Menachot 18a — the Talmud in English

b.

And Rabbi Judah holds

only

in those

who thought of them not in their usual manner, that is, from the eating of the altar to a person or conversely,

do the Rabbis dispute

Rabbi Eliezer—and deem it valid. But the thought

to leave

which is a thought concerning something whose manner is so,

according to everyone it is invalid

by rabbinic decree.

What is the reason

that it is invalid by rabbinic decree?

A decree

against one who thinks to leave

part of its blood

until the next day,

lest

he think to leave

all of its blood

until the next day;

and

the thought to leave

all of its blood

until the next day—behold, it is

a Torah-level invalidity!

And we find that Rabbi Judah holds that the thought of leaving invalidates.

For it was taught: Rabbi Judah said to them

to the Sages who hold that the thought of leaving does not invalidate on a Torah level, even when he thinks to leave all of its blood:

Do you not agree with me that if he left it until the next day it is

it

invalid,

and since leaving it until the next day makes it invalid, even if

he thought to leave it until the next day as well

it is

invalid!

And Rabbi Judah’s reason is that, since if he were to perform the act in practice the offering would become invalid, thought also invalidates it.

c.

And Rabbi Elazar came to say—

also in this case,

in the thought of leaving, they dispute, for

Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid and the Sages deem it valid!

And we raise a difficulty:

But

if

Rabbi Judah holds

that when he thought

to leave some of its blood until the next day, according to everyone it is invalid?!

And it was taught: Rabbi said: When I went to fulfill my measures,

to ask about my uncertainties,

to Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua; and some say

and there are those who say that Rabbi said as follows: When I went

to fulfill the measures of Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua,

to learn and draw from his wisdom,

I found

the

Babylonian Joseph sitting before him. And he was exceedingly dear to him

Joseph to Rabbi Elazar

in particular.

And they occupied themselves with the laws

until

they reached one

law. He said to him

Joseph to Rabbi Elazar:

My master, one who slaughters the offering

with the intention

to leave some of its blood until the next day, what is the law?

Is this a disqualifying thought, or perhaps only when he thinks to eat or burn until the next day is it a thought that invalidates, but not when he thinks merely to leave it until the next day.

In the

morning, he said to him

Rabbi Elazar:

Valid!

At

noon

he asked him again;

he said to him: Valid!

At

the afternoon prayer

he asked him again;

he said to him: Valid! In the evening

he asked him again, and then

he said to him: Valid, but Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid!

The face of the Babylonian Joseph brightened

from joy.

He said to him

Rabbi Elazar:

Joseph! It seems to me that we did not direct our traditions toward one another,

for when I told you that the offering was valid, it did not appear to you that this was the halakha

until now

when I told you—invalidation!?

He said to him

Joseph:

Yes, my master, yes,

indeed, you directed yourself earlier toward the halakha,

but

my face brightened at the end because

Rabbi Judah—

“Invalid,” he taught me! And I went back over all his students

of Rabbi Judah

and sought a colleague for myself

who would say this in the name of Rabbi Judah

but I did not find one,

and I feared that perhaps I had forgotten and erred regarding Rabbi Judah’s words.

Now, when you taught me a second time—

“Invalid,” you have returned my lost possession to me!

Tears streamed from the eyes of Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua. He said: Fortunate are you, Torah scholars, that words of Torah are exceedingly dear to you! He applied this verse to him: “How I love Your Torah; all day it is my conversation”! [

See “Faith and Security” by the Chazon Ish, chapter 3, section 20]

And Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua further said to him:

Ah

that which Rabbi Judah told you, “Invalid,” was not because this is the halakha, but

because Rabbi Judah was the son of Rabbi Ilaai, and Rabbi Ilaai was the student of Rabbi Eliezer; therefore he taught you

Rabbi Judah

the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer,

since it was dear to him.

