Menachot 17a (יז.) — the Talmud in English

The sharp-witted scholars of Pumbedita said:

One act of burning renders another act of burning piggul.

That is, if he burned the kometz with the intention of burning the frankincense on the following day, it is piggul.

And even according to the Rabbis, who say that one cannot render an offering piggul through a half of the matir, this applies only where he had the intention concerning the remainder,

that at the time of burning the kometz he intended to eat the remainder on the following day,

while the frankincense remains in its own status,

as he did not have a piggul intention at the time of its sacrificial service, nor did he intend to burn it on the following day.

But here,

although he did not have the intention at the time of burning the frankincense, nevertheless, since

he had the intention concerning the frankincense,

that at the time of burning the kometz he intended to burn the frankincense on the following day,

, it is as

as

though he had the intention concerning the entire

matir.

Rava said: We too have learned this in the Mishna

as follows.

As we learned:

This is the general principle: With regard to anyone who takes the kometz and places it in a vessel, or carries it, or burns it, if he intends to eat something whose usual manner is to be eaten, or to burn something whose usual manner is to be burned,

if at the time of the sacrificial service he intended to eat it or burn it

outside its designated place,

it is

invalid, and there is no liability for karet.

But if at the time of the sacrificial service he intended to eat it or burn it

outside its designated time,

it is

piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.

Is it not

that the intention that renders the offering piggul at the time of

burning

the kometz is

analogous to these,

the taking of the kometz and placing it in a vessel?

Just as with these, both

when he intended at the time of their sacrificial service

to eat

the remainder outside its designated time, and

both

when he intended

to burn

the frankincense outside its designated time, he renders it piggul,

so too with burning, both

when he intended at the time of burning the kometz

to eat

the remainder outside its designated time, and

both to burn

the frankincense outside its designated time, he renders it piggul.

And we reject this:

No. With regard to these,

specifically

both

if he intended

to eat or to burn.

But with regard to

burning,

only if he had the intention

to eat

the remainder outside its designated time

does

the meal offering become piggul; but if at the time of burning the kometz he intended

to burn

the frankincense outside its designated time,

, it does not

become piggul.

Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and sat and recited in the name of Rav Hisda: One act of burning

of the kometz

does not render another act of burning piggul

of the frankincense.

And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that one can render an offering piggul through a half of the matir, this applies only where he had the intention concerning the remainder, since the kometz is their matir,

as the burning of the kometz permits the remainder,

but here, since the kometz is not the matir of the frankincense,

as one may burn the frankincense before burning the kometz,

he cannot render it piggul.

Abaye said to him: Answer me, my master

[Answer me, my master]! Did he state this

in the name of Rav

that Rav Hisda said it?

He said to him: Yes.

It was also stated

that this statement was transmitted in Rav’s name:

Rav Hisda said in the name of Rav: One act of burning does not render another act of burning piggul.

Rav Yaakov bar Abba said in the name of Abaye: We too have learned this in the Mishna:

If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intention of eating from it on the following day, it is piggul, while its fellow is valid.

If he slaughtered it with the intention

of eating from its fellow on the following day—

both are valid.

What is the reason

that both are valid?

Is it not because, since

this lamb

is not its matir,

of the second lamb,

it cannot render it piggul?

And we reject this:

No, there it

does not become piggul because

the two were not established in a single vessel

[a single vessel]—these two lambs.

But here, since they were established in a single vessel,

as the kometz and the frankincense are in a single vessel,

they are considered as one,

and therefore here it is possible to say that one act of burning renders another act of burning piggul.

Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Hanina impressed this matter upon me

[he impressed it upon me, made me understand and taught it to me—Rashi]

and I value it

[and it is weighty for me—important to me]

as my entire Talmud: If he burned the kometz with the intention of burning the frankincense and of eating the remainder on the following day,

that is, at the time of burning the kometz he intended both to burn the frankincense on the following day and to eat the remainder on the following day,

it is piggul

for him.

And we raise a difficulty:

What does this teach us

from Rabbi Hanina in this matter?

If

the intention that

one act of burning renders another act of burning piggul, let him say, “He burned the kometz with the intention of burning the frankincense,”

and why did he add “and of eating the remainder,” since even without this it is piggul?

And

if

this comes to teach us that

one can render an offering piggul through a half of the matir, let him say, “He burned the kometz with the intention of eating the remainder on the following day,”

as this is indeed a half of the matir, since he had the intention only with regard to the burning of the kometz!

