Menachot 17a — the Talmud in English

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the sharp ones of Pumbedita: one burning renders another burning piggul.

That is to say, if he burned the kometz with the intention of burning the frankincense tomorrow, this is piggul.

And even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render piggul with half of the permitter,

that at the time of burning the kometz he had the intention concerning the remnants to eat them tomorrow,

these words apply when the frankincense remains as an independent matter,

for at the time of its service he did not have a thought of piggul, nor did he have the intention concerning it to burn it tomorrow.

But here,

although he did not have the intention at the time of burning the frankincense, nevertheless, since

he had the intention concerning it, the frankincense,

that at the time of burning the kometz he had the intention concerning the frankincense to burn it tomorrow,

, just as

as

he had the intention concerning it in its entirety

it is considered a permitter.

Rava said: We too have also learned

so.

For we learned:

This is the general rule: anyone who takes the handful and places it in a vessel, and one who conveys it and one who burns it, to eat something whose manner is to be eaten, and to burn something whose manner is to be burned,

if he had the intention at the time of the service to eat it or to burn it

outside its place,

it is

invalid, and there is no excision for it.

And if he had the intention at the time of the service to eat it or to burn it

outside its time,

it is

piggul, and one is liable to excision for it.

Is it not

that the thought that renders piggul at the time of

burning

the kometz is

similar to these,

the taking of the handful and placing it in a vessel—

just as these, whether

he had the intention at the time of their service

to eat

the remnants outside their time, and

whether

he had the intention

to burn

the frankincense outside its time, he rendered it piggul,

so too burning, whether

he had the intention at the time of burning the kometz

to eat

the remnants outside their time, and

whether to burn

the frankincense outside its time, he rendered it piggul.

And we reject this:

No. These

specifically

whether

he had the intention

to eat or to burn.

But

burning,

only if he had the intention concerning it

to eat

the remnants outside their time,

yes,

then the meal-offering becomes piggul; but if at the time of burning the kometz he had the intention

to burn

the frankincense outside its time,

, no,

the meal-offering does not become piggul.

Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and he sat and said in the name of Rav Chisda: Burning

of the kometz

does not render piggul another burning

of the frankincense.

And even according to Rabbi Meir, who says that one renders piggul with half of the permitter, these words apply when he had the intention concerning them, the remnants, for the kometz is their permitter,

since the burning of the kometz permits the remnants,

but here, since the kometz is not the permitter of the frankincense,

for he can burn the frankincense before he has burned the kometz,

he is not able to render it piggul.

Abaye said to him: Answer me, my master

[answer me, my master]! Did he say this

in the name of Rav

Rav Chisda?

He said to him: Yes.

It was also stated

that the statement was said in the name of Rav:

Rav Chisda said in the name of Rav: Burning does not render piggul another burning.

Rav Yaakov bar Abba said in the name of Abaye: We too have also learned:

If he slaughtered one of the lambs with the intention of eating from it tomorrow, it is piggul and its fellow is valid.

If he slaughtered with the intention

of eating from its fellow tomorrow—

both are valid.

What is the reason

both are valid?

Is it not because, since

this lamb

is not its permitter

of the second lamb,

he is not able to render it piggul?

And we reject this:

No, there

it did not become piggul because

they were not fixed in one vessel

[one vessel], these two lambs.

But here, since they were fixed in one vessel,

for the kometz and the frankincense are in one vessel,

they are considered as one,

and therefore here it is applicable to say that one burning renders another burning piggul.

Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Hanina made me swallow this matter

[made me swallow it, made me taste it and taught it to me, Rashi]

and it was weighed for me

[and it was weighty for me—that is, important to me]

like my entire Talmud: If he burned the kometz to burn the frankincense, to eat the remnants tomorrow,

that is, at the time of burning the kometz he had both the intention to burn the frankincense tomorrow and the intention to eat the remnants tomorrow,

piggul

it is.

And we raise a difficulty:

What does he teach us

Rabbi Hanina by this?

If

the intention is

that burning renders another burning piggul, let him say: “He burned the kometz to burn the frankincense,”

and why did he add “to eat the remnants”? For even without this it is piggul?

And

if

this comes to teach us that

one renders piggul with half of the permitter, let him say: “He burned the kometz to eat the remnants tomorrow,”

for this is indeed half of the permitter, since he had the intention only concerning the burning of the kometz!