And we conclude the question:

And if it enters your mind

that Rabbi Judah who taught the Babylonian Joseph

“according to everyone it is invalid”

regarding the thought “to leave”

taught it to him,

he taught him,

what is the meaning of “You have returned my lost possession to me”

which Joseph said to Rabbi Elazar? For even when he heard Rabbi Judah’s words from Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua, these are not the same words that the Babylonian Joseph heard from Rabbi Judah, since

he,

Rabbi Elazar,

was also stating a dispute [

it is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid].

He said this to him,

whereas the Babylonian Joseph heard from Rabbi Judah that according to everyone it is invalid?

And we answer:

Rather, what

do you wish to prove from here—that according to Rabbi Judah as well the thought of leaving is a dispute, and

“It is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it invalid,” he taught it

Rabbi Judah to the Babylonian Joseph, as Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua said?

If so, what is

this that Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua said to the Babylonian Joseph,

“Ah, because”

and so forth, implying that he had to give a reason why Rabbi Judah taught the words of Rabbi Eliezer, who deems it invalid—for the halakha is not like Rabbi Eliezer; and

we too are likewise teaching a dispute,

for everywhere we teach even the words of the individual sage, even though they oppose the majority? [Based on the explanation of the Rashash.]

And we conclude the answer:

Rather, in truth, “According to everyone it is invalid,” he taught it

Rabbi Judah to the Babylonian Joseph. And what you asked,

“And what is the meaning of ‘You have returned my lost possession to me’”,

which Joseph said—for Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua told him that it is a dispute, and not like Rabbi Judah’s words? This is what he said:

That he returned to him

that there is

at least some invalidity in the world.

Since Rabbi Elazar told him that there is an opinion that holds that “to leave” is invalid, he returned his lost possession to him through this, for from now on he can teach in the name of Rabbi Judah that according to everyone it is invalid.

The order of the meal-offering:

One who vows or voluntarily offers a meal-offering of fine flour brings an issaron of fine flour and a log of oil. First he places a little oil in a vessel, and places the flour upon it. He then pours a little oil over the flour, and mixes everything together. Afterwards, he pours over it the remainder of the oil left from the log, places frankincense upon it, and brings it to the koen. The koen presents it to the altar at the southwestern horn, at the point of the angle. Afterwards, the koen takes a kometz from the meal-offering, gathers up the frankincense, salts them, and burns them upon the altar; and the remainder is eaten by the kohanim.

There are meal-offerings that are baked after their mixing with oil. After their baking, he breaks them into pieces the size of an olive, pours over them the oil remaining from the log, and the koen takes a kometz from the pieces and burns it upon the altar.

Mishna:

If he did not pour the oil over the meal-offering—that is, the final pouring of the remainder of the oil—but rather placed the entire log of oil in the vessel before preparing the meal-offering; and likewise if he

did not mix

the oil with the flour,

and did not break

the meal-offering—in those meal-offerings that require breaking into pieces ;

and did not salt, and did not wave

that meal-offering which requires waving, such as the meal-offering of a woman suspected of adultery and the omer meal-offering; and likewise if he

did not present it

to the altar;

or broke it into “many” pieces,

meaning that the pieces were larger than an olive;

and

likewise if he

did not smear them

those meal-offerings that require smearing [and this is a meal-offering that comes as wafers, whose law is that the wafers be smeared with the log of oil brought with the meal-offering ]—

the meal-offering is valid

even if he did not perform all these acts.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty:

What is meant by “did not pour”

as stated in the Mishna?

If you say that he did not pour at all,

why is the meal-offering valid? For

prevention is written concerning it,

since the Torah wrote the law of pouring twice, and we have the principle: “Any matter that Scripture repeated and stated again concerning a meal-offering is only to prevent validity.” If so, with regard to pouring, the law should be that if he did not perform it, the meal-offering is invalid?

Rather,

this is the interpretation of the Mishna:

the koen did not pour, but a non-koen did—

it is valid ,

for pouring is one of the Temple services that are valid when performed by a non-koen

And we object:

If so, “did not mix”

which is written in the Mishna

also

should be interpreted in this way, that

the koen did not mix, but a non-koen did,

and we would infer from this that specifically when a non-koen mixed it is valid,

but if he did not mix at all, it is invalid,