And

if he teaches us both,

that one act of burning renders another act of burning piggul and that one can render an offering piggul through a half of the matir—and he expresses it as either-or: “He burned the kometz with the intention of burning the frankincense on the following day,” which teaches that one act of burning renders another act of burning piggul, or “of eating the remainder on the following day,” which teaches the law of a half of the matir—

let him say, “He burned the kometz with the intention of burning the frankincense and eating the remainder on the following day,”

as this wording implies either-or.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, he holds that one act of burning does not render another act of burning piggul, and that one cannot render an offering piggul through a half of the matir,

and in truth, through either of these intentions—burning the frankincense or eating the remainder on the following day—the meal offering would not become piggul.

But here it is different, since

once he had both intentions,

the intention spread

throughout the entire meal offering.

A tanna recited before Rav Yitzhak bar Abba: If he burned the kometz with the intention of eating the remainder,

and at the time of burning the frankincense he had no intention—

according to everyone, it is piggul.

And we raise a difficulty:

But they fundamentally disagree about this!?

For according to the Rabbis, one cannot render an offering piggul through a half of the matir.

And we explain:

Rather, say: According to everyone, it is invalid,

as the Rabbis also agree in this case.

And we challenge this:

Let him say, “It is piggul,” and it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir,

and there would have been no need to alter the tanna’s wording and say “invalid” instead of “piggul.” And we answer:

The tanna

[who recited this before Rav Yitzhak bar Abba] had been taught

“according to everyone”

[he had been taught this wording], and therefore

“piggul” in place of “invalid”

is something that

could have been confused

and he could have recited piggul instead of invalid; but the wording

“it is

this” in place of “according to everyone” could not have been confused,

and if he had been taught “it is this,” he would not have erred and said “according to everyone.”

We shall return to you, chapter: One Who Takes the Kometz from the Meal Offering

Mishna:

1.

One who takes the kometz of the meal-offering

with the intention

of eating

from it outside its designated time or outside its designated place

something that is not normally eaten,

for example, if he intended to eat the kometz or the frankincense, whose דין is to be burned on the altar and not eaten, the meal-offering is valid.

1

And

if he took the kometz of the meal-offering with the intention

of burning

from it outside its designated time or outside its designated place

something that is not normally burned,

such as if he intended to burn the remainder of the meal-offering, which is eaten by the priests, then the meal-offering is -

valid!

Rabbi Eliezer -

declares it invalid!

2. One who takes the kometz of the meal-offering with the intention

of eating

outside its designated time or outside its designated place

something that is normally eaten,

1

or

if he intended

to burn

outside its designated time or outside its designated place

something that is normally burned,

but his piggul intention concerned

less than an olive-bulk,

the offering is

valid,

for a piggul intention invalidates only when the intention concerns an olive-bulk. 3. And if he had a piggul intention

to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk,

the offering is

valid -

for

piggul intentions concerning

eating

do not combine

to constitute an olive-bulk !

Gemara:

Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer

who invalidates an offering through a piggul intention even when the intention concerned something that is not normally eaten or burned? It is because

the verse says

in the passage concerning piggul: "

And if he shall eat, eat of the flesh of his peace-offering

and from the repetition of the words "eat, eat," they derive that

the verse is speaking of two acts of eating: One is the eating of a person,

that is, piggul with regard to something that is normally eaten,

and one is the eating of the altar,

that is, piggul with regard to something that is normally burned."

The verse juxtaposed them

to tell you: Just as one formulates an intention

of piggul

with regard to the eating of a person, so does one formulate an intention

also an intention of piggul

with regard to the eating of the altar.

And

we learn from this juxtaposition that

just as one formulates an intention concerning the eating of a person with regard to the eating of a person,

that is, the remainder of the meal-offering, which is eaten: If he intended to eat it outside its designated time, it is piggul.

And

just as one formulates an intention

concerning the eating of the altar with regard to the eating of the altar,

that is, the kometz, which is burned upon the altar: If he intended to burn it on the following day, it is piggul,

so does one formulate an intention concerning the eating of a person with regard to the altar,

that is, if he intended to burn the remainder of the meal-offering, which is eaten, on the following day, this is a piggul intention and the offering is invalid,

and

so too one formulates an intention

concerning the eating of the altar with regard to a person,

that is, if he intended to eat the kometz, which is destined to be burned, on the following day, this is a piggul intention and the offering is invalid!

What is the reason

How did Rabbi Eliezer learn that the verse also teaches this law, that an intention concerning the eating of a person applies to the altar, and an intention concerning the eating of the altar applies to a person?

Because the Merciful One expressed it

because the Torah referred to burning

in the language of eating,

and just as we expounded that the verse speaks of two "eatings," one "eating" by a person and one "eating" by the altar, we learn from this that eating and burning are equivalent in this respect: An intention of burning invalidates something destined to be eaten, and an intention of eating invalidates something whose דין is to be burned.

And the Rabbis

why do they not expound the verse as Rabbi Eliezer does?