And

if he teaches us both matters,

that burning renders another burning piggul and that one renders piggul with half of the permitter—and he says either-or: “He burned the kometz to burn the frankincense tomorrow,” which teaches that burning renders another burning piggul, or “to eat the remnants tomorrow,” which teaches the matter of half of the permitter—

let him say: “He burned the kometz to burn the frankincense and to eat the remnants tomorrow,”

for this wording implies either-or?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: In truth, he holds that burning does not render another burning piggul, and one does not render piggul with half of the permitter,

and indeed in each of these thoughts—to burn the frankincense or to eat the remnants tomorrow—the offering does not become piggul,

but here it is different, since

once he thought both thoughts,

the thought spread

through the entire meal-offering.

A tanna taught before Rav Yitzchak bar Abba: If he burned the kometz to eat the remnants,

and at the time of burning the frankincense he did not have an intention—

according to everyone it is piggul.

And we raise a difficulty:

But they disagree about this!?

For according to the Rabbis, one does not render piggul with half of the permitter.

And we explain:

Rather, say: According to everyone it is invalid,

for the Rabbis also agree in this matter.

And we ask:

And let him say, “This is piggul,” and it is Rabbi Meir,

and we would not have needed to alter the tanna’s words and say “invalid” in place of “piggul”? And we answer:

The tanna

[who taught this to Rav Yitzchak bar Abba]

taught him “according to everyone”

[he taught it to him]; therefore,

“piggul” in place of “invalid”

it is possible to say that

he confused it

and taught piggul in place of invalid; but the wording

“this

is” in place of “according to everyone” he would not confuse,

and if he had taught him “this is,” he would not have erred and said “according to everyone.”

We shall return to you, chapter “One who takes the handful of the meal-offering.”

Mishna:

1.

One who took the kometz of the meal-offering

with the intention

of eating

from it outside its time or outside its place

something that is not ordinarily eaten,

such as when he intended to eat the kometz or the levona, whose law is that they are burned on the altar and not eaten,

1

and

who took the kometz of the meal-offering with the intention

of burning

from it outside its time or outside its place

something that is not ordinarily burned,

such as when he intended to burn the remnants of the meal-offering, which are eaten by the kohanim, behold, the meal-offering is —

valid!

Rabbi Eliezer —

declares it invalid!

2. One who took the kometz of the meal-offering with the intention

of eating

outside its time or outside its place

something that is ordinarily eaten,

1

or

who intended

to burn

outside its time or outside its place

something that is ordinarily burned,

but his intention of pigul was regarding

less than an olive-sized portion,

the offering is

valid,

for an intention of pigul invalidates only when the intention is regarding an olive-sized portion! 3. And if he intended with an intention of pigul

to eat half an olive-sized portion and to burn half an olive-sized portion,

the offering is

valid —

for

intentions of pigul concerning

eating

and burning do not combine

to the measure of an olive-sized portion !

Gemara:

Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer

who invalidates through an intention of pigul even when he intended concerning something that is not ordinarily eaten or burned? It is because

the verse says

in the section concerning pigul: “

And if he eats, he shall eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering”

and from the doubling of the words “he eats, he shall eat,” they expound that

the verse speaks of two eatings: one, the eating of a person,

that is, pigul concerning something that is ordinarily eaten,

and one, the eating of the altar,

that is, pigul concerning something that is ordinarily burned.

And Scripture compared them

to tell you: just as one formulates an intention

of pigul

regarding the eating of a person, so one formulates an intention

also of pigul

regarding the eating of the altar.

And

from the comparison we learn

just as one formulates an intention from the eating of a person to the eating of a person,

that is, the remnants of the meal-offering, which are eaten: if he intended to eat them outside their time, this is pigul.

And

just as one formulates an intention

from the eating of the altar to the eating of the altar,

that is, the kometz, which is burned upon the altar: if he intended to burn it on the next day, this is pigul,

so one formulates an intention from the eating of a person to the altar,

for if he intended concerning the remnants of the meal-offering, which are eaten, to burn them on the next day, this is an intention of pigul — and it is invalid.

And

so one formulates an intention

from the eating of the altar to a person,

for if he intended concerning the kometz, which is destined to be burned, to eat it on the next day, this is an intention of pigul — and it is invalid!

What is the reason

from where did Rabbi Eliezer learn that the verse also teaches this law: that one formulates an intention from the eating of a person to the altar, and from the eating of the altar to a person?

Because the Merciful One expressed it

by calling burning

in the language of eating,

and just as we expounded that the verse speaks of two “eatings,” one “eating” by a person and one “eating” by the altar, we learn from this that eating and burning are equal in this respect: an intention of burning invalidates something that is destined to be eaten, and an intention of eating invalidates something whose law is that it be burned.

And the Rabbis

why do they not expound the verse as Rabbi Eliezer does?