Menachot 17b — the Talmud in English

Because they hold that what the verse called burning in the language of eating comes to teach us another law, and this is how they expound the verse:

This

that the Merciful One expressed

burning

in the language of eating —

it is to tell you:

it makes no difference whether, when one formulates an intention,

concerning something to be burned

he uses the language “eating” for the altar ,

such as when he intended “to feed” the kometz to the altar on the next day ,

or whether, when he formulates an intention, he uses the language “burning” for the altar

on the next day: it is pigul.

Alternatively,

or one may say that according to the Rabbis, what the verse called burning in the language of eating comes to say is:

Just as eating is with an olive-sized portion, so burning is with an olive-sized portion ,

for there is no intention of pigul in burning involving less than an olive-sized portion, just as there is no intention of pigul in eating involving less than an olive-sized portion.

And “eating”

of the verse always means an intention of eating

in its ordinary sense,

namely, to burn the kometz and to eat the remnants. [

That is to say, the two answers of the Gemara disagree: according to the Rabbis, what is the law if one intended concerning burning in the language of eating, such as “to feed the altar on the next day”? Is this pigul or not? According to the first answer in the Gemara — it is pigul. According to the second answer in the Gemara — it is not pigul.]

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who learns from the verse also the law that one formulates an intention from the eating of a person to the altar and so forth, says to you:

If so,

according to the words of the Sages, who do not formulate an intention from the eating of a person to the altar or from the eating of the altar to a person,

let the Merciful One write, “If he eats, he eats.” Alternatively,

let Him write

“If he will eat, he will eat”; what is the meaning of “he eats, he shall eat”?

Why did the verse change its language? Rather, from the fact that Scripture changed its language,

you may infer two things:

two laws are learned from this: A. the law of the Rabbis [either that when one uses the language of eating for the altar it is pigul, according to the first answer in the Gemara; or that burning is only with an olive-sized portion, like eating, according to the second answer in the Gemara]; B. the law of Rabbi Eliezer, that even an intention to burn something destined to be eaten, or to eat something destined to be burned, is an intention of pigul.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: And if Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is indeed this,

that he derives his law from the fact that Scripture changed its wording by saying “he eats, he shall eat” —

he should also be liable for excision

when he formulates an intention from the eating of a person to the eating of the altar, or conversely, just like every pigul, whose law is excision!?

And if you would say that this too is so,

that according to Rabbi Eliezer he is liable for excision, then I will raise this difficulty to you —

but you

Rav Asi

are the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Rabbi Eliezer agrees that one is not punished by excision?!

He said to him:

Rav Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: It is a dispute

among the tannaim according to Rabbi Eliezer

whether one is liable for excision or not:

There is one who says

that according to Rabbi Eliezer it is

invalid

by

Torah law,

because he learns this from “he eats, he shall eat,” and there is excision for it. [And this accords with Rabbi Zeira’s understanding: if it is learned from the verse, it is complete pigul.]

And there is one who says

that according to Rabbi Eliezer it is only

invalid by rabbinic law,

for they invalidated it so that one would not come to validate an intention that follows its ordinary form, from person to person or from altar to altar.

And the proof that the tannaim disagree according to Rabbi Eliezer is:

For it was taught in a beraita: One who slaughters the sacrifice

and intended

to drink from its blood, [

that is, an intention of a person concerning the eating of the altar,]

on the next day,

or who intended

to burn from its flesh [

that is, an intention of the altar concerning the eating of a person,]

on the next day ,

or

to eat from its sacrificial fats [

that is, an intention of a person concerning the eating of the altar,]

on the next day,

the sacrifice is

valid,

for the sacrifice becomes invalid only when one formulates an intention from the eating of a person to the eating of a person, or from the eating of the altar to the eating of the altar.

And Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid,

because he holds that an intention from the eating of a person to the eating of the altar, or from the eating of the altar to the eating of a person, invalidates.

If he intended

to leave of its blood

of the offering

for the next day,

although this intention contains neither the eating of a person nor the eating of the altar,

Rabbi Yehuda declares it invalid! [

And the reason for this will be explained below.]

Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case,

where he intended to leave its blood for the next day,

Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid, and the Sages declare it valid,

because this is not an intention of eating.

And we raised the following question:

Rabbi Yehuda,

who declares invalid one who intends to leave some of its blood for the next day,

in accordance with whose view

does he hold?

If you say, in accordance with the view of the Rabbis,

who say that one does not formulate an intention from the eating of the altar to the eating of a person or from the eating of a person to the eating of the altar, then there is a difficulty:

Now, if there,

where he formulates an intention from the eating of the altar to the eating of a person or conversely, even though

he formulates an intention using the language of eating,

nevertheless

the Rabbis validate

because he is not formulating an intention from the eating of a person to the eating of a person or from the eating of the altar to the eating of the altar,

here,

where he is not formulating any intention at all concerning the eating of a person or the eating of the altar, but concerning leaving the blood,

is it not all the more so

that the Rabbis would not invalidate!?

Rather,

necessarily, Rabbi Judah, who deemed a thought of leaving it valid,

according to Rabbi Eliezer

said his words.

And

concerning this

Rabbi Elazar said: Also in this case,

with regard to a thought of leaving it,

Rabbi Eliezer invalidates and the Rabbis deem valid.

And behold, there is room to wonder: if so,

Rabbi Elazar’s words are

the words of

Rabbi Judah,

and both said the same thing: that Rabbi Eliezer invalidates with regard to a thought of leaving it; and what did Rabbi Elazar add to the words of Rabbi Judah!?

And now we establish:

Rather, is it not

the punishment of

karet

that

is the difference between them,

for Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Elazar disagreed regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s position.

For the first tanna,

that is, Rabbi Judah,

holds

one who thinks

to leave it -

it is merely invalidity

it is, and there is no karet in it; but

with regard to those

things that the beraita mentioned at the beginning, with which Rabbi Eliezer invalidates, whose invalidity is because he thinks of human consumption for the altar or of altar consumption for a person,

one is also liable for karet. And Rabbi Elazar came to say

that Rabbi Eliezer holds that

whether

it is a thought of leaving it,

or

a thought of human consumption for the altar or the reverse, they are only

invalidity

by rabbinic ordinance,

and there is no karet in it!

The Gemara rejects the proof:

No,

you cannot prove from here that this is a dispute between tannaim regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s position, because it is possible to say

that everyone,

both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Elazar, hold that

karet

according to Rabbi Eliezer

does not apply!

And even according to Rabbi Judah, Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is not that this is pigul by Torah law.

And here,

in the beraita -

there is a three-way dispute concerning the matter:

a.

The first tanna holds -

with regard to those

where one thinks from a person to the altar and from the altar to a person,

the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree,

the Rabbis deem valid, while Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is invalid because of a decree, lest they come to deem valid a thought of eating in its ordinary manner; but a thought

to leave it,

which is not a thought of eating at all, they did not decree concerning it, and

according to everyone -

it is valid!