nor an intention concerning the eating of a person to the eating of the altar, then this is difficult:

Now, if in that case,

where one formulates an intention concerning the eating of the altar with regard to the eating of a person, or vice versa, even though

he formulates the intention in the language of eating,

nevertheless

the Rabbis validate

because he is not formulating an intention concerning the eating of a person with regard to the eating of a person, or concerning the eating of the altar with regard to the eating of the altar,

here,

where he is not formulating an intention at all concerning either the eating of a person or the eating of the altar, but concerning leaving the blood,

is it not all the more so

that the Rabbis would not invalidate it?!

Rather

necessarily, Rabbi Yehuda, who deemed an intention to leave it valid,

according to Rabbi Eliezer

said his statement.

And

regarding this,

Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case,

with regard to an intention to leave it,

Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid, and the Rabbis deem it valid.

But this is difficult: If so,

Rabbi Elazar’s statement is identical to

the statement of

Rabbi Yehuda,

and both of them said the same thing—that Rabbi Eliezer deems an intention to leave it invalid. What, then, did Rabbi Elazar add to Rabbi Yehuda’s statement!?

And now we establish:

Rather,

the punishment of

karet

is what

distinguishes between them,

as Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar disagreed concerning Rabbi Eliezer’s position.

The tanna kamma,

namely, Rabbi Yehuda,

holds

that one who intends

to leave it—

it is merely invalid,

and there is no karet for it. But

in those cases

that the beraita mentioned at the outset, in which Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid—cases in which one intends to redirect food designated for people to the altar, or food designated for the altar to people—

he is also liable to karet. And Rabbi Elazar came to say

that Rabbi Eliezer holds that

both

an intention to leave it

and both

an intention involving food designated for people being redirected to the altar, or vice versa, are merely

invalid

by rabbinic decree,

and there is no karet for it!

The Gemara rejects the proof:

No,

you cannot prove from here that this is a dispute among the tannaim concerning Rabbi Eliezer’s position, because it is possible to say that

everyone,

both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, holds that according to Rabbi Eliezer

there is no karet

according to Rabbi Eliezer

at all!

And according to Rabbi Yehuda as well, Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is not that this is piggul by Torah law.

Here,

in the beraita—

there is a three-way dispute concerning the matter:

a.

The tanna kamma holds—

in those cases

in which one redirects food from people to the altar or from the altar to people,

the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree,

with the Rabbis deeming it valid. Rabbi Eliezer, however, holds that it is invalid because of a decree, lest people come to deem valid an intention to eat in the proper manner. But an intention

to leave it,

which is not an intention involving eating at all, was not included in the decree, and

according to everyone—

it is valid!